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This thesis offers a doctrinal assessment of Annihilationism ( also known as 
Conditionalism), which is that view of hell which holds that there is a hell, but that it has an 
end in the extinction of the damned. In my first chapter I make a survey of the importance, 
history and terminology of the debate. Until recently most Evangelicals held that the 
damned were tormented in hell without end. I have termed this position Traditionalism, 
since it is the mainstream position of the Western theological tradition. However, over the 
last 25 years Annihilationism has been advanced by a number of evangelical theologians. 
In my second and third chapters I examine the two principal doctrinal objections 
Annihilationism raises about the traditional doctrine of hell as unending torment: the issue 
of justice (how can an unending punishment be just? And the related issue of how can 
God be loving if he inflicts unending torment?), and the issue of dualism (how can the 
unending existence of the evil in hell be reconciled with future perfection? And the 
related issue of how can the existence of hell not spoil heaven?). I begin with an 
exposition of each objection in the recent literature of the last 25 years, but I also draw on 
the debate from the previous period when it was widely debated, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. I argue that annihilationists' doctrinal arguments are not conclusive, 
and at certain points are to be rejected. However, I also argue that annihilationists may be 
correct to argue that the punishment posited by a traditionalist hell is excessively severe. I 
present the notion of the fixity of the damned as a possible mitigation. I also argue that 
annihilationists are correct to argue that Traditionalism is excessively dualistic. I present a 
modified Traditionalism to respond to this point, which I call Reconciliationism, in which 
the damned cease to sin, are lucid, and are reconciled to God, while remaining in hell. My 
~ exposition of Reconciliationism draws particularly on the work of Henri Blocher, with 
additional exposition of the position's advocates, such as T.R. Birks and James Langton 
Clarke, from the latter half of the nineteenth which was the only period in history when 
this position was widely discussed. A fourth chapter explores the relationship between the 
experience of Christ on the cross and the damned in hell. As well as expounding the 
arguments in the debate about hell, I also examine the link between the cross and hell in 
Luther, Calvin, Owen, Edwards and Packer. I argue that, on the basis of this link 
established by the doctrine of penal substitution, annihilationists are forced to draw 
unorthodox conclusions about the incarnation and the resurrection. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Debate About Annihilationism 
This thesis aims to offer a doctrinal assessment of the annihilationist doctrine of hell. In 
brief, Annihilationism, as I intend to define it in this thesis, is that view of hell which 
holds that there is a hell, but that it has an end in the extinction of the damned. This 
definition thus excludes a large number of theologians who hold that the extinction of the 
damned occurs at the death of the body. It stands in distinction both to Universalism and 
also to Traditionalism which I intend to define as any view of hell which that holds that 
the existence of the damned is unending. Annihilationism is thus not an alternative to hell, 
but a particular belief about hell. For the present I would note that in the recent debate 
Annihilationism is usually synonymous with the doctrine of Conditional Immortality, or 
Conditionalism as it is sometimes known. A typical definition is given by John Wenham: 
"Conditionalists... look for the resurrection of all men, followed by the just sentence 
according to the deserts of each, which will mean anguish (but not unending torment) for 
those outside Christ, finally terminating in the second death." 1 I will examine he 
definition and usage of these terms more fully below. 
In outline, I will assess the doctrinal arguments used for and against Annihilationism as 
well as the underlying logic of the position. I will focus on the debate about 
Annihilationism in recent evangelical writing in English from the last twenty-five years, 
since this is the provenance of most of the recent debate, although I will occasionally range 
more widely where this serves to clarify or extend the assessment. I will aim to 
demonstrate that the doctrine of Annihilationism entails the denial of other doctrines 
usually held as orthodox by evangelicals and thus conclude that Annihilationism is not a 
valid option for someone wishing to work within an evangelical framework. However, I 
will also argue that some of the annihilationist criticisms of Traditionalism are valid. 
Therefore I will seek to formulate some modifications of Traditionalism which better 
respond to these criticisms. While the demonstration of a modified doctrine of hell which 
better answers annihilationist criticisms is not formally necessary to reject 
Annihilationism, I will argue it greatly strengthens the case. This modified Traditionalism 
I will term Reconciliationism and I will draw particularly on the work of the French 
1 J.W. Wenham, The Goodness o/God(Leicester: IVP, 1974), pp. 34-35. 
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theologian Henri Blocher and the nineteenth century English theologian T.R. Birks. Before 
proceeding further I will attempt a brief justification for study of the topic and my terms of 
reference. 
1.1 A Justification of the Terms of Reference 
1.1.1 Why Study Hell? 
In the current theological world I may need to offer some justification for studying hell. In 
the 'Introduction' to his book, The Problem of Hell, Jonathan Kvanvig reviews the history 
of the study of hell: "The lesson here is clear: The theological trend of the last few 
centuries strays dramatically from a central feature of historical Christianity. "2 As evidence 
he notes, 
Even the popular press has taken notice of the phenomenon: "Meantime," observes 
church historian Martin Marty, "Hell disappeared. And no one noticed." ... When 
he prepared a Harvard lecture on the disappearance of hell, Marty consulted he 
indices of several scholarly journals, including one dating back to 1889, and failed 
to find a single entry.3 
However, the situation has changed markedly and David Moore notes, writing in 1995, 
"The recent debate on hell, however, has caused an astronomical upswing of magazine 
and journal articles on the topic in the last five years, which has truly been amazing. "4 
K vanvig also comments on the importance of study of the doctrine: 
the problem of hell cannot be ignored. Contrary to the claim of an earlier quote, 
that "hell is theology's H-word, a subject too trite for serious scholarship," there is 
good reason, even overwhelming reason, for a careful and scholarly consideration 
of the doctrine ofhell, ... 5 
There are many reasons for such a consideration of hell, but I will briefly comment on just 
one: the issue of theodicy. Kvanvig rightly states that" ... the problem of hell [is] the worst 
2 J.L. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: OUP, 1993), p. 13. 
3 Ibid, p.13, quoting Kenneth L. Woodward, "Heaven," Newsweek, March 29, 1989, p. 54, quoting from 
Martin E. Marty, "Hell Disappeared. No One Noticed. A Civic Argument," Harvard Theological Review 
78 (July-October 1985), p. 393. The Journal referred to is Church History, the official publication of the 
American Society of Church History. 
4 David George Moore, The Battle For Hell: A Survey and Evaluation of Evangelicals' Growing Attraction 
to the Doctrine of Annihilationism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), p. 16, n. 80. 
5 K vanvig, op. cit., p. 22, quoting Woodward, op. cit .. 
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instance of the problem of evil... "6 Indeed "The problem of hell differs from the general 
problem of evil. .. the problem of hell arises precisely because the point of hell brings about 
evil that seems in no way capable of being redressed by further good, at any rate, not 
future good. "7 This problem has long been an objection to the traditional doctrine. John 
Hick's fifth of five objections to the doctrine of eternal torment follows from the 
accusation that "hell, understood as Augustine ... understood it, must be accounted a major 
part of the problem of evil," or even "the largest part" of it. 8 From an evangelical 
perspective, Clark Pinnock says that, "the idea of everlasting torment ( especially if it is 
linked to soteriological predestination) raises the problem of evil to impossible 
dimensions. If Christians want to hold that God created some people to be tortured in hell 
forever, then the apologetic task in relation to theodicy is just hopeless. "9 Larry Dixon 
concludes: "One of the driving forces behind the evangelical exodus from the traditional 
doctrine of hell is that of setting forth a biblical and reasonable theodicy to the world." 
10
Jerry Walls argues that the doctrine of hell poses a crucial dilemma for the church at the 
end of the twentieth century. 
On the one hand, the person who believes in Christ and accepts the authority of his 
teaching seems inextricably committed to believing the doctrine of eternal hell . . .  
But on the other hand, if one accepts the doctrine, he seems to be committed to a 
morally offensive notion. 
I believe Christians must squarely face this dilemma. If the doctrine is indeed 
morally bankrupt, it should frankly and forthrightly be discarded. But if it is not, it 
should be reclaimed and faithfully taught. Either way, it involves claims of such 
immense importance that it cannot be ignored. 
11
My aim in studying this debate is to seek to offer a doctrinal assessment of 
Annihilationism as a contribution to the end that the doctrine of hell can be "reclaimed and 
faithfully taught." 
6 Ibid., p. 4. There is a discussion of recent writing on this issue in the philosophy of religion in. van 
Holton, Wilko, 'Eschatology with a Vengeance: Hell as the Greatest Conceivable Evil', in Fergusson, David 
& Sarot, Marcel, The Future as God's Gift: Explorations in Christian Eschatology (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 2000). 
1 Ibid, p. 9. 
8 J. Hick, Death and Eternal Life (2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 200.
9 Clark H. Pinnock, "The Destruction of the Finally Impenitent," Criswell Theological Review, 4.2 (1990):
pp. 253-54. 
10 L. Dixon, The Other Side of the Good News: Confronting the Contemporary Challenges to Jesus'
Teaching on Hell (Wheaton, Ill.: Bridgepoint, 1992), p. 70. 
11 Jerry Walls, The Logic of Damnation: A Defence of the Traditional Doctrine of Hell (London: 
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1989), p. 157. 
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1.1.2 Why Evangelical? 
I would note three reasons why I am focusing on the evangelical debate in this thesis. First, 
the current debate about Annihilationism, as I have defined it, is largely an evangelical 
one. Second, evangelicalism is a large, significant and growing form of Christianity. Third, 
evangelicalism is perhaps the chief heir of the traditionalist doctrine of hell. Under this 
head I will also respond to the view that evangelical theology is not usually at a high 
enough level of sophistication to warrant doctoral study. Having offered a brief definition 
of evangelicalism, I will expand each of these points in turn. 
Under the heading 'A working definition of evangelicalism', Alister McGrath writes: 
The debate over the nature of evangelical identity is likely to remain a subject of 
debate and discussion as evangelicalism continues to develop and expand. In 
part this reflects the complex historical origins of the movement, ... 
Nevertheless, most evangelicals and well-informed observers of the movement 
would suggest that evangelicalism is essentially colligatory, in that it finds its 
identity in relation to a series of central interacting themes and concerns, 
including the following: 
1. A focus, both devotionally and theologically, on the person of Jesus 
Christ, especially his death on the cross; 
2. The identification of Scripture as the ultimate authority in matters of 
spirituality, doctrine and ethics; 
3. An emphasis upon conversion or a 'new birth' as a life-changing 
religious experience; 
4. A concern for sharing the faith, especially through evangelism. 12 
My first reason for focusing on evangelicalism is that almost all annihilationists in the 
recent debate are evangelicals, as are the majority of traditionalists who have interacted 
with Annihilationism. The ACUTE study notes that, "Derek Tidball's influential study of 
12 McGrath, Alister E., A Passion for Truth: The Intellectual Coherence of Evangelicalism (Leicester: 
Apollos, 1996), p. 22. McGrath's list is very similar to that of David Bebbington, who on the basis of 
detailed historical research lists conversionism (a call to people to be converted), activism (an active faith 
affecting all oflife), biblicism (A commitment to the authority and inspiration of the Bible), and 
crucicentrism (holding the cross at the centre of all life and theology). [Bebbington, David, W., 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1989), pp. 2-17]. 
In the recent study on hell by the Evangelical Alliance in the United Kingdom the authors note that there 
is an abundance of studies seeking to define evangelicalism [ACUTE, The Nature of Hell (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 2000), p.123, n.5]. Besides the book by McGrath already mentioned, they mention: Tidball, 
Derek, Who are the Evangelicals? (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994); McGrath, Alister E., 
Evangelicalism and the Future of Christianity (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993); Noll, Mark A., The 
Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Leicester: IVP, 1994); Wells, David F., No Place for Truth, or 
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past and present evangelicalism in fact defines this debate as a distinctively evangelical 
one, which many in the wider church and world would regard as an internal 'family' 
dispute." 13 Further, in evangelicalism, Annihilationism has rapidly become the major 
alternative understanding of hell to Traditionalism. 14 Kendall Harmon opens his article on 
Annihilationism with these words: "The seeds of the evangelical confusion about the final 
state of those who reject Christ have been widely sown in our generation." 15 In 
summarising the present situation in evangelicalism, James Packer quotes the Anglican 
theologian Peter Toon: 
In 1986 Peter Toon wrote, with reference mainly to Britain and North America: "In 
conservative circles there is a seeming reluctance to espouse publicly a doctrine of 
hell, and where it is held there is a seeming tendency towards a doctrine of hell as 
annihilation." He went on to refer to "conditional immortality, which appears to be 
gaining acceptance in evangelical orthodox circles." 16 His words, I guess, are truer 
in 1990 than when they first appeared. 17 
Packer's judgement is confirmed by the opening words of Donald Macleod's article in 
Evangelicals Now dated June 1991: "The new orthodoxy is Annihilationism." 18 However, 
while the recent debate is predominantly an evangelical one, I will not limit myself to 
evangelical writers in this thesis, but will also draw on writers from other traditions if their 
arguments are relevant to the debate. In particular there were a number of theologians from 
around the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries who argued for Annihilationism, 
but not all of whom would be described as 'evangelical' today. 
Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology? (Leicester: IVP, 1993); Thompson, Mark, Saving the 
heart: What is an Evangelical? (London: St. Matthias Press, 1995). 
13 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 122, quoting Tidball, op. cit., pp. 152-3. 
14 "The impact of this debate may be reflected in a recent theological survey of 848 Evangelical Alliance 
member churches, which showed conditionalism to be a minority view, but a not insignificant one." 
[Footnote: In the survey, conducted in summer and autumn 1998, 79.6% ofresponses (675 churches) 
affirmed the statement, 'Those who die without faith in Jesus face eternal punishment in hell', while 14.2% 
(121 churches) affirmed the statement, 'Those who die without faith in Jesus will be annihilated'.] 
[ACUTE, op. cit., p. 6.] 
15 K.S. Harmon, "The Case Against Conditionalism," in Universalism and the Doctrine of God, ed. by 
Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 193. [I would like to express my thanks to 
Rev. Harmon for giving me a pre-publication copy of his paper, which greatly helped me in my studies. I 
would also like to express my warm thanks to Rev. Harmon for his advice and encouragement and to 
acknowledge my debt to him for many insights into this complex debate.] 
16 Peter Toon, Heaven and Hell: A Biblical and Theological Overview (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1986.) 
pp. 174,176. In a footnote Toon writes: "This assertion is difficult to prove, but it is based on the writer's 
conversations over a number of years with evangelical theologians." [Ibid., p. 181]. 
17 J.I. Packer, The Problem of Eternal Punishment (Cheshire: Orthos, n.d.), p.12. 
18 D. Macleod, "Must we all become Annihilationists?" in Evangelicals Now (June 1991), p.13. He is 
clearly referring to a new orthodoxy amongst evangelicals. 
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It might seem that John Hick assumes a broader theological support for Annihilationism 
when he states that some form of it is also the major alternative to Universalism: " ... 
contemporary theologians who do not accept the doctrine of universal salvation usually 
speak of the finally lost as passing out of existence rather than as endlessly enduring the 
torments of hell-fire." 19 However, Hick's definition of Annihilationism includes the 
position I am excluding, that the damned pass out of existence at death, and thus his 
conclusion has limited relevance to this discussion. 
A second reason for focusing on evangelicalism is its importance in the world-wide 
church. Evangelicalism, as I have defined it, is a very numerous and widespread 
phenomenon indeed, including most of Pentecostalism, Fundamentalism, and many in 
'mainline' denominations (for example, perhaps a third of the Church of England could be 
labelled 'evangelical'). Thus it is a very extensive movement indeed, and any theological 
doctrine that influences evangelicalism is necessarily an influential doctrine. The 
importance of evangelicalism is highlighted by Alister McGrath: "It is widely agreed that 
evangelicalism is one of the most significant forms of Christianity in the modem world, 
having particular influence in North America."2° Kendall Harmon draws the following 
conclusion: "When mainstream evangelical theologians ... disagree on an important 
doctrine like hell, clearly a re-examination is in order. "21 
Third, evangelicalism stands in the mainstream W estem theological tradition in its 
doctrine of hell.22 It is this Traditionalism which is now being challenged. Therefore to 
study and engage in this debate amongst evangelicals is actually to engage in debate with 
this mainstream tradition. This long tradition of which Traditionalism is heir gives the 
recent debate a well developed doctrinal context. However, while there are some books 
and articles by academic theologians aimed at an academic audience, much of the writing 
19 Hick, Death, p. 201. 
20 A.E. McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 
129. Again, "It is now clear that evangelicalism is the largest and most actively committed form of 
Christianity in the West." McGrath, Passion, p. 9 
21 Harmon, Case, p. 195. 
22 Harmon highlights one reason for referring to the 'Western' tradition when he observes, "Hell has been 
a much greater problem in Western than Eastern thought in part because Western soteriology has had a 
strongly juridical character, whereas in Eastern thought this has been less so." [K.S. Harmon, Finally 
Excluded From God? Some Twentieth Century Theological Explorations of the Problem of Hell and 
Universalism with Reference to the Historical Development of These Doctrines. DPhil diss. (Oxford 
University, 1993), p. 22. 
13 
by evangelicals on the doctrine of hell has been either by academics but aimed at a non-
academic audience, or has been written by popular, rather than academic, authors. This is 
an indication of the popular concern and interest there is in this question in the evangelical 
constituency, and thus its importance to the church. However, whatever the lack of 
academic rigour in much that has been written in this debate, my concern in this thesis is 
with the actual doctrine of Annihilationism, and thus I hope that whatever the level of the 
writing being engaged with, my own arguments can still be rigorous. 
1.1.3 Why Annihilationism? 
I would also note three reasons for the study of Annihilationism. First, there is the 
widespread recognition amongst evangelicals of a need for further study of 
Annihilationism. Second, there is the widespread recognition that there are important 
theological, pastoral and evangelistic implications following from the doctrine of hell one 
holds. Third, if, as I will argue, Annihilationism arises out of a dissatisfaction of 
Traditionalism, then a study of Annihilationism may serve to highlight weaknesses in 
Traditionalism to which it is reacting. I will argue that it does just this, and thus it serves to 
point out areas where a reformulation of Traditionalism is necessary. I will now briefly 
expand on these three reasons. 
First, as well as a recognition of the growing influence of Annihilationism, noted above, 
there is also a widespread recognition amongst evangelicals that there is a need for further 
study of the doctrine of hell, including a more rigorous study of the annihilationist 
arguments and the traditionalist position it rejects. Eryl Davies' assessment from 1991 was 
"that very little has been written in the last three or four decades clarifying and upholding 
the orthodox doctrine [ of hell] and at the same time interacting with the flood of 
conditionalist/annihilationist writings in recent years. "23 John Wenham concluded his 
chapter on 'Hell', in his 197 4 book The Goodness of God, with a section entitled 'The 
Need for Fresh Study'. He comments: 
A study of the literature reveals a remarkable failure by the 'traditional orthodox' to 
get to grips with the solid arguments put up by conditionalists. This is partly due to 
a vicious circle, in which suspicion of heresy has made it difficult for 
23 Eryl Davies, An Angry God? The Biblical Doctrine of Wrath, Final Judgement and Hell (Bryntirion: 
Evangelical Press of Wales, 1992), p. 17. 
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conditionalists to find reputable publishers, which has resulted in their books being 
unread, which in its turn has resulted in their views remaining unduly suspect. .. 
Discussion there must be if Christians are to be renewed in a common mind for the 
faithful proclamation of the gospel. 24 
In a paper delivered 17 years later he expresses great disappointment at the quality of those 
'traditional orthodox' books that have been published since then. Commenting on Shedd, 
Helm, Gerstner and Packer he writes: "The extraordinary thing about these replies is that 
none of them actually addresses the arguments used by the conditionalist. 1125 His 1991 
paper ends with this call: "Most of all I should rejoice to see a number of theologians 
(including some of the very first water) joining Fudge in researching this great topic in all 
its ramifications. "26 This call he repeats unchanged in his Autobiography, published in 
1998, although written before his death in 1996. Edward Fudge, a leading annihilationist, 
echoes Wenham's earlier statement when he writes in his Preface: "The conditionalist 
arguments have never been squarely met, ... this subject has not been discussed in the open 
by the best minds and methods of mainstream evangelical scholarship. 1127 Stephen Travis 
wrote in 1980: "There is here an important issue for debate, a debate in which for half a 
century scholars have hardly engaged at all. 1128 I would argue that this lack of study is a 
particular problem at the doctrinal level. Thus I hope to make a contribution to this call for 
a re-examination in this thesis, with the focus on doctrinal arguments. 
Second, there is also a widespread recognition that there are important theological, 
pastoral and evangelistic implications which follow from the doctrine of hell one holds. 
Indeed the importance of these implications explain much of the spread and vigour of the 
debate about hell amongst evangelicals. I have already touched on the issue of theodicy 
above that is raised by one's doctrine of hell. I will add some comments on the perceived 
pastoral and evangelistic implications. John Wenham expresses his view of the pastoral 
and evangelistic implications forcibly when he writes: 111 believe that endless torment is a 
hideous and unscriptural doctrine which has been a terrible burden on the mind of the 
24 Wenham, Goodness, pp. 40-41. 
25 J.W. Wenham, "The Case for Conditional Immortality," in Universalism and the Doctrine of God, ed. 
by Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 167. I would like to express my thanks 
to John Wenham for giving me a pre-publication copy of his paper, which greatly helped me in my 
studies. I would also like to acknowledge my debt to his book The Goodness of God which planted the 
seed of interest in the doctrine of Annihilationism. 
26 Wenham, Case, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 
27 E.W. Fudge, The Fire That Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of final Punishment (Houston: 
Providential Press, 1982), p. xvi. 
28 S.H. Travis, Christian Hope and the Future of Man (Leicester: IVP, 1980), p. 136. 
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Annihilationism, smce evangelicals are among the staunchest defenders of the 
Traditionalism, and Annihilationism is usually held as a mitigation of Traditionalism. 
Thus K vanvig notes that " ... the annihilation view ... has been perceived over the last few 
centuries as a mitigation of the strong view of hell. "35 This is also suggested by Rowell, 
commenting on the debate in the nineteenth century: "The adherents of systematic 
conditionalism were almost entirely to be found within the Augustinian-Calvinist 
tradition, and placed a high value on the verbal inspiration of the Bible." He goes on to 
suggest that other sections of the church had alternative responses to Traditionalism: 
There seems to have been no High Anglican conditionalists. The reason for this is 
probably to be found in the fact that they already had their own ways of modifying 
the rigours of eternal punishment, through the advocacy of some form of 
purgatory. Likewise Broad Churchmen moved towards universalism, rather than 
towards the elaborate theories of conditionalism. 36 
Powys draws a similar conclusion with a formal hypothesis: "It is that the great majority 
of modern positions of the unrighteous may be classified and largely explicated in 
terms of presuppositionally-determined reactions against 'traditional orthodoxy'. "37 
Thus I would agree that Annihilationism first really gained popularity in conservative 
theological circles in the nineteenth century because its role was to mitigate the traditional 
view.38 
This reactive quality of Annihilationism also helps explain one of the distinctive features 
of the literature: the majority of the arguments used by annihilationists are stated 
negatively, as an argument against Traditionalism, rather than positively as an argument 
for Annihilationism.39 The reason for this is probably that Annihilationism is usually 
35 K . . 68 vanv1g, op. cit., p. . 
36 G. Rowell, Hell and the Victorians: A Study of the Nineteenth-Century Theological Controversies 
Concerning Eternal Punishment and the Future Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 205. 
37 D.J. Powys, 'Hell': A Hard Look at a Hard Question. The Fate of the Unrighteous in New Testament 
Thought (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998), p. 39 [Bold original]. 
38 Harmon quotes and comments: "The great appeal of [Annihilationism], in the words ofH.R. 
Mackintosh, is its attempt to function "as a via media between universalism and the ecclesiastical doctrine 
of eternal punishment." On this view the awfulness of sin and the vital significance of human 
responsibility are affirmed, and yet a way is proposed of avoiding a final, eschatological dualism since 
those who finally refuse to have God are sent by him into the non-existence out of which they originally 
came." [Harmon, Finally Excluded, p. 267, quoting H.R. Mackintosh, Immortality And The Future 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), p. 212.] 
39 Powys notes a feature ofFroom's huge work which reflects this tendency: "His work suffers from lack 
of clarity at points. In his enthusiasm to demonstrate the degree of historical support for conditionalism, 
he sometimes claims the support of people who, while opposed to everlasting torment were by no means 
inclined towards conditional immortality. F.W. Farrar is a case in point... A second example [is]. .. J.A.T. 
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understood by evangelicals to be an alternative to Traditionalism and mitigation of it, and 
thus a refutation of Traditionalism is seen as a significant part of the case for 
Annihilationism. This reactive quality of Annihilationism explains two features of this 
thesis. First, this reactive quality explains why I will be examining the annihilationist 
criticisms of Traditionalism, as well as direct statements about Annihilationism, in order 
to gain an understanding of Annihilationism. Second, this quality explains why I will 
develop modifications of Traditionalism which respond to annihilationist criticisms, and 
thus may go some significant way to countering Annihilationism itself. Finally, another 
consequence of this reactive quality of Annihilationism in the literature is that it leads to a 
focus in the discussion on differences with Traditionalism, such as eventual extinction, 
with the consequence that significant features of the annihilationist position itself, such as 
the relation between torment and extinction, have tended to be overlooked. 
Thus the value of a study of Annihilationism lies not just in its growing importance as a 
theological option in its own right, but also in its links to Traditionalism. Therefore my 
hope is to show that while Annihilationism has significant doctrinal weaknesses that have 
rarely been examined in depth, it has nonetheless pointed out important weaknesses in the 
traditional position and, in forcing a reassessment, will leave the traditional position more 
securely founded. A.H. Strong rightly observes that "In our treatment of the subject of 
eternal punishment we must remember that false doctrine is often a reaction from the 
unscriptural and repulsive over-statements of Christian apologists. 1140 Henri Blocher, with 
whose article this thesis shares several of its conclusions, shares my conclusion: "It is 
possible, we suggest, to reach such a renewed understanding of the old dogma that will 
relieve some of the tension [about the doctrine of hell]."41 
1.1.4 Why Doctrinal? 
I will note three main reasons for making a doctrinal study of Annihilationism. First, 
having argued in the previous section that there had been a lack of study of 
Robinson." [D.J. Powys, "The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Debates about Hell and Universalism." 
In N.M. de S. Cameron ed. Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 
105, n. 16.] 
40 A.H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Rev. ed., London: Pickering and Inglis, 1907), p. 1035. 
41 Henri Blocher, "Everlasting Punishment and the Problem of Evil." In N.M. de S. Cameron ed. 
Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 285. 
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Annihilationism, I want to argue here that this is particularly true at the doctrinal level. 
Second, I want to argue that a doctrinal study is particularly fruitful in assessing 
Annihilationism. Not only do annihilationists make doctrinal claims which need assessing, 
but there are important doctrinal implications which have not been widely noted. I believe 
that some of these doctrinal implications argue decisively against Annihilationism as an 
option for evangelicals. However, third, I also want to argue that the case against 
Annihilationism is strengthened if some of the elements of Traditionalism which 
annihilationists object to are modified. I will comment on each of these points in turn. 
First, there has been a particular lack of study of Annihilationism at the doctrinal level. 
Exegetical study of the biblical material is the focus of the great majority of annihilationist 
works and traditionalist responses in the recent debate. Fudge, a leading annihilationist, 
gives a typical expression of this policy: 
Our question finally is: What does Scripture actually teach? That is really the only 
question that matters. That is where the discussion of this subject should take place 
and all conclusions be reached. The Bible is God's Word written, and whatever it 
actually teaches must be the only authoritative source and measure of our faith. "42 
Again, "Our case rests on a detailed examination of many passages of Scripture ... 
In the first place, therefore, objections ought not to be philosophical, dogmatic or 
pragmatic, but exegetical. .. We do not reject the traditionalist doctrine, therefore, 
on moral, philosophical, intuitive, judicial or emotional grounds, nor are we much 
concerned with the arguments of any who do.43 
Therefore, although some doctrinal arguments are made in the literature, they rarely form 
the focus of the studies. This was a lack also noted in the nineteenth century debate. In his 
Preface to Life in Christ Edward White, probably the most important nineteenth century 
annihilationist, justified his unusually wide doctrinal coverage in the following words: 
No one hitherto has treated the question precisely in this coherent method: and yet 
conviction often comes when men can be persuaded to look round a large circle of 
ideas, while doubt remains so long as they consider a few of its degrees. 44 
Writing later of the same earlier debate, Warfield draws a similar conclusion: 
Metaphysical and ontological considerations must of necessity enter into any 
estimate of the theory of annihilation, although it is notorious that the present age 
is impatient and distrustful of abstract reasoning. Arguments based upon the 
supposed unity and simplicity of the soul carry less weight to-day than when the 
methods of philosophy were in more general use and favour. This is perhaps one 
of the reasons why the theory of annihilation has rapidly acquired a considerable 
42 Fudge, op. cit., p. 395. 
43 Ibid., p. 435. 
44 E. White, Life in Christ (London: Elliot Stock, 1878, 3rd ed.), p. xii (Preface to First Edition). 
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popularity. Owing to the temper of the age, the philosophic difficulties have been 
insufficiently recognized. 45 
This lack of doctrinal studies remains a feature of the recent debate. 46 I aim to go some 
way to meeting this lack. 
Second, I believe that there are particular benefits from a doctrinal study of 
Annihilationism. The ACUTE report recognises the importance of doctrinal study: 
The Christian doctrine of hell is ultimately a construct of systematic theology. That 
is to say that it represents a programmatic synthesis of all relevant material form 
the canon of Old and New Testament Scripture, as developed through centuries of 
ecclesiastical debate and reflection. We shall explore these systematic theological 
dimensions of hell ... realising the need for creedal and dogmatic formulations ... 4 7 
A doctrinal discussion, with its greater level of abstraction, is one means to assist in 
deciding between the different views of hell. I would note John Hick's observation that in 
the "highly speculative" field of eschatology "the only way to assess theories is by trying to 
spell out their meaning and implications as fully as possible. "48 I believe that a doctrinal 
discussion can clarify the implications of the different positions. Packer goes a step further 
when he states that, "the mainspring of conditionalism is not exegetical but theological. "49 
Even though I think that many annihilationists would dispute this, it does serve to 
highlight the importance, albeit often unacknowledged, of the doctrinal level of debate. 
In order to make a doctrinal assessment of Annihilationism there are several tasks to be 
completed. There is a need to expound the underlying logic of the annihilationist position 
which is rarely made clear in the debate. For example, I will examine the relation of penal 
torment and extinction in Annihilationism, which is an issue hardly ever addressed 
systematically. Further, where doctrinal arguments are made in the literature, they are 
usually brief, and variations in the position are rarely noted. There is therefore a need to 
systematically expound the arguments and then assess their internal coherence and also 
their coherence with other doctrines held by evangelicals. This latter task of assessing the 
coherence with other doctrines is important because the doctrine of hell is interlinked with 
45 B.B. Warfield, Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics s.v. 'Annihilation', ed. by J. Hastings 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1908-26), p. 548, col. 2. [Italics mine.] 
46 Harmon notes "[hell's] comparative neglect at the level of systematic analysis in recent study," 
[Harmon, Finally Excluded, p. 21]. 
47 ACUTE, op. cit., p.36. The report continues that the ultimate test of doctrinal formulations needs to be 
Scripture: "evangelicals will judge the validity of these formulations first and foremost on their 
correspondence with pertinent biblical teaching." [p. 36] 
48 Hick, Death, p.231. Quoted by Harmon, Finally Excluded, p. 268. 
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many other doctrines, and thus any change in the doctrine of hell has implications for a 
range of other doctrines to which it is integrally related. Moore writes, "it needs to be 
remembered that hell is inextricably linked to other doctrines such as sin, judgment and 
the atonement."50 Similarly, Guillebaud notes the importance of this wider doctrinal 
context: "It is impossible to begin to understand eternal punishment, if it is considered in 
isolation from the Problem of Evil and the Doctrine of the Atonement. 1151 More 
specifically, Leckie writes: 
Conditionalism is formidable in this respect, that is, that it, more than any other 
eschatological speculation, influences the entire theology of those who adopt it, 
and would, if generally received, profoundly modify the whole Christian view of 
the world and life.52 
One of the great strengths of Traditionalism is that, as the mainstream doctrine of hell in 
the tradition, it is placed within a dogmatic framework carefully developed and tested over 
the centuries. Kvanvig notes that 11 ... the history of discussion of the problem of hell 
within Christianity does considerable justice to the variety of abstract theoretical 
structures to which any approach to the problem of hell might appeal. 1153 However 
Annihilationism has rarely been placed in this wider doctrinal context in the recent debate. 
I hope to demonstrate that Annihilationism raises doctrinal problems (what Leckie calls its 
"rational perplexities"54) that are often not fully appreciated and are sometimes not even 
considered in much of the recent debate. I will argue that some of the annihilationist 
arguments are not internally coherent and that others would entail the denial of doctrines 
usually held orthodox by all evangelicals. I believe that some of these problems are serious 
enough to conclude that Annihilationism is not a valid option for someone wishing to 
work within an evangelical framework. 
However, third, not all doctrinal difficulties are of themselves a necessary reason to reject 
a doctrine. An annihilationist could reasonably ask in response to the some of the 
49 J.I. Packer, God's Words (Leicester: IVP, 1981), p. 209. 
50 Moore, op. cit., p.67. 
51 H.E. Guillebaud, The Righteous Judge: A Study of the Biblical Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment 
(Taunton: The Phoenix Press, 1964), p.44. 
52 J.H. Leckie, The World To Come and Final Destiny (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 2nd Ed., 1922), 
p.219. Leckie is writing with a certain understanding of Annihilationism in mind, and with certain 
presuppositions of his own as to what, for example, is entailed by a denial of the immortality of the soul 
which he believes conditionalists are required to make. His statement is thus something of an 
exaggeration, but still serves to make the point that to change the doctrine of hell has knock on effects on 
other doctrines. 
53 K . . 11 vanv1g, op. czt., p. . 
54 Leckie, op. cit., p.245. 
21 
problems raised whether there is any better alternative. Further, Donald Bloesch warns that 
the doctrine of hell may not be amenable to a fully rational solution when he writes: "Hell 
belongs with Satan and sin and death to that numinous aspect of the divine activity which 
is not for us to rationalize or moralize. "55 Therefore there may be no doctrine of hell that is 
free of all 'rational perplexities'. In consequence, as Dixon notes, "Pointing out the 
weaknesses in the three alternative positions to hell does not in itself prove the truth of the 
traditional eternal conscious punishment view."56 Therefore I hope to strengthen the case 
against Annihilationism by suggesting a modified version of the Traditional doctrine to 
respond to some of the valid objections annihilationists have raised. This demonstration of 
a 'better' option is not formally necessary to reject Annihilationism, but I believe that it 
does strengthen the case. Further, as I have already mentioned, this strategy is also 
encouraged because Annihilationism has largely been held in reaction to Traditionalism, 
and so a response to Annihilationism will involve a reassessment of Traditionalism as well 
as a direct critique. 
A final methodological note at this point is to emphasise that I will not be asking whether 
the positions I discuss can be justified from a study of the text of Scripture, except in the 
secondary sense that they accord with doctrines already widely held by evangelicals. 57 
Rather my starting points are the doctrinal positions as they are stated or implied by 
evangelicals in the debate, regardless of the hermeneutical and exegetical issues about 
55 D.G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979), Vol. 2, p. 
227, quoting Kantonen, The Christian Hope (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1954), p.107. 
56 Dixon, op. cit., p.173. To the two commonly noted alternatives to Traditionalism of Annihilation ism 
and Universalism, Dixon adds a third alternative in which the damned can be saved and transferred to 
heaven. This is sometimes known as Restorationism. (See especially Chapter Four, pp. 97ff.) 
57 Several writers have questioned whether Scriptural language about hell permits the type _of doctrinal 
discussion that is sometimes conducted in the literature, and which is the subject of this thesis. Peter 
Cotterell writes, "That the doctrine of an eternal hell is there in Scripture is beyond dispute. That the 
imagery is just that, imagery, is similarly beyond dispute. What it is that corresponds to that imagery we 
simply do not know." [Peter Cotterell, Mission and Meaninglessness (London: SPCK, 1990), p. 74]. 
Bauckham and Hart make a similar point, but also add a comment about the importance of doctrinal 
coherence. "What is clear from the use of all the images of final condemnation is that at least they depict 
the unimaginable horror of rejection by God and its finality ... They represent the final loss of salvation. It 
may be that beyond this we cannot go. The traditional doctrine of hell took the images of eternally 
experienced punishment literally, but was thereby obliged to take the images of final destruction less 
literally. Our contention that eschatological language is irreducibly imaginative suggests that we should be 
content to let the various images stand, not reducing one to another, though we must also avoid 
understanding them in a way that is inconsistent with what we know of God and God's purposes in Christ." 
[Richard Bauckham and Trevor Hart, Hope Against Hope: Christian Eschatology in Contemporary 
Context (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1999), pp. 146-7]. However, the majority of writers in the 
debate do not leave discussion at the point that Cotterell, Bauckham and Hart might recommend, but 
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Scripture they might assume or raise. However I recognise that such questions about 
Scripture will be ultimately decisive for evangelicals, but the task of testing the positions I 
study and propose against Scripture will need to be done elsewhere. 58 
1.1.5 Why English-Speaking? 
The debate about Annihilationism is also predominantly an English-speaking one. David 
Powys has carried out an extensive analysis of the debates about hell in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, and he underlines the primary provenance of the debate, a provenance which 
applies particularly to the debate about Annihilationism: "It is concerned mainly with 
English-speaking theologians, many of them British. This largely reflects the geography of 
the debate, at least in recent times. "59 There are also rare but important contributions from 
outside the English-speaking world, and I will be making particular reference to the 
French theologian Henri Blocher, although most of his relevant work has been translated 
into English. However the Annihilationism debate remains dominated by English-
speaking theologians. 
1.1.6 Why Recent? 
The primary reason for focusing on recent literature, from the last 25 years, is that this is 
when the modem debate has been re-kindled. As I demonstrate below, the watershed in 
the debate is widely recognised as the publication of John Wenham' s book The Goodness 
of God in 1974. Since then there has been a growing flood of literature from 
annihilationists and traditionalists alike. However, the extent of the modem debate has 
probably not yet reached that of the nineteenth century, when Annihilationism also became 
very influential amongst evangelicals. It is therefore something of a surprise that the 
modem debate rarely refers to writing from the previous century. However I will tum to 
proceed to make more specific doctrinal statements. Again, whether or not these doctrinal statements are 
soundly based, my aim is to assess them as they stand. 
58 There are a large number of exegetical studies of the relevant texts, and many include a certain amount 
of hermeneutical reflection on the nature of eschatological language and the interpretation of metaphors 
related to the nature of hell. The most extensive evangelical discussion is in Powys, Hard, while a succinct 
overview of many of the texts and issues is offered by ACUTE, op. cit .. Both these books have extensive 
bibliographies. 
59 Powys, Debates, p. 93. 
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the nineteenth century debate and draw on it where it offers clearer or different doctrinal 
arguments which can add to my assessment of the issues. 
1.2 The Structure 
In the rest of this chapter I will begin by attempting to clarify and define the terms of the 
debate, which in this century has been fraught with misunderstanding particularly due to 
the variety of historical and current usage of the terms 'Conditionalism' and 
'Annihilationism'. I will then offer an overview of the history of Annihilationism, and the 
development and current state of the debate. 
Next, I will give a brief summary of the mam doctrinal arguments as given by 
annihilationists. I will argue that they boil down to three main arguments, one of which I 
will deal with in this chapter, the second and third forming the bases of my second and 
third chapters respectively. So, in this chapter I will deal with one doctrinal issue which 
has loomed large in the debate, but which I believe is not as decisive as many writers 
believe, on both sides of the issue, and thus can be excluded at this stage. That issue is the 
immortality of the soul. The remaining two main arguments, each with subordinate points, 
revolve around questions of justice and dualism. In each of the subsequent chapters I will 
seek to expound and assess one of these arguments, as well as offering different aspects of 
a modified form of Traditionalism in response to each. The arguments I assess are not 
necessarily shared by all writers, but they give what I believe to be the important or 
distinctive points, and I will seek to highlight any significant alternatives. In chapter four I 
develop an argument which is less central in the literature, but which I believe is decisive 
for the debate, to do with the link between the punishment of Christ on the cross and that 
of the damned in hell. I will also explore this link in the light of the modified 
Traditionalism having expounded it in chapters two and three. I now offer a lengthier 
summary of this structure. 
In chapter two, I will assess the issue of the justice of hell. Having stated the 
annihilationist argument against Traditionalism at this point, I will attempt to expound 
annihilationist penal theories which underlie their own position. In most cases these are 
neither clear nor even explicit, and I have usually had to make my own distinctions. I will 
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begin by setting out the annihilationist understanding of the fate of the damned, and in 
particular the relationship between the two elements of hell: torment and extinction. This 
also serves to clarify further the basic 'shape' of evangelical annihilationist theories. I will 
then offer a critical assessment. On the question of the nature of the punishment, I will 
argue that if extinction is understood simply as an 'infinite' punishment as annihilationists 
claim then their principal criticism of the justice of Traditionalism, that an infinite 
punishment for sin committed in this life is unjust, is self-refuting. Annihilationists are 
therefore left with the challenge of arguing that extinction is an infinite punishment and 
yet less unjust than the infinite punishment of the traditionalist hell of eternal torment. 
However I will go on to argue that extinction is in fact only a finite punishment. This 
position raises further problems for annihilationists, in particular why the damned are not 
eventually translated to heaven rather than being extinguished and why an atonement was 
required. I will suggest that a possible formulation of Annihilationism which avoids these 
objections is that hell is a finite punishment but with permanent consequences. Thus the 
question of justice comes down to whether sin deserves an infinite or a finite punishment. 
I will suggest that there may be some validity to the classic traditionalist justification of an 
infinite punishment and therefore an unendingly experienced hell. In this case the 
annihilationist position would be unjustly lenient. However if the annihilationist hell is 
maintained to be an infinite punishment, as they claim, then the issue remains as to 
whether it is more just, because less severe, than the traditionalist hell. I will not attempt to 
adjudicate on this issue directly but instead I will argue that if annihilationists believe that 
their hell is more just because a mitigation of the traditionalist one, then a modified 
Traditionalism recently proposed by Henri Blocher can also be interpreted as a mitigation 
and thus may meet the annihilationist objection about injustice. Blocher's modified 
Traditionalism can be understood to have two aspects: on the one hand that the damned 
are in a fixed state; on the other hand that the damned do not sin, are lucid, and are 
reconciled to God. While both aspects can be understood to suggest a degree of mitigation 
of Traditionalism, I will examine the former in this chapter, saving the latter for the 
following chapter on dualism. I will suggest that Blocher's notion of the fixity of the 
damned can be interpreted to mean that the punishment of hell is either finite or infinite. 
Thus, depending upon whether Annihilationism is understood as a finite or an infinite 
punishment, this modified Traditionalism may be able to present an alternative to either. 
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In chapter three I will examine the charge of dualism made against Traditionalism by 
annihilationists. Dualism is a slippery term in the debate, used broadly to refer to the 
ongoing existence of evil in the universe after the Last Judgement. However, I will 
distinguish three types of situation to which the charge of dualism is made: suffering 
dualism in which continuing suffering is considered dualistic; sin dualism, in which 
continuing sin and rebellion is considered dualistic; and damnation dualism, in which any 
creature continuing in a state of damnation is considered dualistic. I will argue that 
suffering dualism is not dualistic because a just punishment is not a further evil, therefore 
the issue is that of the justice of the punishment of hell. I will also note that in making the 
charge of suffering dualism, Annihilationism is not immune from this charge itself. 
However, I go on to argue that sin dualism is properly dualistic, and that the annihilationist 
critique of Traditionalism is correct at this point, since it holds to the continuation of sin in 
hell. 
One aspect of the issue of dualism is the problem of the so-called 'Abominable Fancy' 
which has been a part of traditionalist justifications of hell in the past, although rare in the 
current debate. The phrase refers to the rejection of the notion that the blessed gain 
'pleasure' from the sight of the damned, but rather that the existence of hell will diminish 
the bliss of heaven. I will argue that annihilationist criticisms are self-refuting, since they 
serve to undermine any period of torment in hell. 
The conclusion that Traditionalism is dualistic leads onto a final section in this third 
chapter which offers a modified Traditionalism which I believe offers a more satisfactory 
response to the problem of this sin dualism. As in the previous chapter, I will draw on the 
modified Traditionalism of Henri Blocher. I will divide the relevant part of Blocher's 
thesis into three elements: the damned do not sin in hell; the damned are lucid and thus 
acknowledge the justice of their punishment; and the damned are reconciled to God in the 
limited sense that they acknowledge the justice of God's judgement, and may even praise 
him for it. I will also argue that this modified Traditionalism better responds to the 
problem of salvation dualism than Annihilationism because there is a clearer purpose in 
the continued existence of the damned, and less of the sense of waste of extinction. 
Further, these three elements of the modified position are linked and, as I noted above, 
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they also provide a further mitigation of the usual traditionalist position, which may thus 
meet the objections of annihilationists both to the unjust severity of Traditionalism and 
also its dualism. Thus I will argue that this modified Traditionalism avoids the major 
charges of the annihilationists against Traditionalism, while retaining its strengths. 
In chapter four I examine the links in the current debate and in the tradition between the 
cross and hell, and the arguments based upon those links. Traditionally a very similar logic 
has been applied by evangelicals to the justice of the punishment of Christ on the cross as 
to the punishment of the damned in hell. The basis of this link is the doctrine of penal 
substitution, by which Christ is held to have suffered the punishment for sin as a substitute 
for some or all sinful people. The arguments made on the basis of this link in the recent 
literature have usually been brief but I believe they can be developed to offer some 
decisive points. I argue that annihilationists must hold that after a period of torment the 
human nature of Christ was extinguished on the cross. I then argue that this leads to an 
unorthodox understanding of the incarnation, since the union of the two natures of Christ 
is broken, and an unorthodox understanding of the resurrection since Christ's human 
nature would need to be recreated having ceased to exist. I also argue that it is not possible 
for Christ to suffer extinction in a way analogous to the damned since his divine nature is 
not extinguished. 
One way f<?r annihilationists to avoid these conclusions would be to reject the link 
between hell and the cross that underlies these arguments. However I survey Calvin, Owen 
and Edwards, along with briefer studies of Luther and, from the recent debate, Packer, to 
examine this link. These writers are selected both because they address the link at some 
length and because of their importance for evangelicalism. The ACUTE report notes more 
broadly that evangelical theology 
must give particular attention to the theologies of Reformation and post-
Reformation Protestantism, since it is these theologies which have most 
distinctively shaped evangelical belief as we know it today. . . The birth of 
Protestantism in the early 1500s, the Puritan era and the Evangelical Revival are 
obvious reference-points here. 60 
I argue that in the tradition this link between the cross and hell is held to follow from the 
doctrine of penal substitution. On the doctrine of penal substitution, Packer writes that it 
60 ACUTE, op. cit., pp.111, 126. 
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is, "a belief which, by and large, is a distinguishing mark of the world-wide evangelical 
fraternity. "61 Therefore I conclude that if Annihilationists are to offer an alternative link 
while retaining a doctrine of penal substitution, they will be rejecting the conclusions of 
theologians they would usually defer to. Clearly annihilationists have already rejected the 
doctrine of hell held by these writers, but to reject further elements of their teaching is to at 
least raise doubts for evangelicals assessing the doctrinal implications of this doctrine. 
I will also include an Appendix in which I will examine in more detail the historic 
precedents for this modified Traditionalism. 
1.3 Definitions 
Before offering a brief history of Annihilationism and a survey of the current debate I will 
seek to clarify the terms used to describe the different positions. Some terms I can deal 
with briefly. I will use the term extinction, to refer to the final cessation of the existence of 
the damned. I use this term in preference to annihilation, which would confuse with 
Annihilationism understood as torment plus extinction; and to destruction, since 
traditionalists usually hold that this is a biblical term referring to the whole of the 
punishment of hell. 62 I will refer the period of suffering before extinction as torment. My 
primary reason for choosing this term is that one of the most common descriptions of the 
hell of Traditionalism is as eternal conscious torment, and therefore it serves to highlight 
the common element between the two positions. 63 I will use the term punishment as a 
general category for any understanding of hell, and thus in context can include both 
torment and extinction, and eternal conscious torment. I will discuss in the next chapter 
whether extinction is a punishment, but my conclusion will be that it is, and therefore I 
will speak, for example, of extinction as part of the punishment of an annihilationist hell. 
61 J.I. Packer, "What Did The Cross Achieve? The Logic Of Penal Substitution," Tyndale Bulletin 25 (1974), 
p.3. 
62 Fudge comments that he uses the term extinction rather than annihilation to avoid the cavil that "Some 
have objected that "annihilation" is physically impossible, that even when something is burned its smoke 
and ashes remain." [op. cit., p. 431.] This is not a common objection, and therefore not a factor in my 
decision about terminology. 
63 Packer discusses the use of 'torment', and decides not to use it because "to the modem mind, it suggests 
sadism and cruelty and torture, ... " [op. cit., p. 8]. Instead he uses the phrase "divinely executed retributive 
process." [Ibid, p. 8]. Although I think that Packer's decision is pastorally helpful, I won't follow it, since 
'torment' is much more succinct a term and it has a long usage in the tradition. 
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Further, on terminology, I will use several terms to refer to those in heaven and those in 
hell such as the blessed and the righteous for the former, and the damned, the unrighteous 
and the wicked for the latter. The variation is intended to carry no theological weight, their 
usage usually varying with the usage of an author being discussed. 
1.3.1 Annihilationism and Conditionalism. 
There are two mam issues of definition I will note here to do with the terms 
Annihilationism and Conditionalism: first, there are differences in anthropology which 
historically have distinguished the two terms; second, there are two different 
understandings of personal eschatology associated with both terms. So, first, underlying 
the terminology of the debate are differences in anthropology. Kendall Harmon observes 
that "one has to be discerning enough to consider both aspects of a teacher's doctrine and 
not to assume, based on what a person's view is on one of these doctrinal areas, that ) ou 
can deduce the other."64 The anthropological distinction is over the natural immortality of 
the soul. "Conditional Immortality, strictly speaking, refers only to the view that all men 
and women are created mortal but that for those who respond to the gospel the gift of 
eternal life is given. "65 It was on account of the desire to emphasise this positive aspect of 
immortality as a gift to the righteous that many writers in the nineteenth century preferred 
to term their position "Life in Christ. "66 In contrast, Annihilationism, strictly speaking, 
holds that men and women are naturally immortal. As will be seen, 'natural immortality' 
here means not that the soul cannot be extinguished, but that the soul survives physical 
death. B.B. Warfield draws out the theoretical distinction clearly: 
The point of distinction between [ Annihilationism proper] and "conditionalism" is 
that these theories [ of Annihilationism] with more or less consistency or heartiness 
recognize what is called the "natural immortality of the soul," and are not tempted 
therefore to think of the soul as by nature passing out of being at death ( or at any 
time), and yet teach that the actual punishment inflicted upon or suffered by the 
wicked results in extinction of being... They retain their common character as 
theories of annihilation proper so long as they conceive the extinction of the soul 
as an effect wrought on it to which it succumbs, rather than as the natural exit of 
64 Harmon, Case, p.196. Hannon's discussion is the clearest in the literature, pp. 196-199. A more 
detailed taxonomy of all understandings of hell can be found in Powys' essay, passim. 
65 lbid.,p.197. 
66 The tenn became popular with the publication of Edward White's book entitled Life in Christ in 1846. 
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the soul from a life which could be continued to it only by some operation upon it 
raising it to a higher than its natural potency. 67 
More briefly: Annihilationism, strictly defined, holds that there is an immortal soul which 
has to be extinguished; Conditionalism, strictly defined, holds that the soul is mortal and 
only receives immortality as a gift. Thus the distinction is anthropological. 
However this distinction has often been ignored, with Conditionalism and Annihilationism 
being used as synonyms by many writers. By the turn of the century Warfield could write 
irenically: 
It has become usual, therefore, to speak of them all as annihilationists, or of them 
all as conditionalists; annihilationists because they all agree that the souls of the 
wicked cease to exist; conditionalists because they all agree that therefore 
persistence in life is conditioned on a right relation to God. 68 
This overlapping usage has generally continued in the current evangelical debate, and both 
terms are used by proponents and opponents alike. Packer notes that conditional 
immortality and annihilation comprise "a verbal distinction that corresponds to no 
theological difference."69 This is certainly largely true at the level of current usage. Even 
where a distinction is retained, the ultimate end of the wicked remains the same. Thus, 
Edward Fudge calls himself a conditionalist, rejecting the term annihilationist,70 and John 
Stott calls himself an annihilationist, but, although they differ in their anthropology, they 
are substantially agreed on the resurrection of both the righteous and the unrighteous, the 
latter being extinguished after a period of penal suffering. This suggests that the question 
of the immortality of the soul is not a decisive issue in this debate.71 In this thesis I will use 
the term 'Annihllationism' to cover both positions, since I think that it better focuses on the 
distinctive of this position, in contrast to Traditionalism: the final extinction of the wicked. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis 'annihilationist' will be used inclusively of those 
holding a 'conditionalist' position; and 'Annihilationism' as inclusive of 'Conditionalism.' 
B.B.Warfield, art. "Annihilationism", in The Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, (New 
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1908-12) vol. 1, p. 184. 
68 Ibid, p. 184. 
69 J.I. Packer, "Evangelicals and the Way of Salvation," in Evangelical Affirmations, ed. K.S. Kantzer and 
C.F.H. Henry, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), p. 134. 
7° Fudge, op. cit., p. 38 n. 2. Harmon writes, "It is very important to note the historical background to 
Fudge's disavowal at this point. In the 19th century when Conditionalism was at its peak of influence 
conditionalists avoided the word 'annihilationism' to describe their position because many materialists 
who did not believe in any life after death seemed to have a view which could be termed annihilationism." 
[Harmon, Case, p. 198, n. 15. Italics original. Harmon footnotes Rowell, op. cit., p. 197.] 
71 I will argue this at greater length below. · 
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Second, there are at least two different understandings of individual eschatology that have 
been attached to the term Annihilationism. First, that the damned are extinguished without 
a period of torment, most commonly at the death of the body; but possibly after their 
resurrection; second, that they are extinguished after a period of torment, most commonly 
after a period following the Last Judgement, but possibly at the Last Judgement itself after 
a period of torment in the Intermediate state. The most important issue here is whether the 
damned experience a period of torment after the death of the body and before they are 
finally extinguished. On the first view, in its most common form, the damned are not 
resurrected but extinguished at the death of the body. Harmon notes that, "This doctrine 
was held by some 16th century Anabaptists and 17th century Socinians and today it is 
believed by the Jehovah's Witnesses."72 John Wenham comments on this position: "[It] 
assumes that the first death is the end and that there is no Day of Judgement [for the 
unbeliever] and that we are not judged according to our works. This is plainly unscriptural 
and not the view of any conditionalist that I know." 73 W enham's statement is clearly 
inaccurate if he is taken to mean that he knows of no-one who holds this position. 74 
However I think that his statement should be understood to mean 'no evangelical 
conditionalist that I know holds this view'. 75 The minority form of this position is 
catalogued by Harmon: "some people in the literature seem to believe that after the 
resurrection the wicked are immediately destroyed, ... " He gives no examples of advocates 
of this position, but Pinnock may be one, whom I will discuss below. 
Writing at the beginning of the century, B.B. Warfield describes the majority position 
amongst annihilationists: "The greater part, however, teach a resurrection for all, and a 
"second death," which is annihilation, for the wicked."76 This is the second view I have 
72 Hannon, Case, p. 197. 
73 Wenham, Case, p. 189. [Italics mine.] 
74 One example of a prominent theologian who does hold the first position is Edward Schillebeeckx, who 
Wenham notes is a subject in Harmon's thesis. (J.W. Wenham, Facing Hell: The Story of a Nobody, An 
Autobiography 1913-1996 (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998), p. 262]. 
75 Hannon conveniently presents the chief arguments against this position, of extinction at physical death, 
under three headings. First, Scriptural: it is difficult to dismiss the New Testament references to the 
universality of the finaljudgement (e.g. Rom.14:10,12.). Second, Tradition: It is these Scriptural truths 
which are the basis of the affirmation, found in the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds, that when 
Jesus comes again he shall judge all people, and this idea is irreconcilable with God's enemies simply 
being left in death. Third, Theological: Flowing from a strong doctrine of creation one can argue for the 
importance of people to be accountable for their use of freedom; a responsibility they could escape if God 
simply left them in death. Harmon's conclusion is that such a position should be decisively rejected. 
[Hannon, Case, pp. 263ft] 
76 Warfield, Schaff-Herzog, p.184. 
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noted. It is the confessional position of the Seventh Day Adventists and is that held by 
evangelicals in the debate I am examining. Clark Pinnock memorably describes this 
position as: "Fire, then nothing. "77 A minority form of this view, where the torment occurs 
in the intermediate state, rather than after the Last Judgement, was held by White. Powys 
highlights the contrast with Constable, who held the majority version: 
"They were agreed in anticipating a finite post-mortem retribution for the 
unrighteous. They were not agreed, however, about when this would occur. White 
had located this during the intermediate state, anticipating a complete end in the 
second death. Constable, in contrast, located this retribution after the 
resurrection." 78 
However, no writer in the recent debate follows White at this point. 
Misunderstanding over this distinction has served to confuse some of the Evangelical 
debate on hell. William Crockett notes that 
It is common to condemn proponents of annihilation by linking them with sects 
that believe in the extinction of the wicked after death, like Jehovah's Witnesses 
and Christadelphinians. 79 If some evangelicals are beginning to deny the existence 
of hell, they are probably no better than the cults, or so the reasoning goes. 80 
Even Crockett's comments could be more precise. The position of the sects he notes would 
be better described as "extinction of the wicked at physical death," to avoid confusion with 
the second death. Harmon notes an example of this confusion: "J .I. Packer and Donald 
Bloesch lump Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists together, in spite of the 
fact that the first believes only the righteous will be resurrected, and the second that both 
the good and the wicked will be. "81 A further confusion is introduced when traditionalists 
sometimes refer to the hell envisaged by evangelical annihilationists, and yet refer only to 
extinction, omitting reference to a period of torment. This oversight of a period of torment 
accounts for some of the references to annihilationists as not believing in hell at all, in 
other words confusing annihilationists who hold the second view I have noted abo~e with 
those who hold the first. An example of this looseness is by Grudem who writes, "several 
77 "Fire, Then Nothing" was the title of an article by C.H. Pinnock, published in Christianity Today (20th 
March 1987). The title of Fudge's book serves as a similar summary: The Fire that Consumes. As I will 
note below, Pinnock's position is actually unclear as to whether he thinks that there is a period of torment 
before extinction, but he certainly allows for such a possibility in order to allow for degrees of 
punishment. , 
78 Powys, Debates, pp. 109-110. He footnotes White, op. cit., p. 311 point two; and H. Constable, Hades: 
or the Intermediate State of Man (London: Kellaway and Co., 1875), p. 171. 
79 It would be clearer to say that they hold to extinction at death, rather than after death. 
80 W. Crockett, "The Metaphorical View", in Hell: Four Views, William Crockett, ed., (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1992), p. 62. 
81 Harmon, Case, p. 199. 
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prominent writers within evangelicalism have used strong arguments to tell us that we 
should no longer believe in the doctrine of hell, ... "82 Another example is Moore, whose 
definition of Annihilationism makes clear the omission of any period of torment: "Those 
who hold to the doctrine of annihilation believe that the rejection of Christ will result in 
obliteration, utter non-existence. This will occur at the Great White Throne judgment. "83 It 
is unclear whether this is simply a momentary oversight or because he believes that the 
extinction is the distinctive or the dominant element of the punishment. Whatever the 
reasons, the result is that such usage has contributed to some confusion in the debate. 
Confusion is not only a fault of some traditionalists. Harmon also notes that Stott' s 
description of Conditionalism as that position where "nobody survives death except those 
to whom God gives life ... "84 serves to identify all conditionalists with the Jehovah's 
Witness' position. 85 
A helpful attempt to clarify the debate and to bring out these two distinctions I have noted 
is made by Kendall Harmon. He uses the terms 'conditionalist' and 'immortalist' (rath r 
than 'annihilationist') to make the anthropological distinction. He then uses the terms 
'immediate extinctionism' and 'eventual extinctionism' to mark the key eschatological 
distinction. I will use 'Annihilationism' in this thesis to include 'conditionalist ·eventual 
extinctionism' and 'immortalist eventual extinctionism'. 86 Therefore, in this thesis, I will 
use 'Annihilationism' to refer to the position that the wicked are resurrected, suffer a period 
of torment and are then extinguished at the second death. This is the position of all the 
evangelical annihilationists I will be studying. 
A possible exception to this statement, that all annihilationists hold to a period of torment 
before extinction is, as I noted above, Clark Pinnock. Pinnock speculates that there could 
be degrees of torment in the very act of extinction, and therefore no distinct period of 
torment. However he also recognises that in order to incorporate the notion of degrees of 
punishment there may be different lengths of time of torment. "I am sure that it is not 
82 Grudem, 'Forward' in Moore, op. cit., p. vii. Grudem is more careful about terminology in his 
Systematic Theology. W. Grudem, Systematic Theology: An lntrpduction to Biblical Doctrine (Leicester: 
IVP, 1994), p. 1150. 
83 M . 2 oore, op. elf., p. . 
84 J.R.W. Stott, Essentials: A Liberal-Evangelical Dialogue (Sevenoaks: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), p. 
316. 
85 Harmon, Case, pp. 198-9, n. 16. 
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beyond God's wisdom to figure out how degrees of punishment might enter into this event. 
Maybe there will be a period of punishment before oblivion and nonbeing. "87 Thus 
Pinnock considers that there may not be a period of torment before extinction. However, 
as he is the only annihilationist to suggest it, and he does not do so dogmatically, I will 
retain my definition of Annihilationism. Thus the usual annihilationist position held by 
evangelicals, and which is our focus in this thesis, is that the damned are not extinguished 
at the first death, but are resurrected, punished with a period of torment and then 
extinguished. The two unvarying elements of this position are that there is a period of 
torment, which distinguishes the evangelical position from those such as the Jehovah's 
Witnesses, and that this torment comes to an end with extinction, which distinguishes 
Annihilationism from Traditionalism. This chronology is clear in Wenham's summary, 
which I repeat: "Conditionalists ... look for the resurrection of all men, followed by the just 
sentence according to the deserts of each, which will mean anguish (but not unending 
torment) for those outside Christ, finally terminating in the second death. 1188 
1.3.2 Traditionalism 
The term "Traditionalism" is used by several writers in the debate, such as Fudge who 
defines it as that "view which signifies the understanding that hell will involve the 
unending conscious torment (whether spiritual or physical or both) of the wicked who 
have been made deathless (immortal). "89 The final phrase of this definition is 
unnecessary and introduces a potentially confusing anthropological element: if the 
punishment is unending conscious torment than clearly the wicked will have an 
unending existence, and it is probably best to avoid the term 'immortal'. Therefore for 
the present I will simply define Traditionalism as the view that the existence of the 
damned in hell is without end. A common description of this position in the literature is 
'eternal conscious torment'. This definition highlights the key difference which I am 
focusing on in this thesis: whether the damned will exist forever in hell or whether they 
will eventually be extinguished. 
86 Ibid, p. 197. 
87 C.H. Pinnock, "The Conditional View" in Four Views, p. 154. 
88 Wenham, Goodness, pp. 34-35. 
89 lb'd . l ., p. XVI. 
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K vanvig offers an analytic approach to the doctrine of hell, which serves to clarify this key 
distinctive of Traditionalism and to highlight some common areas between annihilationists 
and traditionalists in the current debate. He writes: 
First I consider the traditional doctrine of hell, perhaps the most common one in 
the history of Christian thought on hell. In summary form, it maintains that hell is a 
place where some people are punished eternally with no possibility of escape. We 
can analyze this doctrine, which I call here the strong view of hell, into four 
separate components: 
(HI) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: some persons are consigned to hell; 
(H2) The Existence Thesis: hell is a place where people exist, if they are 
consigned there; 
(H3) The o Escape Thesis: there is no possibility of leaving hell, and 
nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of hell, once one is 
consigned there; and 
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for and purpose of hell is 
retributive in nature hell being constituted so as to mete out punishment to those 
whose earthly lives and behaviour warrant it.90 
One advantage of K vanvig's analysis is that it highlights the elements of the doctrine both 
traditionalist and annihilationists share. Thus Traditionalism is, in this debate, that 
position which upholds all four theses. 
K vanvig defines the annihilationist position as the denial of H2: 
The view that denies the Existence Thesis we can call "the annihilation view." 
Annihilationists thus still maintains (H 1 ), the claim that some people end up in 
hell, (H3) the claim that no one can leave hell once there; and (H4), the claim that 
the reason for hell is to mete out deserved punishment. What it denies is that any 
persons exist in hell. Instead, hell is the condition of non-existence. That is, 'hell' is 
a term that denotes what becomes of a person whom God literally annihilates.91 
However, while this is helpful in stating what both views hold in common in this debate, 
K vanvig, as so many have done in the history of this debate, has overlooked the distinction 
between annihilationists for whom extinction follows immediately upon death and those 
for whom it follows a period of torment. Evangelical annihilationists hold to this latter 
position, and for them hell is a place where people are tormented and then extinguished, 
and thus they argue that H2 is eventually, but not immediately, denied. Thus the debate 
between Annihilationists and Traditionalists could be stated as whether the existence 
thesis (H2) is permanently true. 
90 Kvanvig, op. cit., p. 19. 
91 Ibid., p. 68. 
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K vanvig's analysis is also helpful, because it highlights another important distinctive of the 
evangelical debate: the majority of writers on both sides do hold the retribution thesis 
(H4). This distinguishes them from many non-evangelical traditionalists, and some 
annihilationists, who reject thesis H4. Henri Blocher has observed that "Among the 
modem, the most popular argument, the very soul of most apologies for the possibility of 
hell, refers to human freedom. Since the nineteenth century, one notices a systematic effort 
at discharging God from the responsibility of punishment. "92 While, as I will note in 
chapter three, traditionalists often hold additional justifications for hell on the grounds of 
human freedom they also hold that hell is fundamentally retributive punishment, as do 
most annihilationists. 93 One of the reasons why evangelicals have held on to arguments 
from retribution is that it also underlies the doctrine of penal substitution, which is the 
main evangelical doctrine of the atonement, and I will examine the link this establishes 
between the cross and hell further in chapter four. 
However, within "Traditionalism" there are many other secondary differences of opinion. 
The American scholar Norman Fiering rightly notes, with reference to the traditionalist 
doctrine: "When the doctrine of hell was fully elaborated, it was more complex and 
variegated than is sometimes realized."94 Similarly, Fudge writes: 
One finally concludes that there is no such thing as a uniform, standardized, 
detailed traditionalist orthodoxy. About all one can count on from traditionalist 
authors is that they believe the wicked will remain alive forever, in sensible 
punishment of some description, so that neither they nor it will ever pass away.95 
Fudge gives a succinct selection of these differences in the second edition of his book: 
They disagree among themselves on how the wicked will be able to exist for ever 
when totally cut off from God, the extent of their number, the case of the 
92 Blocher, op. cit., p. 295. 
93 Exceptions to this generalisation are Travis and Pinnock. Travis, in Christ and the Judgment of God: 
Divine Retribution in the New Testament (Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1986) argues that the 
notion of retributive punishment is largely replaced in the New Testament by that of loss of relationship 
with Christ. However he doesn't exclude the concept of retribution entirely. See, for example, p. 77, point 
7; and p. 171, point 12. More recently he has written: "I have argued that Paul's understanding of the death 
of Christ does not include the idea that he bore the retributive punishment for our sins which otherwise 
would have to be inflicted on us." [Stephen H. Travis, "Christ as Bearer of Divine Judgment" in Green, 
Joel B., and Max Turner, eds. Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ. Essays on the Historical Jesus and 
New Testament Christology. Festschrift for I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 
344.] Pinnock and Brow comment succinctly: Hell is not retributive punishment." [C.H. Pinnock & R.C. 
Brow, Unbounded Love: A Good News Theology for the 2 r' Century (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994), p. 88.] 
94 N. Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and 
Humanitarianism." in Journal of the History of Ideas 37/2 (April-June 1976), p. 213. Harmon describes 
this statement as "a deft understatement." [Harmon, Finally Excluded, op. cit., p.103.] 
95 Fudge, op. cit., p.412. 
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unevangelized pagans or deceased infants, the degree and nature of the 
punishment, and even the matter of possible salvation beyond the present life. 96 
Another, and more succinct, summary of differences is provided by Powys who offers a 
four-fold classification of controversy over the duration, quality, finality and purpose of 
hell.97 
There are however certain features which are common to the evangelical understanding of 
Traditionalism, and which I will be assuming in my use of the term. These include the 
view that hell is primarily punishment for sin committed in this life and that the damned 
continue to sin in hell. Since I believe that these features are the most common position in 
the tradition I will refer to such a form of Traditionalism as 'classic', where I need to 
distinguish it from the modified Traditionalism I will propose in the course of this thesis. 
Fudge writes of his choice of the terms Traditionalism and Conditionalism that "Although 
some authors on both sides intentionally use loaded terms to describe the two positions, 
these words are chosen in the hope of avoiding any unfair connotations. "98 However the 
term Traditionalism does signal that this is the predominant position in the W estem 
theological tradition. The ACUTE report summarises: "We recognise that the 
interpretation of hell as eternal conscious punishment is the one most widely attested by 
the Church in its historic formulation of doctrine and in its understanding of Scripture. We 
also recognise that it represents the classic, mainstream evangelical position. "99 Sachs, 
writing of the Roman Catholic scene, comments on "the rather modest pronouncements by 
the magisterium concerning hell ... 11100 However, he lists several conciliar statement which 
affirm Traditionalism. 
According to the Provincial Council of Constantinople (543) the punishment of the 
demons and impious will have no end (DS 411 ). Lateran IV (1215) states that the 
96 E.W. Fudge, The Fire That Consumes: The Biblical Case for Conditional Immortality (Carlisle: 
Paternoster Press, 1994, 2nd rev. ed. Revising Editor, Peter Cousins), p. 5. The final point is still highly 
disputed as to whether it is an evangelical option, and Pinnock, an annihilationist, is rare in proposing it. 
[See ACUTE, op. cit., pp. 89-92]. (Fudge gives a more extended list of such differences amongst 
traditionalists in the first edition of his book. [Fudge, F' ed, op. cit., pp. 423-425.] [The 2nd edition is 
largely a condensation, although material has been added in a few footnotes, interacting with some more 
recent literature. Given its condensed nature and limited revision, I will usually quote from the first 
edition, and all references to Fudge will be to this edition unless specifically stated.] 
97 Powys, Debates, pp. 93-138. 
9s F d . . u ge, op. Cit.' p. XVI. 
99 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 134. 
100 J.R. Sachs, "Current Eschatology: Universal Salvation and the Problem of Hell," in Theological 
Studies 52 (June 1991), p. 238. 
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dead will rise and receive, according to their works, eternal reward with Christ or 
eternal punishment with the devil (DS 801 ) ... The Congregation of the Doctrine of 
the Faith (1979) has recently affirmed an "eternal punishment for the sinner, who 
will be deprived of the sight of God, and that this punishment will have a 
repercussion on the whole being of the sinner. 101 
I would also note that The Athanasian Creed proclaims, "At whose [Jesus'] coming all 
men shall rise again with their bodies: and ... they that have done evil into everlasting 
fire."102 
There is a similarly uniform tradition in the Protestant tradition, to which most 
evangelicals bear a closer allegiance. Peterson offers a brief selection of Protestant 
Confessions. 
The Lutheran church's Augsburg Confession (1530) affirms, "It is also taught 
among us that our Lord Jesus Christ will return on the last day for judgment and 
will raise up all the dead ... to condemn ungodly men and the devil to hell and 
eternal punishment."103 Presbyterians likewise historically have believed in [a 
traditionalist] hell, as the Westminster Confession of Faith bears witness: "The 
wicked ... shall be cast into eternal torments, and be punished with everlasting 
destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of His power."104 
Baptists also have declared in writing their commitment to the orthodox doctrine. 
We see this in the Southern Baptist Convention's "The Baptist Faith and Message" 
of 1963: "Christ will judge all men in righteousness. The unrighteous will be 
consigned to hell, the place of everlasting punishment." 105106 
A survey of evangelical confessional statements, mainly from the United Kingdom, is 
given in an Appendix in the ACUTE report. 107 There they note that there are explicit 
affirmations of the traditionalist position in the Doctrinal Basis of the British Evangelical 
Council (1953); the Constitution of The Evangelical Movement of Wales (1955) and the 
Doctrinal Basis of The Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches (1922). A 
101 Ibid., pp. 238-9, n. 48. 
102 Book of Common Prayer. Although many annihilationists affirm the notion of everlasting fire, but 
reject everlasting torment, the Athanasian Creed was written with a traditionalist understanding of the 
phrase. 
103 Theodore G. Tappert, ed. The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), p. 21. 
104 The Westminster Standards (Philadelphia: The Great Commission Publications, n.d.). Reformed 
churches likewise affirm the doctrine of hell; see the Second Helvetic Confession, chap. 26, and the 
Dordrecht Confession, art. 18. 
105 Encyclopedia of Southern Baptists, 3 vols. (Nashville: Broadman, 1971), 3:1592. An older symbol, 
respected by many Baptists, is The Philadelphia Confession of Faith of 1742, which is modelled after The 
Second London Confession of 1689. Its chap. 32, sec. 2 is almost identical to the section of the 
Westminster Confession quoted above. 
106 Peterson, op. cit., pp. 240-241. 
107 ACUTE, op. cit., pp.136-138. 
38 
significant change though is noted in the revision of the Evangelical Alliance Basis of 
Faith (1970), which removed a clear traditionalist clause in the 1846 original. ACUTE 
suggests that this change may have been to allow annihilationists to sign. In clarifying their 
own understanding they conclude, "We understand the current Evangelical Alliance Basis 
of Faith to allow both traditionalist and conditionalist interpretations of hell. 11108 They then 
recommend the inclusion of a further clause, "as a means of clarifying what we take to be 
an implicit openness to conditionalism in the present wording of the Basis." 109 There is 
therefore some variation in recent evangelical confessional statements as to whether 
Annihilationism is an option. Certainly this most recent report by ACUTE represent a 
significant advocacy of a policy to include both positions. However, it should be noted that 
none of the confessions noted advocate Annihilationism to the exclusion of 
Traditionalism. 
In summary, even in the light of the evidence of recent evangelical confessions, Pinnock is 
perhaps a little cautious when he writes only of" ... the semi-official position of the church 
since approximately the sixth century has been that hell lasts forever and that human 
beings thrown into it are tormented endlessly."110 A more accurate statement, which 
includes the views of theologians as well as confessional statements, comes from 
Bauckham: 
Until the nineteenth century almost all Christian theologians taught the reality of 
eternal torment in hell. Here and there, outside the theological mainstream, were 
some who believed that the wicked would be finally annihilated ... Even fewer 
were the advocates of universal salvation, though these few included some major 
theologians of the early church. Eternal punishment was firmly asserted in official 
creeds and confessions of the churches. It must have seemed as indispensable a 
part of universal Christian belief as the doctrines of the Trinity and the 
incarnation. 111 
Several annihilationists acknowledge the strength of this tradition. Pinnock declares that 
the "strongest argument for holding the Augustinian view of hell is the long tradition."112 
108 Ibid., p. 134. 
109 Ibid., pp. 134-5. 
110 Pinnock, Fire, p. 40. 
111 Richard J. Bauckham, "Universalism: A Historical Survey," in Themelios 4/2 (January 1979): p. 48. 
Bauckham continues, "Since 1800 the situation has entirely changes, and no traditional Christian doctrine 
has been so widely abandoned as that of eternal punishment." [Ibid., p. 48.] However I would suggest that 
this abandonment has not been the case amongst evangelicals. 
112 Pinnock, Destruction, p. 257. 
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Stott judges that Traditionalism "has to be described as traditional orthodoxy, for most of 
the church fathers, the medieval theologians and the Reformers held it. And probably most 
Evangelical leaders hold it today."113 He also mentions that his hesitancy to acknowledge 
his belief in Annihilationism is due to his respect for the "lon~standing tradition which 
claims to be a true interpretation of Scripture."114 Therefore the use of the term 
'Traditionalism' points to the prominence of that position in the tradition. I now turn to a 
brief summary of the annihilationist tradition. 
1.4 The History of Annihilationism 
In this history of Annihilationism, I shall spend most time on the recent debate which is 
the focus of this thesis, and only touch very briefly on the earlier periods. The standard 
articles on Annihilationism usually cite the first Christian annihilationist theory as that of 
the African apologist Arnobius at the beginning of the fourth century (Disput. adv. Gentes, 
ii.15-54). 115 Peterson offers an explanation for including a study of Arnobius, which 
highlights both the rarity of this position, and the poor quality of his work. 
[ Arno bi us] is included here because a better representative of annihilationism 
could not be found in the early church, Middle Ages, or Reformation. He does not 
make much of the Bible, but that may be due to his purposes in writing his defence 
of the faith, Against the Pagans. His theological argumentation is not strong, but 
that doesn' t mean that there are no good arguments for annihilationism. It does 
mean, however, that there are no good arguments for it in the period we have 
studied. 116 
From the fowth century a leap is usually made to the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Although there were a number of philosophers and theologians who held that extinction 
occurred at physical death, there were very few who held to the form of 'Annihilationisrn' 
which is the subject of this thesis. The chief exceptions are noted by Walker: "as Locke, 
Whiston and some Socinians believed, the wicked will be annihilated only after having 
113 Stott, op. cit., p. 314. 
114 Ibid., p. 319. 
115 Perhaps the most reliable of the many brief histories of Annihilationism prior to the recent debate is 
Warfield's article in Schaff-Herzog. The lengthiest, but not always reliable, historical survey is by Froom 
[L.E. Froom, The Conditionalist Faith of our Fathers, 2 Vols. (Washington: Review and Herald 
Publishing Association, 1965).]. There are also lengthy histories in Fudge [op. cit.] and Powys [HardJ as 
well as specialist studies by Walker on the seventeenth century [The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century 
Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964)] and Rowell on the 
nineteenth century [ op. cit.]. 
116 Peterson, op. cit., p.115. 
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suffered a period of torment appropriate in length to their sins."117 "The real extension of 
the theory" Warfield comments, referring to writers who did generally hold a form of what 
I have defined as Annihilationism "belongs, however, only to the second half of the 
nineteenth century. During this period it attained, chiefly through the able advocacy of it 
by C.F. Hudson and E. White, something like a popular vogue in English-speaking 
lands." 118 Leckie, writing in 1918, looks back to the previous century: 
But it was not until the nineteenth century that the doctrine really attained to 
fullness of expression, or received the support of any considerable number of 
thinkers. During that century, however, it did achieve a position of considerable 
influence and was expounded in several important works both of theology and 
philo ophy; and it is probable that it continues in our day to increase the number of 
its adherents. 119 
Fudge concludes: "The nineteenth century saw a revival of conditionalism that swept 
across national linguistic and denominational lines.'.i 2o Wenham writes of "the nineteenth 
century which was the heyday of conditionalism among Evangelicals," and he notes B.L. 
Bateson' s estimation that 'at least fifty books and pamphlets appeared and many items of 
correspondence appeared on both sides in Christian magazines." 121 Jim Packer is thus 
wrong in his claim that Traditionalism "was never queried with any seriousness [by 
Evangelicals] until the twentieth century." 122 However, by the time the first edition of The 
Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church was published in 1957 the writer of the article 
on "Conditional Immortality" could summarise with these words: "Though still used in 
certain kinds of popular apologetics, it has nowadays but few defenders among serious 
Christian theologians." 123 Since that was written there has been something of a revival in 
Annihilationism. 
117 Walker, op. cit., p. 67. 
118 Warfield, Schaff-Herzog, p. 185. J.H. Leckie, writing in 1918, judges that White's Life in Christ was 
the most important exposition of Annihilationism from a biblical standpoint. [Quoted in Toon, op. cit., 
p.176.] Again, H.W. Fulford writes: "[White's] Life in Christ, which is justly regarded as an epoch-
making book in the history of Conditionalism." [Hastings, s.v. 'Conditional Immortality', p. 824, c. 1] 
Froom also concurs: "more than any other individual in the nineteenth century ... [White] was instrumental 
in bringing the principles of Conditional Immortality to prominence and respect." [Froom, op. cit., vol. 2, 
p. 322.] 
119 Leckie, op. cit., p. 225. 
12° Fudge, op. cit., p. 401. Fudge's own list of "a few of the more notable authors" in a sub-section of'The 
Nineteenth Century' entitled 'Notable Conditionalists' comprises the following: Richard Whately (A View 
of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State, 1829); Edward White (Life in Christ, 1846); 
Henry Constable (Duration and Nature of Future Punishment, 1868); Joseph B. Rotherham (The only 
work mentioned is a letter to the Christian World, June 19, 1874.); and Emmanuel Petavel-Olliff (The 
Problem of Immortality, 1891). [Ibid., p.401.] 
121 Wenham, Case, p. 181, and n. 27, quoting from a private communication. 
122 Packer, op. cit., p. 23. 
123 Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (1 st ed., Oxford: OUP, 1957.) p. 325, c. 2. 
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The beginning of the recent debate about the endlessness of hell amongst English-
speaking evangelicals is probably to be traced to the publication of The Goodness of God 
by John Wenham in 1974.124 In his autobiography, Wenham comments on the decision of 
the IVP to publish this book, with its brief case for Annihilationism: "They agreed to this, 
and so a great watershed was crossed. I don't think that any other evangelical publishers 
jealous of their orthodoxy had previously consented to do this at any time during the 
twentieth century."125 Wenham notes two other evangelical scholars in the early part of the 
century who had held annihilationist views but had found it difficult to find reputable 
evangelical publishers who were willing to publish their work. He cites H.E. Guillebaud's 
work The Righteous Judge subtitled A Study of the Biblical Doctrine of Everlasting 
Punishment, which was eventually published privately in 1964 but, according to a 
publisher's note, was "written not long before its author's death in 1941."126 In the 1940's 
B.F.C. Atkinson also published privately a work entitled Life and Immortality: An 
Examination of the Nature and Meaning of Life and Death as they are revealed in the 
Scriptures. 127 Atkinson was a prominent figure in English evangelical circles, particularly 
through the Cambridge Inter-Collegiate Christian Union during his long career in 
Cambridge from 1925-1960, and Wenham says that he learnt Annihilationism from him in 
about 1934:28 One other work taking an annihilationist position pre-1974 is J Stafford 
Wright's book What is Man?, published in 1955. In his autobiography, Wenham notes 
what may have been another influential step in the spread of annihilationist thought, and 
also offers a more comprehensive list of leading evangelical annihilationists. 
In 1954 the Tyndale Fellowship had given a whole conference to the study of the 
fate of the lost, which had confirmed my belief in conditional immortality, a view 
shared by many of IVF' s staunchest supporters, like Basil Atkinson, Harold 
Guillebaud, Stafford Wright, Robert Clark and Norman Anderson. 129 
124 Wenham, Goodness. 
125 Wenham, Facing, p. 179. Some years earlier Eryl Davies also described this book as a "watershed." 
Davies, op. cit., p. 10. 
126 Guillebaud, op. cit .. B.F.C. Atkinson writes in the introduction that Guillebaud, when dealing with the 
question of everlasting torment in a book for Inter-Varsity Fellowship, found that he could not answer the 
question satisfactorily and thus this chapter was omitted from the _published work and later expanded into 
this book. Tidball claims that it was "written in the 1930s, ... " [Derek J. Tidball, Who Are The 
Evangelicals? (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994), p. 152] 
127 B.F.C. Atkinson, Life and Immortality (Published privately, n.d.). Carson gives the details as London: 
Goodman, 1962. [Carson, Gagging, p. 525.] 
128 Wenham, Case, p.163. 
129 Wenham, Facing, pp. 178-9. 
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However only twenty-five years ago Annihilationism was viewed by most evangelicals 
with grave suspicion, and few public proponents could be found. Wenham himself 
recounts how when his manuscript for The Goodness of God was presented to IVP in 
1973, "they were up in arms and a long correspondence ensued which ended with a 
conference with some of their senior people." 130 Until the debate begun in the seventies, 
there was very little dissension from the traditionalist doctrine of hell. One marker of the 
change that has occurred is the New Bible Dictionary, an important evangelical reference 
work. When it was first published in 1962, it included the following conclusion in the 
article on "Hell" written by D.K. Innes: "The reality and eternity of suffering in Gehenna is 
an element of biblical truth that an honest exegesis cannot evade." 131 The revised edition 
of the same work, issued in 1982, has the same author writing on this subject, but with a 
different emphasis:" ... the New Testament leaves the door open for the belief that while 
hell as a manifestation of God's implacable wrath against sin is unending, the existence of 
those who suffer in it may not be." 132 A similar openness in a standard text is also found, 
for example, in IVP's Pocket Guide to Christian Beliefs. Written by Howard Marshall, it 
records without expressed preference that "Opinions differ as to whether [ eternal 
punishment] means eternal conscious torment or annihilation." 133 
Since the publication of Wenham's "watershed" book, The Goodness of God, with its brief 
and modest call for "the serious consideration of the case for conditional immortality,"134 
there has been a growing number of evangelical scholars espousing Annihilationism in 
print. Scholars taking an annihilationist line, even if only tentatively, would include the 
following. J.N.D. Anderson wrote, in the book of a lecture series delivered in 1975, 
What must, moreover, be regarded as the traditional view of hell sees this 
condemnation in terms of an eternal, conscious separation from God; but it would, 
I believe, be equally true to biblical teaching to express it in terms of a death and 
destruction which is "eternal" in the sense that it is final and irreversible. 135 
130 Wenham, Case, p. 164 
131 J.D. Douglas, ed., The New Bible Dictionary (London: Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 1962), p. 519. Quoted 
by Harmon, Finally Excluded, op. cit., p. 231. , 
132 N. Hillyer, ed., The New Bible Dictionary (2nd ed., Leicester: IVP, 1982), p. 473. 
133 I.H. Marshall, Pocket Guide To Christian Beliefs (Leicester: IVP, 3rd ed., 1982), p. 136. 
134 Wenham, Goodness, p. 41. The issue is only directly dealt with on pages 34-41. 
135 J.N.D. Anderson, Issues of Life and Death (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p. 29. That 
Anderson is indeed talking about Annihilationism is underlined by his reference at this point to Basil 
Atkinson's book, Life and Immortality. [Atkinson, op. cit .. ] 
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Other evangelical scholars espousing Annihilationism include Stephen Travis, with his 
Christian Hope and the Future of Man in 1980136 (and, at a more popular level I Believe 
in the Second Coming of Jesus in 1982137); P.E. Hughes in chapter 37 of his 1989 book 
The True lmage 138 entitled Is the Soul Immortal?; Nigel Wright in The Radical 
Evangelicazl 39; David Powys, with his essay surveying Nineteenth and Twentieth century 
debates about hell 140, and the publication of his doctoral thesis as 'Hell': a Hard Look at a 
Hard Question; more recently still E. Earle Ellis in an essay entitled "New Testament 
Teaching on Hell" 141 ; and Clark Pinnock. 142 Pinnock's writings on hell can be found in 
several places, which include the following. In 1987 he wrote a brief article entitled "Fire, 
Then Nothing" for the Christianity Today Institute study of Universalism, in which he 
asked for evangelicals to consider Annihilationism. 143 He then defended this position at 
greater length in a 1990 article in the Criswell Theological Review144, and he has further 
expanded his arguments in a section of the book Hell: Four Views. 145 The in 1994 he co-
authored Unbounded Love with Robert Brow, which includes a chapter on hell entitled 
"Hell: Rejecting Love". 146 
136 Travis, Hope. 
137 Travis, I Believe in the Second Coming of Jesus (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982). 
138 P .E. Hughes, The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ (Leicester, IVP, 1989.) See 
especially pages 402-7. 
139 Nigel Wright, The Radical Evangelical: Seeking a Place to Stand (London: SPCK, 1996), pp. 87-102. 
140 David J. Powys, "The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Debates about Hell and Universalism," in 
N.M. de S. Cameron ed. Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), pp. 93-
138. 
141 E. Earle Ellis, "The New Testament Teaching on Hell", in K.E. Brower & M.W. Elliott eds., 'The Reader 
Must Understand': Eschatology in Bible and Theology (Leicester: Apollos, 1997), pp. 199-219. 
142 Moore notes, "There is some doubt whether Pinnock remains an evangelical any longer." [Moore, op. 
cit., p. 13, n. 41]. Moore rightly notes that "There is a fair bit of disagreement about what constitutes true 
evangelical belief." [Ibid.] Pinnock's move in theology has been labelled a 'megashift' [Modern 
Reformation, Spring 1993], and includes changes in doctrine such as an inclusivist rather than an exclusivist 
approach to world religions and subjective, exemplarist theories of the atonement, rather than objective and 
substitutionary models. [See, for example, Tracking the Maze (New York: Harper and Row, 1990)]. 
However Moore continues to label Pinnock an evangelical "to attest to the fact that Pinnock et al. are 
clearly products of the evangelical ethos." [Moore, op. cit., p. 13.] While I agree with Moore's 
conclusion, I think that the stronger reason is simply that Pinnock is quoted in the literature as an 
authority, and thus treated as an evangelical for the purposes of this debate. 
143 Pinnock, Fire, pp. 20-21. 
144 Pinnock, Destruction, pp. 243-259. 
145 Pinnock, Conditional, 1992. Erickson notes that, "In the United States, the most complete argument for 
annihilation among evangelicals has been offered by Clark Pinnock." [M. Erickson, The Evangelical Left 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), p. 116]. While I think that this accolade should be awarded to Fudge, it 
does indicate the importance of Pinnock in the debate. Blomberg also indicates the influence of Pinnock: 
"... none [ of the recent defenders of Annihilationism] has generated so much response as Stott 
(particularly in the UK) and Pinnock (particularly in the US)." [Craig Blomberg, "Eschatology and the 
Church: Some New Testament Perspectives," Themelios 23/3 (June 1998): p. 21, n. 4.] 
146 Pinnock, Unbounded Love, pp. 87-95. 
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At the more popular level Michael Green briefly expressed his view in Evangelism 
Through the Local Church in 1990. 147 In the context of a discussion concerning those who 
have never heard the gospel, he states: "Christians, therefore, should reject the doctrine of 
conscious eternal torment for those who have never heard the gospel just as firmly as they 
reject Universalism." 148 While this refers specifically to those who have never heard the 
gospel, and different conditions might obtain for others, the logic of Green's arguments 
would require that all those who are not saved suffer some form of annihilation. Green 
concludes, "I doubt very much if [eternal conscious torment] is a genuinely Christian 
option.',149 Certainly Wenham regards Green as an annihilationist from the evidence of 
this book: "Michael Green also committed to print his belief in conditional immortality 
in 1990."150 I would also note Roger Forster's booklet, Eternal Destiny: Heaven and 
Hell. 151 
Probably the most influential evangelical proponent though is John Stott, who i 
Essentials writes that he holds this belief 'tentatively.'152 Blanchard comments: "John Stott 
is the best-known contemporary Christian spokesman said to be in favour of conditional 
immortality, ... "153 and Fudge judges that Stott "is generally regarded as the dean of world-
wide evangelicalism, ... "154 In Essentials Stott writes in response to David Edwards: 
"You rightly declare that I have never publicly declared whether I think hell, in addition 
to being real, terrible and eternal, will involve the experience of everlasting 
suffering." 155 In the light of this it is interesting to note two intimations of reservations 
from Stott in 1975, quoted by Eryl Davies. In an interview with the editor of The 
Evangelical Magazine of Wales Stott said that he was agnostic about Annihilationism, 
and went on to say: "Those who emphasise that hell will go on and on have not faced up 
to the problem of time." Then in his book Christian Mission and the Modern World he 
147 E.M.B. Green, Evangelism Through the Local Church (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), p. 69f. 
148 Ibid, p. 70. 
149 Ibid., p. 69 [Italics original]. 
150 Wenham, Facing, p. 234. 
151 Roger T. Forster, Eternal Destiny: Heaven and Hell (London: Icthus Christian Fellowship, 1992). 
152 Stott, op. cit., p. 319. 
153 J. Blanchard, Whatever Happened to Hell? (Darlington: Evangelical Press), p. 213. 
154 d nd d . 10 Fu ge, 2 e ., op. cit., p. . 
155 Stott, op. cit., p. 314 
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spoke of a "certain reverent and humble agnosticism about the precise nature of Hell." 156 
Wenham sheds another ray of light when he notes that "[Stott] has told me that he has 
spoken about it for thirty or forty years.'iI 57 I will discuss Stott's position more fully 
below. However, the impact of the publication of Essentials in 1988, with what 
Blomberg calls "John Stott's famous admission," 158 is noted by the ACUTE report: 
"Conditionalism has attracted much greater attention within evangelical circles since 
1988. 11159 
However the most important book in favour of Annihilationism in the current debate in 
terms of its range and depth of coverage has been written by the American Edward Fudge. 
In the opening pages of his article "The Case for Conditional Immortality," published in 
1992 (but written in 1990), John Wenham notes that when he wrote The Goodness of God 
in 1973, with its tentative espousal of Annihilationism, the three key annihilationist books 
were those of L.E. Froom, 160 Basil Atkinson and Harold Guillebaud. 161 Wenham goes on 
to note not only what he perceives as the failure of supporters of the traditional doctrine t 
provide a reply to these works, but also what he judges to be the single major 
annihilationist addition to this list since then. 
So I have been waiting since 1973 for a reply to the massive work of Froom (2,476 
pages), to Atkinson's closely argued 112 pages, to Guillebaud's 67 and (more 
important) to the one additional (excellent) book which has appeared on the 
conditionalist side: Edward Fudge's The Fire That Consumes of 500 pages (Texas: 
Providential Press, 1982). 162 
In a striking testimony to Wenham's high estimation of these four writers as superior to 
the others mentioned I would note his comment on a book by traditionalist Ajith 
Fernando: "He pays some attention to Conditionalism, referring to Stott, Travis and 
Pinnock, but to no major conditionalist work."163 The implication of Wenham's words is 
that these other books are the 'major conditionalist works'. Peterson also judges that "The 
156 Stott, Christian Mission in the Modern World, p. 112, quoted in Eryl Davies, op. cit., Chapter 1. 
157 Wenham, Case, p. 166. 
158 Blomberg, op. cit., p. 4. 
159 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 5. The ACUTE report also hints at the influence of John Stott in redrafting the 
Evangelical Alliance Basis ofFaith so that it would be open to annihilationists. [Ibid., p. 6, p. 66.]. Stott 
convened the Evangelical Alliance's Theological Study Group dtJring the period of revision from 1967-
1970. [Ibid, p. 66, n. 47]. 
160 F . room, op. cit .. 
161 Wenham, Case, p.162. 
162 Ibid., p. 231. 
163 Ibid., p. 167, n. 9. Wenham is referring to Ajith Fernando's book Crucial Questions About Hell 
(Eastbourne: Kingsway, 1991 ). 
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four best books espousing Annihilationism have been written in this century." 164 His 
selection is the same as Wenham's. The importance of Fudge's book is further underlined 
by comments in a paper given by Kendall Harmon at the same Edinburgh Conference as 
Wenham delivered his. Harmon's paper was entitled "The Case Against Conditionalism: A 
response to Edward William Fudge", and he gives the following justification for choice: 
There are two reasons for choosing the work of Mr Fudge. First, although not as 
prominent as John Stott or Philip Hughes, Mr Fudge's work is much more 
substantial than theirs (500 pages) and is devoted exclusively to the doctrine of 
hell. Secondly, Mr Fudge's book has been praised for its tone and its thoroughness. 
Dr John Gerstner, an evangelical Presbyterian who taught at Pittsburgh 
Theological Seminary for many years, recently called Fudge's book 'the ablest 
critique of [the traditional understanding ofJ hell by a believer in the inspiration of 
the Bible ... there hasn't been anything comparable to it in this century.t1 65 
As might be expected, not all annihilationists hold their views with the same strength of 
conviction. Back in 1918 Leckie noted an interesting trend: 
The most significant sign of the times, in this regard, is the increasing tendency 
among Evangelical theologians to adopt an "agnostic" attitude towards the whole 
problem of Destiny. This type of thought is, indeed, so prevalent and so influential 
that it may be well to indicate its general characteristics. For example, it always 
affirms that the scriptural evidence is inconclusive; ... But its most distinctive 
feature is that it is generally stated in such a way as to show that its advocate 
inclines towards some positive conclusion ... Thus, Dr. Agar Beet, while he asserts, 
on scriptural grounds, an agnostic view, yet finds no speculative weakness in 
Conditionalism. 166 
In the recent debate there are several writers who would fit Leckie's description of being 
'agnostic' and yet inclining to the positive conclusion of Annihilationism. Thus Stephen 
Travis argues that " ... it is difficult to decide between annihilation and eternal torment on 
purely exegetical grounds." 167 He argues that this ambiguity is the result of the secondary 
importance of the subject to the biblical writers for whom much the most significant thing 
about the destiny of the unjust is that they will be separated from God. Compared to that 
fact there is little point in asking for a more precise definition of their destiny, whether it 
involves continued conscious existence or not. In fact "once this idea of relationship is 
164 Peterson, op. cit., pp. 161-2. 
165 Harmon, op. cit., pp. 193-4. The Gerstner quote is from The Christian Observer, July 6, 1990, p. 11. 
Wenham comments on the choice of Pinnock as a representative of evangelical Annihilationism in 
Harmon's thesis, by noting, "I understand he has done this for reasons of space. He regards Fudge as a 
stronger representative of this school of thought but considers his earlier critique of Fudge in 
Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell is sufficient refutation." Wenham, Facing, p. 262. 
166 Leckie, op. cit., p.196. 
167 Travis, Hope, p.135. 
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seen to be fundamental, questions about the details of the after-life become ultimately 
irrelevant." However, he continues, "If pressed, I must opt for ['conditional 
immortality']." 168 Clark Pinnock takes a similar line to Travis on the nature of the biblical 
material: that it is simply not intending to furnish us with details about the afterlife, 
although it does tend towards Annihilationism.169 However, as I will demonstrate below, 
for doctrinal reasons he comes down strongly in favour of Annihilationism . 
John Stott also takes an 'agnostic' position, while opting for Annihilationism. John 
Wenham notes that, "[Stott] says he prefers to describe himself as 'agnostic' which, he tells 
me, is how the late F.F. Bruce also described his position ... in [Stott's] view Scripture 
does not come down unequivocally on either side" .170 Stott himself writes, "Scripture is 
not absolutely plain ... The late Professor F.F. Bruce wrote to me in 1989 that 'annihilation 
is certainly an acceptable interpretation of the relevant New testament passages'. He added: 
'For myself I remain agnostic'. My position is similar."171 In Essentials, Stott ends his 
discussion with a cautious conclusion and a modest aim: "I do not dogmatise about the 
position to which I have come. I hold it tentatively. . . I also believe that the ultimate 
annihilation of the wicked should at least be accepted as a legitimate, biblically founded 
alternative to their eternal conscious torment" .172 However, Stott can also write of 
Traditionalism that "emotionally, I find the concept intolerable and do not understand how 
people can live with it without either cauterising their feelings or cracking under the 
strain. " 173 In the light of such strong and definite feelings, one might expect that Stott 
would deny Traditionalism as a valid evangelical option, but he doesn't, affirming that 
emotions are subordinate as an authority to Scripture, and thus he formally maintains his 
more tentative conclusion. Wenham' s quote above also described F .F. Bruce as holding an 
'agnostic' position like Stott. However, Bruce seems to be more agnostic than Stott from 
his Introduction to Fudge's book, where he writes: 
168 Travis, Believe, p. 198. (See his discussion throughout chapter 6: The Dark Side of Hope, and the 
briefer statement in "The Problem of Judgement" in Themelios 11/4, pp. 52-57.) 
169 For example, Conditional, p. 144. 
170 Wenham, Case, p.166. 
171 Stott, "The Logic of Hell: A Brief Rejoinder," in Evangelical Review of Theology 18 (1994), p. 34. 
172 Stott, Essentials, p. 320. Klaas Runia is thus inaccurate when he writes that, compared to John 
Wenham who "leaves the matter open", "John Stott goes a step further. He deliberately opts for the idea of 
annihilation ... " [Klaas Runia, "Eschatology in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century" in Calvin 
Theological Journal 32/1 (April 1997), p. 133. Italics original.] 
173 Ibid., p. 314. 
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I suppose that, as the terms are defined in this work, I would be regarded as neither 
a traditionalist nor a conditionalist. My own understanding of the issues under 
discussion would be very much in line with that of C.S. Lewis. Lewis did not 
systematize his thoughts on the subject (and I have not done so either). 174 
The difficulty of this statement is that Lewis' own position was unclear and open to 
different interpretations. Wenham briefly notes, "[Lewis] clearly believed in some 
continuance of the damned ... Lewis, though still believing in the Black Hole [ an image of 
a traditionalist hell in The Pilgrim's Regress], has turned it into a very different (and 
somewhat elusive!) concept."175 
I would also note the more definite agnosticism of Peter Toon who argues that the effort to 
determine "whether hell means everlasting punishment or annihilation after judgement 
may be interesting but is both a waste of time and an attempt to know what we cannot 
know." 176 Rather than comment directly on this claim, I will simply note that the majority 
of writers do believe that the evidence points one way or the other, even if only tentatively, 
and I am primarily concerned with a study of these writers. Indeed, I think that the position 
of Travis and others like him is a declining, minority position in the current evangelical 
debate which is increasingly being conducted between convinced opponents. 
There is also a small but diverse group of writers who in effect argue for both 
Annihilationism and Traditionalism, claiming that their reconciliation is a mystery. One 
example of this position is Harry Blamires: 
We human beings cannot combine the notion of endless torment with the notion of 
death or destruction. What is endless must go on and on indefinitely. On the other 
114 F d . . .. u ge, op. Clt.' p. Vlll. 
175 Wenham, Facing, pp.261-2. The Pilgrim's Regress, (Rev. ed. London: Geoffrey Bies, 1943). For an 
extensive study see Harmon's thesis, Finally Excluded, chapter 4, where he studies Lewis as a 
representative of the traditional doctrine of hell. 
176 Peter Toon, Heaven and Hell: A Biblical and Theological Overview (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 
1986), p. 201. This reflects a significant trend beyond evangelicalism. Hannon notes: "One of the clearest 
ways in which twentieth century eschatology stands out from that of earlier times is in the degree of 
agnosticism which pervades the discussion." [Hannon, Finally Excluded, p.348]. He then goes on to quote 
from the 1922 report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine of the Archbishops of Canterbury and 
York which "serves as a symbol of contemporary eschatological tentativeness. They concluded: "Whether 
in fact any soul will suffer final loss in either sense [Conditionalism or Traditionalism] it is not possible 
for man to pronounce." The question "must" be left open, there "must be room in the Church" for all three 
views. The report goes on to note that "probably the majority feel strongly the force of the argument on 
both sides and are content to hold their minds in suspense." [Ibid., pp. 348f, quoting from Doctrine in the 
Church of England, The Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine Appointed by the Archbishops 
of Canterbury and York in 1922, pp. 218-219.] Hannon then comments that "This would never have been 
written in the sixteenth century when the traditional doctrine was written in so many creeds; it represents a 
permanent legacy from the nineteenth century to our own." [Hannon, Finally Excluded, p. 348]. 
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hand, total destruction must involve an abolition of consciousness which is final. It 
could be argued that at the point where the human mind runs up against a brick 
wall in its exploration of the hereafter it must accept the mystery ... the seeming 
irreconcilability of the notion of everlasting punishment with the threat of total 
annihilation has been a problem for centuries ... the problem is already latent in the 
New Testament in the competing threats of everlasting fire on the one hand and 
death or destruction on the other hand. 177 
Blamires gives one pointer forward: "The seemingly irreconcilable destinies of endless 
torment and total destruction can be said to be reconciled only in so far as the apostle 
Paul reconciled them in his reference to destruction as deprivation of God's presence." 
178 However, he doesn't develop this idea. The difficulty for this position is that it has to 
counter two sets of arguments: the arguments both sides raise to those who take the 
opposing view. 
A similarly agnostic position is advocated, briefly, by Bauckham and Hart who argue from 
the nature of eschatological language, which is quoted above. They concluded: "Our 
contention that eschatological language is irreducibly imaginative suggests that we should 
be content to let the various images stand, not reducing one to another, ... "179 This reflects 
what may be a growing sensitivity amongst evangelicals to the nature of eschatological 
language in the Bible, and the limits it may place on doctrinal formulations. John Stott, 
writing in 1993 in response to an article on Annihilationism, says, "In Dr Chan's article I 
think his paragraph on 'understanding metaphor' may offer the most fruitful way forward 
in our continuing inter-evangelical dialogue." 180 However, not only are doctrinal 
arguments put forward by writers like Stott which need to be assessed, but as Bauckham 
and Hart point out there is the outstanding need to assess a view of hell by its consistency 
with other doctrines such as the nature of God and the work of Christ. I will aim to do both 
of these things in this thesis. 181 
177 H. Blamires, Knowing the Truth About Heaven and Hell: Our Choices and Where They Lead Us 
(Servant Books: Ann Arbour, Michigan, 1988), pp. 65, 67-68. While coming from a more catholic 
churchmanship than most evangelicals, Blamires would share the key evangelical assumptions about 
Scripture, and is widely read by evangelicals. 
178 Ibid., p. 66. 
179 Bauckham and Hart, op. cit., pp. 146-7. 
180 Stott, Logic p.3. 
181 Guillebaud discusses the view of Agar Beet under the heading, 'Is the Scripture Ambiguous?', which, 
from an earlier period, has many similarities to these current 'ambiguous' views. [Guillebaud, op. cit., pp. 
17-19]. "Dr. Agar Beet in The Last Things put forward with great learning and ability the view that, as 
between endless torment and the ultimate ending of existence, the teaching of the Bible is ambiguous. 
Neither view is ruled out, neither can be held to be definitively proved from the Bible ... In sum, he holds 
that God has not seen fit to reveal to us clearly and certainly what the ultimate fate of the wicked will be, 
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Another writer who argues that both positions might in some sense be true is Douglas 
Spanner, who draws on the insights of Einstein's theory of relativity which "seem to 
indicate that from different points of view a real event may be both on-going and 
endless ... and at the same time over and done with ... "182 He concludes, "The two 
opposing doctrines [of hell] we set out to examine many not be irreconcilable." 183 It is 
noteworthy that the ACUTE report mentions Spanner's view and concludes "hell might be 
experienced as annihilation but observed as continuing punishment, gradually fading from 
view." 184 This is an interesting speculation, but since the proposal requires the acceptance 
of modem scientific theories it has few points of contact with the arguments in the 
tradition, and has not been discussed beyond the ACUTE reference in the recent literature. 
I turn now to the growing number of those who are what I would call strong adherents of 
Annihilationism, with the accompanying change in tone in the debate. This is illustrated 
by two quotes from Wenham. In The Goodness of God in 197 4 Wenham calls for "the 
serious consideration of the case for conditional immortality." 185 This is simply a call for 
the consideration of the doctrine with the hope that it be accepted as one of two possible 
options for evangelical belief. However, by 1991, in his Rutherford House lecture, 
Wenham is much bolder:"! believe that endless torment is a hideous and unscriptural 
doctrine ... " 186 This may well point to a new and growing confidence amongst 
annihilationists, or at least the confidence to make public, that not only is their view an 
option, but that Traditionalists are gravely mistaken and their view is the cause of great 
discredit to God and harm to his Church. Wenham probably expresses the growing view 
of many on both sides of the debate, that the language of 'option' is wrong, when near the 
end of his paper he s~ys: "Whichever side you are on, it is a dreadful thing to be on the 
wrong side in this issue." 187 Fudge gives his view by way of a quotation: 
beyond the fact that it will be irretrievable and utter ruin." [Ibid., p.17] Guillebaud responds that the 
language is not as ambiguous as Beet believes. He concludes by arguing, "the doctrine of endless torment 
is by common consent so dreadful, that only a deep conviction that the teaching of the Bible cannot 
honestly be explained otherwise, can make it possible to believe that God could punish so ... If there is 
doubt, the doubt must be resolved on the side of the more merciful theory." [ Ibid., p. 19] 
182 Douglas Spanner, 'Is Hell Forever?' in Churchman 110/2, 1996, pp. 107-120. 
183 Ibid., p. 120. 
184 ACUTE, op. cit., p.125. 
185 Wenham, Goodness, p. 41. 
186 Wenham, Case, p.190. 
187 Ibid., p. 190. [Italics original]. 
51 
... [ final punishment] is certainly not unimportant. In that light we can agree with 
the point of the nineteenth-century writer who said concerning the traditional 
doctrine of hell: It must be loyally proclaimed or else denounced. If believed, it 
should be preached from the house-tops; if not believed, it should be opposed to 
the very end. If this dogma be false, it is a calumny against God and a stumbling-
block in the way of humanity. All the resources of apologetics would not suffice to 
counter-balance its baneful effects. 188 
If I am correct in arguing that his logic applies to all the damned, then Michael Green is 
also definite, when he writes, as I have already quoted: "Christians, therefore, should reject 
the doctrine of conscious eternal torment for those who have never heard just as firmly as 
they reject universalism." 189 Pinnock is also definite in his Annihilationism when, m 
dialogue with liberal theologian Delwin Brown, he writes: 
I was led to question the traditional belief in everlasting conscious torment because 
of moral revulsion and broader theological considerations, not first of all on 
scriptural grounds. It just does not make any sense to say that a God of love will 
torture people forever for sins done in the context of a finite life ... It makes no 
sense to suppose that alongside the new creation, tucked away in some comer of it, 
there exists a lake of fire with souls burning ceaselessly in it. It's time for 
evangelicals to come out and say that the biblical and morally appropriate doctrine 
of hell is annihilation, not everlasting torment. 190 
This greater confidence represents a return to the lines of the debate of the nineteenth 
century, of which Leckie notes: "This theory [of Annihilationism], somehow, has the 
faculty of creating, on the one hand, fervid partisans, and, on the other, very determined 
foes."191 
1.5 Traditionalist Responses to Annihilationism 
In his autobiography, Wenham records a comment to him from a publisher in 1992, which 
suggests the recent volume of traditionalist writing: "We badly need a book on hell from 
188 Fudge, op. cit., p. 43 5, quoting E. Petavel, The Problem of Immortality (E.T. London: Elliot Stock, 
1892), p. 267. 
189 G . 70 reen, op. c1t., p. . 
19° Clark H. Pinnock and Delwin Brown, Theological Crossfire: An Evangelical/Liberal Dialogue (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), pp. 226-227. It is difficult to reconcile this with his position articulated in 
Tracking the Maze (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). There, in making a distinction between 
Christianity's essential and non-essential doctrines he suggests that "a diversity of interpretation is also 
possible" on the non-essentials which include "Is hell a place of never-ending torment?" [Ibid., p. 190]. 
191 Leckie, op. cit., p. 219. From that earlier debate, I would note an interesting line of argument from 
Hodge: "The earnestness with which the doctrine of the unending punishment of the wicked is denounced 
by those who reject it, should convince them that its truth is the only rational solution of the fact that 
Christ and his Apostles did not condemn it." [C. Hodge, Systematic Theology (New York: Charles 
Scibner's and Co., 1884), Part IV, Ch. IV, p. 874.] In other words the stronger the disagreement the more 
they are likely to be wrong! 
52 
your point of view; the traditionalists are pouring out books and pamphlets; ... "192 While 
not all of these books were directly in response to Annihilationism, almost all traditionalist 
books on hell after 197 4 have contained some response to Annihilationism. I will note 
some of the chief ones. Wenham, in his Rutherford House lecture of 1991, states, under a 
heading "An Answer Attempted" that "To my knowledge there have been four serious 
attempts at reply."193 The four works he mentions are: the 1986 reprint of The Doctrine of 
Endless Punishment by W.G.T. Shedd; Paul Helm's 1989 book The Last things: Death, 
Judgement, Heaven and Hell; J.H. Gerstner's 1990 book Repent or Perish; and J.I. 
Packer's published lecture of the same year entitled The Problem of Eternal Punishment. 
Wenham then adds a further work: Ajith Fernando's 1991 book Crucial Questions about 
Hell. In his autobiography, published in 1998, Wenham adds just one further traditionalist 
response to Annihilationism: the 1991 essay by Kendall Harmon entitled, 'The Case 
Against Conditionalism: A Response to Edward William Fudge.' Wenham is highly 
critical of all of these works. Of the four books, he criticises them for "not answering the 
conditionalist arguments with any seriousness, ... "194 On Harmon's paper Wenham 
concludes, "It is good to have this thoughtful and even-tempered discussion of the whole 
subject, even though it does not seem to me to grapple seriously with Fudge's 
argument.,, 195 
A large number of other traditionalist books and articles could also be mentioned from the 
recent debate, which include some sort of critique of Annihilationism. I will only list some 
of the books here. (I will simply give authors and dates; full bibliographic details can be 
found in the Bibliography.) To begin with there are books which are substantially or 
wholly devoted to the subject of hell, and which include some discussion of 
Annihilationism. In addition to those books noted by Wenham above, there are books by 
Gerstner (1980); Morey (1984); Davies (1991 ); Dixon (1992); Pawson (1992); Moore 
(1995); Peterson (1995); Blanchard (1996); and Motyer (1996 [1965]). Gerstner also 
mentions another reprint of an earlier writer which falls into my definition of the recent 
debate: "the re-publication of Edward Hickman's 2 volume edition of The Works of 
Jonathan Edwards (1838) by the Banner of Truth Trust ·in 1974 is, no doubt, the greatest 
192 Wenham, Facing, p. 262. 
193 Wenham, Case, p. 164. 
194 Wenham, Facing, p. 234. 
195 Ibid., p. 262. 
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defence of hell ... in the twentieth century."196 Edwards touches on many aspects of the 
doctrine of hell, but the two chief published works of relevance to this debate are (titles 
and page references from Hickman): The Eternity of Hell Torments (Sermon XI, on 
Matthew 25:46, dated April 1739), Vol. 2 pp. 83-89; Remarks on Important Theological 
Controversies, Chapter II: "Concerning the Endless Punishment of those who Die 
Impenitent," Vol. 2, pp. 515-525. 197 There have also been several collections of essays 
which have included traditionalist works, including those edited by Crockett and 
Sigountos (1991); Crockett (1992); Cameron (1992); and Brower and Elliott (1997). 
Finally, there have been a number of important discussions of Annihilationism by 
traditionalists in books not primarily on the doctrine of hell, including: Fuller (1992, pp. 
196-203); Grudem (1994, pp. 1148-1153); Carson (1996, pp. 515-536); and Reymond 
(1998,pp. 1068-1085) 
Probably the most influential theologian to take up the traditionalist cause amongst 
evangelicals is J.I. Packer. His general significance is brought out clearly by McGrath who 
judges, perhaps rather generously, that "Benjamin B. Warfield and James I. Packer [are] 
widely regarded as the most significant evangelical writers of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries respectively."198 
1.6 Introductory Comments on the Annihilationist Arguments 
In the following chapters I will attempt to expound the annihilationist arguments before 
turning to assessment. There is a great deal of repetitiveness in the literature, with the 
same basic arguments forming something of a litany. However, as Peterson notes, "None 
of the four books ~entioned [by Guillebaud, Atkinson, Froom and Fudge, which he 
judges the four best books espousing Annihilationism] offers a succinct summary of the 
196 John H. Gerstner, Repent or Perish (Ligonier, Pa.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1990). p. 40. Gerstner 
was writing about Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Revised by Edward Hickman. 2 
vols. (Carlisle: Banner of Truth Trust, 1974). 
197 Gerstner quotes extensively from two unpublished sermons on Mark 9:44 entitled "The torments of 
hell will be eternal," and dated winter-summer 1730. Gerstner describes them as, "the most complete 
couplet of sermons Edwards ever preached on this subject [of the etemality of hell]. John H. Gerstner, 
Jonathan Edwards on Heaven and Hell (Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1998 [1980]), pp. 
73-78. . 
198 McGrath, op. cit., p. 129. 
54 
best case for Annihilationism."199 The most systematic of authors in setting out the 
arguments, with succinct summaries, are Stott, Travis and Pinnock who each do so in brief 
compass.200 Useful summaries of the chief annihilationist arguments are also provided by 
some traditionalists, particularly Packer, Grudem, Carson and Peterson.201 However, 
simply because a writer presents his material in a more systematic fashion does not 
necessarily make them more useful for the purposes of this thesis. Fudge is the clearest 
example of a writer who covers a wider range of arguments, at greater depth, and more 
suggestively, than almost anyone else, and yet scatters them throughout his book. There 
are several reasons why Fudge is more difficult to summarise than many other authors, 
besides his scattering of references. First, he nowhere expresses his views in brief 
compass. The nearest that Fudge comes to a systematic statement comes in his final 
chapter entitled "Focusing on the Issue". However the bulk of the chapter is spent offering 
criticisms of traditionalist arguments, and traditionalist criticisms of Annihilationism, 
rather than a positive statement of the arguments for Annihilationism. Second, there is no 
index ( although this has been rectified in the shorter second edition of the book published 
in 1994 ). These points may well account for the lack of detailed criticism of the book. The 
single extended study of Fudge available is Harmon's paper published in Universalism and 
the Doctrine of Hell. 202 
My own summary is that there are three main doctrinal arguments used by annihilationists 
in this debate, with other related and subordinate arguments. The first of these arguments 
relates to the immortality of the soul, and I will examine it in the remainder of this chapter 
since it is a less fruitful avenue of debate. I will examine each of the other two main 
arguments, along with some related and subordinate points, in each of the subsequent 
chapters. In chapter two I will examine the argument that the traditionalist punishment of 
hell is unjustly severe (both Stott and Pinnock head this 'Justice1203) and therefore 
Annihilationism is to be accepted because less severe; in chapter three that Traditionalism 
199 Peterson, op. cit., p. 162. 
200 Stott, op. cit., pp. 315-319; Travis, Hope, pp. 134-135; Believe, pp. 198-199; Pinnock, Conditional, 
pp. 143-155. 
201 Packer, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Grudem, op. cit., p. 1150; Carson, op. cit., pp. 518-520; Peterson, op. cit., 
pp. 162-178. 
202 H C . armon, ase, op. ell .. 
203 Stott, op. cit., p. 318; Pinnock, Conditional, p. 151. 
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is dualistic (the argument Stott calls 'Universalism' and Pinnock 'Metaphysics'204) and 
therefore Annihilationism is to be accepted because it avoids the problem. Having 
responded to the agenda set in the literature, I will then develop arguments based on a link 
between the hell and the atonement which are relatively rare in the literature but which I 
believe are decisive. 
1. 7 The Immortality of the Soul 
Many annihilationists, on my definition, are mortalists and hold that the soul is not 
innately immortal. The key issue in relation to the debate about hell is that mortalists 
therefore deny that the human soul will naturally survive for ever. For example John 
Wenham argues that people are mortal due to the self-destructive force of sin, and that 
immortality is "part of the gift of eternal life bestowed on those who come to partake of 
the divine nature through union with Christ. 11205 Hughes gives a broader theological 
justification for the same conclusion: 
To contend that only the human soul is innately immortal is to maintain a position 
which is nowhere approved in the teaching of scripture, for in the biblical purview 
human nature is always seen as integrally compounded of both the spiritual and the 
bodily. If this were not so, the whole doctrine of the incarnation and of the death 
and resurrection of the Son would be despoiled of meaning and reality ... The 
immortality, accordingly, of which the Christian is assured is not inherent in 
himself or in his soul but is bestowed by God and is the immortality of the whole 
person in the fullness of his humanity, bodily as well as spiritual... The immortality 
which was potentially ours at creation and was forfeited at the fall is now really 
ours in Christ, in whom we are created anew and brought to our true destiny.206 
In each case Mortalism is assumed to be an argument against Traditionalism. The 
assumption which seems to underlie their charge is stated by Travis: "If resurrection life is 
a gift from God, then its opposite can only be extinction. 11207 Travis gives this as the first 
of his arguments supporting Annihilationism: "The Bible does not teach that the soul is 
naturally immortal, but that resurrection is a gift of God. This suggests that God grants 
resurrection to those who love him, but those who resist him go out of existence. 11208 
204 Stott, op. cit., p. 319; Pinnock, Conditional, p. 154. 
205 Wenham, Goodness, p. 35. 
206 Hughes, op. cit., pp. 400-401. 
207 Travis, Judgement, p. 67. 
208 Travis, Hope, p. 134. Travis is here giving arguments for a broader range of positions than those we 
have defined as Annihilationism. He says that he is referring to "Belief in· the annihilation of the 
unbeliever at death or at the final judgement..." [Ibid., p. 134. ]The former position of annihilation at death 
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The argument continues that the traditional understanding of hell has been coloured by the 
premise that humans are inherently immortal: if it is assumed that they will always exist, 
then annihilation after judgement has not been a possible option. Wenham writes: 
The traditional view gains most of its plausibility from a belief that our Lord's 
teaching about Gehenna has to be wedded to a belief in the immortality of the soul. 
A fierce fire will destroy any living creature, unless that creature happens to be 
immortal. If man is made immortal, all our exegesis must change.209 
Wenham argues that this may be due to the influence of Greek philosophy on Christian 
interpretation, 210 and that traditionalists assume the immortality of the soul although the 
biblical evidence for it is lacking.211 Pinnock heads his second argument in favour of 
Annihilationism "Immortality of the Soul" and he highlights this development: 
Presumably the traditional view of the nature of hell was originally constructed in 
the following way: People mixed up their belief in divine judgement after death 
(which is scriptural) with their belief in the immortality of the soul (which is 
unscriptural) and concluded (incorrectly) that the nature of hell must be everlasting 
conscious torment.212 
Travis adds "the claim of the conditionalist is that the 'traditional orthodoxy' of eternal 
torment arose in the early church precisely because biblical teaching was (illegitimately) 
interpreted in the light of Platonic philosophy, which involved belief in the immortality of 
the soul and everlasting punishment."213 One of the main theses of Froom's massive two 
volume work entitled The Conditionalist Faith of our Fathers, is that "innate Immortal-
Soulism" is the main reason for the Traditionalist view of hell. In the nineteenth century, 
White wrote: "Here, in the popular doctrine of the soul's immortality, is the Jons et origo 
of a system of theological error."214 
Further, as I noted above, writers on both sides of the debate sometimes make a link 
between anthropologx and eschatology. Thus on the annihilationist side, Pinnock states 
that the mortality of the soul would fit with an annihilationist reading of Scripture: "The 
Bible warns against absolute loss in hell [i.e. extinction] and has the anthropological 
assumption to support that possibility." Similarly, but from the traditionalist side, Charles 
is excluded by my definition. However Travis himself does hold a position which is included within my 
defmition. · 
209 Wenham, Case, pp. 174-5. 
210 Wenham, Goodness, p. 36. 
211 Wenham, Case, p. 175. 
212 Pinnock, Conditional, pp. 148-149. 
213 Travis, Hope, p.135. 
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Hodge writes, "If the Bible says that the sufferings of the lost are to be everlasting, they are 
to endure for ever, unless it can be shown either that the soul is not immortal or that the 
Scriptures elsewhere teach that those sufferings are to come to an end."215 
However, while agreeing that belief in the immortality of the soul has been influential in 
the history of the debate in favouring Traditionalism, Fudge rightly argues that the 
immortality of the soul can be logically affirmed or denied by both traditionalists and 
annihilationists, and thus anthropology does not determine eschatology at this point. Fudge 
has a brief section entitled "False Issues and Irrelevant Distinctions," in which he makes 
this point that it is a non-determinative issue: "Even the matter of man's nature does not 
clinch the issue."216 Fudge continues: "In either case - among mortalists or immortalists -
there is no reason why anthropology should govern eschatology. The true Christian 
position about final punishment must finally stand on a thorough exegesis of the Word of 
God."217 Gray concludes similarly: "[I]t may appear in the end the argument from 
conditional immortality may be a red herring. For, if Scripture teaches eternal punishment 
in the form of conscious torment, then other considerations such as immortality are 
irrelevant. "218 
I will note several writers who illustrate this point in different ways. First, Stott is an 
annihilationist who holds to some form of the immortality of the soul, although his 
discussion is unclear at points. Anthropologically, Stott holds that the souls of all people 
survive death, with the impenitent being finally extinguished. Such a conclusion may be 
drawn from the fact that Stott calls himself an 'annihilationist,' which he explains as 
follows: 
... 'annihilatioti' is not quite the same as 'conditional immortality'. According to the 
latter, nobody survives death except those to whom God gives life (they are 
therefore immortal by grace, not by nature), whereas according to the former, 
everybody survives death and will even be resurrected, but the impenitent will 
finally be destroyed. 219 
214 White, op. cit., p.70. 
215 Hodge, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 876. 
216 Fudge, op. cit., p. 424. 
217 Ibid, p.-76 
218 Tony Gray, "The Nature of Hell: Reflections on the Debate Between Conditionalism and the Traditional 
View of Hell", in K.E. Brower & M.W. Elliott (eds.), 'The Reader Must [J_nderstand': Eschatology in Bible 
and Theology (Leicester: Apollos, 1997), p.238. 
219 Ibid, p. 316 
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The confusion is that it looks as though he is defining 'conditional immortality', by contrast 
with 'annihilation', as denying the resurrection of the impenitent, and therefore all post-
mortem existence, which as we noted above is the position of the Jehovah's Witnesses, but 
of no Evangelical annihilationist. Stott's two terms, as defined, thus seem to leave no room 
for what is the major position among those who believe that hell ends in extinction: that 
the soul does not survive the first death, but is resurrected for judgement and subsequent 
extinction. Further confusion is caused because, although Stott denies the immortality of 
the soul, he is only denying that the soul is indestructible, not that it can survive death, 
which is what other annihilationists also deny. 
It cannot, I think, be replied [by the traditionalist] that it is impossible to destroy 
human beings because they are immortal, for the immortality - and therefore 
indestructibility - of the soul is a Greek not a biblical concept. According to 
Scripture only God possesses immortality in himself (1 Timothy 1:17; 6:16); he 
reveals and gives it to us through the Gospel (2 Timothy 1: 10).220 
Therefore Stott serves as an illustration of the fact that, as I argued earlier, anthropology 
does not determine eschatology. 
Second, Pinnock, who is a mortalist, acknowledges that God could give immortality to the 
wicked, but that there would be a problem "explaining why he should choose to do so."221 
Third, some traditionalists hold to the natural mortality of the soul, but argue that God 
does indeed give immortality to both righteous and wicked. Thus, for example, F emando 
and Pawson believe that the traditional understanding of immortality has been incorrect, 
and admit that some traditionalists may have reached their conclusions concerning hell 
due to this. However, they proceed to argue that those conclusions were correct due to the 
positive teaching of Scripture on the subject.222 
Thus, Christian advocates of immortality have qualified their view by saying that God 
could annihilate the soul. On the other hand Christian mortalists have recognised that God 
could grant immortality to anyone he wishes, including the unjust. So, immortalists allow 
for the possibility of the final annihilation of the wicked, while the mortalists allow for the 
possibility of the eternal preservation of the wicked. Fudge correctly summarises: 
220 Stott, op. cit., pp. 315-316. 
221 Pinnock, Conditional, p.149. 
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The crucial question does not really concern man's natural mortality or 
immortality, therefore, for both sides concede the ultimate point to the greater 
sovereignty of God. The issue really becomes a matter of exegesis. Since God is 
able to preserve or destroy His human creature, what does Scripture indicate that 
He will do to those He finally expels to hell?223 
That said, writers like Fudge and Froom believe that "like some hidden footlight, the 
doctrine has tinted exegesis, "224 and that, 
Although traditionalists formally concede that God is able to kill and annihilate 
even the soul if He so desires, they interpret all the Scripture passages which seem 
to say that exactly as if they had declared it unthinkable and impossible. The 
philosophic view of immortal souls may be officially denied yet wield a 
determining influence on one's interpretation of Scripture.225 
It is difficult to assess these claims directly, since the charge is usually that of unconscious 
influence and its force seems to rest on a prior commitment to the annihilationist reading 
of these texts. ·While there may well be a link between the immortality of the soul and 
Traditionalism, and between Mortalism and Annihilationism, and while, if the 
interpretation of Scripture is ambiguous as to the fate of the damned, then arguments about 
Scriptural anthropology may tip the balance away from Traditionalism, I have shown that 
the link is not a necessary one. Thus, this argument is primarily about influences on 
exegesis and is thus of secondary interest for this thesis. Peterson is right when he 
concludes that "This argument [about immortality] has been vastly overrated ... "226 I will 
therefore not pursue it further in this thesis, but turn now to the other major arguments 
given by annihilationists. 
222 Fernando, op. cit., pp. 42-43; J.D. Pawson, "God Of Love, God Of Justice", in Alpha (Feb 1993), p. 
33. , 
223 Fudge, op. cit., p. 57. 
224 Ibid., p. 75. It should be noted that Froom takes this a lot further than Fudge, who criticises Froom in a 
footnote saying: "By constantly ascribing Platonism to immortalists ( overlooking important distinctions), 
he detracts somewhat from his [Froom's] primary thesis, ... " [Ibid., p. 55, n. 17.] 
ns · Ibid., p. 387, n. 3. 
226 Peterson, op. cit., p. 177. 
60 
Chapter 2: The Justice of Hell 
In this chapter I will begin by expounding the main argument raised by annihilationists to 
do with the justice of hell. There are a number of differences between writers but, in brief, 
most annihilationists argue that the traditionalist hell is an unjust punishment because it is 
too severe. This is understood to be an argument for Annihilationism because the hell of 
Annihilationism is held to be a less severe punishment and therefore more just. However 
there is a lack of clarity in the literature about the nature and severity of the punishment of 
an annihilationist hell, and so part of my task of exposition will be to construct a taxonomy 
of the kinds of punishment an annihilationist hell could be, and how their severities might 
compare to that of a traditionalist hell. Before moving on to assessment, I will expound a 
related argument that the traditionalist hell displays God as unloving. My reason for 
including this argument in this chapter is that I will argue that the issue collapses into the 
prior question of the justice of the punishment. I will then assess the annihilationists' chief 
argument about justice. I will conclude that if annihilationists simply hold that extinction 
is an infinite punishment then their argument against Traditionalism, that an infinite 
punishment is unjust, is self-refuting unless they can show that it is less severe. I will 
suggest that there is some plausibility to the view that extinction is less severe than 
unending torment. However I will go on to argue that extinction is neither an infinite 
punishment, nor no punishment at all as some traditionalist argue, but only a finite 
punishment. While extinction as a finite punishment clearly makes an annihilationist hell 
less severe, it also raises further difficulties. First, annihilationists then face the challenge 
of explaining why the damned shouldn't be translated to heaven after their punishment has 
been completed. However I will suggest that they may be able to avoid this conclusion by 
arguing that it is a finite punishment but with permanent consequences. Second, 
annihilationists are left vulnerable to any argument that the damned do indeed deserve an 
infinite punishment. I will briefly examine the main arguments for an infinite punishment, 
and suggest that they may have some plausibility, and therefore Annihilationism as a finite 
punishment is not severe enough. Finally I will propose a modified Traditionalism which I 
believe offers a more satisfactory resolution of the problem of excessive severity raised by 
annihilationists. 
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The importance of this argument about the injustice of the traditionalist hell is stated by 
Crockett who comments: "Pinnock has put his finger on the issue that bothers evangelicals 
most about the doctrine of endless conscious punishment - that an eternal punishment for 
temporal sins seems cruel and unfair. "227 The link between the final two terms is that if 
the punishment is excessive, it is not only unfair but also cruel, being inflicted for some 
purpose other than retributive punishment. Although Pinnock's terminology is different to 
my own, the problem of God seeming cruel is equivalent to that of God seeming unloving, 
and God seeming unfair is equivalent to God seeming unjust, which form the two related 
objections to Traditionalism considered in this chapter. 
Before turning to expound and assess the arguments, I will offer some brief definitions. In 
the debate the terms 'eternity' and 'endless' or 'everlasting' are regularly used without 
distinction to refer to a period of time without end. There is usually no recognition in the 
recent debate of the otherwise common distinction in the tradition between eternity 
meaning timeless or a-temporal, and endless or everlasting meaning within time or 
temporal.228 I will therefore use the terms interchangeably, usually following the usage of 
the writer I am commenting on at that point. Where I want to distinguish between a state 
that is timeless or within time I will use the terms a-temporal and temporal. Another term 
regularly used in the debate to describe the punishment of hell is 'infinite'. Again, this is 
usually used interchangeably with eternal and endless or everlasting, the logic being that 
an endless punishment is also an infinite punishment. If a punishment is not held to be 
infinite then it is finite. However there are different aspects of the punishment which can 
be described as infinite and finite. First, not only can the punishment of hell be considered 
infinite in its length but it is sometimes held that it could be qualitatively infinite, in the 
sense that it was infinitely severe in its intensity. This was sometimes held to be the 
experience of Christ on the cross, 229 but impossible for the damned in their human 
finitude. Thus, for example, Aquinas argued that "punishment is measured in two ways, 
namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time ... 
Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is 
227 W.V. Crockett, Response to Clark H Pinnock, in Crockett, Four Views, p.171. [Emphasis mine.] 
228 See, for example, T.V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 1991), pp. 120-138. 
229 I will examine this further in chapter four. 
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incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. "230 A second 
distinction in the aspects of hell considered as infinite punishment is that between 
punishment as suffering (poena sensus) and punishment as loss (peona damni): thus the 
punishment of hell is not solely to be judged by the degree of suffering, but also by the 
degree of what has been lost. 231 The loss of the bliss of heaven could itself be judged as 
infinite punishment in two senses: the loss of something that continues eternally; and the 
loss of a bliss that is, in some sense, infinite in intensity. It is on this basis that many 
annihilationists claim that extinction is an infinite punishment, since it is an infinite loss in 
one or both of these senses. 
The terminology I will use in comparing punishments is that they are more or less severe. 
This comparison can refer to one of three features of a punishment, or a combination of 
them. Thus a punishment is more severe if, other things being equal, it: first, continues for 
longer; and/or second, involves more intense suffering; and/or third, involves a greater 
loss. The distinction between the second and third points is necessary because there may 
be both a subjective and an objective level of punishment for assessment. Thus, for 
example, Chan writes 
Can a prisoner be said to be punished if he enjoys being in prison? But this 
confuses the psychological state which accompanies punishment with the 
objectivity of the penalty itself. To be shut out of the totally real is an objective 
punishment, even when the shutting out is freely chosen. 232 
If a particular punishment is less severe than another then it is a mitigation of it. 
230 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols. 
(Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1948, rpt. 1981), Q. 99, Art. 1, p. 2996; p. 2997. 
231 Powys notes this distinction, reporting Leckie, but then draws an odd conclusion: "It can and has been 
argued (see J.H.Leckie, The World to Come and Final Destiny (2nd ed.: Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1922), pp. 
200-3) that Aquinas did not strictly hold that the unrighteous would suffer everlasting torment: that only 
poena damni, not poena sensus, can properly be regarded as infinite. The subtlety of this point seems 
nevertheless to have been lost and Aquinas has come to be regarded as an advocate of immediate everlasting 
torment." [Powys, Hard, p. 44, n. 10]. The oddity here is to conclude that Aquinas did not advocate 
everlasting torment, since everlasting torment usually refers to its length rather than its intensity and this is 
just the distinction Aquinas makes. 
232 Simon Chan, "The Logic of Hell: A Response to Annihilationism," Evangelical Review of Theology, 18/1 
(January 1994), p. 30. In the next chapter I will argue that when it comes to the punishment of hell, the 
damned need to be lucid about their punishment, which means that they are subjectively aware of the 
objective severity of the punishment they_ receive. 
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2.1 The Annihilationist Arguments 
2.1.1 The Traditionalist Hell is Unjustly Severe 
One of the chief criticisms of Traditionalism made by annihilationists is that the 
punishment of eternal conscious torment for sin committed in this life is unjust. John Stott 
argues from the limiting principle of the lex talionis which he explains as follows: 
The third argument in favour of the concept of annihilation concerns the biblical 
vision of justice.233 Fundamental to it is the belief that God will judge people 
'according to what they [have] done' ( e.g. Revelation 20: 12), which implies that the 
penalty inflicted will be commensurate with the evil done. This principle had been 
applied in the Jewish law courts, in which penalties were limited to an exact 
retribution, 'life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot' 
(e.g. Exodus 21 :23-25). 
On the basis of this principle of justice Stott asks: 
Would there not, then, be a serious disproportion between sins consciously 
committed in time and torment consciously experienced throughout eternity? I do 
not minimise the gravity of sin as rebellion against God our Creator, but I question 
whether 'eternal conscious torment' is compatible with the biblical revelation of 
. • 234 Justice, ... 
Clark Pinnock uses the heading "Justice" for the fourth of his five arguments for 
Annihilationism, under which he argues that " ... the traditional doctrine of the nature of 
hell... depicts God acting unjustly. Like morality235, it raises questions about God's 
character and offends our sense of natural justice. "236 It is unjust because "It is too heavy a 
sentence and cannot be successfully defended as a just action on God's part. Sending the 
wicked to everlasting torment would be to treat persons worse than they could deserve. "237 
Pinnock, like Stott, argues from the lex talionis: 
Consider it on the basis of an Old Testament standard of justice, the standard of 
strict equivalence: An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (Exod. 21 :24) ... Did 
the sinner visit upon God everlasting torment? Did he cause God or his neighbors 
everlasting pain or loss? Of course not; no human has the power to do such harm. 
233 Stott's first and second arguments he heads language and imagery respectively. [Stott, op. cit., p. 315; p. 
316. Italics original.] Under the former head Stott deals with the question of the immortality of the soul, 
which I have dealt with in the previous chapter; and under the ,latter head he deals with biblical material 
which I have excluded from consideration in this thesis. 
234 Ibid, pp. 318-9. 
235 Morality is another of Pinnock's headings, the argument under which I will examine below under the 
heading below, The Traditionalist Hell Displays God as Unloving, p.77. 
236 Pinnock, Conditionalist, p. 151. 
237 Ibid, p. 152. 
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Under the Old Testament standard, no finite set of deeds that individual sinners 
have done could justify such an infinite sentence. 
However, Pinnock goes on to argue that Jesus operated a higher standard of justice than 
the lex talionis and that this higher standard more accurately reflects God's standard. "The 
commandment of Moses limited the vengeance of unlimited retaliation, and Jesus limits it 
still more. "238 Thus under this new standard hell is even more unjust, although he doesn't 
spell it out any further. Pinnock also notes and rejects the main traditionalist argument for 
an infinite punishment, which I call the 'classic' traditionalist argument, in the form 
articulated by Anselm: 
Anselm tried to argue that our sins are worthy of an infinite punishment because 
they are committed against an infinite majesty. This may have worked in the 
Middle Ages, but it will not work as an argument today ... The fact that we have 
sinned against an infinite God does not justify an infinite penalty. No judge today 
would calibrate the degree of punishment on a scale of the honor of the one who 
has been wronged. 239 
Fudge also rejects this argument. 
This whole logic of "finite" and "infinite" punishment... is totally without biblical 
basis, springing instead from medieval speculation grounded in feudalistic canons 
of justice. The entire approach is protested today on philosophical grounds, which 
is proper since that was also its origin. 240 
The fundamental principle of justice on which these annihilationist arguments are based is 
that punishment should be retributive, and thus proportionate. This principle of justice is 
common to both traditionalists and annihilationists in the debate, with the exception of 
Travis and Pinnock, whom I mentioned in the previous chapter. However they share the 
principle that a just punishment is proportionate to the sin, while their objection to 
retribution is because it is usually understood to be a punishment inflicted from without. 
Thus the difference between the two positions is not over the principle of justice but over 
its application. So, Wenham can write: "My problem is, not that God punishes, but that the 
punishment traditionally ascribed to God seems neither to square with Scripture nor to be 
just."241 This argument also featured prominently in the earlier debate in the nineteenth 
century, and an example is from Henry Constable: "the punishment which the theory of 
Augustine supposes that God will inflict is infinitely too great, and we are therefore to 
238 Ibid, p. 152. 
239 Ibid, p. 152. 
24° Fudge, op. cit., p. 232. 
241 Wenham, Case, p. 185. [Italics original.] 
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reject it as untrue."242 In a similar vein: "Now we allow that the Augustinian theory of 
punishment is infinitely more terrible than ours. Between the two there is and can be no 
comparison. It is idle to compare them - as idle as to compare time with etemity."243 
Indeed this criticism of the eternity of a traditionalist hell is not limited to annihilationists, 
but has long been perceived as a difficulty. One quote will suffice to illustrate this: 
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the orthodox theologian on the subject of hell 
was the problem of justifying an "eternity" of torment for the sins of a brief 
terrestrial life. The eternity was the very "hell of hell," as many commentators 
observed, the incomprehensible and stupefying fact that the torture would never, 
never end. 244 
This issue of justice is also recognised as a key annihilationist argument by traditionalists. 
Packer notes it as the second of four arguments that annihilationists use: "Second, it is said 
that everlasting retribution would be needless cruelty, since God's justice does not appear 
to require it. "245 Grudem notes as the third of four arguments: "the apparent injustice 
involved in the disproportion between since sins committed in time and the punishment 
that is eternal. "246 A little later he puts the same point in terms of fairness: "the argument 
that eternal punishment is unfair (because there is a disproportion between temporary sin 
and eternal punishment) ... "247 In both these cases it is striking that the objection is 
understood to be to the everlasting nature of the punishment, rather than its nature as 
torment. 
As I noted above, these arguments are in the form of criticisms of Traditionalism. There is 
little systematic exposition of the justice of the annihilationist position itself. I will 
therefore attempt to determine what kind of punishment annihilationists think that hell is, 
and how its severity compares to that of Traditionalism, before turning to an assessment of 
it. In order to develop an exposition of the annihilationist position, I will interrogate 
annihilationists with a series of questions, premised on the fact that the annihilationist hell 
is made up of two elements: torment and extinction. This distinction between torment and 
242 H. Constable, Duration and Nature of Future Punishment (London: Edward Hobbs, 1886), p. 140. [All 
references to Constable will be to this work, unless otherwise stated.] 
243 Ibid., p. 229. [Italics original] 
244 N. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards' Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University 
North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 220. 
245 Packer, Problem, p. 13. 
246 Grudem, p.1150. [Italics original]. 
247 Ibid., p.1151. [Italics original]. 
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extinction is implied by the very definition of Annihilationism with which I am working 
and yet it is one that is rarely explored in the literature. The issues I want to discuss all tum 
on the nature of extinction, and so I will give just a brief quote to highlight the range of 
views about the preceding period of torment: 
evangelical conditionalists characteristically hold that the unsaved will be 
destroyed either soon after general resurrection and adverse final judgment 
[Footnote: Constable, Aldwinckle, Stott, Hughes], or following a more protracted 
period of divine retribution [Footnote: Froom, Fudge, White, Atkinson, 
Guillebaud].248 
In turning to extinction, I will ask first whether extinction is held to be penal, and conclude 
that it is. Second, if it is penal, I will ask whether extinction is held to be a finite or an 
infinite punishment, and conclude that it is infinite. Third, if it is an infinite punishment, I 
will ask how severe a punishment it is held to be in comparison to a traditionalist hell, and 
conclude it is less severe. Fourth, to further explore the crucial issue of relative severity, I 
will ask how the damned in torment view their impending extinction. There will be some 
overlap between the issues raised by these questions, but they will open up some of the 
key features of the argument. The conclusion that extinction is viewed as less severe a 
punishment than unending torment is the expected one given the form of the 
annihilationist argument. What is surprising is that extinction is held to be an infinite 
punishment, when it might have been expected to be finite; and that there is a wide range 
of views as to how the damned perceive extinction, when it might be expected that it 
would be welcomed in comparison to continuing torment. Of course an annihilationist is 
not required to argue that extinction is less severe than unending torment, if they are 
willing to drop this objection based on justice, and there are some statements which 
suggest either uncertainty or unclarity at this point. 
So, first I tum to th~ question of the penal nature of extinction. Although it is not a 
common distinction in the literature, logically extinction can be either penal or non-penal. 
If extinction is non-penal then it is not a separate punishment from torment, but merely the 
end-point of the punishment of torment. Thus the punishment of an annihilationist hell 
would consist in torment alone. Such a position would be a clear mitigation of 
248 ACUTE, op. cit., p.18 and footnotes 20-22. Several of these writers are not clear as to the length of 
torment, and are therefore harder to categorise than this quote suggests. Thus, for example, Guillebaud 
writes, commenting on Luke 12:46-48, "Nor is anything said about the duration of the penalty ... we are in 
the region of speculation for time itself is of this world." [Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 32]. The one error in this 
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Traditionalism, and so it is perhaps a surprise to discover that there are only occasional 
comments which could be understood as pointing to a non-penal understanding of 
extinction. 249 However, in each case I have found there is clear reason to believe that this 
is not actually the position of the writer. 
Constable is clear that Annihilationism is a mitigation of the severity of hell, and it might 
seem from the following quote that he understands extinction as non-penal: 
This [ second] death is attended and produced by such various degrees of pain as 
God in his justice and wisdom thinks fit to inflict. The attendant pain with its issue 
in death are not two distinct punishments; but are one punishment, varying in 
degree of suffering according to the guilt of the object.250 
However, Constable makes very clear elsewhere that he believes extinction is penal, and 
indeed an infinite punishment. In response to the argument that if punishment if not felt it 
is not punishment (which I examine below), Constable argues that "Endless annihilation is 
an endless or an infinite punishment ... Annihilation, therefore, is an infinite punishment, 
both as it is endless, and as the quality of good lost is infinite ... Final annihilation then is 
an infinite evil, as it is inflicted in disapprobation of sin. "251 As part of his argument fo 
this claim Constable uses the analogy of execution, which is penal and severe.252 Thus 
Constable introduces several features of this issue which I will note more than once: the 
link between hell as endless and infinite; the use of the analogy of execution for 
extinction; and the claim that an annihilationist hell is an infinite punishment. 
John Wenham can also be understood to be adopting a non-penal view when he writes, 
"For those who have rejected the love of God there will be after the last judgment just 
retribution varying in severity according to individual desert, but (in my view) the 
sufferings will end speedily and mercifully in the second death. "253 The impression is 
given of extinction ~eing closer to euthanasia than execution.254 The same conclusion 
list is the categorisation of White, who is unique amongst those listed in locating the period of torment in 
the intermediate state, with extinction immediately after the Final Judgment. [White, op. cit., pp. 311-2]. 
249 It is however a charge made by Traditionalists. Fudge writes, "Traditionalists sometimes object that 
irreversible (therefore endless) extinction is actually no 'punishment' at all." [Fudge, op. cit., p. 123] 
250 Ibid., p. 10. [Italics mine.] 
251 Ibid., pp. 23-24. [Italics original] 
252 Ibid., p. 22. 
253 Wenham, Goodness, pp. 77-78. 
254 In the terms of this section, K vanvig argues that euthanasia is actually just as penal as execution. 
Arguing from a doctrine of divine conservation, he concludes, "the distinction between killing and letting 
die, although important in some contexts, is not relevant here ... [T]here is no distinction between the 
conditional immortality view, which wishes to picture annihilation in terms of omission, and some strictly 
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seems warranted when he writes, "... there is an infinite difference between the most 
shocking sufferings that come to an end, and sufferings which go on for ever."255 Yet 
earlier Wenham seems to make its penal quality clear: "It is an everlasting punishment, but 
not an everlasting punishing. "256 
John Stott states that "The debate about hell concerns not the eternity but the nature of the 
punishment, whether the wicked will endure conscious torment for ever or be 
destroyed/annihilated for ever."257 However, he concludes his brief argument for the 
rejection of a hell of unending torment with a statement which is hard to reconcile with 
penal extinction: "unless perhaps ( as has been argued) the impenitence of the lost 
continues throughout eternity. "258 If the torment of hell can only continue if the damned 
continue to sin, thus deserving further retributive punishment, then it suggests that at the 
end of their period of torment the damned deserve no further punishment. In this case 
extinction is simply the end of the period of punishment and not a part of it. However this 
is a very slight thread to hang this conclusion on. Further I think that it is an unlikely 
conclusion since Stott applies the biblical language of destruction, which has a penal 
aspect to extinction.259 However, other writers are clear that extinction is penal. 
Fudge is explicit that extinction is penal. Commenting on the phrase 'eternal destruction' 
he writes, "This destruction is not accidental, nor is it self-inflicted. It is the penal outcome 
of God's judgment. It is punishment, in this instance capital punishment... It is truly, 
"everlasting" or "eternal" punishment, ... "260 In his book, Fudge makes a more extensive 
use of this analogy of capital punishment: 
It is sometimes argued that everlasting extinction implies something less than an 
'eternal' punishment. . . it may be worth re-emphasizing that the duration of final 
punishment is clear; the question concerns its nature. We measure capital 
punishment, ·for example, by its permanency, not by the time required for its 
execution ... Somebody facing capital punishment will derive little comfort from 
the thought that their actual pain will be brief. The sentence is not measured in 
conceived annihilation view, which pictures annihilation in terms of commission. Only one type of 
annihilation exists, ... " [ Op. cit., p. 71] 
255 Wenham, Goodness, p.91. [Italics. mine.] 
256 Ibid., p. 36. 
257 Stott, Logic, pp. 33-34. 
258 Stott, Essentials, p. 319. I will argue in the following chapter that this possibility of continuing sin is to be 
rejected, a key reason being that it results in an unacceptable dualism. 
259 Ibid., p. 315. 
260 E.W. Fudge, "The Final End of the Wicked" in JETS21/3 (September 1984), p. 333. 
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terms of pain. This same reality, recognized by courts and criminals thoughout the 
earth, also answers the objection that eternal extinction is really no punishment. 
For all agree that instant death before a firing squad is rightly regarded as a far 
greater penalty than even a lifetime in prison. 261 
Fudge leaves a number of issues unclear. If capital punishment is worse than life 
imprisonment in this life, why doesn't he conclude that extinction is more severe than 
unending torment in hell? How severe must the conditions of a traditionalist hell become 
before extinction becomes a preferred option? I will touch on these issues further below. 
Finally some brief comments from two other annihilationists also make clear the penal 
nature of extinction. Guillebaud imagines an objector who uses the analogy of capital 
punishment for the extinction of the damned to ask why there is the need for torments as 
well in an annihilationist hell. In accepting the assumption that there is an analogy with 
capital punishment, it shows that he holds that it is penal. 
[W]e ... who acknowledge that the ultimate fate of the wicked is the end of 
conscious existence .. . must answer the question, "Then why torment them first?" 
In earthly justice, it is acknowledged by all civilized people that the death penalty 
is the supreme punishment, and that no unnecessary suffering should ever be 
added to it ... 262 
His response is that the analogy breaks down because God has a greater task than any 
human judge, in particular the exact retribution of sin for which varying periods of torment 
allow.263 Finally, Froom argues that after the resurrection the wicked will endure divinely 
inflicted suffering "proportionate to the demands of the just judgement of God" as the 
"preliminary phase of the total punishment," the culmination of which was extinction. 264 
In conclusion, it seems to be the uniform position in the literature that extinction is held to 
be penal by annihilationists. However, if extinction is penal, then my second question is 
whether it is held to be a finite or an infinite punishment, where it is infinite because it is 
unending in time, or because it is the loss of the infinite good of heaven. Carson certainly 
understands many annihilationists to hold that it is finite when he counters: "One must not 
firmly conclude ( as many annihilationists do) that punishment must be finite because we 
are finite and our actions are finite. "265 This would seem to be a valid conclusion to draw 
261 Fudge, 2nd ed, op. cit., p. 207. 
262 Guillebaud, op. cit., pp.63-4. 
263 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
264 Froom, op. cit., p. 496. 
265 Carson, Gagging, p. 534, n. 52. 
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from their argument that infinite punishment is excessive punishment for finite sins. 
However I have found no clear references from annihilationists in the recent literature to 
extinction being only a finite punishment. There are however several clear references to 
extinction as an infinite punishment. I have already quoted Stott above who states this 
("The debate about hell concerns not the eternity ... "). 
Wenham also referred to an "everlasting punishment" above, and also argued that "To sin 
means ultimately to forfeit heaven, and this is the greatest possible punishment which 
anyone can ever receive, and this is the punishment which sin deserves. Compared with 
this all other punishments, however terrible, are relatively insignificant. "266 Another 
example is Fudge. As well as the quote above, I would add the following: 
If death is seen to be destruction without limitation (which the traditional view has 
not allowed), then is not penal death [extinction] itself an infinite punishment, 
especially if it is an eternal death which is forever irreversible?"267 Again, "both 
Augustine and Jonathan Edwards conceded that such a situation [of extinction] 
would satisfy the expression "eternal punishment", ... 
Fudge also introduces another sense in which extinction can be thought of as an infinite 
punishment, when he argues that the loss of salvation, and not just the loss of life itself, is 
an element in the assessment of the severity of hell. In the context of a discussion of 
Irenaeus, Fudge notes with approval Constable's view, who believed Irenaeus to be "a 
witness for his position. "268 "Constable argues that Irenaeus thinks that future punishment 
is "eternal" because "it is the loss of blessing which is eternal. It does not consist in 
eternally inflicting new misery, but in the eternal loss of what might have been eternally 
enjoyed.""269 Dixon, a traditionalist, also argues that the severity of the punishment is to 
be determined by the loss incurred, and he concludes that it is infinite since it is the loss of 
an eternity of bliss in. heaven. 270 Thus annihilationists hold that extinction is an eternal or 
infinite punishment. 
I now turn to my third question: if extinction is an infinite punishment, how severe a 
punishment is it held to be in comparison to a traditionalist hell, which is also an infinite 
266 Ibid., p. 70. [Italics original]. 
267 Fudge, op. cit., p. 232. 
268 Ibid, p. 332. 
269 Ibid, p. 333, n. 17, quoting Constable, op. cit., p. 188. 
210 o· . 82 lXOil, op. Cit., p. . 
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punishment? Given that the argwnent against Traditionalism turns on Annihilationism 
being a mitigation of Traditionalism, it would be expected that eternal torment would be 
considered the greater punishment. However, as so often in the literature, annihilationists 
are less clear than might be expected. So I will set out a brief taxonomy. Logically there 
could be three positions, which I will note, along with annihilationists who seem to offer 
support. First, it could be argued that unending torment and unending extinction are 
equally severe punishments. Surprisingly, Fudge seems to hold this position when he 
quotes from and comments on Jonathan Edwards' Concerning the Endless Punishment of 
Those Who Die Impenitent. 
In a lengthy paragraph (#31) Edwards responds to the idea that the wicked will 
suffer penal pains according to the precise measure of divine justice, then will b·e 
exterminated. 
"On this," he writes, "I would observe that there is nothing got by such a 
scheme; no relief from the argwnents taken from Scripture, for the proper eternity 
of future punishment. "271 In other words, sinners can find no comfort in this 
understanding of hell, for it is as properly eternal and scripturally horrible as the 
common view of unending conscious torment! He reaffirms the concession at the 
end of his paragraph. 272 
In quoting Edwards, Fudge seems to affirm that extinction is an equally severe punishment 
as the traditionalist hell. However, as I have mentioned, a priori this is a very unlikely 
position for Fudge or any other annihilationist to hold, since it would immediately refute 
his argwnent about the unjust severity of a traditionalist hell. Although he doesn't state 
this, Fudge seems to be making an ad hominem argument to support the notion that 
extinction is a punishment, in response to those who claim that it is no punishment at 
all.213 
Second, it could be argued that extinction is a more severe punishment than 
Traditionalism. This is even more unlikely a position for an annihilationist if they hold that 
Traditionalism is unjustly severe. However, the regular use of the analogy from capital 
punishment, and the recognition that it is a more severe punishment than life 
imprisonment, suggests just such a conclusion. Fudge writes, 
Traditionalists sometimes object that irreversible (therefore endless) extinction is 
actually no 'punishment' at all. Yet throughout human history people have 
willingly chosen the severest tortures, life imprisonment, or exile into intolerable 
271 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 515-525; quotation on p. 524. 
272 Fudge, op. cit., p. 200. [Italics mine]. 
273 I will pick up the point made by Edwards, that if extinction is an infinite-punishment then this means that 
there is no need for any preceding torment, below, pp. 85-86. 
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circumstances and total isolation rather than lose their expected years of life ... as 
Constable pointed out, 
"From the earliest records of our race capital punishment has been reckoned as not 
only the greatest but also the most lasting of all punishments; and it is only 
reckoned the greatest because it is the most lasting. A flogging, inflicted on a petty 
thief, inflicts more actual pain than decapitation or hanging inflicts upon a 
murderer. Why then is it [i.e. capital punishment] greater and more lasting? 
Because it has deprived the sufferer of every hour of that life which but for it he 
would have had. Its duration is supposed co-existent with the period of his natural 
life."214 
However, as above, Fudge seems to be making an ad hominem argument to counter the 
charge that extinction is no punishment by showing that the analogous punishment of 
execution is considered penal. However, it does highlight the need for any annihilationist 
who argues from penal analogies in this life, to show why, if execution is considered a 
more severe punishment than life imprisonment, it doesn't lead to the conclusion that 
extinction is more severe than eternal torment. 
Third, it could be argued that extinction is less severe. Constable, despite his use of the 
analogy of capital punishment above, goes on to state very clearly that Annihilationism is 
indeed less severe: "Now we allow that the Augustinian theory of punishment is infinitely 
more terrible than ours. Between the two there is and can be no comparison. It is idle to 
compare them - as idle as to compare time with eternity. "275 While the language of "no 
comparison" and "an infinite difference" is polemical rather than precise, it does clearly 
highlight that annihilationists see extinction as a mitigation of the severity of 
Traditionalism. Pinnock writes of "the ultimate of penalties - everlasting conscious 
torment."276 This implies that extinction is less than the 'ultimate' penalty in terms of 
severity. This is what is expected from the form in which the annihilationist argument 
about justice is presented: if it is believed that the argument that Traditionalism is unjust 
because it is too severe a punishment is an argument for Annihilationism, then 
Annihilationism must be a less severe punishment This conclusion is also clearly 
perceived by traditionalists. Gomes, for example, states: "Yet the whole point of the 
annihilationist's argument is to mitigate the horror of eternal suffering for the lost. .. "277 I 
think that Gomes overstates the case in claiming this is the 'whole point', but I think he is 
. , 
274 Fudge, op. cit., pp. 198-199, quoting Constable, op. cit., p. 12. [Italics mine]. 
275 Ibid, p. 229. 
276 Pinnock, Conditional, pp. 151-2. 
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right that annihilationists do view their position as a mitigation of · the severity of 
Traditionalism. To quote Kvanvig again, who offers a more measured assessment, " ... the 
annihilation view ... has been perceived over the last few centuries as a mitigation of the 
strong view of hell. "278 This then raises the question of how extinction can be both an 
infinite punishment and yet a less severe punishment than Traditionalism. This issue is not 
addressed directly in the literature. I will argue below that such an argument could be 
made, but that annihilationists need to work at formulating it. 
Fourth, I turn to the question of how the damned in an annihilationist hell view their 
extinction. The purpose of this investigation is to gain further information about how 
annihilationists understand the severity of extinction. As with the above issue, I have 
found no clear discussion of this question in the annihilationist literature. There are two 
issues here which need to be distinguished, which correspond to extinction viewed 
objectively and subjectively by the damned: objectively, the relative penal value and, 
subjectively, the relative severity of the two elements understood here as the intensity of 
the suffering. First, there is the relative penal value of the two elements. One might expect 
that the period of torment could not be viewed as anything but insignificant alongside an 
'infinite punishment' of extinction. However Wenham seems to suggest that the torment is 
actually the greater part of the punishment, although some elements of the argument are 
problematic. 
Some argue that destruction is no punishment, since many an unbeliever wants to 
die, so mere death would be a denial of justice. This assumes that the first death is 
the end and that there is no Day of Judgement and that we are not judged 
according to our works. This is plainly unscriptural and not the view of any 
conditionalist that I know. The very wicked who have suffered little in this life will 
clearly get what they deserve. Perhaps a major part of the punishment will be a 
realisation of the true awfulness of their sin ... 279 
I am taking 'the major part of punishment' to be a reference to the period of torment 
before extinction. The problem that this leaves an annihilationist like Wenham to explain 
is in what sense torment can be the major part of a punishment that includes extinction 
which is in itself an infinite punishment. Fudge is clear that extinction is the greater part of 
277 A. W. Gomes, "Evangelicals and the Annihilation of Hell, Part One," in Christian Research Journal 
(Spring 1991), p. 18. 
278 Kvanvig, op. cit., p. 68. Although, as I noted in the previous chapter, Kvanvig's defmition of the 
annihilation view includes the position of extinction at physical death, his point still stands for the position I 
am examining. 
279 Wenham, Case, p. 189. [Italics mine.] 
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the punishment, although his arguments are not clear at every point. This quote comes in 
the context of a discussion of the biblical phrases 'eternal destruction' and 'eternal 
punishment'. 
[W]e suggest that this 'eternal destruction' will be the penal suffering exactly 
suited to each degree of guilt by a holy and just God, but that penal suffering is not 
itself the ultimate retribution or punishment. There will be an act of destroying, 
resulting in a destruction that will never end or be reversed ... In keeping with their 
scriptural usage, we suggest that the 'punishment' here includes whatever penal 
suffering God justly awards to each person but consists primarily of the total 
abolition and extinction of the person for ever. The punishing continues until the 
process is completed, and then it stops. But the punishment which results will 
remain for ever.280 
Therefore extinction is the major part of the punishment of Annihilationism. 
Second, there is the question of the relative severity of each element, understood as the 
intensity of the suffering, which I will approach by way of a question: do those in torment 
desire extinction or not? The assumption here is that the damned in hell will desire the 
future punishment they perceive as involving the least suffering. Thus, if continued 
torment is considered less severe than extinction, it will be the desired state. It is of course 
arguable that the damned will decide irrationally, or that each person will decide by 
different criteria, or that they have no relevant desires. However, where writers in the 
debate do comment, none takes these positions. However, there are three answers I will 
briefly consider: the damned do not desire extinction because it is more severe; they are 
indifferent to the matter since it is equally severe; or they desire extinction, because it is 
less severe. I will examine each in turn. It should be noted though that some writers make 
statements which seem to fit more than one position. 
First, extinction could be viewed as more severe a punishment than continued torment and 
thus not desired by the damned. As with the discussion above about relative penal values, 
a priori this would seem to be an unlikely position for an annihilationist to adopt since it 
would make the annihilationist hell more severe than Traditionalism. However Guillebaud 
argues that the damned will not desire extinction. "The instinct, which so often makes 
even the suicide struggle desperately for life at the last,, will surely be far more powerful as 
the soul faces the final disintegration of personality, the utter end, and what an awful 
28° Fudge, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 18-19. [Italics mine]. 
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end!"281 It therefore seems that for Guillebaud extinction is no merciful release. There is 
some lingering uncertainty though when Guillebaud talks about a 'suicide'. This may 
suggest that while the damned don't desire extinction for itself, they still desire extinction 
rather than the continuation in existence. Such a distinction would enable an 
annihilationist to hold that extinction is an infinite but less severe punishment than 
unending torment. Wenham though excludes this option when he states, 
If it is said that conditionalism devalues the terror of the biblical deterrents. . . and 
many tormented people might welcome annihilation, conditionalists would 
reply ... It is doubtful if anyone really desires annihilation. Man clings tenaciously 
to life, and it is arguable that the prospect of annihilation is the most dreadful of all 
fates. 282 
Fudge also excludes this option when he argues, by analogy, that the true horror of hell is 
not the temporary torment but the prospect of extinction: "... throughout human history 
men have willingly chosen the severest tortures, life imprisonment, or exile into 
intolerable circumstances and total isolation rather than face the final cutting off of their 
expected years of life. "283 I would also note that Fudge believes that "the wicked do not 
happily and quietly fade away."284 But if the wicked do not happily fade away, then 
presumably they would rather continue in torment than be extinguished. If maintained this 
would make it impossible to maintain that Annihilationism is less severe. 
Second, the damned could be indifferent to the matter since extinction and continuing 
torment are considered equally severe. Travis is ambivalent as to which would be the most 
fearful: unbelievers will be separated from Christ, and "Compared with that tragic fact, 
there is - according to the New Testament writers - little point in asking whether the lost 
continue to be conscious or are annihilated. "285 Moore claims other writers hold a position 
of equivalence. 'Amazingly, neither Pinnock nor Hughes sees annihilation as mitigating its 
awfulness!' However neither of the references he footnotes seem to substantiate this 
claim.286 However, this leads to the same question as when extinction is more severe: how 
can Annihilationism be less severe, but extinction not desired in comparison to continuing 
torment? 
281 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 45. 
282 Ibid, p. 37 
283 Fudge, op. cit., p. 198. 
284 Ibid, p. 428. 
285 Travis, Hope, p. 136. 
286 Moore, op. cit., pp. 29-30. He footnotes Hughes,' op. cit., p. 407 and Pinnock, Destruction, p. 259. 
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Third, extinction could be viewed as less severe than the torments of hell and thus 
something to be comparatively welcomed. Thus Wenham, for example, writes, "(in my 
view) the sufferings will end speedily and mercifully in the second death."287 This does 
not necessarily mean that extinction is desired for its own sake, nor that it is not penal, but 
that it is less severe and thus more desirable than the alternative of continuing conscious 
torment. The impression is of extinction being closer to a form of euthanasia than 
execution. If, as I have argued, the annihilationist believes their position is a mitigation of 
Traditionalism then it would seem to follow that they would hold that extinction is less 
severe than unending torment. 
A further question which arises if there are two elements to the punishment of an 
annihilationist hell is: what are torment and extinction respectively the punishments for? 
As so often in the literature, there is little, if any discussion or even reference to the 
question. As I noted in the previous chapter, a ready distinction lies to hand in the 
tradition: Aquinas, for example, argues that the deprivation of heaven is punishment for 
original sin, while positive degrees of_ torment are punishment for sins committed in life. 
The annihilationist could perhaps draw on this tradition to argue that extinction is the 
punishment for original sin and the period of torment the punishment for sins committed 
in life. However there has been no discussion of this issue. 
In conclusion, I have argued that annihilationists hold that an annihilationist hell is a 
mitigation of the traditionalist hell. From this it follows that it is less severe. Thus they 
hold that extinction is an infinite punishment, while also maintaining that it is less severe a 
punishment than the hell of Traditionalism. There is no attempt to provide an argument to 
justify an infinite punishment. From the premise that Annihilationism has two elements to 
its punishment (torment and extinction) it follows that extinction ought to be welcomed 
by the damned in comparison with the prospect of continued torment. However leading 
annihilationists like Fudge avoid this conclusion without clear justification. 
Before making an assessment of the annihilationist argument, I will tum to a related 
argument about the love of God. 
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2.1.2 The Traditionalist Hell Displays God as Unloving 
Several annihilationists, and indeed some traditionalists in their summaries of 
Annihilationism, give a separate argument from the goodness or love of God. As with 
many of the annihilationist arguments, it is presented as an argument for Annihilationism, 
although it is in the form of a criticism of Traditionalism. The argument is that the 
traditionalist hell displays God as unloving or cruel. I include it in this chapter because we 
will argue that in fact the criticism depends upon the prior question of the justice of hell. 
An example of this argument is Pinnock's third argument for annihilation which is headed 
Morality. He writes," ... the traditional view, ... depicts God acting in a way that contradicts 
his goodness and offends our moral sense. "288 Under this heading Pinnock also argues that 
"Unending torment would be utterly pointless, wasted suffering that could never lead to 
anything good. "289 Pinnock can sometimes use even more forceful language when framing 
this point, concluding that the God of Traditionalism has similarities to Satan in his 
cruelty. 
Let me say at the outset that I consider the concept of hell as endless torment in 
body and mind an outrageous doctrine, a theological and moral enormity, a bad 
doctrine of the tradition which needs to be changed. How can Christians possibly 
project a deity of such cruelty and vindictiveness whose ways include inflicting 
everlasting torture upon his creatures, however sinful they may have been? Surely 
a God who could do such things is more nearly like Satan than like God, at least by 
any ordinary moral standards, and by the Gospel itself ... Surely the God and father 
of our Lord Jesus Christ is no fiend; torturing people without end is not what our 
God does. 290 
Pinnock states the importance of this argument when he writes, 
The idea that a conscious creature should have to undergo physical and mental 
torture through unending time is profoundly disturbing, and the thought that this is 
inflicted upon them by divine decree offends my conviction about God's love. This 
is probably the primary reason why people question the tradition so veheme·ntly in 
the first place. 291 
Crockett draws a similar conclusion when he comments: "... Pinnock's most powerful 
point [is] the moral argument. He wonders whether the 'Abba' Father of Jesus could torture 
people without end, and what we would think of someone who acted as vindictively as the 
287 Wenham, Goodness, pp. 77-78. 
288 Pinnock, Conditional, p. 149. 
289 Ibid, p. 153. 
290 Pinnock, Destruction, pp. 246-7. See also Conditional, p. 149. 
291 Ibid., p. 164. [Italics mine]. 
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doctrine of eternal hell suggests God will act. "292 For Pinnock this argument is clearly 
presented as distinct from that based on the injustice of Traditionalism, since in his 
summary in Four Views on Hell he deals with the arguments related to justice under a 
separate head, entitled Justice, from those headed Morality. 293 The arguments headed 
Morality may even be indicated to have priority since they precede those headed Justice in 
Pinnock's list of arguments, coming in third and fourth places respectively. 
However, other writers make the link to justice clearer. Travis also gives a similar 
argument as the fourth of his five arguments for Annihilationism. "Eternal torment serves 
no useful purpose, and is therefore merely vindictive. This vindictiveness is incompatible 
with the love of God in Christ. "294 Unlike Pinnock, Travis doesn't give a separate 
argument about the justice of hell, and thus I think that his argument is of the same form as 
Wenham's: if hell is unjust, then God would be "merely vindictive" to inflict it. Wenham 
initially seems to make a similar point to Pinnock: 
To any normal way of thinking (and Jesus has told us when we think about God to 
think how a human father acts) [Traditionalism] depicts God as a terrible sadist, 
not as loving father. "295 Again, " I know that no sinner is competent to judge the 
heinousness of sin, but I cannot see that endless punishment is either loving or 
just ... Unending torment speaks to me of sadism, not justice. It is a doctrine which 
I do not know how to preach without negating the loveliness and glory of God. 296 
However, Wenham's basis for his argument is that, as I quoted above, "the punishment 
traditionally ascribed to God seems neither to square with Scripture nor to be just. "297 
Wenham's argument is thus that ifhell is unjust then it follows that God would have to be 
sadistic to inflict it on anyone. In Packer's summary of the key arguments he also lists this 
argument in the form held by Wenham: "Let us look at the biblical arguments used [by 
annihilationists]. They reduce to four ... Second, it is said that everlasting retribution would 
be needless cruelty, since God's justice does not appear to require it. "298 
Why then is Pinnock's formulation different at this point? The answer seems to be that 
Pinnock is operating with significant theological differences to Wenham and most 
292 Crockett, Four Views, p. 171. 
293 Pinnock, Conditional. 
294 Travis, Hope, p. 13 5. Travis gives this argument as the fifth of six in Travis, Believe, p. 199. 
295 Wenham, Case, p. 184. 
296 Ibid, pp. 185, 187. 
297 Ibid, p. 186. 
298 Packer, Problem, pp. 12-13. 
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evangelicals. The difference with most relevance to our discussion is his rejection of "the 
ideal of punitive, retributive justice [which] underlies traditional thinking about the nature 
of hell."299 Pinnock argues that God's nature is "boundlessly merciful"300 and therefore that 
he would not inflict suffering on anyone unless it made redemption possible. 
"[Unredemptive suffering] would be punishment for its own sake. Surely God does not act 
like that. 11301 Thus Pinnock differs not only from traditionalists, but from most evangelical 
annihilationists too. Although he uses the language of punishment and desert, he actually 
argues that extinction is motivated by respect for the choices of the wicked: 
According to my view, God is morally justified in destroying the wicked because 
he respects their human choices. He will not save them if they do not want to be 
saved ... To affirm hell means accepting human significance. Sinners do not have to 
be saved and will not be forced to go to heaven. They have a moral "right" to hell. 
The God who seeks our well-being in fellowship with himself will not force his 
fellowship upon anyone. In the end he will allow us to become what we have 
chosen.302 
The logic of Pinnock's arguments would seem to be that there should be no torment prior 
to extinction, and if this is true then he ceases to fit the form of Annihilationism which I 
am studying in this thesis. As I noted above, Guillebaud, who here represents the usual 
evangelical annihilationist position, answered criticism similar to Pinnock's by claiming 
that, although punishment before extinction seems vindictive, it is actually necessary to 
judgement and the redressing of the inequalities that we experience in this world. 303 
Thus, for evangelicals, hell only contradicts God's goodness if it is unjust. This point is 
made clearly by Wayne Grudem: 
With respect to the argument from the love of God, the same difficulty in 
reconciling God's love with eternal punishment would seem to be present in 
reconciling God's love with the idea of divine punishment at all, and conversely, if 
(as Scripture abundantly testifies) it is consistent for God to punish the wicked for 
a certain lengtp of time after the last judgement, then there seems to be no 
necessary reason why it would be inconsistent of God to inflict the same 
punishment for an unending period of time. 304 
299 Pinnock, Conditional, p. 153. 
300 Ibid, p. 149. 
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In his point following 'conversely' Grudem is not arguing that an unending punishment is 
just, but that if it is just then it is consistent with the love of God for him to inflict it. 
Again, the issue reverts to that of the justice of any particular punishment. This is also 
recognised by the ACUTE authors who entitle the second of their 'Key Theological Issues', 
"Love and Justice. 11305 Their statement of the argument concludes with the issue of justice: 
"The argument ... is a forceful one: it asks what love and justice could possibly be 
manifested in everlasting, unrelenting conscious torment, and responds that there is 
surely a grave disproportion between crimes committed in a single lifetime, and 
punishment administered for all eternity. 11306 
Therefore I will focus on the determinative issue which is that of the justice of hell. 
Before continuing, I would note Blamires' view on the response of love, which also links 
the issue to justice, but in a different way. Blamires makes the point that love would 
demand justice since love does not want people to be deceived into thinking that they are 
good when they are not. 307 I will argue in the next chapter that such lucidity about the 
good is a feature which is problematic in classic Traditionalism, but is a feature of the 
modified Traditionalism I will expound. 
2.2 An Assessment of the Annihilationist Arguments 
In the rest of this chapter I will aim to do two things. First, I will first offer an assessment 
of the possible annihilationist penal theories I have mapped out, and argue that none are 
without significant·problems. I will begin by examining the problems for annihilationists if 
extinction is an infinite punishment. Then I will argue that extinction is not an infinite 
punishment, because it cannot be experienced as punishment after it takes place, and 
before hand there can only be a finite appreciation of its consequences. Thus extinction is 
only a finite punishment. One consequence is that if there is any sense in which sin 
deserves an infinite punishment, then Annihilationism will be unjustly lenient. I therefore 
turn to a discussion of whether sin deserves an infinite punishment. I will briefly outline 
what I call the 'classic' argument for an infinite punishment, and conclude that if this is 
accepted, then it constitutes a reason for rejecting an annihilationist hell of finite 
305 ACUTE, op. cit., pp. 102-106. 
306 Ibid., p. 103. 
307 Blamires, "The Eternal Weight of Glory," Christianity Today, 27 May 1991, pp. 6, 9. 
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punishment. However, I will argue that there may be some validity to the annihilationist 
critique that Traditionalism is excessively severe. 
Second, in response to this conclusion, I will attempt to formulate a modified 
Traditionalism which can be interpreted as a mitigation of the severity of classic 
Traditionalism and thus responds to the chief annihilationist concern relating to justice, 
while retaining some of the strengths of Traditionalism. This task is not formally necessary 
to refute Annihilationism, but it strengthens the argument. Drawing on Henri Blocher' s 
work, I will expound the notion of the fixity of the damned. In Chapter Three I will 
expound the additional notions of the damned ceasing to sin, being lucid, and being 
reconciled to God in a limited sense, which can also serve as mitigations, but more directly 
relate to the issue of dualism. In the present chapter I will propose two alternative 
strategies. First, if the annihilationist criticism of the justice of an infinite punishment for 
finite sin is persuasive, then rather than requiring a complete rejection of Traditionalism I 
will suggest that it merely requires modification, along the lines of one interpretation of 
the fixity of the damned. However, second, if there is some cogency to the claim that sin 
deserves an infinite punishment, then not only does this rule out Annihilationism as 
unjustly lenient, but Blocher's modified Traditionalism can also be interpreted as being an 
infinite punishment. The advantage of this modified Traditionalism over the classic form 
is that it can also be interpreted as less severe, and thus achieves what I think many 
annihilationists are attempting to do: to formulate a punishment which is infinite but less 
severe than classic Traditionalism. This is the position I favour in this debate. 
2.2.1 If Extinction is an Infinite Punishment 
As I noted above, annihilationists usually hold that extinction is an infinite, or eternal, 
punishment since it is without end and it involves the loss of an infinite, or eternal, bliss. 
This raises problems about the justice of an annihilationist hell and the relation between 
punishment as extinction and a proportionate period of torment. I will make several 
criticisms, before assessing Annihilationism if extinction is held to be a finite punishment. 
First, the annihilationist criticism that the punishment of a traditionalist hell is unjust 
because it is an infinite punishment is self-refuting if extinction is also held to be an 
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infinite punishment, without further explanation. Blanchard states correctly that their 
criticism "begs an obvious question. 11308 Thus, if Traditionalism is unjust because it is an 
infinite punishment for finite sin, then Annihilationism is also unjust. To re-cap just one 
particularly clear example: when Pinnock rejects "such an infinite sentence," and goes on 
to ask whether a sinner could cause God an infinite loss, his objection applies not just to a 
sentence of everlasting torment, but to any infinite sentence, including extinction. This 
objection is something of a commonplace in the literature. Blanchard writes: "If it would 
be wrong of God to punish finite sin with everlasting punishment, how can it be right for 
him to punish it by annihilation, which by definition is itself everlasting?11309 Blomberg 
argues similarly: "the problem of infinite punishment for finite sin is not resolved by 
Annihilationism: those who would cease to exist would still do so for an infinite period of 
time."310 Again, Grenz: 
annihilationism does not truly assuage the problems which lead its proponents to 
reject the traditional view. Ceasing to exist for all eternity is as permanent a 
consequence as conscious suffering in hell. for this reason, the annihilation of the 
lost ought to be equally offensive to evangelical sensibilities about what constitutes 
just punishment for decisions made during earthly life. 311 
This response is effective against any annihilationist objection expressed in terms of the 
comparison between infinite punishment and finite sin. If this annihilationist objection is 
to be sustained then they must argue that it is not an infinite punishment per se which is 
unjust, but only a certain type of infinite punishment, that is unending torment. The most 
hopeful line of argument is probably from this-world analogies, and particularly human 
penal systems. K vanvig offers some comments on human analogies from penal practice, 
but notes that these would suggest that Annihilationism is actually more severe than 
Traditionalism. 
Nothing is to be gained in responding to objections to a penal theory by 
substituting metaphysical capital punishment for metaphysical life imprisonment; 
if anything capital punishment would suggest that the annihilationist view assigns 
a more severe punishment than does the strong view.312 
Again, "the annihilation view ... in no sense involves a mitigation of the strong view. "313 
However K vanvig also makes an important qualification when he suggests that "the 
annihilation view has some privileged position with respect to a torture chamber image of 
308 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 225. 
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311 Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994), p. 830. 
312 Kvanvig, op. cit., p. 68. 
313 Ibid., p. 69. 
83 
hell. .. "314 and this, he suggests, may be mitigated by extinction. The 'torture chamber 
image of hell' would include the classic understanding of Traditionalism. However, other 
writers have argued that even on the torture chamber image the damned would still prefer 
a tortured existence to extinction, and so 'the annihilation view' is still not a mitigation. 
Writers I have quoted above to this effect include Fudge: " ... throughout human history 
men have willingly chosen the severest tortures ... rather than face the final cutting off of 
their expected years of life."315 This view has a long pedigree, and Bonda traces it back as 
far as the Neoplatonism of Augustine: "In Augustine's philosophy it is always better to 
exist than not to exist, even when the existence is unhappy."316 Bonda quotes in evidence 
from The City of God: 
Mere existence is desirable in virtue of a kind of natural property. So much so 
that even those who are wretched are for this very reason unwilling to die. . . If 
those wretches were offered immortality, on the condition that their misery 
would be undying, with the alternative that if they refused to live for ever in the 
same misery they would cease to have any existence at all, and would perish 
utterly, then they would certainly be overjoyed to choose perpetual misery in 
preference to complete annihilation. 317 
Bray notes the same philosophical roots: "In the Platonic scheme of things, the continuing 
existence of rebellious souls is a lesser evil than their total destruction, ... ,,3 18 Bonda and 
Bray though seem to have very different assessments of this older view. Bonda writes, 
"This kind of philosophy is meaningless to us. We cannot believe that an endless existence 
of torture is preferable to non-existence." 319 For support he could have cited Aquinas, who 
draws a similar conclusion using an argument based on Aristotle. In an article entitled, 
"Whether the Damned by Right and Deliberate Reason Would Wish Not to Be?" 
Aquinas responds: 
I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus 
it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure deprivation 
of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from 
some unhappiness: and thus not to be takes on the aspect of good, since to lack 
314 Ibid, p. 69. 
315 Fudge, op. cit., p. 198. Fudge is talking about the present life but he uses it as an argument by analagy to 
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an evil is a kind of good as the philosopher says (Ethic. V. 1). In this way it is 
better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. 320 · 
Bray, on the other hand, having compared extinction to euthanasia, concludes that, 
One difficulty with this is that we do not accept euthanasia (i.e. deliberate 'mercy' 
killing, not suspension of treatment for the incurable) as a valid response to 
hopeless suffering here on earth, so why should we do so in the afterlife? However 
bad it may be, continuing existence is a better state than total annihilation, because 
it preserves the dignity of the individual person.321 
My own view agrees with K vanvig that extinction is to be regarded as a mitigation of the 
classic traditionalist hell of the 'torture chamber'. However, I will argue in chapter three 
that the damned will want to remain alive, and that it is indeed a 'better state' than 
extinction because there is purpose in their justly suffering. It remains unclear though how 
bad the torment of the traditionalist hell would have to become before extinction becomes 
the preferable option. I suspect that analogies from this life are not close enough to provide 
a reliable basis for an argument where such fine distinctions are required. 
This difficulty of using the analogy of capital punishment is compounded by the problem 
that O'Donovan notes in determining the penal severity of capital punishment in this life. 
"The conventional answer, that [capital punishment] is just a little more severe than being 
sentenced to prison for life, is highly controversial, for .. . one could argue with great 
persuasiveness either that it is immeasurably more severe or that it is immeasurably more 
lenient. "322 Later he writes of the "probl~m of the incommensurability of capital 
punishment with quantitatively calculated limits. "323 This seems to reflect both the 
uncertainty and the variety of opinions about the conclusions to be drawn from the analogy 
with capital punishment in the literature on hell. In the light of this difficulty it seems that 
it would be unwise to rest much weight on an argument from the analogy from capital 
punishment. Further, if the first option is taken, that it is 'immeasurably more severe', then 
the annihilationist claim, that their position is more just because less severe than 
Traditionalism, is weakened even more: extinction would be more severe. If the second 
option is taken, that it is 'immeasurably more lenient', then this seems to result in the 
position I will argue for below: that it is merely a finite punishment. However, it is clear 
320 Aquinas, op. cit., Q. 98, Art. 3, Suppl., pp. 2991-2. [Italics o;iginal]. See also Q. 86, Art. 2, Suppl. 
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that the predominant view held by both traditionalists and annihilationists is that the 
severity of the traditionalist hell is great enough to make extinction a mitigation. 
Second, annihilationists need to offer an argument for the justice of extinction if they 
continue to claim that it is an infinite punishment. This they fail to do, and it is hard to see 
how they could do having rejected the classic traditionalist argument that sin against God, 
who is an infinite being, deserves infinite punishment. There are a number of other 
arguments, besides what I have called the 'classic' argument, which traditionalists use to 
justify a traditional hell, but which are not obviously available to an annihilationist.324 The 
two chief alternatives I will note here are that the damned continue to sin in hell and thus 
deserve further punishment; and that the guilt of the damned cannot be satisfied by 
suffering and therefore always remains to be punished. However, both these arguments 
seem to be justifications for a continuation of torment, as Stott suspects when he writes, "I 
question whether 'eternal conscious torment' is compatible with the biblical revelation of 
divine justice, unless perhaps ( as has been argued) the impenitence of the lost also 
continues throughout eternity. "325 In Chapter Three I will also argue at length that the 
argument from the continuation from sin is to be rejected on other grounds. An alternative 
strategy is to retain the traditionalist argument for an infinite punishment, drop their 
argument against the injustice of Traditionalism based on the rejection of this principle, 
and simply argue that the nature of the infinite punishment cannot be determined on the 
basis of this argument from justice alone. 
Third, if extinction is an infinite punishment, there is the problem of justifying a finite 
period of torment preceding it. This problem has been noted by several annihilationists. 
Fudge discusses the issue, and quotes Jonathan Edwards, as I noted above, to argue that 
extinction is "as properly eternal and scripturally horrible" as Traditionalism. However, if 
extinction is as scripturally horrible, then there would seem to be no need for a separate 
period of torment as well. This is precisely the point that Edwards goes on to make. Fudge 
records Edwards' argument, but fails to make any response to it. 
If "eternal punishment" does not consist of conscious unending torment but rather 
extinction forever, then it is as fully "eternal" with or without the preceding penal 
324 The most extensive range of alternative justifications of endless punishment is discussed by Shedd in 
his third chapter entitled "The Rational Argument" op. cit., pp. 118-170. 
325 Stott, Essentials, p. 319. 
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pains, he says. And therefore "it answers the scriptural expressions as well, to 
suppose that they shall be annihilated immediately, without any long pains, 
provided the annihilation be everlasting. 11326327 
The implication of this point is that Annihilationism can collapse into the position of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses, with extinction at the first death. The fact that Fudge notes that 
"[Edwards] is arguing ad hominem in response to those who insisted on a very, very 
lengthy period of pain which would be followed by extinction, "328 does not effect the logic 
of the point. However Guillebaud argues that a period of torment allows for different 
degrees of punishment in hell. He asks the question that if the damned are to be punished 
with extinction, "Then why torment them first?"329 After offering some qualifications to 
the hwnan penal analogy, since God is not exactly like a hwnan judge, Guillebaud 
emphasises the issue of degrees: "If the penalty for the vilest wickedness were a painless 
extinction of existence, many of the worst inequalities of earth would go eternally 
unredressed. "330 Later he adds, "the fact of gradation of punishment, which would be 
impossible if there were no penal suffering, gives room for a perfect administration of 
justice."33 1 However, it remains difficult to see why the difference in degrees of torment 
doesn't become insignificant alongside an 'infinite' punishment whose consequences are 
eternal. Annihilationists could of course respond that although the period of torment and 
the doctrine of degrees that follow from it may seem insignificant, because they are merely 
finite alongside an infinite punishment, they are not thereby shown to be necessarily 
wrong. 
I suspect that for many annihilationists, although the infinite penal nature of extinction is 
formally upheld, the focus of comparison tends to shift to the common element of the two 
views, that is the comparative lengths of torment, one finite, the other infinite. This might 
explain W enham's reference above to 'an infinite difference' between the two hells and 
Constable's analogy above of a comparison between time and eternity. If there is a 
tendency to overlook the penal nature of extinction at points in the argwnent this may be 
because it offers a much clearer mitigation, and may result from an unacknowledged sense 
that extinction is actually a finite punishment. Thus, in much annihilationist writing there 
326 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 515-525; quotation on p. 524. [Italics mine]. 
327 Fudge, op. cit., p. 200. 
328 Ibid., pp. 200-20 I. 
329 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 64. 
330 Ibid., p. 65. 
331 Ibid., p. 66. 
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is a tension on the issue of the severity of the punishment: there is a rejection of the classic 
traditionalist view as being unjustly severe, and yet at the same time annihilationists have 
emphasised the horror of extinction in part to avoid the charge from traditionalists, 
considered by Wenham, that "conditionalism devalues the terror of the biblical 
deterrent. "332 
In conclusion, annihilationists have not always formulated their arguments about justice 
clearly. In particular they need to clarify that their argument is not against an infinite 
punishment per se, but against the severity of the infinite punishment of Traditionalism, if 
they are not to be self-refuting. However, once it has been admitted that both sorts of hell 
are infinite punishments, I don't think the objection that classic Traditionalism is too 
severe can be easily established from an argument about justice. If there is a ground for 
such an objection it probably lies in the area of analogies from this life, although these 
would require careful formulation, and would probably not be decisive. The problems that 
annihilationists face in justifying a limited period of torment before extinction do not seem 
to be decisive either. However there is a widely held opinion that extinction is less severe 
a punishment than the endless torment of Traditionalism which is usually portrayed in a 
way close to Kvanvig's torture chamber view. I think that this claim may be valid. In the 
final section of this chapter, I therefore hope to formulate a modified Traditionalism which 
may go some way to meeting the objection of annihilationists who believe that the usual 
traditionalist hell is too severe. 
2.2.2 If Extinction is a Finite Punishment 
In this section I want to argue that extinction is neither an infinite punishment, nor no 
punishment at all as some traditionalists have argued, but a finite one. I want to suggest 
that such a position has to its own problems, which should lead to its rejection, unless 
Annihilationism can be modified to meet them. Finally, I will suggest that a modified form 
of Traditionalism can also be understood as a finite punishment, but with fewer problems 
than a modified Annihilationism. I will begin by n<;>ting and refuting the views that 
extinction is either an infinite punishment or no punishment at all, before making my own 
case that extinction is actually a finite punishment. 
332 Wenham, Goodness, p. 37, where he considers this argument. 
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I want to begin by arguing that extinction is not an infinite punishment. First, extinction is 
not an infinite punishment because it is not an infinite loss. A loss is only a punishment if 
it is a loss of something held by right. Thus, for example, the loss of winning the National 
Lottery is not a punishment, but the loss of my freedom is. It is doubtful whether the 
damned have been deprived of an infinite bliss to which they otherwise have a right, and if 
this is so then the argument is refuted. However, second, even if it is decided that this is an 
infinite loss, then for loss to be a just retributive punishment the damned must be able to 
f ully comprehend, and thus in some sense experience, the infinite extent of the loss, or the 
severity of the punishment is unrelated to the experience of the one punished. However 
both options are to be rejected, because for a punishment to be retributive it must be 
experienced, but extinction can only be experienced in prospect, and this cannot be a 
complete apprehension of it in its infinite extent. Therefore annihilationists actually face 
the difficulties of a hell of finite punishment, which I will note below. 
The second view of the penal nature of extinction taken by some traditionalists is that it is 
no punishment at all. Fudge notes that Traditionalists "sometimes object that irreversible 
(therefore endless) extinction is actually no 'punishment' at all."333 Tidball notes it as the 
first objection raised against Annihilationism: "Many [traditionalists] have to be persuaded 
that annihilation is punishment, since it makes hell out simply to be a state of non-
existence. "334 The argument is usually that ·punishment needs to be experienced and that 
by this criterion extinction is not a punishment. An example of a traditionalist who makes 
this criticism, with great repetitiveness, is John Gerstner. For example, "Extinction is no 
punishment at all because it leaves no one to suffer any punishment. "335 Essential to 
Gerstner's understanding is the assumption that punishment involves suffering. "I must 
keep repeating that annihilation is an alternative to or a substitute for pain, not a form of 
it." Gerstner is an Edwards scholar, and his own view follows that of Edwards. To give a 
single quote of Edwards from many possible ones, 
. . . a state of annihilation is no state of suffering at all... They no more suffer to 
eternity than they did suffer from eternity ... It is agreeable both to Scripture and 
333 Ibid , p. 198. Gray imagines that an annihilationist might also want to use this argument to avoid the 
problems of extinction being an infinite punishment. He rejects the argument because it "is to ignore the 
effects of that action [of extinction]." Gray, op. c'it., p. 237 [Italics original]. 
334 Tidball, op. cit., p. 154. 
335 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 153. 
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reason to suppose, that the wicked will be punished in such a-manner that they 
shall be sensible of the punishment they are under.336 
A similar argument is made by Shedd, who argued that "the extinction of consciousness is 
not of the nature of punishment. The essence of punishment is suffering, and suffering is 
consciousness. "337 Another example of this argument in the recent debate is from Gomes, 
who states that 
once we have said the word 'punishment we have also said, at least by implication, 
the word 'conscious.' Punishment, per se, is conscious or it is not a punishment. A 
punishment that is not felt is not a punishment." He continues, "Someone cannot 
be punished eternally unless that someone is there to receive the punishment. One 
can exist and not be punished, but one cannot be punished and not exist. 
Nonentities cannot receive punishment.338 
Again, Grudem states," ... it may be wondered whether ... immediate annihilation can really 
be called a punishment, since there would be no consciousness of pain. "339 Support may 
be drawn for this point from Moberly's book The Ethics of Punishment. The book, which 
is rarely quoted in the debate, has a final chapter entitled 'The Conception of Eternal 
Punishment' in which he makes this point, although his own position is different to that of 
both Traditionalism and Annihilationism. Moberly suggests that without suffering there is 
no punishment: 
How then must we thing [sic] of 'Hell', i.e. the ultimate condition of lost souls, if 
we are to think of it at all? Not as a condition of perpetual, deserved and conscious, 
suffering, but as one of imbecility deepening into personal nonentity ... there would 
be no suffering, for there would be no consciousness left to suffer... Hell then 
would not be a state of punishment. 340 
I think that this is correct: first, the obvious point that once the damned are extinguished 
they no longer suffer; and, second, that retributive punishment needs to be experienced by 
the one being punished. 
Howev~r it is wrong to conclude that extinction is not a punishment at all. Rather 
extinction is a punishment but not an infinite one. An annihilationist would be correct in 
using the analogy of execution to argue that extinction can reasonably be viewed as -a 
punishment. However I think that the traditionalist argument above is also correct: that 
336 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 84, col. 2. 
337 W.G.T. Shedd, The Doctrine of Endless Punishment (orig. 1885; rpt. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1990), 
p.92. ' 
338 Gomes, "Evangelicals and the Annihilation of Hell, Part Two," in Christian Research Journal (Summer 
1991), p. 11, quoted in Dixon, op. cit., p. 90. 
339 Grudem, op. cit., p. 1150. 
340 Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 349-350. [Italics mine]. 
I will examine Moberly's position further in the following chapter. · 
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retributive punishment needs to be experienced by the one punished, and thus after the 
moment of extinction punishment ceases for that person since they cannot experience it. 
The resolution of these two statements comes, I believe, in the observation that the 
damned may be able to contemplate their coming extinction, in a way analogous to that in 
which a criminal could contemplate his execution in this life. In this case they would be 
able to comprehend, though only partially, the future loss, and so in some sense experience 
it in the present, thus meeting the criteria for retributive punishment to be experienced. 
However I do not see how they could experience it as an infinite punishment in the 
present, since a finite mind could not fully grasp the prospect of an infinite future, and thus 
not experience an infinite loss. Edwards has a brief discussion of the issue, from a 
traditionalist perspective, and concludes that even though the damned may have their 
understanding enlarged, they still could not fully comprehend an infinite period of time: 
If it were possible for the damned in hell to have a comprehensive knowledge of 
eternity, their sorrow and grief would be infinite in degree. The comprehensive 
view of so much sorrow, which they must endure, would cause infinite grief for 
the present. Though they will not have a comprehensive knowledge of it, yet they 
will doubtless have a vastly more lively and strong apprehension of it than we can 
have in this world ... their capacity will probably be enlarged, their understandings 
will be quicker and stronger in a future state; and God can give them as great a 
sense and as strong an impression of eternity, as he pleases, to increase their grief 
and torment. 341 
Several annihilationists themselves argue this in the case of the death of Christ, which I 
will examine further in chapter four. They argue that Christ could not have known what it 
was like to face, and thus in some sense experience, an infinitely long period of torment, in 
a finite period. In other words, the imagination is not able to take in an infinite loss, and 
thus although the damned in an annihilationist hell would indeed experience extinction as 
a punishment, it could not be as an infinite punishment. Further, the notion that extinction 
is only a punishment to the extent that it is perceived and thus experienced beforehand, 
would seem to gain support from another annihilationist argument. Annihilationists argue 
that the first death is not an adequate punishment in itself. However by their criteria of loss 
it would seem to be as much an infinite punishment as extinction at the second death. 
Presumably they need to argue for the second death, with respect to this point, because the 
damned are not adequately aware of their loss and its re!ributive nature at the first death. 342 
341 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 88. [Italics mine]. 
342 In this chapter I am focusing on the requirement for punishment to be suffered or experienced to be 
punishment; in the following chapter, in a section on the lucidity of the damned, I will use a similar argument 
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Therefore I conclude, against several traditionalists, that extinction is a punishment. I 
would also conclude, against the explicit statements of annihilationists, that it is not an 
infinite punishment because there is no infinite experience involved. This means that the 
punishment of an annihilationist hell is finite, a point which I now assess. An obvious 
advantage of the position that extinction is a finite punishment is that it avoids the self-
refuting nature of the annihilationist charge against Traditionalism that an infinite 
punishment is unjust for sin committed in this life. However there are also several possible 
criticisms. 
First, a number of traditionalists in the recent debate have argued that if annihilation is a 
finite punishment then it can be completed, and after its completion the damned should be 
translated to Heaven. Thus a finite hell becomes a form of purgatory since the damned 
should be translated to heaven at their end of their punishment. What is surprising about 
this argument as it is presented is that it rests on an assumption, that no annihilationist 
holds, that extinction is not a further punishment, but simply the end point of the 
punishment. However if extinction is a finite punishment it means that the total 
punishment of hell, including both torment and extinction, is finite and therefore the 
punishment could still be completed. I will therefore note one of several examples of this 
argument in the literature. Carson writes, "One might reasonably wonder why, if people 
pay for their sins in hell before they are annihilated, they cannot be released into heaven, 
turning hell into purgatory. Alternatively, if the sins have not yet been paid for, why 
should they be annihilated?"343 I think that the principle here is sound that if the penalty 
for sin can be completed by the suffering of the damned, then they should be translated to 
heaven. I also think that the traditionalist argument is sound for an annihilationist hell 
where the only penal element is the torment. If this were the case then Annihilationism 
to argue further that for a punishment to be a just punishment it needs not only to be suffered or experienced 
as punishment but it must also be perceived as just. 
343 Carson, Gagging, p. 530. See also, for example, Grudem, op. cit., p. 1151; Blanchard, op. cit., p. 223; 
and Moore, op. cit., p. 33. In conversation, Kendall Harmon has aptly described the annihilationist position 
as "Purgatory in reverse," in other words a period of fixed suffering to pay for earthly sins, but followed by 
destruction rather than the beatific vision. However, a formal comparison with the Roman Catholic doctrine 
of Purgatory falls down chiefly because evangelicals are not arguing that the damned have had the guilt of sin 
removed, leaving only any punishment for sin. So, for example, Vatican II says, "The doctrine of purgatory 
clearly demonstrates that even when the guilt of sin has been taken away, punishment for it or the 
consequences of it may remain to be expiated or cleansed ... after death with punishments designed to purge 
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would collapse into Universalism, which has almost always been rejected as an option by 
evangelicals.344 However I don't think that this argument can be extended to cover the 
finite punishment of extinction so that as soon as the damned are extinguished they would 
have completed their punishment, and thus deserve to be re-created and translated to 
heaven. One of the problems here is that in order for extinction to be more than a very 
light punishment, the damned would have to believe that it would be a permanent state 
rather than a momentary cessation of existence. However, if the damned are to believe that 
extinction is irreversible it would involve a deception, which is hard to reconcile with a 
divine punishment. Further if the damned are required to know that their punishment is 
just, as I will argue in the next chapter, they would also presumably be capable of this 
logic and conclude that they would have to be re-created if God wasn't to be unjustly 
severe. Therefore I think that an annihilationist could respond to this criticism by arguing 
that the annihilationist hell is a finite punishment but with permanent consequences. Thus, 
although the argument about a collapse into purgatory is effective against any finite 
punishment without permanent consequences, such a revised position avoids it. Indeed the 
permanent consequence in this case is extinction which necessarily rules out any 
subsequent translation to heaven. 
Second, a common traditionalist charge against any position which fails to maintain an 
infinite punishment for sin is that it fails to serve as a deterrent to sin or as an adequate 
motive to evangelism and conversion. An example of this argument with respect to 
evangelism is given by Packer, already noted in chapter one, although he frames it in terms 
not of infinite and finite, but of the greatest punishment in distinction to anything less. 
Packer writes that the annihilationist "will miss out on telling the unconverted that their 
prospects without Christ are as bad as they possibly could be. . . Conditionalism, logically 
thought through, cannot but impoverish a Christian man, and limit his usefulness to the 
Lord. "345 A strong response though can be made by arguing that the periods of both 
torment and extinction are fearful enough to serve these ends. Indeed Wenham offers the 
interesting counter-claim that Annihilationism is actually a better deterrent because it is 
away their debts." [Documents of Vatican 11, ed. Austin P. Flannery (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975) p. 
64.] 
344 "Today, universalism remains a largely non-evangelical view, although there are signs that it has begun 
to have some influence on the more radical wing of evangelicalism." ACUTE, op. cit., p. 27. For more 
details see the survey, pp. 24-34. 
345 Packer, op. cit., p.14. 
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more believable.346 Wenham makes a direct response to Packer's argument when he 
observes that "I have no reason to think that the adoption of conditionalism impairs a 
man's evangelism. "34 7 
Third, any annihilationist who wants to argue that hell is a finite punishment needs to 
show that the traditionalist argument for sin deserving an infinite punishment is 
unfounded. I will examine this in the next section. 
In conclusion, in this chapter so far I have sought to show that the annihilationist argument 
against the justice of a traditionalist hell as they state it, without qualification, is self-
refuting if they hold that extinction is an infinite punishment. While they could refine their 
argument and hold not that an infinite punishment per se is unjust, but the particular type 
of infinite punishment held by traditionalists is unjust, they do not argue this, and it is hard 
to see how they could justify such a nuanced distinction on the basis of an argument from 
justice alone. However, I have argued that in fact extinction is a finite punishment. I have 
then argued that any form of finite hell may collapse into a form of purgatory, unless it is a 
finite punishment but with permanent consequences. 
2.2.3 The Possible Justice of an Infinite Punishment 
I now turn to assess the annihilationist criticisms of the classic traditionalist justification 
for an unending hell. The issue that arises for annihilationists with respect to this argument 
is that if, as I argued above, extinction is a finite punishment then an annihilationist will 
need to show that the traditionalist argument for sin deserving an infinite punishment is 
unfounded. I will argue that there is some validity to the classic traditionalist argument, 
and that if this is accepted then Annihilationism is found to be an unjustly lenient 
punishment. 
I will begin by expounding more fully what I have called the classical traditionalist 
argument to justify an eternity of torment for sin co111;IDitted in this life. 348 It may be 
346 Wenham, Goodness, p. 37, n. 7. 
347 Wenham, Facing, p. 250. 
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summarised as follows: in sinning against an infinite Being we deserve an infinite 
punishment, yet since in Hell the damned can only suffer as finite beings their punishment 
must therefore be infinite in duration. One of the most important versions of this argument 
historically is from Anselm who argued that the degree of guilt entailed by sin depended 
upon the dignity of the person offended, so sin against an infinite God demands infinite 
punishment because of the infinite guilt entailed. 349 A later example of this argument is 
given by Aquinas. 
Further, the magnitude of the punishment matches the magnitude of the sin ... Now 
a sin that is against God is infinite; the higher the person against whom it is 
committed, the graver the sin - it is more criminal to strike a head of state than 
private citizen - and God is of infinite greatness. Therefore an infinite punishment 
is deserved for a sin committed against him.350 
However, this view that the gravity of sin is defined by its object isn't simply due to 
Anselm's feudal model of relationships. For other presentations of the same point from 
later, non-feudal, periods, one could turn to Jonathan Edwards351 from the eighteenth 
century. From the nineteenth century Shedd notes: "The doctrine that sin is an infinite evil 
and involves infinite guilt, because of its objective reference to an infinite Being, is one of 
the commonplaces of theology."352 From the twentieth century Peterson comments 
succinctly on this point: "Aquinas is right,"353 and Paul Helm argues: "Hell is without limit 
because the offence justly punished is committed against one of infinite, immeasurable 
holiness and goodness. "354 A final recent example is from Carson, who quotes John Piper: 
"The essential thing is that degrees of blameworthiness come not from how long you 
offend dignity, but from how high the dignity is that you offend."355 
However annihilationists reject these arguments. Thus Pinnock claims that, "We do not 
accept inequality in judgments on the basis of the honor of the victim, as if stealing from a 
doctor is worse than st~aling from a beggar ... No judge today would calibrate the degree 
348 D.P. Walker refers to this justification as "The usual way of doing this, . .. " in the tradition. [The Decline of 
Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 
43.] 
349 This principle is found in Anselm's discussion in Cur Deus Homo, Book I, chapter 21. 
350 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), la2ae.87,4. Also Summa Theologiae 
Suppl.99.1 and Summa Contra Gentiles 3:140-146 
351 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 1, p.669; vol. 2, p. 83; pp. 251-2. 
352 Shedd, op. cit., p.152, n. 48. 
353 Peterson, op. cit., p. 174. 
354 Helm, op. cit., p. 116. 
355 Piper, Let the Nations Be Glad! The Supremacy of God in Missions (Leicester: IVP, 1993), p. 127, 
quoted by Carson, Gagging, p. 534, n. 52. 
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of punishment on a scale of the honour of the one who has been wronged. "356 However 
judges do determine punishments according to the person wronged, even if not necessarily 
according to their honour as defined by Anselm, because people are not just private 
individuals but representative persons. Thus my killing the Queen would receive a greater 
punishment than my killing my brother, because the Queen is head of state and thus her 
murder is also an assault upon the state. By extension, it could be argued that if to rebel 
against God is in effect to desire the death of God, this is to assault all that is good of 
which God is the source. Thus it is the most serious crime I could possibly commit, and 
thus is worthy of the most serious penalty. Since God is in some sense infinite, it could be 
argued that sin against God in some sense deserves infinite punishment by the retributive 
principle of the lex talionis. 
I will also note some other argwnents against the classic justification. Miley was a 
traditionalist and an Anninian from the nineteenth century, and he rejects the classical 
traditionalist argument, yet he believes in a traditionalist hell on the basis of revelation 
alone, holding that reason is unable to adjudicate upon the question of justice. He makes 
two points to support this conclusion, which serve as criticisms of the classical 
justification. First, 
If the principle be true, seemingly, it must equalise all sins, which is neither 
rational nor scriptural. "357 Second, "we may posit another principle: Sin is the deed 
of a finite being, and therefore can have only finite demerit. And who shall say that 
the former is any clearer than the latter? In truth, neither has any solution in our 
reason.358 
However I think that Aquinas has offered an articulation of the classic traditionalist 
position which takes both of these points into account. First, there are degrees of 
punishment in the intensity of the torment, although not the length of hell. Second, 
Aquinas incorporates b<?th the finite sinner and the infinite object of sin in his formulation, 
so that the damned are punished in finite intensity but for infinite duration. Walker 
explains the point, 
Thomas' own justification of eternal torment is more subtle and satisfactory. Since 
the torments of hell are infinite in duration but finite in intensity (though much 
more intense than any pain in this life), the sin must be both infinite and finite; 
356 Ibid, p. 152. 
357 J. Miley, Systematic Theology (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1989 [1893]), p. 468. 
358 Ibid, p. 468. 
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infinite in that it is turning away from God, but finite in that it is turning toward a 
creature. 359 
It is hard to adjudicate on the validity of these arguments, but in theory they do offer a 
response to the criticisms. 
Further, it could be argued that since an infinite period of punishment can never be 
completed, it follows that the punishment is necessarily incomplete and justice could 
never be fully done. On this view hell would be necessarily unjust on the 'classical' 
traditionalist understanding. However it could be responded that so long as the sentence is 
fully just, then the fact that it can never, of necessity, be completed is not a reason for 
holding it to be unjust. 
Some writers seem to simply side-step the whole question. Blocher concludes: 
We shall excuse ourselves of all calculus of infinities, and hide behind a quotation 
from Charles Hodge ... 'Men are apt to involve themselves in contradictions when 
they attempt to reason about the infinite. The word is so vague and so 
comprehensive, and our ideas of what it is intended to express are so inadequate, 
that we are soon lost when we seek to make it a guide in forming our 
judgements. a6o 
Fudge made similar comments on the calculation of infinities, which I quoted above. 
However, while there are major difficulties in relating different uses of the term 'infinite' 
and then in equating them with a temporal duration, there needs to be some valid link 
since the unending hell of classic Traditionalism and the infinite punishment of extinction 
do indeed continue for an infinite period and thus, on almost any theory of retribution, to 
be just, the sin must in some sense be an infinite demerit. If it is not infinite, then the only 
alternative is that sin is only finitely grave. In this case one needs to establish what the 
alternative positions are to the 'classical' argument that unending hell is the just 
punishment for sins corpmitted in this life, because sin is infinitely grave. 
In conclusion, it seems to me that there is some plausibility to the argument that sin 
against God is in some sense an infinite demerit and thus deserving of infinite punishment. 
If this is the case, and extinction is a finite punishment, then Annihilationism is shown to 
be unjustly lenient. However, this still leaves open the question of what severity of infinite 
punishment is justified. I am not sure that from the criteria of justice alone it is possible to 
359 Walker, op. cit., p. 44. 
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adjudicate between different sorts of hell of infinite punishment. As I have shown, most 
annihilationists view their hell as both infinite and a mitigation of the traditionalist one. 
Even though I have argued that they are wrong to believe that it is an infinite punishment, 
nonetheless they think that it is. Therefore ifl can offer a modified Traditionalism which is 
also a mitigation of its severity, it may serve to remove one of the major annihilationist 
objections to Traditionalism. To this I turn below, and the modified Traditionalism of 
Henri Blocher. However I argue that it can also be interpreted as a finite punishment. 
Therefore if the classic traditionalist argument for the justice of an infinite punishment is 
rejected, and no alternative found, then Blocher' s position also offers a traditionalist 
alternative to the Annihilationism of finite punishment. 
2.3 A Modified Traditionalism: The Damned are in a State of Fixity 
William Crockett writes, with reference to Clark Pinnock, "He says ... that the doctrine of 
everlasting punishment has caused great anxiety in the Christian world ( certainly true) and 
may be about to disappear unless a better interpretation can be offered about its nature 
(probably true)."361 As I have shown, one such alternative interpretation which is claimed 
to be better by its proponents is Annihilationism, but their argument about justice is not as 
strong as they believe. Are there then any other 'better interpretations' available to 
evangelicals? I want to argue that there is one, and to develop some suggestions made by 
Henri Blocher.362 Indeed Blocher offers his thesis as a modification of the traditional 
position, writing at the beginning of his paper: "It is possible, we suggest, to reach such a 
renewed understanding of the old dogma that will relieve some of the tension ... "363 In the 
360 Hodge, op. cit., p. 878, quoted by Blocher, op. cit., p.299. 
361 Crockett, Four Views, p: 171. • 
362 Henri Blocher, Professor of Systematic Theology at the Faculte Libre de Theologie Evangelique in Vaux-
sur-Seine, France. Blocher first wrote about his position in "La doctrine du cillttiment etemel," in lchthus 32 
(April 1973), pp. 3-9. A brief account was also given in "The Scope of Redemption and Modem Theology," 
in The Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology, p. 103. His major presentation of his thesis is in a paper 
delivered at the Rutherford House Conference in Christian Dogmatics, entitled "Everlasting Punishment and 
the Problem of Evil," and published in Universalism and the Doctrine of God, ed. N.M. de S. Cameron 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992). [All references to Blocher are from this essay unless otherwise stated.] 
There has been almost no interaction with Blocher's essay: The or;ily references to Blocher's thesis I have 
found outside of reviews are three pages in Bonda, op. cit., pp. 226-228), and less than a page in both Carson 
(Gagging, p. 534) and Wenham (Facing, p. 258). 
363Blocher, op. cit., pp. 284-5, [Italics original]. At the very end of his essay Blocher re-caps this point: 
"Regarding the everlasting punishment, our effort aims only at keeping within the bounds of the revealed 
truth, but without reading into the text misconceptions that cause many to .stumble." [Ibid, p. 312. Italics 
original.] 
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rest of this chapter I want to examine only one element of Blocher's modified 
Traditionalism, that the damned do not experience an unending succession of moments 
but are instead in what Blocher describes as a state of "fixity." Blocher does not divide his 
thesis, having a continuous exposition of his position, but I think that this element stands 
independently from the rest and can thus be studied in isolation. 364 I will examine this 
element of Blocher's thesis at some length because I think that it has two advantages over 
the classic traditionalist position. First, it offers a mitigation of the severity of the torment 
of the classic traditionalist hell because the subjective experience of the damned is limited 
in certain respects. This mitigation serves at least to lessen the basic annihilationist 
objection about the injustice of excessive severity. Second, this position can be interpreted 
as a traditionalist hell which only requires sin to be finitely serious as justification. 
Therefore if the arguments for the infinite seriousness of sin committed in this life are not 
persuasive, it is still possible to maintain a form of Traditionalism. 
In turning to exposition, Blocher's portrayal of the nature of hell at this point turns on his 
understanding of the Biblical concept of eternal death. He writes: 
The Biblical idea of death does not involve non-existence, but, indeed, the loss of 
life. Life is ability to act and to project, life is sharing in exchanges; total death is 
isolation, paralysis (no facultas left, to recall the Augustinian word), non-renewal, 
that is fixity, absolute fixity ... What remains is the corpse of a sinful life together 
with the lucid consciousness of that truth - abhorrence - and no ground whatsoever 
for any change of that final situation.365 
Blocher then draws on other writers to illuminate the meaning of 'eternal death': 
Somewhat intriguingly, we may borrow phrases or sentences from writers whose 
global doctrine we criticized, to illustrate the meaning of 'eternal death'. Karl 
Rahner argues from the power of freedom to set something definitive: 'because 
"eternity" is not the temporal continuation, beyond, of the history of freedom, but 
the accomplished definitiveness of history, hell is "eternal", and, so, the 
manifestation . of God's righteousness.'366 Rahner probably plays with a 
sophisticated idea of eternity, a purely a-temporal eternity, which we would not 
364 In the next chapter I will examine the other elements of Blocher's modified Traditionalism, which I will 
argue offers a better way of avoiding the problem of eternal evil, or dualism. My own view is that this 
element of fixity is more speculative than the other elements and that it could be rejected without requiring 
the rejection of the others. 
365 Ibid, p. 308. 
366 This is Blocher's own translation ofRahner's study s.v. 'Hoelle,' in Sacramentum Mundi. Theologisches 
Lexikonfur die Praxis (Freiburg: Herder, 1968), II, col. 738. This passage can also be found translated in 
the English edition, Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi. Edited by Karl Rahner 
(E.T. London: Bums and Oates, 1975), p.604. 
p. 604.] 
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consider adequate. 367 It is not adequate for eternal life, but it could approximately 
suit eternal death, the endless duration of which is equivalent to a nunc 
aeternum.368 
I would also note Rahner's essay "Ideas For a Theology of Death," where he describes the 
state after death as being "frozen," which sounds similar to Blocher's notion of fixity. 
Life 'after death'... is something radically withdrawn from the former temporal 
dimension and the former spatially conceived time, and a state of final and 
definitive completion and immediacy to God which is absolutely disparate from 
time and space, and is the end-point of a life lived once and for all in freedom 
precisely here, the end-point of that personal history which is brought to its 
completion in itself... someone might object that it would, after all, be terrible if 
our former life, with all its banalities and questionable aspects were itself frozen in 
a final and definitive state. 369 
Rahner goes on to deny not that the state is frozen, but that it is banalities rather than love 
which the state consists of. He is here talking of heaven but, as Blocher has done, it could 
be transferred to hell: a terrible freezing of our earthly life in a final state. Blocher himself 
then goes on to make a similar point from Barth: "We could similarly compare Karl 
Barth's view on man in the final state: his emphasis is that man shall exist eschatologically 
as past, 'one day he will only have been.'370 But this, in our proposal, would apply only to 
the lost. "371 
There are also a number of similarities between Rahner's view of eternity and those of 
Aquinas, and another Roman Catholic theologian: von Balthasar. Sachs offers the 
following description of von Balthasar's position. "Balthasar... speaks of hell as 
everlasting, never-ending duration, "complete withdrawal to the point of shrivelling into a 
disconsolate immovable now," which is utterly absent of opportunity, future, and 
desire. "372 In an article on von Balthasar's doctrine of hell, Flannery draws out a distinction 
with Aquinas. 
Balthasar does not directly contradict the proposition that for these souls hell is 
eternal. He attempts to maintain the doctrine, while offering a special 
367 See various contributions in Nigel M. de S. Cameron, ed., The Power and Weakness of God: 
Jmpassability and Orthodoxy (Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 1990), including our 'Divine 
Immutability', p. 9 on eternity. 
368 Ibid, p. 309, quoting Karl Rahner, s.v. 'Hoelle' in op. cit., vol. 2, col. 738. 
369 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations 13, (E.T. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), p. 174. 
37° Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 111/2, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, ed., trans. Harold Knight et. al. 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), p. 632. 
371 Blocher, op. cit., p. 309. 
372 Sachs, art. cit., p. 248, n. 92. The quote is from Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope "That All Men be 
Saved"? with A Short Discourse on Hell and Apokatastasis: Universal Reconciliation (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 1988), p. 133. 
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understanding of what 'eternity' might mean, with regard to hell. There is nothing 
novel in this per se: Thomas Aquinas, for instance, says ·quite flatly that in hell 
there is no 'true eternity' but rather 'interminability.'373 Thomas's intention is not to 
mitigate the reality of hell; if anything, it is to acknowledge a worse prospect for 
sinners than eternity, which he views quite favourably since it is so bound up with 
beatitude. Balthasar's intention is quite the opposite. In accord with Thomas, he 
makes the point that 'the eternity in eternal life' is an enhancement of life, but then 
he says that the eternity of eternal death 'is complete withdrawal to the point of 
shrivelling into a disconsolate immovable now... where nothing more can be 
contemplated or done.a74 
Thus Blocher suggests a view of hell which turns on its head the traditional view, for 
example, of Aquinas. For Aquinas the blessed experience an a-temporal eternity while the 
damned experience endless time. More precisely, Aquinas argues that true eternity, which 
entails immutability, belongs only to God, but through the beatific vision the blessed 
participate in this and can therefore properly be said to enjoy eternal life. In hell there is a 
succession of torments in a succession that has no end. For Blocher it is the damned who 
experience something akin to an a-temporal eternity, although without the connotations of 
blessedness. 
Blocher himself also notes that his position is similar to elements of C.S. Lewis' thought. 
Lewis writes, in passages not quoted by Blocher, that the lost soul "is eternally fixed in its 
diabolical attitude" and continues that we cannot be certain "whether this eternal fixity 
implies endless duration - or duration at all."375 A key difference though is that for Blocher 
the damned's attitude is not diabolical. I would also note the similarity here to Lewis' 
understanding of the biblical imagery. "But I notice that Our Lord, while stressing the 
terror of hell with unsparing severity usually emphasises the idea not of duration but of 
finality. Consignment to the destroying fire is usually treated as the end of the story - not 
as the beginning of a new story ... "376 
These features also raise the question as to whether Blocher's position is best thought of as 
variant of Traditionalism or Annihilationism. There is some evidence that he is best 
373 Aquinas, op. cit., I,q.10,a.3,ad 3; see also IV Sent. 49,q.l,a.2 solutio 3,ad 4. 
374 K.L. Flannery, "How To Think About Hell," in New Blackfriars, (Nov. 1991), p. 475, quoting from H. von 
Balthasar, Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved? (Ignatius Press: San Francisco, 1988), p. 133. Flannery 
goes on to argue that Balthasar holds to the impossibility of eternal damnation, and thus "He must then mean 
that the shrinking of hell to a 'disconsolate immovable now' somehow forces the souls out." [Flannery, op. 
cit., p. 476]. 
375 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (Orig., 1940; rpt, London: Fountain Books, 1977), p. 115. 
376 Ibid., p. 114. 
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understood as an annihilationist, but I will argue that he is best understood as a 
traditionalist.377 Blocher quotes Lewis' words on 'destruction' with qualified approval, 
which could suggest that he is closer to a form of Annihilationism. "If soul [sic] can be 
destroyed, must there not be a state of having been a human soul? And is not that, perhaps, 
the state which is equally well described as torment, destruction and privation?( ... ) What 
is cast (or, casts itself) into hell is not a man: it is "remains"."378 However, there is also 
disagreement over whether Lewis himself was best thought of as an annihilationist or a 
traditionalist, but Blocher seems to lie more to the annihilationist side of Lewis, when he 
concludes "Lewis, then, deviates, and he interprets these words [particularly "destruction"] 
in terms of maximum sinfulness. We would say: what is cast into hell is not the man 
living, but the man dead."379 Again, Blocher's language of "corpses"380 in hell, may 
suggest this conclusion. Kvanvig raises a very similar question about C.S. Lewis' position, 
as to whether it actually becomes a form of Annihilationism. 
Yet, if hell does not involve "duration," if it is "in no sense parallel to heaven," but 
instead is "the outer rim where being fades away into nonentity," the most natural 
view of hell to hold is that it is a metaphorical description of what becomes of a 
person whom God annihilates. Lewis, however, balks at this conclusion ... 
Nonetheless, his language is strongly suggestive of that view, and it is not clear 
how to reinterpret his language so that the annihilation view can be avoided and 
yet his claims constitute a response to the objection he is considering.381 
I think that Blocher's position does come close at points to a form of Annihilationism. 
However there are other aspects of Blocher's position which do not fit with annihilation 
and Blocher is explicit in his rejection of the position. Before proposing his own position, 
Blocher reviews current alternative apologies for hell and offers what he calls a "tentative 
appraisal." Here he both affirms Traditionalism and rejects Annihilationism concluding: 
"Annihilationist arguments ... come short of the proof needed."382 It is also clear that the 
damned are mentally lucid since they now see their sin for what it truly is. 383 Therefore, I 
believe that Blocher's position is best thought of as a form of Traditionalism. 
This is a difficult position to understand because, as Blocher notes, such a state is 
impossible to imagine: "We are utterly unable to imagine the experience of absolute fixity, 
377 Harmon discusses Lewis' position in chapter three of his thesis, Finally Excluded 
378 Ibid., p. 113, quoted in Blocher, op. cit., p. 309. 
379 Blocher, op. cit., p. 309. 
380 Ibid, p. 308. 
381 Kvanvig, op. cit., p. 123. 
382 Blocher, op. cit., p. 287. 
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the 'feeling' of the remorse-consciousness etemalised. As long as we enjoy a measure of 
life, duration equals renewal. "384 However, one area requiring clarification is whether 
Blocher is arguing for a temporal or an a-temporal hell. He only touches briefly on the 
topic, when he writes of "a purely a-temporal eternity ... [which] could approximately suit... 
the endless duration which is equivalent to a nunc aeternum. "385 Thus I think that Blocher 
conceives of the damned as being in time, since there is an endless duration, although its 
static nature means that it is in some sense "equivalent to" such an a-temporal hell. The 
sense of "equivalent to" here is not clear: it may be from the perception of the damned 
themselves, or it may be that both describe a state in which there are no changes. If this 
fixed state must be experienced in time, then it may be that the damned experience it 
subjectively as a finite period of time, although objectively it is never ending. A partial 
analogy may be some distressed mental states in which a scene or incident is replayed over 
and over again in the mind, thus approximating to a subjectively brief experience 
continued over a lengthy period of time. In the case of hell, this finite experience is 
continued over an infinite period of time. 386 
In turning to an assessment of this position, I would note agam Blocher's 
acknowledgement that assessment is difficult. However there are problems in Blocher's 
conception of hell as a place of 'absolute fixity'. In particular there is a problem as to 
whether one can experience anything in a state of 'fixity'. Certainly if suffering implies 
change then this would have to occur within time. This was one of the key objections to 
the notion of the passibility of God, which is that for God to be passible he must change, 
and since he is perfect change could only be for the worse. 387 While I could draw on 
arguments from the extensive tradition for an a-temporal after-life and apply it to the 
damned rather the righteous, Blocher holds that it is temporal. A solution may be that hell 
383 I will explore Blocher's understanding of the lucidity of the damned in hell in the following chapter. 
384 Blocher, op. cit., p. 309. 
385 Ibid., p. 309. 
386 There are also similarities to the argument of Swinburne in The Christian God. There are two related 
points that he makes which could be used to support the notion of a finite experience in infinite time. First, 
Swinburne argues for the possibility of time having a topology but not a metric. [Richard Swinburne, The 
Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 80, n. 15.] Secqnd he argues that God is in time, but that 
if there is a qualitatively consistent act, and no laws of nature, then there would be no difference between a 
finite and an infinite period of time. [Ibid, p. 141.] It might be that the damned's experience of time could 
also be considered to lack a metric, and be a single consistent act, in this case remorse, and there would be no 
difference between an infinite and a finite length of time. 
387 See R.J. Bauckham, "'Only the Suffering God Can Help': Divine Passibility in Modem Theology," in 
Themelios (1984) vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 6-12. 
103 
needs to be viewed from two perspectives. Objectively, and perhaps from the perspective 
of the blessed, hell is temporal and thus is infinite; from the subjective experience of the 
damned it is experienced as a fixed or a-temporal state.388 
There are, however, several strengths to this conception of hell as a state of fixity. First, 
this understanding of hell offers a mitigation of the severity of the traditionalist hell: if the 
experience of the damned is either a-temporal or finite in the subjective experience of the 
damned, then this would reduce the severity of a torment that lasts for an infinitely long 
period. However, it could be responded that if the torment (for Blocher consisting 
primarily of remorse, although understood as retributively inflicted) is just as intense as 
that which goes on unendingly, then nothing has been gained because what the damned 
experience in successive moments through time on the traditional understanding they 
simply experience at the one moment on Blocher's understanding. In other words, the 
same torment fills up the entire temporal horizon of the damned in each case. In reply, it 
could be argued that the knowledge of an infinite succession of moments of torment still 
to come is an extra part of the horror of the usual traditionalist hell, and this is mitigated. 
My own judgement is that this does constitute a mitigation of the traditionalist hell. It 
could be argued that this conception of hell is also a mitigation of the severity of an 
annihilationist hell. 
A second strength is that it would rule out subsequent changes or events, whether 
repentance or extinction. Having written about the Last Judgement, Blocher asks, with 
reference to the damned: "And then? What comes next? Nothing. The concept of a 'next' 
stage is empty and deceptive ... Now, it is death. 'Full stop' for ever and ever.' ... [there is] 
no ground whatsoever for any change of the final situation. "389 In support, Blocher also 
argues that "The language of Scripture, with its stereotyped metaphors, and in the role it 
plays, seems to insist on the durational, permanent character of the state of torment, and to 
exclude any later change, anything beyond the outcome of the last judgment."390 This 
rules out extinction after torment, since there could be no sequence of events. Further, the 
argument that the damned would repent if they ceased to sin in hell has been the primary 
traditionalist objection to the other features of Blocher' s position which I will discuss in 
388 This would reverse the position put forward by Spanner, noted in chapter 1. 
389 Blocher, op. cit., p. 308. [Italics original]. · 
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the next chapter, and therefore this is an important response to it: they simply cannot. Even 
if there were a subjectively finite experience of time for the damned, which might seem to 
open the door to repentance or extinction, then Blocher adds that this experience is not 
new experience, but simply past, presumably in the sense of reflection on past experience. 
Given that Blocher thinks that his position is in some sense equivalent to an a-temporal 
hell, I will turn briefly to look at the discussion on this issue of the nature of time in hell in 
the debate. Discussion of the nature of time in hell is both rare and usually brief in the 
recent evangelical debate. Wenham is typical when he simply notes the issue and consigns 
it to a footnote. 
There is the further question as to whether the life of the age to come should be 
thought of as in time at all. Post-Einsteinians naturally think of space and time as 
so related that creation would be the creation of space-time, the two being 
inseparable. This is a philosophical question which the Bible does not address, but 
it does use time-language concerning heaven. However, this may be because this is 
the only category in which we can think.391 
Cotterell makes a more confident assertion: 
the emotive element in the discussion of an eternal hell is misplaced. We cannot 
import time into eternity ... in a post-Einsteinian world it is remarkable that 
Christians continue to debate theology in terms appropriate to the state of 
knowledge of the fifth century, pre-Boethius, as though we did not know the 
difference between time and eternity. In an eternity there can be no 'day after 
day'.392 
One writer who has drawn on the insights of Einstein is Spanner, who I noted in chapter 1. 
Further, it is not only post-Einstein that speculations based on time and eternity have been 
made. A.H. Strong wrote "that eternal punishment does not necessarily involve endless 
successions of suffering, - as God's eternity is not mere endlessness so we may not be 
forever subject to the law of time."393 However, there has been a lack of discussion of the 
nature of time in hell, and this is surprising since it seems to provide a way for 
traditionalists to respond to some of the charges of injustice raised by annihilationists. If 
the punishment of hell is not in time, then it could be argued that it is not necessarily an 
infinite . punishment, because there is no metre for measuring its length. Yet such a 
punishment would also be unending, since there are no subsequent events to occur. C.S. 
Lewis saw a similar advantage to his speculations about the nature of time in hell which he 
390 Ibid., p. 288. 
391 Wenham, Case, p. 177, n. 22. 
392 Cotterell, op. cit., p. 74. 
393 Strong, op. cit., p. 1035. 
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offers them as a response to the objection to Traditionalism that something done in time 
cannot deserve an infinite penalty. 
Another objection turns on the apparent disproportion between eternal damnation 
and transitory sin. And if we think of eternity as a mere prolongation of time, it is 
disproportionate. But many would reject this idea of eternity. If we think of time as 
a line - which is a good image, because the parts of time are successive and no two 
of then can co-exist; i.e., there is no width in time, only length - we probably ought 
to think of eternity as a plane or even a solid ... If your drew your base line askew, 
the whole solid will be in the wrong place. 394 
A timeless eternity would also provide a simple refutation of Annihilationism, since there 
could be no subsequent events for the damned, such as extinction. The lack of discussion 
may reflect the philosophical problems of conceiving of an a-temporal existence. However 
despite these difficulties there is a well established argument in the tradition for an a-
temporal heaven, as I noted above on page 61, which could be drawn upon. 
In conclusion, Blocher's position can be interpreted to accommodate either of two options 
for the justification of the punishment of hell, depending on whether the punishment is 
viewed as infinite or finite in severity. If it is decided that an infinite punishment is 
justified, because sin committed in this life is of infinite seriousness, then it can be argued 
that Blocher's hell is indeed infinite. On the other hand, if an infinite punishment is not 
justified then it could be argued that the punishment of Blocher's hell is finite since the 
experience of the damned is limited, being either fixed or for a finite period of time. On 
this option it would not be necessary to argue from the infinite seriousness of sin to 
establish the justice of hell. I have argued that this modified Traditionalism is a mitigation 
of classic Traditionalism. It is a form of Traditionalism because the suffering is never 
ending, but it is a mitigation because the experience of the damned is in some sense 
limited. There are other elements of Blocher's conception of the nature of hell, of an end to 
sin and of reconciliation in hell, which I will explore in the following chapter, which 
would also offer a mitigation of the severity of Traditionalism and thus also serve to meet 
the objections of those annihilationists who argue that hell is an infinite punishment but 
less severe than the usual traditionalist one. However since these other elements also 
provide a response to the annihilationist charge of excessive dualism, I will examine the 
rest of Blocher's thesis in the next chapter, where I deal with the other major criticism of 
Traditionalism. 
394 Lewis, Problem, pp. 111-2. 
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Chapter 3: The Dualism of Hell 
In this chapter I examine the charge of dualism made against Traditionalism by 
annihilationists. A succinct form of this argument is made by Travis: "Eternal torment 
involves an eternal cosmological dualism, which it is impossible to reconcile with the 
conviction that ultimately God will be 'all in all'. "395 Dualism is a slippery term, and usage 
in the literature is varied and often unclear. A brief definition is: "In relation to the 
problem of evil, the view that the world has a fundamental division between the reality of 
good and the reality of evil, and that they are in ultimate conflict. "396 Therefore, in general 
terms, the charge is that Traditionalism involves the unending existence of evil in hell, that 
this is dualistic and should thus be rejected. There is also the implied claim that 
Annihilationism is not dualistic, and thus offers a preferable doctrine of hell at this point. 
I will begin by noting the varied arguments put forward by annihilationists to argue that 
Traditionalism is dualistic. I will then expound the various alternative resolutions of the 
problem of dualism argued for or implied by annihilationists. Then I will turn to 
assessment of the arguments, noting responses made by traditionalists in the literature. 
Central to my assessment is a distinction which is rarely noted, between continuing 
suffering and continuing sin. Some annihilationists argue, or assume, that there is dualism 
if suffering continues unendingly; others argue that there is dualism if sin continues 
unendingly. My response is that these arguments, which are regularly confused in the 
literature, are significantly distinct, and lead to different conclusions. If the continuation of 
suffering is dualistic then I argue that Annihilationism itself is not immune from the 
charge of at least temporary dualism after the Last Judgment since it holds to at least a 
period of torment in hell. However, I go on to argue that annihilationists are not being 
consistent here since they also hold that just punishment is a good, and thus suffering as a 
part of such punishment is a good and not an evil, and therefore it is not dualistic. 
Therefore this issue actually turns on the underlying issue of the justice of the punishment 
of hell. 
395 Travis, Hope, p.135. 
396 David Cook, Thinking about Faith (Leicester: IVP, 1986), p. 78. 
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One aspect of this is the problem of the so-called 'Abominable Fancy', which I will 
examine in a separate section. In the tradition the phrase refers primarily to the rejection of 
the notion that the blessed gain 'pleasure' from the sight of the damned, but it also carried 
the implication that the knowledge of the existence of suffering of the damned in hell will 
diminish the bliss of heaven. I argue annihilationist criticisms are self-refuting, since they 
serve to undermine any period of suffering in hell. 
I will argue that annihilationists are right to argue that unending sin is properly dualistic, 
and that they are right to reject it. I will use the terminology of 'sin dualism' for the position 
I consider to be properly dualistic, and 'suffering dualism' to refer to the position that is 
claimed by some to be dualistic. I will survey the mainstream traditionalist position, 
which I will refer to as classic Traditionalism, and conclude that it does usually hold to 
continuing sin in hell and therefore is properly dualistic. Indeed I suggest that it is the 
validity of this argument which has caused some annihilationists to argue as well against 
the continuation of suffering which they have conflated with it. · This conclusion leads onto 
a final, lengthy, section in which I propose a modified form of Traditionalism, drawing 
particularly on the work of Henri Blocher, which I call Reconciliationism. I argue that this 
modified form of Traditionalism offers a more satisfactory response to the problem of 
dualism than classic Traditionalism, and that it may offer a more satisfactory response than 
Annihilationism. As I argued in Chapter 1, if annihilation is in part held in reaction to the 
weaknesses of classic Traditionalism, then any diminution of these problems will serve to 
diminish the doctrinal attraction of Annihilationism to evangelicals. Since the modified 
form of Traditionalism has been hardly noted at all in the recent debate, and where it has it 
has overlooked any arguments from a similar doctrine proposed at length in the nineteenth 
century by theologians such as T .R. Birks, I will expound this modified position at length, 
with extensive reference to the earlier debate. 
There is also at least one more way that dualism is used in the literature, and that is to refer 
to any position which holds to anything less than the salvation of all people. Thus, 
although just suffering might be a good, it may not be the highest good available. 
Therefore it could be said that this 'damnation dualism' holds that the effects of evil are 
endless and thus, in this limited sense, both Annihilationism and Reconciliationism are 
judgement has been completed, there will be two kingdoms, each with its own 
distinct boundaries, the one Christ's, the other the devil's, the one consisting of 
good, the other of bad." (Enchiridion 111).402 
Hughes responds: 
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it leaves a part of creation which, unrenewed, everlastingly exists in alienation 
from the new heaven and the new earth ... When Christ fills all in all and God is 
everything to everyone (Eph.1 :23; 1 Cor 15 :28), how is it conceivable that there 
can be a section or realm of creation that does not belong to this fullness and by its 
very presence contradicts it?403 
Rather, he argues, the renewal of creation demands the elimination of sin and suffering 
and death. "The conception of the endlessness of the sufferings of torment and of the 
endurance of "living" death in hell stands in contradiction to this teaching. 11404 Stott makes 
essentially the same point when he charges Traditionalism with failing to take account of 
the 'universalist' texts of scripture. Stott writes, under the heading "Universalism": 
My point here ... is that the eternal existence of the impenitent in hell would be hard 
to reconcile with the promises of God's final victory over evil, or with the 
apparently universalistic texts which speak of Christ drawing all men to himself 
(John 12:32), and of God uniting all things under Christ's headship (Ephesians 
1: 10), reconciling all things to himself through Christ (Colossians 1 :20), and 
bringing every knee to bow to Christ and every tongue to confess his lordship 
(Philippians 2: 10-11 ), so that in the end God will be 'all in all' or 'everything in 
everybody' (1 Corinthians 15:28).405 
He concludes that these texts 
lead me to ask how God can in any meaningful sense be called 'everything to 
everybody' while an unspecified number of people still continue in rebellion 
against him and under his judgement. It would be easier to hold together the awful 
reality of hell and the universal reign of God if hell means destruction and the 
impenitent are no more. 406 
The importance of this issue in the debate is indicated by Guillebaud who examines it in 
his chapter two entitled Will _ Evil Exist Forever? 
A very great difficulty (the present writer feels it to be the greatest of all) in the 
way of everlasting torment can be expressed in the form of a question. We do not 
believe that evil has existed from all eternity in the past, but can we believe that it 
will exist for all future eternity in hell? Will there always be an "outer darkness" 
outside the kingdom of God, a prison of evil co-eternal with God Himself and His 
redeemed?407 
His argument is summed up in a series of rhetorical questions: 
402 Hughes, op. cit., p. 406. 
403 Ibid, p. 406. 
404 Ibid, pp. 405-6. 
405 Stott, op. cit., p. 319. 
406 lbid, p.319. 
407 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 5. 
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But the question which we have to face is how God could be all in all, and how all 
things could be summed up in Christ, if evil were to exist eternally in hell? Would 
not His victory be imperfect, and above all would not His kingdom be incomplete? 
The demons and men in hell would be His conquered enemies, it is true, but His 
enemies still, with wills and desires in opposition to Him, however unable to make 
that opposition effective. How then could His kingdom be truly universal, and He 
Himself "all in all"? ... When the present writer still believed in everlasting 
torment, the only answer that he could give to this difficulty was to suppose that 
the "outer darkness" was where to all eternity God had willed not to be, an 
exception to His own decree from His omniscience, excluded from His universal 
kingdom. When the impossibility of this conception gradually dawned upon him, it 
did more than anything else to prepare his mind for the change of view to which he 
was brought about by a re-examination of the whole subject in the Bible.408 
Later in his book he again emphasises this point: 
But the fundamental reasons which led the present writer to abandon the doctrine 
of everlasting torment are two, both founded on the Word of God. First, the Bible 
teaching that God will sum up all things in Christ, and that ultimately He Himself 
will be all in all, seems incompatible with the eternal existence of sin and sinners 
in hell.409 
Wenham also raises the charge of dualism against Traditionalism: "If there are human 
beings alive suffering endless punishment, it would seem to mean that they are in endless 
opposition to God, that it to say, we have a doctrine of endless sinning as well as of 
suffering. How can this be if Christ is all in all ?"410 He suggests a distinction between an 
eternity of suffering and an eternity of sinning, which will be important in my assessment 
below. A possible implication ofWenham's words is that the charge of dualism is raised 
against Traditionalism because of the endless sinning of the damned, but not necessarily 
because of the endless suffering of the damned. When I review the writers already quoted I 
will argue that this distinction is largely absent. Another writer who perceived the 
particular problem of continuing sin was Atkinson. 
As long as we hold that the wicked live for ever in conscious misery in hell and 
especially ifwe hold what seems to be the most terrible aspect of that view, that 
they continue for ever to sin in hell, this word of the apostle raises grave 
difficulties. While sinners live and continue to sin, how can God be all in all?4 n 
It is precisely this distinction between the unending nature of the torment and the 
continuation of sin, which Atkinson points to, which I believe means that annihilationists 
may look more favourably on a modified Traditionalism which retains the unendingness 
408 Ibid., p. 6. 
409 Ibid., p. 47. The second reason given by Guillebaud was a rejection of the immortality of the soul. 
410 Wenham, Case, op. cit., p. 189. 
411 Atkinson, op. cit., p. 112. 
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of torment, but not 'the most terrible aspect of that view': that they continue to sin in hell. I 
will develop this position below. 
This issue of dualism is also recognised as a key annihilationist argument by 
traditionalists. Again, though, there is a lack of clarity as to what exactly is being objected 
to: sin dualism or suffering dualism. Grudem gives it as the fourth of four arguments, and 
speaks of marring the universe: "Arguments advanced in favour of Annihilationism are: 
... (4) the fact that the continuing presence of evil creatures in God's universe will 
eternally mar the perfection of a universe that God created to reflect his glory."412 Crockett 
makes a similar point using different terminology in his summary of annihilationist 
arguments: 
The Problem of Harmony. As I have said, the significant point of the 
annihilationist view is that the wicked will not endure an eternal hell; they will 
simply be extinguished. If this were not so, say the annihilationists, how could 
there be harmony in the cosmos? When God creates a new heaven and a new earth 
(Isa. 65: 17; Rom 8: 19-23 ), is it not reasonable to expect the whole creation to be at 
peace with God? If somewhere, in some dark comer of the universe, there are still 
rebellious or suffering creatures gnashing their teeth, how can this be considered 
harmony?413 
Sinclair Ferguson also agrees about the importance of the issue. 'This is perhaps the most 
powerful and appealing theological argument against the orthodox doctrine: how can God 
be 'all in all' (1 Corinthians 15:28) ifthere is an 'outside' in the final world order.'414 In 
conclusion, a major criticism, and for some the major criticism, raised by annihilationists, 
against Traditionalism is that it is dualistic (what Pinnock calls a "cosmological dualism" 
and Travis an "eternal cosmological dualism"). 
3.2 An Assessment of the Annihilationist Arguments 
In turning to assessment, I will begin by arguing that Annihilationism has its own 
temporary suffering dualism. Therefore I will conclude that any annihilationist argument 
that assumes any degree of dualism after the Last Judgment is inadmissible serves to 
undermine their own position too. However, I will argue that the stronger argument is that 
Annihilationism avoids both permanent suffering dualism and sin dualism. I will then note 
412 Grudem, op. cit., p. 1150. [Italics original]. 
413 Crockett, op. cit., p. 63. [Italics original] 
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that annihilationists tend to conflate two argwnents for Traditionalism being dualistic: the 
damned continue to suffer and the damned continue to sin. I will respond to each objection 
in tum. First, I will discuss the former objection about continuing suffering. If 
annihilationists argue that any suffering in hell is dualistic, then it is self-refuting since the 
damned also suffer in an annihilationist hell. If they respond that temporary suffering is 
not dualistic, then this must be because suffering justly inflicted is a good, and if it is a 
good for a finite period it must remain so as long as the punishment remains just. I will 
note that some annihilationists recognise this. I will also note that some traditionalists also 
conflate these issues of continuing suffering and sin, which may partially explain the 
confused response of some annihilationists. A very similar response about just punishment 
being a good can be made to the annihilationist objection that the knowledge of the 
damned by the righteous diminishes their bliss, and so I will examine this issue next under 
the head The Abominable Fancy. Second, I will argue that the latter objection about 
continuing sin does have some validity. 
3.2.1 Annihilationism is Also Dualistic 
I begin by noting that Annihilationism cannot completely avoid the problem of damnation 
dualism. Blocher suggests that Annihilationism suffers from what he terms the dualism of 
'waste'. He comments that, unlike Annihilationism, on his position "the existence of the 
lost shall not amount to a total waste, neither for the universe, nor for God, nor for 
themselves, ... ":.415 Further, if to deal with dualism is to deal with the problem of evil, 
then Langton Clarke argues, writing in the early part of the Twentieth Century, that the 
annihilationist position leaves evil victorious, and thus this type of dualism remains. 
But how is [evil] to be expelled? There is the way of Annihilation - expulsion of 
sin by the destruction of the sinner. But. . . if this were the method of cure, who 
would be the victor- God or sin? Would not the victory remain with the evil which 
compelled God to uncreate His own creation?416 
Macleod argues that even if Annihilationism views evil, under which head he includes 
both sin and suffering, as coming to an end it doesn't fully avoid the problem of evil, and 
thus of dualism. 
414 Ferguson, W G. T. Shedd and the Doctrine of Eternal Punishment : The Evangelical Library Annual 
Lecture 1994 (Lewes: F.C.M. Trust, 1994), p. 13. 
415 Blocher, op. cit., p. 311. 
416 Clarke, op. cit., p. 109. 
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[ Annihilationism] seems more in keeping with the divine love and offers the hope 
of a solution to the Problem of Evil. If the annihilationist is correct, Evil will 
simply cease to exist. There will be no hell, no sinners, no demons, no pain and no 
suffering. Instead there will be a reconciled universe, perfectly at peace with God. 
Unfortunately, the solution is not quite as perfect as it appears. The real problem is 
not the quantity or the duration of Evil, but the fact. .. God already has an awful lot 
to answer for: the Flood, Sodom and Gomorrha [sic], the Inquisition, the 
Holocaust, Aberfan and Kuwait. And Calvary. At every such point (and many 
more) humanity asks: Why? It is no answer to say: 'Ah! But one day God will put 
them out of their pain.' He stands accused of permitting pain in the first place. The 
claim that he won't let it last for ever is a poor defence. 417 
Macleod is correct that the extinction of evil is not a complete solution to the problem of 
evil and of the dualism it entails, although his argument is only valid if Annihilationism is 
claiming to fully resolve the problem of evil. However I don't think that most 
annihilationists would claim that extinction is a complete avoidance of the problem of 
damnation dualism, and thus a complete solution to the problem of evil, even though their 
criticism of Traditionalism may suggest that they are. Thus Stott, for example, argues that 
extinction only eases or reduces the problem.418 Guillebaud is clear that the mere 
extinction of evil does not 'solve' the problem of evil by itself: "Why evil was allowed to 
come into the universe is an insoluble mystery."419 Therefore the issue should be whether 
Annihilationism can reduce the problem of damnation dualism in comparison to 
Traditionalism. 
As I have already noted, there are frequently two elements of the traditionalist hell which 
annihilationists believe result in an excessive dualism: unending suffering and continuing 
sin. I will begin by dealing with the issue of unending suffering. In many ways my 
response is similar to that of the objection that the traditionalist hell shows God as 
unloving: in both cases, if the punishment, and the resultant suffering, are just, then I 
would argue that the objection collapses. In this case, if the continuing suffering of the 
damned is a just punishment, then it is a good, and thus doesn't exacerbate the problem of 
dualism. Indeed the problem of dualism would be exacerbated by leaving sin unpunished, 
and thus leaving evil not dealt with. This response in the tradition is given by Augustine, 
and noted by Blanchard: 
417 Macleod, op. cit., p. 13. 
418 Stott, op. cit., p. 319. 
419 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 44. If Guillebaud is arguing that we do not have access to a solution to the 
problem of evil either in this life alone or because we are finite beings, I would agree. Ifhe is taking the 
irrationalist position that there can be no solution to the problem, then I would reject this. 
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[Augustine] does not hesitate to argue that since hell is sin's proper punishment, it 
is itself a "good" thing and not evil. This was how he answered the charge that 
unending torment made evil ( as well as good) eternal - a doctrine he strongly 
opposed in his dualistic Manichaen adversaries. 420 
Therefore, "[God] will reign as completely in one place [hell] as in the other [heaven]."421 
Thus, "Together with Saint Augustine, the classical line insists that punishment, in truth, is 
no evil added, but the balancing cancellation of evil, the moral order repaired, the good 
vindicated. "422 So, the usual argument is that sin that is justly punished is a good and not 
an evil. This argument can and is used by both traditionalists and annihilationists. 
Therefore, for example, Helm writes, 
[W]hile there is pain in hell, and pain is in some sense an evil, the pain of hell is 
deserved pain. It is penal pain. If pain per se is an evil, then hell is the triumph of 
evil. But if, on the other hand, hell is a just place, because none suffer there except 
those who deserve to suffer, and none suffer more, nor less, than they deserve, then 
hell is not evil. 423 
Grudem agrees, and rightly argues: 
Regarding the fourth argument (by annihilationists ), while evil that remains 
unpunished does detract from God's glory in the universe, we also must realize 
that when God punishes evil and triumphs over it, the glory of his justice, 
righteousness, and power to triumph over all opposition will be seen ( see Rom. 
9:17, 22-24).424 
Again, Blanchard maintains that God's victory of being 'all in all' would not be challenged 
by the existence of hell - rather hell glorifies God's justice.425 Fernando claims that all will 
kneel at Christ's throne and acknowledge him with fear and regret if they are in hell, and 
that all are reconciled to God as he crushes the impenitents' rebellion by consigning them 
to hell - an area still under the jurisdiction of God.426 However traditionalists have 
sometimes obscured this point. For example, Macleod responds to the charge of cosmic 
dualism against the traditionalist position by arguing that hell is outside of the ordered 
cosmos: 
[E]ven the redeemed, reconciled world includes a Black Hole - the place prepared 
for the devil and his angels. Yet to speak of this as an eternal, cosmic, dualism is 
misleading. Cosmic is exactly what it is not. Cosmic (hence cosmetics) is beauty. 
420 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 221. 
421 Ibid., p. 221. 
422 Blocher, op. cit., p. 292 [Italics original.] 
423 Helm, op. cit., p.114. [Italics original]. 
424 Grudem, op. cit., p. 1151. Grudem is careful to note that this is not a complete solution to the problem 
of dualism: "yet after all this has been said, we have to admit that the ultimate resolution of this question 
lies far beyond our ability to understand, and remains hidden in the counsels of God." [p. 1151]. 
425 Blanchard, op. cit., pp. 221 f. .1 
426 Fernando, op. cit., pp. 72-7. I will go on to argue that rebellion is only fully crushed if the damned 
cease to sin. 
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It means ordered reality. In that sense hell is not part of the cosmos. It is the 
receptacle within which, at last, God confines the world's sin. But it is not outside 
the world. It is outer darkness. It is Outside. Light-less. Lawless. Love-less: the 
place where men indulge, and suffer, the collapsed moral order which unbelief and 
. . h h 421 1mpemtence ave c osen. 
While Macleod avoids the charge of cosmic dualism, it is at too high a cost. The 
traditional argument that retributive punishment is a good, and thus hell is a just 
punishment for sin, entails that hell is part of the 'cosmos': the 'ordered reality'. However, 
on this assumption Macleod's argument seems to imply that hell is not a just punishment 
and is thus an evil, which heightens the very dualism he is trying to avoid. He also seems 
unable to affirm the universal rule of God. What Traditionalism has usually maintained is 
that hell is in the cosmos and thus is not dualistic. Further, some traditionalists in the 
recent debate have argued from the current existence of sin and evil to that of eternal sin 
and evil, claiming that this raises no significant extra difficulties. Dixon seems to take the 
even stronger line that eternal evil raises no extra problems at all: "We must also argue 
that if God can be completely holy and good and yet allow evil ( although restrained) to be 
present now in His creation, why not forever (but confined to a place called the lake of 
fire)?"428 Blanchard acknowledges that eternal evil is a problem, but less of a problem than 
current evil. He writes: 
... one might add that the endless existence of a moral 'black hole' is not the 
greatest unsolved problem with regard to sin. After all, if in his perfect holiness 
God can allow evil now he can certainly do so in eternity. A much greater problem 
is the very existence of sin at all as such an absurd and irrational curse on the 
universe.429 
Again, this position overlooks the fact that evil without punishment would be open to the 
charge of dualism, but that both annihilationists and traditionalists can rightly argue that 
only punished evil will continue beyond the Last Judgment. 
3.3 The Abominable Fancy 
I now tum to the related annihilationist objection that the sight or knowledge of the 
continuing suffering of the damned will diminish the blessedness of the righteous in 
heaven. I am using the term 'the Abominable Fancy' t~ refer to this awareness of the state 
of the damned by those in heaven. I will argue that the issue must also tum chiefly on the 
427 Macleod, op. cit., p. 14. 
428 Dixon, op. cit., p. 159. 
429 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 221. 
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prior issue of the justice of the punishment of hell, but I include it in this chapter, rather 
than the previous one, for several reasons. First, it is presented independently of the issue 
of justice in most annihilationist literature, and in some traditionalist responses to 
Annihilationism. Second, a variation on this argument has been used as a positive 
argument for Traditionalism, which does not entirely overlap with the issue of justice. 
Pinnock briefly mentions this related issue, which has a long history in the tradition: that 
from the perspective of heaven, hell "was a dimension of the divine artistry" and by seeing 
what it was that they had avoided, "believers, far from being disturbed by these hellish 
torments, would experience satisfaction and admiration on account of them. "430 Third, the 
annihilationist argument can be understood, as with the argument above, as a reaction 
against an excessive dualism of continuing sin. Fourth, the modified Traditionalism I will 
propose in response to the charge of excessive dualism serves to reduce the problem, and 
may even result in a more sympathetic response to the traditional idea of the knowledge of 
hell increasing the blessing of heaven. 
Before examining the objection I will first sketch out the place of this notion in the 
tradition. From the assumption that the righteous would be aware of, or even be able to 
see, hell there arose in the tradition an argument for Traditionalism based on it: hell adds 
to the bliss of the saints.431 In a section entitled 'The Abominable Fancy', Walker notes two 
ways in which hell adds to the bliss of the righteous: "This sight gives them joy because it 
is a manifestation of God's justice and hatred of sin, but chiefly because it provides a 
contrast which heightens their awareness of their own bliss."432 Dean Farrar first described 
this aspect of the traditional doctrine of hell as 'an abominable fancy',433 and it has become 
a semi-technical term in the literature through the usage of Walker. I have therefore 
decided to use the terp1, although it is clearly highly pejorative. The Abominable Fancy is 
a very significant part of the tradition. Walker notes that, "It has moreover the support of 
the greatest Doctors of the Church, St. Augustine 434 and St. Thomas Aquinas, 435 and the 
430 Ibid, p. 155. 
431 There is also a much rarer position in the tradition, in which hell is required to serve as a warning to the 
saints to prevent them from falling. I will note this below. 
432 Walker,' op. cit., p. 29. 
433 F.W. Farrar, Eternal Hope (five sermons preached in Westminster Abbey in 1877), (London: 
Macmillan, 1878), p. 66. 
434 Augustine Civ. Dei, XX, xxi, xxii. It appears also in Tertullian and St. Cyprian (see G. Bardy, ["Les P~res 
de l'Eglise en face des probl~mes poses par l'enfer"] in L 'Enfer [Paris: Collection Foi Vivante, 1950], pp. 
152-3). 
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Master of the Sentences, Peter ofLombardy.436" 437 A classic statement of the value of hell 
to the righteous is from Aquinas, in response to the question: "Whether the Blessed 
Rejoice in the Punishment of the Wicked?" 
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, 
when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the 
punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something 
annexed to it: and in this way the saints rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by 
considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which 
will fill them with joy.438 
Rowell notes that "Aquinas argued against annihilationism because he believed the 
glory of the blessed to be enhanced by their knowledge of the torments of the 
damned. "439 Walker continues that "It is therefore odd that this aspect of hell should 
become almost obsolete by the 17th century, ... "440 However, a prominent example of a 
later writer using this argument is Jonathan Edwards. Examples could be multiplied, but a 
typical one comes from a sermon entitled The wicked useful in their destruction only: "The 
destruction of the unfruitful is of use, to give the saints a greater sense of their happiness, 
and of God's grace to them."441 With the rise in particular of humanitarianism the idea of 
pleasure at the suffering of others has become a 'problem' in the western world and thus 
the Abominable Fancy has generally fallen into sharp disuse.442 It is not prominent in 
traditionalist writings in the recent debate, although some traditionalists do argue that 
eternal conscious torment glorifies God, rather than counting against Him. Gerald Bray 
provides one of the clearest statements of this view: 
... if the non-elect have no hope of salvation and God does not want them to suffer 
unduly, why were they ever created in the first place? Their existence must serve 
some purpose, and once that is admitted the view that their eternal punishment 
glorifies the justice of God seems perfectly logical. 443 
An important distinction within the tradition, that is vital to keep clear, is made by 
Gerstner: 
The "righteous" are not to take any "ungodly joy at the fate of the righteous." This, 
of course, is agreed by all ... I do not deny that Orthodoxy sees a godly joy in 
435 Aquinas, op. cit., Suppl., Q. 94, art. i. 
436 J>etrus Lomb., Sent., IV, dist. 50.7 (Migne, Patr. Lat., T. 192, col. 962). 
437 Walker, op. cit., p. 29. · 
438 Aquinas, op. cit., Q. 94, Art. 3, p. 2961. 
439 Rowell, op. cit., p. 126. 
440 Ibid., p. 29. 
441 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 127. See also, for example, vol. 2, p. 87. 
442 See Norman Fiering, Compassion, op. cit., pp. 195-218. 
443 Bray, art. cit., p. 23. See also Fernando, op. cit., pp. 95ff; Dixon, op. cit., pp. 83-4. 
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heaven's contemplating hell not because of the misery of the damned, but because 
of the justice of God in the inflicting of that misery. 444 
A further aspect, that was often held as a corollary of this, is the notion that part of the pain 
of hell comes from contemplating the bliss of the righteous in heaven. Perhaps not 
surprising for a Jonathan Edwards scholar, Gerstner has several references to this rarer 
idea in the modem debate: "Hell's misery is made perfect by the sight of the saints (whom 
they had despised and hated in this world in return for the saints' love of them and efforts 
for their salvation) enjoying everlasting bliss (Luke 16:23-26). "445 
Finally a rare argument for the value of hell to heaven is noted in the ACUTE report. 
Another more speculative rationale for the continuation of hell in God's 'new order 
of things' is mooted by Blanchard and elaborated by the evangelical biophysicist 
Douglas Spanner. This argues that an everlasting hell would actually be 'good 
news', because it would show that God would never ever compromise with sin, 
and would thereby put an end to the possibility of sin ever breaking out again and 
ruining his new creation, as it did in the beginning with Adam and Eve. As 
Spanner puts it, hell in this scenario would serve as the 'never-definitively ending 
evidence that God will tolerate no defiance of his wise and sovereign authority', 
and would be necessary 'lest the temptation to rebel' occurred once more. 446 
Birks, who also believed that the righteous in heaven are not only able to sin in heaven 
but might be tempted to do so, makes this point, and uses it as an argument against 
Annihilationism. Rowell presents the conclusion of his argument: 
Birks suggests that the continued knowledge of the lost by the blessed makes 
redemption a perpetually revealed, present reality, whereas, if the wicked were 
annihilated, redemption would only be the recollection of an ever-fading past as 
far as the blessed were concemed.447 
However, the belief that the righteous can sin is not usually held in the tradition, and the 
ACUTE report rightly concludes: "Intriguing though this idea may be, conditionalists 
could retort that its premise of a potential 'second fall' is nowhere attested in 
Scripture. "448 
444 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 151 quoting Fudge, op. cit., p. 195. And,'Edwards would add, the emphasising of 
his grace to them, and their happiness. 
445 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 190. 
446 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 108, quoting Spanner, op. cit., p. 120 [Italics original], and referring to Blanchard, 
op. cit., p. 221. 
447 Rowell, op. cit., p. 126. See Birks, Victory, p. 205. 
448 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 108. 
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3.3.1 The Annihilationist Arguments 
The concept of the Abominable Fancy has been frequently referred to by annihilationists 
in the recent debate, being given as one of the reasons for rejecting a traditionalist hell: 
that far from increasing the bliss of heaven, the awareness of the continued existence of 
hell greatly detracts from it, and therefore for heaven to be heaven there can be no hell of 
unending torment. It is the first reason Michael Green gives for his rejection of 
Traditionalism: 
There is no doubt that many earnest Christians hold [to Traditionalism], but all the 
same I doubt that it is a genuinely Christian option. What sort of God would he be 
who could rejoice eternally in heaven with the saved, while downstairs the cries of 
the lost made an agonising cacophony? Such a God is not the person revealed in 
Scripture as utterly just and utterly loving.449 
Wenham writes: "I plead guilty also to failing to see how God and the saints could be in 
perfect bliss with human beings hopelessly sinning and suffering."45° Fudge quotes F.W. 
Farrar: 
[His words] are directed to any who ask how they can be confident of everlasting 
happiness unless they know the damned will suffer without end. The whole 
question Farrar regarded as wicked and selfish, and his response exploded from his 
heart: " ... I would here, and now, and kneeling on my knees, ask Him that I might 
die as the beasts that perish, and for ever cease to be, rather than that my worst 
enemy should, for one single year, endure the hell described by Tertullian, or 
Minicius, or Jonathan Edwards, or Dr. Pusey, or Mr. Furniss, or Mr. Moody, or 
Mr. Spurgeon."451 
I would also note the summary of the key arguments for Annihilationism, given recently 
by the traditionalist J.I. Packer. He writes: 
Let us look at the biblical arguments used [by annihilationists]. They reduce to 
four ... Third, it is said that the harmony of the new heaven and earth will be marred 
if somewhere. the lost continue to exist in impenitence and distress ... Fourth, it is 
said that the joy of heaven will be marred by knowledge that some continue under 
merited retribution.452 
The surprise in Packer's list is his fourth point. Evangelical annihilationists (with the 
possible exceptions of Pinnock and Travis who raise questions about retributive justice, 
noted above) formally share the traditionalist view that merited retribution is a 'good', and 
thus presumably would not mar the joy of heaven. Therefore, by separating this fourth 
449 Green, op. cit., p. 69. 
450 Wenham, Case, p. 189. 
451 Fudge, op. cit., p. 196, quoting Farrar, op. cit., p. 202. 
452 Packer, Problem, pp. 12-13. 
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point Packer seems to suggest that it is an argument based not on the injustice of the 
punishment but an emotional dislike of any suffering at all. I think that Packer is accurate 
and that in the recent debate the argument is indeed raised by some annihilationists in such 
a way that it is divorced from the prior issue of justice. Carson also notes the importance 
of this issue for annihilationists when he summarises their argument about dualism in 
terms of the spoiling of heaven. "( 6) Does not the notion of a continuing hell with 
conscious suffering inmates jar against the image of the new heaven and the new earth, 
created to reflect God' s glory and extol his perfections? Would not an ongoing hell mar 
heaven?"453 
However not all annihilationists are happy to use this argument. Both annihilationist 
exceptions I have found come from the Nineteenth century. Constable argues in a way 
similar to some traditionalists when he argues that the 'Abominable Fancy', far from being 
a problem, is rather the chief purpose of hell. He begins by stating that" ... the grand object 
of all-wise punishment [is] the lesson taught by it to those who have not offended," and 
continues that " ... eternal death inflicted on sinners is eternally felt, and has an eternal 
influence on the parties whom it was intended principally to effect."454 However, this is 
not to say that the extinction of the damned won't be welcomed by the onlooking blessed 
as well as the damned themselves: "So the close of each agonised life in hell would be 
longed for there [in hell]; [and] would send a thrill ofrelief throughout the habitations of 
the blessed. "455 Edward White also seems to go some way towards this view when he 
states that punishment in the life to come was not purely retributive, but also vindicatory. 
"Scripture represents judgement (krisis ), the display to the whole rational creation of the 
justice of the ways of God, rather than punishment as such (krima), as the primary object, 
so to speak, of extending the resurrection, not only to the just, but to the unjust. "456 These 
are rare examples of annihilationists using the classic traditionalist response to the charge 
of the purposelessness of hell and the Abominable Fancy: that hell serves to display the 
justice of God. They don't appear at all in the modem debate amongst annihilationists, 
although there is no logical reason why they should not. 
453 Carson, Gagging, p. 520. 
454 Constable, op. cit., p. 25. [Italics in original] 
455 Ibid., p. 14. 
456 Wh. . .. 1te, op. elf., p. v11. 
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Constable refers to the annihilation of sinners being 'eternally felt' by the righteous. In 
other words despite their extinction the memory of their punishment remains in some 
form. This question of whether the saints will have any memory of hell even after the last 
of the damned are annihilated is a significant issue because if the saints can remember hell 
then it would seem that, if the present perception of the sufferings of the damned limits the 
bliss of heaven, then the memory of it would also continue to trouble them. Thus any 
annihilationist who argues against Traditionalism on the basis of the Abominable Fancy 
would seem to also argue against the saints' memory of hell. It is an issue rarely discussed 
by annihilationists, and where they do they hold differing positions. Philip Hughes 
suggests that the memory of hell will be lost: 
Their lot, whose names are not written in the Lamb's book of life, is the destruction 
of the second death. Thus God's creation will be purged of all falsity and 
defilement, and the ancient promise will be fulfilled that "the former things shall 
not be remembered or come to mind" as the multitude of the redeemed are glad 
and rejoice forever in the perfection of the new heaven and the new earth (Is. 
65:17f.; Rev. 21:1-4).457 
However some annihilationists argue for the existence of some sort of memory, with the 
implication that if hell is just then it is a good. Guillebaud writes on Jude 7: "The 
conclusion of the discussion ... is that the "unquenchable fire" represents a perpetual 
memorial of God's righteous judgement, which continues for ever after the existence of the 
condemned has ended. "458 Several annihilationists share this interpretation of the phrase 
'unquenchable fire' as a perpetual memorial. If it is to be a comprehensible memorial it 
must serve to remind the righteous about the punishment of the damned. Fudge also 
argues that hell is unendingly memorialised. Commenting on Revelation 14:9-11 he 
argues that, the damned's destruction "is forever memorialised in the smoke that 
remains. "459 This might seem to be contradicted by his quotation of Mounce on Revelation 
14:9-11, which he not~s with seeming approval." ... there is no suggestion that the 
suffering of the damned takes place in the presence of martyred believers who now rejoice 
to see their oppressors burning in hell. "460 However, that Fudge is objecting not to any 
view of hell from heaven, but to Schadenfreude, is indicated by the comment which 
immediately follows: "The Old Testament often speaks of the righteous beholding the 
457 Hughes, op. cit., p. 407. 
458 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 11. 
459 Fudge, op. cit., p. 298. 
460 R.H. Mounce, The Book of Revelation (The New International Commentary on the New Testament, 
gen. ed. F.F. Bruce) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 276, quoted by Fudge, op. cit., p. 297. 
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evidence of the wicked's destruction, but it does not have them gloating over their actual 
pain either."461 If then Fudge believes that there is an eternal memorial of the punishment 
of the wicked, this raises the problem of how this can be reconciled with his quotation of 
Farrar above. It could be that Fudge believes that the extinction will be remembered, but 
not the suffering of the damned. However, I think it more likely that the point Fudge wants 
to make is not that suffering in hell per se diminishes the blessedness of heaven (the 
problem of squeamishness), but that a traditionalist hell diminishes it because it is unjust. 
3.3.2 An Assessment of the Annihilationist Arguments 
The notion that the knowledge or sight of the damned in hell increases the bliss of the 
righteous in heaven has fallen into general disuse and, from being a central aspect in 
traditional teaching on hell, it is now a comparative rarity amongst traditionalists. 
However the argument that the very opposite is the case, which I have termed the 
'Abominable Fancy', that this knowledge of hell in heaven would reduce the bliss of 
heaven, is a common annihilationist argument in the recent debate. Thus, annihilationists 
argue that, for heaven to be heaven there can't be an unending hell of conscious torment. 
The response to the annihilationist argument depends upon the point they are making: if 
they are arguing that unjust suffering would diminish the bliss of heaven, then 
traditionalists would agree with them, and the issue would be the prior question of what is 
a just punishment for the damned. Packer states that "since in heaven Christians will be 
like God in character, loving what he loves and taking joy in all his self-manifestation, 
including his justice, there is no reason to think that their joy will be impaired in this 
way."462 Ajith Fernando believes the punishment of a traditionalist hell to be just and so he 
can argue that "we will be able to agree wholeheartedly with the judgement of God upon 
our lost loved ones. "463 This positive attitude towards just suffering is equally a position 
that an annihilationist may take of the attitude of the righteous in heaven, and some, such 
461 Fudge, op. cit., pp. 297-8. 
462 Packer, op. cit., p. 18. I would also note Bray's comment that, since the existence of heaven and hell 
side-by-side promoted no problems to the minds of biblical writers, it should not therefore promote a 
difficulty to the minds of modem day annihilationists. [Bray, art. cit., p. 23] 
463 Fernando, op. cit., p. 69. However, Fernando adds that in heaven bliss can co-exist with regret over the 
lost [Ibid., pp. 70-71] which leaves open the question of the degree of"regret" that is possible in heaven for 
it still to be heaven. 
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as Constable, clearly have done. However, if annihilationists suggest that any suffering of 
the damned, even if just, serves to diminish the bliss of heaven then this raises a series of 
problems. First, if such diminution of bliss is an unacceptable state for the righteous to be 
in, then this would immediately undermine any suffering of the damned after the Last 
Judgement. However, if it is argued that the diminution of the bliss of the righteous is 
acceptable, then if it is acceptable for a temporary period, it must also be acceptable 
permanently if it remains a just punishment. Carson makes this point and suggests that the 
reason this logic is not perceived is that there has been a shift in the understanding of 
suffering away from the notion that suffering as a result of just punishment is a good. 
The assumption that eternal conscious punishment would be needlessly cruel owes 
something, I suspect, to a shift in our view of suffering ... The shift in model is 
surely behind Pinnock's rhetorical question ... "Does the one who told us to love 
our enemies intend to wreck vengeance on his own enemies for all eternity?"464 
But the logic of his question surely demands revision: "Does the one who told us 
to love our enemies intend to wreck vengeance on his own enemies?" So far as I 
know, Pinnock would answer that question in the affirmative, though probably he 
would recast the question a little. Justice must prevail; just punishment must be 
meted out; vengeance in the purest sense belongs to the Lord. What then is 
different about the question by adding the final three words, "for all eternity"? If 
justice is still prevailing, if just punishment is still being meted out. .. then 
Pinnock's objection falls to the ground. If just punishment was ever justly meted 
out, then Pinnock should not cast his question as if to imply that any display of 
justice contradicts the command to love one's enemies. 465 
However, if it is argued that the diminution of the bliss of heaven if acceptable, but only 
for a limited period, then this raises other problems: the creation of a New Intermediate 
State; explaining the place of memory; and the extinction of Satan. I will now examine 
these points in greater detail. First, if it is argued that even the just punishment of the 
damned in hell will diminish the bliss of heaven, then the annihilationist position 
introduces what I will·term a 'New Intermediate State' into eschatology, with a period 
between the Last Judgement and the extinction of the final sinner in hell. I say new since it 
is also widely held, especially by traditionalists, that there is existence after death and 
before the last judgement, which is often called the "intermediate state." On this new 
position there would seem to be a period of 'limited' bliss in heaven while those in hell 
· continue in torment, followed, after an unspecified period, with the annihilation of the last 
person in hell and then unalloyed bliss. The only hint of recognition of this possibility I 
464 Pinnock, Destruction, p.247. 
have found is from Guillebaud, who is clearer than most annihilationists in his 
chronology, and who argues that, 
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in 1 Corinthians 15 :28 Paul is writing of the final consummation of all things, the 
last event of which the Word of God has anything to say, the ultimate completion 
of the victory of God ... Nothing is said as to how long that end may be delayed. 
But it will surely come, ... 466 
This is to introduce a novel doctrine that is nowhere in the tradition. There is also the 
wider issue of whether there are such significant events after the Last Judgment. It could 
be argued that the notion of any event for the damned after the Last judgement is to evade 
the force of it being the last judgement. Blocher writes: "The language of Scripture, with 
its stereotyped metaphors, and in the role it plays, seems to insist on the durational, 
permanent character of the state of torment, and to exclude any later change, anything 
beyond the outcome of the last judgement. "467 A possible response would be that 
extinction was determined as the final element of the punishment at the Last Judgment, 
but I still think that Blocher' s argument carries weight. 468 
This criticism of a New Intermediate State is valid, I believe, for annihilationists who 
believe that the punishment of the damned comes after the Last Judgement. This is the 
majority position in the recent debate, and I have been assuming it in my definition of 
Annihilationism. However this problem would be avoided by an annihilationist who holds 
one of two positions. First, they could hold that the punishment of torment takes place in 
the Intermediate State before the Last Judgement. The only advocate of such a position I 
have found is Edward White. Thus one of White's reasons for holding to the "survival of 
the spirits of sinful men in death," while rejecting the innate immortality of the soul, was 
to assign a special horror to the second death with the extinction of the soul. There are two 
main reasons, though, why this variant has been rarely adopted by annihilationists. First, 
most annihilationists deny the natural immortality of the soul and this is then usually 
believed to undermine any belief in a conscious intermediate state. White certainly denied 
the immortality of the soul, and yet was very unusual in not drawing the usual corollary of 
a denial of the intermediate state. Second, if the extinction occurred at the Last Judgement 
465 Carson, Gagging, pp. 530-531. 
466 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 6. 
467 Blocher, op. cit., p. 288. 
468 One consequence of Annihilationism is that it is committed to a temporal afterlife for both the damned as 
well as for the righteous until the final extinction. This follows from the structure of their position: the 
then it is difficult to see how punishment could be just since some people would have 
spent thousands of years in torment in the Intermediate State while others would spend 
very little time there, or even perhaps none for those still alive at the Second Coming. 
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A second alternative an annihilationist could adopt to avoid the problem of creating a New 
Intermediate State is to hold that punishment takes place at the Last Judgement. As I have 
shown, this may be the position of Pinnock. The difficulty that Pinnock himself 
acknowledges with this position is that, as with the position above, it is difficult to account 
for degrees of torment. Further, as with the position above, it is very rare amongst 
annihilationists. 
A second problem for the annihilationist who argues that the existence of hell limits the 
bliss of heaven, is the place of memory. First, there is the memory the righteous would 
have of the damned after their extinction. While debate has usually focused on the 
immediate apprehension of a 'present' hell, it seems that the problem is not removed if 
there is an unending memory or memorial of a completed past event. Blocher makes a 
similar objection with reference to Universalism, which probably implies that memory 
remains: " ... the problem of God's love remains, though it may be felt to be less acute, if 
the final state of many is annihilation or extinction. The orthodox could argue that even 
universalists have to face it: should all suffering cease, having suffered shall never be 
abolished!"469 An obvious response is to argue that the memory of the damned will be 
erased from the minds of the righteous, as P.E. Hughes does.470 This is not an argument 
restricted to annihilationists, and from the traditionalist side Blanchard suggests that both 
God and the blessed will forget at least their own sins. "If we dare to use such language 
[from Jeremiah 31 :34), God will have a mental block as far as the sins of his people are 
concerned. What is more, so will [the blessed], or they could not be perfectly happy."471 
One difficulty with this position is to determine how one can have selective memories of 
one's past life on earth without recalling the existence of the damned. Further, if memory 
is selectively erased, there is the question of how Christ's death is to be remembered. To 
damned are tormented for differing periods of time, while the righteous wait until the period of tonnent is 
completed. 
469 Blocher, op. cit., p. 293. Blocher footnotes J. Hick, Evil and the Love of God (London: Collins, 1974, 
3rd pr. [1st ed. Macmillan, 1966]), p. 378, p. 386. 
470 Hughes, op. cit., p. 407. 
471 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 180. 
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understand Christ's atonement would include recollection of the suffering endured as 
punishment for sin, and the penalty faced by those who were not saved. Thus even if the 
memories of the righteous were purged, there remains a permanent reminder of torment in 
heaven in the marks of Christ's passion that he bears in his resurrected body. Macleod 
writes: "The Throne itself bears eternally the marks of the cross (Rev. 5.6)."472 Indeed the 
annihilationist objection I am considering here makes it very difficult to see what place 
there can be for remembering the cross, either in heaven or now on earth, since it shows 
the suffering involved in the just punishment of a sin. Finally, there may also be an issue in 
determining wherein lies the basis of personal continuity, if elements of memory are 
erased.473 Thus another difficulty with the annihilationist position which argues from the 
Abominable Fancy, irrespective of the issue of the justice of hell, is that it fails to take 
adequate account of the operation of memory.474 
A third problem for Annihilationism is that of the unending suffering of other, demonic, 
beings in hell. Several traditionalists have used the parallel of Satan to argue against 
Annihilationism. Jonathan Edwards bases the parallel on a text from Revelation: "Again, 
wicked men will suffer the same kind of death with the devils; as in verse 25th of [Rev. 
xx], "Depart ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Now 
the punishment of the devil is not annihilation, but torment; ... "475 Calvin also argues from 
the parallel of Satan and the damned in his Psychopannychia to argue against a form of 
Annihilationism. Having used the analogy of Satan to show that someone can experience 
death, and yet still be conscious, he goes on to ask whether there will "be any end to that 
death" in Satan's case? His answer is in the negative, from which he argues that the wicked 
too, "although dead ... shall still feel eternal fire and the worm which dieth not. "476 
472 Macleod, op. cit., p. 14. Macleod is using this point to counter the claim of annihilationists that their 
position solves the problem of dualism. 
473 The memory theory of personal continuity holds that continuity of memory, rather than material or the 
soul's continuity, is the key. See, for example, C.W. Bynum, "Material Continuity, Personal Survival, and 
the Resurrection of the Body: a Scholastic Discussion in its Medieval and Modem Contexts," in The 
History of Religions, no. 30, p. 60. 
474 The ACUTE report also comments on the biblical evidence for the memory or present awareness of the 
damned by the blessed. "Presumably, if God wanted to remove ali'knowledge of the fate of the damned 
(whether ongoing or not) from the consciousness of the righteous, he could do so. The problem, however, 
is that Scripture sometimes paints a picture which is rather different from this." ACUTE, op. cit., p.109. 
Biblical passages are discussed, ibid., pp. 109-110. 
475 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 85, col. 2. 
476 J. Calvin, Psychopannychia, in Tracts and Treatises in Defense of the Reformed Faith, tr. Henry 
Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), vol. 3, p. 453, quoted in Fudge, op. cit., p. 459. 
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If the unending torment of angelic beings in hell also limits the bliss of heaven then 
presumably the annihilationist has to argue that Satan and his angels should be 
extinguished too. However I don't think that this raises any significant further doctrinal 
difficulties for the annihilationist, but it encourages caution in proceeding since there is 
almost no such claim in the tradition.477 Alternatively, if it is maintained that Satan is not 
extinguished, then, as well as responding to the above arguments, the annihilationist needs 
to explain why the unending torment of Satan isn't subject to the same arguments that they 
raise against Traditionalism: for example, that it is unjust in the length of the sentence; and 
that it results in an excessive dualism. 
As I have noted, the classic traditionalist position is that rather than the sight of the 
damned diminishing the bliss of the blessed, it actually achieves the very opposite effect, 
and increases their bliss. This is not pleasure in the torments of the damned, but in the 
justice of God displayed in their punishment. If such a sight does increase the bliss of the 
righteous, then extinction would necessarily reduce it. Thus if there is any validity to such 
arguments, that the sight of the damned is of benefit to the righteous, and I think that 
there is, then it serves as an argument against Annihilationism, on the assumption that 
the blessing of the righteous will be maximised. 
In conclusion, in this section I have sought to show that the annihilationists' attempt to 
avoid the problem of the Abominable Fancy fails. I have argued that their criticism of 
Traditionalism argues for too much. In arguing that the sight of any suffering, even justly 
inflicted, will diminish the bliss of the damned, annihilationists leave no place for any 
torment in hell and thus undermine their own position. If they argue that a temporary 
period of the diminution of the blessedness of the righteous is permissible, then it creates a 
new intermediate state and does not take account of the presence of memory and of the 
crucified Christ in heaven. However, I have also argued, as some annihilationist have seen 
more clearly than others, that the disagreement with traditionalists at this point actually 
boils down to a disagreement about the justice of the punishment of an unending hell: if an 
unending hell is unjust then it cannot serve to display to the blessed the justice of God. 
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However, if the punishment of hell is just then the blessed must therefore be able to praise 
God for hell. 
Further, although the annihilationist argument in the form they present it boils down to the 
question of justice, I think that there is actually another issue influencing the debate on this 
issue. This is suggested by the fact that the collapse of the annihilationist argument into the 
question of justice is a rather obvious point, and some explanation seems necessary to 
explain the inability of so many writers to note it. A strong candidate for this influential, 
but unacknowledged, issue is the state of the damned: that they continue to sin and to rebel 
against the justice of God. I now turn to discuss this feature of classic Traditionalism. 
3.4 Traditionalism's Problem of Unending Sin 
One element of the annihilationist charge of excessive dualism against Traditionalism is, I 
believe, valid. As I have already noted, it is important to distinguish two elements in the 
annihilationist charge that are usually treated as if they were synonymous: the existence of 
suffering in hell and the existence of sin and rebellion in hell. As I will argue below, it is 
possible to conceive of a hell in which the damned suffer punishment for sins committed 
in this life, and yet do not continue to sin in hell, and in fact may even praise God for the 
justice of his judgements. This confusion is common. Thus, for example, P.E. Hughes, 
whom I quoted above, moves from saying that an everlasting hell "means that suffering 
and death will never be totally abolished from the scene," to concluding that the 
inescapable logic of this position is a separate kingdom, ruled by the devil and consisting 
of "bad," that is sin. However the logic is not, I believe, inescapable: suffering in hell does 
not imply either the continuation of sin or rebellion in hell. Such a misunderstanding is 
hardly surprising, though, since almost every traditionalist assumes the same logic. Thus 
annihilationists are simply arguing on the same assumption as those they disagree with. In 
assessing the value of the argument I want to clearly distinguish these two elements. I 
believe that the charge of dualism is correct where the damned in hell continue to sin and 
remain in a state of rebellion. As several annihilationists' rightly point out, such a position 
cannot be reconciled with what Stott calls the universalist texts of scripture, that in the end 
477 It is also exegetically more problematic which is the primary reason for the rarity of this position in the 
tradition. One of the strongest texts in support of a traditionalist position is Rev. 20: 10 which refers to 
129 
God will be 'all in all'. However the charge of dualism fails where the damned merely 
suffer punishment without continuing to sin and rebel against God. As I have stated above, 
where sin is justly punished it is part of the 'cosmos', part of the ordered creation, and thus 
it is not dualistic. In other words, my argument is that if annihilationists accept that the 
retributive punishment of sin is just then such punishment is not dualistic; if they argue 
that it is dualistic then it is hard to see how they can justify any such punishment after the 
Last Judgement. However, their criticisms are probably assuming that traditionalists are 
arguing for more than this, in particular including the notion of continuing sin, which is 
dualistic. Therefore the problem is not to do with the continued existence of punishment 
and the torment, but with the attitude of the damned, and in particular their continued 
sinning. 
To conclude, in this chapter so far I have argued that the case for Annihilationism and for 
the rejection of Traditionalism as dualistic is not as strong as annihilationists have 
claimed. However I believe that the annihilationist charge of dualism in Traditionalism 
does carry weight, and thus neither position is without significant problems. I now want to 
propose a modified form of Traditionalism, which I will term Reconciliationism, which I 
will argue deals better with the problem of dualism than either Annihilationism or classic 
Traditionalism. 
3.5 Reconciliationism: A Modified Traditionalism 
In the remainder of this chapter I will propose certain modifications to the traditionalist 
understanding of hell, based on some suggestions made by Henri Blocher. Blocher 
presented his position in its clearest form in a paper presented to the Rutherford House 
Theological conference in 1991, and published in Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell 
in the following year. Blocher had already touched on some of these ideas in previous 
articles,478 but this Rutherford House paper is the place he develops them at greatest 
length. However even here his treatment is brief. I will give an exposition and assessment 
of each of the elements of Blocher's position in turn, as well as a fuller exposition of the 
Satan and his angels. 
478 I have cited these in the previous chapter, p. 97, n. 362. 
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traditionalist position of which they are a modification.479 In the course of the argument 
below I will focus on the arguments of Blocher, since he is a contributor to the recent 
evangelical debate and indeed is the only writer in the recent debate who has proposed 
them as an alternative position. In expounding and developing this position I will also 
refer at length to the older debate where it can serve to supplement or clarify the issues. 
The reason for this use of older material is to supplement the very limited discussion of the 
issues raised by this Reconciliationism in the recent debate. I will note two forerunners to 
these ideas. First, apparently without Blocher' s knowledge, he is heir to a broad position 
about which there was considerable debate and interest in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth Centuries. In this earlier debate most of the proponents of this modified 
Traditionalism regarded it as so distinct as to be a fourth type of view of hell alongside 
Traditionalism, Annihilationism and Universalism. However I will argue that it is actually 
best understood as a modification of Traditionalism, although for clarity I will refer to it by 
the neologism Reconciliationism. The second, and rather surprising, type of forerunner to 
these ideas, especially that of lucidity, are classic traditionalist writers themselves. 
However, these modifications are not applied to the whole period of hell, but usually 
limited to the Last Judgement. I am arguing that the arguments for their use are sound and 
they should be extended to the period after the Last Judgement too. 
I will argue for three main conclusions, each more far-reaching than the previous. My 
minimal conclusion will be that one advantage of these modifications is that they serve to 
reduce the dualism of the traditionalist position, although they do not remove it entirely. 
This reduction in dualism may, I will suggest, give a reason for annihilationists to accept 
this form of Traditionalism, particularly if my observation is correct that Annihilationism 
has developed in part as a reaction to the perceived problems with Traditionalism. My 
medium conclusion is that this modified Traditionalism deals with the problem of dualism 
more successfully than Annihilationism. This may provide an even stronger reason for 
annihilationists to accept it, if dualism has been one of their major objections to 
Traditionalism. I will also suggest that these modifications offer a further mitigation of the 
severity of the classic traditionalist hell, and thus a further response to the charge of 
excessive severity examined in the previous chapter. My maximal argument is that this 
479 The aspect ofBlocher's thesis I called 'fixity' and examined in the previous chapter is independent of those 
examined in this chapter, and thus could be rejected without requiring the rejection of those I am examining 
modified Traditionalism is, on a variety of other additional grounds, a better doctrine of 
hell, and should be accepted by all traditionalists and annihilationists in the debate. 
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I will distinguish three related elements in Blocher's own argument, further to his 
argument for fixity examined in the previous chapter. Blocher does not divide the points in 
this fashion, having a continuous exposition of his position, but I think that this imposed 
division will help to clarify the different issues involved, even if it necessitates some 
overlap. The three elements are, first, the damned don't sin; second, the damned are lucid; 
and third, the damned are reconciled to God. I will suggest that the first and third steps in 
particular deal with the problem of excessive dualism: the first step better than classic 
Traditionalism; the third step better than Annihilationism. The second element is not only 
an important step for establishing a less dualistic doctrine of hell, but also in establishing a 
more just one, since I will argue that lucidity is also an essential element for a punishment 
to be just. 
3.5.1 The Damned Do Not Sin 
First, and foundational, to Blocher's position and the modified Traditionalism I want to 
present is the thesis that "The main fact about everlasting punishment, the fate of the 
reprobate, is this: sin shall be no more. "480 This and the following elements are linked, 
particularly with the thesis that the damned are lucid but, as I have noted above, I will treat 
them separately, while recognising that they make something of a cumulative case. 
Although Blocher offers some arguments for and against the 'no sin in hell' position he 
gives little exposition of it and little account of the extent of the alternative positions in the 
debate. Therefore I will-begin this section by noting two important distinctions in the 
tradition, which Blocher doesn't note. I will then offer an historical survey of the 'no sin in 
hell' position in the tradition and the mainstream 'continuing sin in hell' position which it 
is rejecting. Finally I will examine arguments for the modified position. In examining the 
arguments for and against, I will begin with the points Blocher himself makes, but expand 
them with the insights of other writers, mainly from the Nineteenth century debate. 
here. 
480 Blocher, op. cit., p. 304. 
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3.5.1.1 A Survey of the Debate About Sin in Hell 
In this section I want to survey three areas in turn: first, writers who have held that there is 
continuing sin in hell; second, writers who have held that there is an end to sin in hell; and 
third, the positions annihilationists have taken. I will conclude that the mainstream 
position has been that the damned continue to sin in hell, and that the only period when 
this was widely questioned was in the second half of the Nineteenth century. 
An indication of the widespread belief in the continuation of sin in the tradition is 
suggested by the title of Leckie's chapter surveying Traditionalism: "Everlasting Evil 
(Dualistic Solution)". It is striking that Leckie not only points out the prominence of 
continuing sin in the tradition, but also what he perceives as the major problem with it, 
which I am dealing with in this chapter: dualism. However, in charting the complexities of 
the traditionalist position on the continuation of sin in hell, it is important to note two 
distinctions in the tradition. The first distinction is between the punishment of continuing 
sin as the primary and as a secondary argument for a traditionalist hell. The widespread 
debate about this issue, at least in the nineteenth century when this issue was last 
prominent, is indicated by Leckie who puts it first in a list of important and unresolved 
questions regarding hell: 
We cannot find agreement among orthodox thinkers regarding some of the most 
important questions, as, for instance, these: Is eternal punishment the just penalty 
of a sinful life, or is it said, rather, that men will suffer always because they always 
continue to sin ?481 
The primary argument is that continuing sin is a justification, or even the sole justification, 
for the unending hell of Traditionalism. On this view, hell is unending because sin is 
unending. If this is held_ as the sole justification for Traditionalism, then this permits the 
view that all sins are deserving of finite punishment, and thus greatly eases the problem of 
the justice of infinite punishment. In this primary form this is widely recognised as a 
strong argument for Traditionalism. D.P. Walker states that "one of the easiest and most 
obvious justifications of eternal torment is to suppose that the damned continue freely to 
sin and therefore to be justly punished."482 In the recent debate John Stott asks: "Would 
there not be a serious disproportion between sins consciously committed in time and 
481 Leckie, op. cit., p. 206. 
482 Walker op. cit., p. 24. 
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torment consciously experienced throughout eternity?"483 The answer he gives is positive, 
but he notes this one qualification: "unless perhaps ( as has been argued) the impenitence 
of the lost also continues throughout eternity. "484 In other words, if sinners do continue to 
sin then this would be possible justification for an unending hell. Blocher writes of "the 
idea that sinners, such being the power of their freedom, will persevere in hatred against 
God, for ever and ever." He then comments that amongst traditionalists, "Here lies the 
strongest rationale of hell. "485 
Where continuing sin in hell is held as a secondary argument, it is held along with the 
classic traditionalist justification for hell, which Blocher refers to as the apology from "the 
infinite gravity of sin."486 To recap from the last chapter, this may be summarised as 
follows: in sinning in this life against an infinite Being we deserve an infinite punishment. 
Since in Hell the damned can only suffer as finite beings their punishment must thus be 
infinite in duration. Thus the doctrine of continuing sin could logically be removed 
without destroying the classic case for Traditionalism. In other words, such secondary 
justifications are logically superfluous for the justification of Traditionalism. On the other 
hand, if the argument for continuing sin is adopted as a primary argument for 
Traditionalism then this must involve a rejection of the classic traditionalist argument that 
sin committed in this life deserves an unending punishment. I have limited my definition 
of Traditionalism as holding to an unending hell as punishment for sins committed in this 
life, and in this I am following the usage in the evangelical debate. I have therefore 
excluded the continuation of sin as the primary argument for an unending hell. Thus most 
evangelical traditionalists hold to the continuation of sin in its secondary form. 
Thus, many traditionalists give at least two types of justification for an unending hell: first, 
the 'classic' traditionalist argument; second, the argument from the continued sin of the 
damned. Examples of writers who use these arguments in this secondary sense are legion. 
483 Stott, op. cit., p. 318. 
484 Ibid., p. 319. 
485 Blocher, op. cit., p. 296. Blocher himself goes on to reject this rationale, while sharing a traditionalist 
view of hell, as I will show below. It is striking that Kvanvig fails to note this important distinction in his 
taxonomy of positions on hell. The continuous sin position holds that hell is based upon retribution, but 
Kvanvig has defined the "Retributive Thesis" as about "punishment to those whose earthly lives and 
behaviour warrant it." [Kvanvig, op. cit., p. 19. [Italics mine.]] 
486 Ibid., p. 297. 
One example is Shedd, who is also careful to establish that the endlessness of sin is a 
secondary argument. 
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In the second place, endless punishment is rational, because of the endlessness of 
sin. If the preceding view of the relation of penalty to guilt be correct, endless 
punishment is just, without bringing the sin of the future world into the account ... 
But while this is so, it is a fact to be observed, that sin is actually being added to 
sin, in the future life, and the amount of guilt is accumulating. 487 
Shedd places what I have called the classic traditionalist argument third: "In the third 
place, endless punishment is rational, because sin is an infinite evil; infinite not because 
committed by an infinite being, but against one. "488 Hodge is another example, and he 
carefully avoids the problem of confusing the argument from endless sin in its primary and 
secondary forms. After a discussion of the classic traditionalist argument he notes, 
Relief on this subject is sought from the consideration that as the lost continue to 
sin forever they may justly be punished forever. To this, however, it is answered 
that the retributions of eternity are threatened for the sins done in the body. This is 
true; nevertheless, it is also true, first, that sin in its nature is alienation and 
separation from God; and as God is the source of all holiness and happiness, 
separation from Him is of necessity the forfeiture of all good; secondly, that this 
separation is from its nature final and consequently involves endless misery.489 
One of the clearest statements is from Constable, an annihilationist, who William Reid 
notes and comments upon in a chapter entitled 'Endless Punishment and Endless Sinning'. 
Reid is critical of the use of continuing sin a primary argument, but is clear that it can be 
used as a secondary argument: 
The objection has been expressed thus - "If we cannot defend man's future 
treatment as being a just reward for his present conduct, we cannot justify it at all. 
It is a piece of the coolest effrontery for us to present as a reason for God's conduct 
what God has not Himself presented when explaining to man His judicial conduct. 
Just fancy an earthly judge sentencing a criminal to a punishment too severe for the 
offence committed, and then gravely justifying the sentence by the observation that 
the criminal would be sure to deserve it all by his conduct in jail! Yet such is the 
judicature, unworthy of a Jeffreys, which learned professors of theology and 
doctors of divimty ascribe to the Judge of the whole earth! 11490 
So argues the Prebendary of Cork, and the argument is sound. We believe 
equally with him, that "the punishment of the future is for the sins of the present," 
and we have unequivocally taken this ground in treating of the demerit of sin. But 
in addition to this, and in confirmation of our position, we may surely hold, that as 
God is under no obligation to convert and sanctify a sinner, there can be no 
injustice in punishing him so long as he sins ... 491 
487 Shedd, op. cit., pp. 145-146. 
488 Ibid., p. 152. 
489 Hodge, op. cit., pp. 878-9. 
490 Constable, op. cit., p. 44. 
491 William Reid, Everlasting Punishment and Modern Speculation (Edinburgh: Oliphant, 1874), pp. 102-
103. 
A typical example from the recent debate of belief in the continuation of sin as an 
argument for the continuation of punishment is from Carson. 
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What is hard to prove, but seems to me probable, is that one reason why the 
conscious punishment of hell is ongoing is because sin is ongoing ... [H]ell' s 
inmates are full of sin. They hate and attract retribution, they still love only 
themselves and attract retribution, they are neither capable of nor desirous of 
repenting, and attract retribution. As dark as these reflections are, I suspect they go 
a long way to providing a rationale for the eternal nature of hell and its torments. 492 
One striking feature of Carson's discussion is that he judges that this argument from 
continuing sin is "probable," but "hard to prove."493 It also seems that Carson, by 
suggesting that continuing sin could provide a rationale for a traditional hell is using this 
as a primary argument. However, from the above discussion it is apparent that most 
traditionalists only use continuing sin in hell as a secondary argument, albeit an important 
one. 
The second distinction in the tradition over the continuation of sin refers to the culpability 
of the sin committed in hell. Different writers argue that the sin committed by the damned 
in hell may or may not deserve further punishment. Thus, for example, Aquinas, argues 
that sin in hell does not deserve further punishment, but is a part of the punishment itself. 
This subtle nuance is succinctly expressed by Walker: 
the damned do continue to commit evil acts, particularly by way of blasphemy; but 
these acts are due to the obstinate perversity of their will, which is part of their 
punishment, and do not therefore constitute a demerit ("mala in damnatis non sunt 
demeritoria, sed pertinent ad damnationis poenam")494 
Such a view clearly serves to undermine the continuation of sin as a primary argument. 
Further, this is not the only view amongst traditionalists and, where an opinion can be 
discerned, more seem to hold that further sin in hell does indeed deserve further 
punishment. For some ~ters this even leads to the notion of the punishment of hell 
becoming progressively severe as the sin of the damned becomes ever greater. This is 
492 Carson, Gagging, pp.533-4. See also D.A. Carson, How Long, 0 Lord? Reflections on Suffering and 
Evil (Leicester: IVP, 1991 ), pp. 102-103. 
493 Ibid., p. 533. , 
494 Walker, op. cit., p. 23. Walker footnotes Aquinas, op. cit., 2a 2ae, q.13, a.4; Suppl. Q. 98, a.6. It is 
noteworthy that part of the argument Aquinas uses has similarities to Blocher's understanding of the fixity 
of the damned. "For all are agreed that after the judgement day there will be neither merit nor demerit. 
The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil: 
and after the day of judgement good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there 
will no further addition to good or evil. Consequently ... evil will in the damned not be a demerit but a 
punishment only." [Ibid., Q. 98, a.6.] 
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suggested by Edwards, who is countering the argument that the punishment of the damned 
will lead to their reform: 
[If] they shall go on in such wickedness ... how desperately will their guilt be 
increased! How many thousand times more guilty at the end of the term, than at 
the beginning! And therefore they will be much more the proper objects of divine 
severity, deserving God's wrath, and still a thousand times more severe or longer 
continued chastisements than the past. .. 495 
On this view hell is dynamic, not in the sense of the damned being able to repent, but in 
their worsening sin and resultant severer punishment. Shedd also argues that there is a 
decline into greater sinfulness: "wicked will intensifies itself perpetually. Pride, left to 
itself, increases and never diminishes. Enmity and hatred become more and more 
satanic. ,,496 Constable writes of this as "a theory which describes eternity as entering down 
an endless course of increasing sin calling for endlessly increasing punishment. "497 Garratt 
also notes a further element of this: 'traditional view' is the deepening mutual corruption 
of the damned, " ... the contamination of those less depraved by association with those 
more depraved, and a seething mass of corruption becoming worse and worse to 
everlasting ages. ,,49s By way of conclusion, I will quote Garratt who articulates what he 
calls "the traditional view."499 
Peter Lombard was the real author of the traditional view, or at all events it was by 
him reduced into a system. The doctrine of the Schoolmen as formulated in his 
Summa Theologiae was this, that punishment and sin will both go on for ever, the 
punishment having no corrective power, and in consequence of continued sin 
continually increasing; ... 500 
I now tum to my second task, to survey the 'no sin' position in the tradition. The tradition 
for the continuation of sin in hell is strong, and certainly qualifies as the mainstream 
tradition, and the 'no sin' position might seem to be a relatively rare one. However, 
Blocher, who adopts a ~no sin' position, suggests that the view of a uniform tradition of 
continuing sin in hell may be a distortion, and that his own position "may be nearer to 
older orthodoxy than nineteenth and twentieth century emphases.11501 Blocher claims that 
neither Augustine nor Calvin may have held that sin continued in hell. Blocher's main 
witness from the tradition is Augustine: 
495 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 518. 
496 Shedd, op. cit., p. 147. 
497 Constable, op. cit., p. 153. 
498 Ibid., p. 204. 
499 Garratt, World, p. 197. 
soo Ibid., pp. 204-5, footnoting Peter Lombard, Sentent. Lib. Iv. , Distinct. 1. 
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Speaking of the final division between the Two Cities, the two categories of 
people, [Augustine] writes: 'The former shall have no longer any desire, the latter 
any ability, to sin.' ... Whether the total absence of any facultas peccandi amounts, 
for him, to agreement with God, to reconciliation in the sense of Colossians 1 :20, 
is not clear. But we would claim that it is logically entailed: for a man to disagree 
with God is to sin, and to do so anew at every moment; Saint Augustine has 
discerned that it cannot be any more, the facultas [peccandi] is no longer there. 502 
Leckie draws a similar conclusion about Augustine from a consideration of the following 
theological bind he believes Augustine's theology drove him into. 
If we ask how he could believe that evil had no real existence, and yet that it was 
certainly immortal, the answer is that he did not affirm the eternity of sin, but only 
of punishment. It is true that he did not explicitly deny that sin will last for ever. 
But we do not find in The City of God any suggestion that he thought of the future 
state as one in which men continue in active rebellion against the Most High. The 
moral history of a man was ended when he was condemned at the Judgement; and 
eternity was, for him, only a perpetual reaping of the harvest he had sown in this 
earthly life; it was a state of simple retribution. 503 
Another surprising advocate of a 'no sin' position is Candlish. The surprise is that 
Candlish is one of the chief critics of Birks, who is in tum also an advocate of this 
position. Candlish responds to Birks' own understanding of Candlish's position, stating 
that "we do not say, as [Birks] would insinuate, that [Candlish's position was] "the 
purpose of God's government is to stereotype and etemalise active rebellion against 
God.""504 Rather, Candlish claims that he simply doesn't dogmatise about it. He then 
adds that the whole notion of rebellion is a false import. 
Some rash and rude religious terrorists, borrowing from the Church of Rome, 
and importing into Protestant teaching orally, the horrid sight exhibited at 
Antwerp and elsewhere, - let the poets, also, the Italian Dante, and even our own 
Milton, share the responsibility, - may be quoted as uttering things that should be 
held to be unutterable, as regards the future destiny of the finally lost. To fasten 
upon these exceptional instances is unworthy of this Protestant clergyman, and 
unfair to us who are his fellow Protestants. 505 
Candlish' s comments suggest that the continuing sin is not only wrong, seemingly 
because of the problem of dualism it raises, but also 'exceptional', though influential on 
501 Blocher, op. cit., p. 304. 
502 Ibid., p. 305. 
503 Leckie, op. cit., p. 123. The argument here seems to be that because sin leads ultimately to a natural 
extinction, and yet hell is believed to be unending, it implies that there must be no continuing sin. 
504 Candlish, Tendencies in Connection with the Doctrine of Future Punishment: Being Principal 
Candlish 's Introductory Lecture at the Opening of the Session 1869-70, in the New College, Edinburgh 
(James Nisbet: London, 1870), p. 12. 
505 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
Catholics in particular. However, I think that this is to significantly underestimate the 
influence of the doctrine. 
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A particularly original form of this view, that holds that hell is unending torment, but that 
there is an end to sin, was proposed by T.R. Birks. Birks was a prominent Evangelical and 
successor to F .D. Maurice as Professor of Moral Philosophy at London, and subsequently 
he held a professorship at Cambridge. Rowell writes of Birks "Although he could not be 
described as an outstanding scholar, he was definitely to be ranked amongst the leaders of 
Evangelicalism, and the young Gerard Manley Hopkins could describe him in 1864 as 
'almost the only learned Evangelical going'. 11506 Birks' "major statement of his position11507 
was The Victory of Divine Goodness. 508 I will discuss Birks' position, and that of other 
writers who hold a similar position such as Langton Clarke and James Orr, below. A brief 
questioning of the tradition of continuing sin in hell, in the recent debate, is found in Paul 
Helm's book The Last Things. Helm writes: 
those in hell recognise hell for what it is and the justice of their being there. 
Otherwise hell would be a breeding ground for further injustice and resentment, 
for further sin. For although hell is a place of sinners, there is no reason to think 
that it is a heaven for sinners, a fools' paradise ... So hell is a place of pain, but not 
of defiance or resistance. 509 
Third, I turn to the views of annihilationists on the issue of continuing sin in hell. Fudge is 
unusual in addressing this issue. He does so by drawing on the arguments of Constable 
from the nineteenth century, which I have noted above. 
Henry Constable responded to this type of argument [ for the continuation of sin] 
by pointing out that (1) Scripture never suggests any such idea as sin in hell but (2) 
specifically states over and over that future punishment is for deeds "done in the 
body" during the present life in this age. "Just fancy an earthly judge sentencing a 
criminal to a punishment too severe for the offence committed, and then gravely 
justifying his sentence by the observation the criminal would be sure to deserve it 
all by his conduct in gaol!"510 
Constable's analogy in the final sentence, also quoted by Reid above, only serves as an 
argument against the primary form of the continuing sin argument, which is not the way 
that it is stated by most traditionalists, even if it does sometimes seem to function as a 
506 Rowell, op. cit., p. 124, quoting from C.C. Abbott (ed.), Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
1956, p. 18 (6 June 1864). Rowell discusses Birks over several pages (pp. 123-129). 
507 Rowell, op. cit., p. 124. 
5os B' k . lf S, op. Cit .. 
509 Helm, op. cit., p. 114. 
510 Fudge, op. cit., p. 181, n. 57, quoting Constable, op. cit., pp. 107-109. Quotation on p. 109. 
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primary argument as a way of avoiding the problem of justifying unending punishment for 
sin committed in this life. However, Constable's arguments would undermine the 
argument in either form. Thus Fudge, following Constable, ends up taking a position 
similar to Blocher at this point. One might have expected all annihilationists to be clearly 
in favour of the notion of an end to sin, since the continuation of culpable sin in hell is an 
obvious argument for Traditionalism, as Stott recognises. Put the other way, 
Annihilationism necessarily excludes the notion of continuing sin in hell for which the 
sinner deserves further punishment, unless it is argued that extinction was the punishment 
for some or all sins committed in hell. However no one argues this. 
3.5.1.2 Arguments for the 'Continuing Sin' Position 
Having briefly surveyed the debate about sin in hell in the tradition, in this section I will 
first examine the arguments for and against the continuing sin position. It is necessary to 
establish that the 'no sin in hell' position is at least reasonable, in order to offer this form 
of modified Traditionalism as a more adequate response to the annihilationist charge of 
excessive dualism. In fact I will argue that the 'no sin' position is not just reasonable, but 
should be accepted, on the basis of the arguments in favour of it. 
In turning to the arguments for the continuing sin position, Blocher notes several and 
responds to them. As well as noting these, I will expand on them, and also add other 
additional reasons, as well as my own response. The first reason Blocher gives, and with 
no further exposition, is that "Psychological considerations on habit and hardening eclipse 
all other arguments."511 His point seems to be that without the intervention of Divine grace 
the damned have no power to change their habitual sinfulness which they exhibited on 
earth. Therefore they will continue to sin, because there has been nothing to change them 
or prevent them. Blocher cites no examples, but one such is Shedd: 
Another reason for the endlessness of sin is the bondage of the sinful will ... a man 
is not forced to sin, but if he does, he cannot of himself get back to where he was 
before sinning ... The effect of vicious habit in dii;ninishing man's ability to resist 
temptation is proverbial ... The culmination of this bondage is seen in the next 
life ... the guilty free agent reaches that dreadful condition where resistance to evil 
ceases altogether, and surrender to evil becomes demonical.512 
511 Blocher, op. cit., p. 301. 
512 Shedd, op. cit., pp. 148-150. 
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Another example is Strong: 
Upon the correct view of the will which we have advocated, ... the sinful soul, in 
its very sinning, gives to itself a sinful bent of intellect, affection, and will; in other 
words, makes for itself a character, which, though it does not render necessary, yet 
does render certain, apart from divine grace, the continuance of sinful action."513 
Again, "habit begets fixity of character, and in the spiritual world sinful acts, often 
repeated, produce a permanent state of sin, which the soul, unaided, cannot 
change.514 
In response I would note that the Last Judgement may provide just such a moment of 
intervention, even if not of grace, to break the pattern of sin. This is certainly what Blocher 
argues below. 
Second, Blocher notes A.H. Strong's only exegetical support for the position is his use of 
Mark 3:29, 'he is guilty of an eternal sin,' but states that "it is easy to understand this word 
as guilt remaining, not as sin being constantly reproduced"515 Blocher concludes that "the 
thesis of continuing sin is found nowhere in Scripture."516 
Third, Blocher notes a theological reason given by Hodge, which is drawn from the 
damned's alienation and separation from God. Since "God is the source of all holiness and 
happiness, separation from Him is of necessity the forfeiture of all good," which entails 
sinfulness. 517 Blocher own response is that, 
This reasoning, however, is not strictly conclusive. It does not take into account the 
complexity of 'separation'; orthodoxy has to maintain that the lost, in the final state, 
still depend metaphysically on God, and have in him their being if they are to exist 
at all. Even in life, we say they are separated from God, 'without God in the world,' 
and, yet, the very energy of their sinning, at every instant is given them by God. 
Hodge's logic, then, does not envisage the possibility of another relationship to 
God, in judgement, that will exclude both fellowship and active sinfulness ... 518 
I would also add that Hodge's argument, as stated, achieves too much. If existence is a 
good, and all good is forfeited at the judgment of separation, then this would mean the loss 
of existence. 
513 Strong, op. cit., p. 1041. 
514 Ibid., p. 1049. 
515 Blocher, op. cit., p. 301. , 
516 Ibid., p. 302. Although I am not addressing exegetical issues in this thesis, it is interesting to note that 
in the nineteenth century debate there are only three passages that are quoted frequently to argue for 
ongoing sin in hell: Luke 16:23-28; Revelation 20:7-8 and 22:11. Carson, in a briefcomment on Blocher's 
thesis, also quotes Revelation 20: 10-11 as a reason for rejecting the position, and adds Revelation 16:21. 
[Carson, Gagging, p. 533]. 
517 Charles Hodge, op. cit., p. 879. Quoted in Blocher, op. cit., p. 302. 
518 Blocher, op. cit., p. 302. [Italics original.] 
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Fourth, a further objection, which Blocher doesn't mention, is that sin has only truly ceased 
if the damned have repented, since the failure to repent is itself a sin. However, if the 
damned have repented then they should be forgiven and taken to heaven, in which case 
Blocher' s position collapses into Universalism. In response, I would argue that failure to 
repent is only a new sin if repentance remains a command of God with the concomitant 
ability of the damned to fulfil it. However, as I argued in the previous chapter when 
discussing fixity, death and the Last Judgement mark the end of the possibility of 
repentance, and indeed all moral change. Therefore the failure to repent is not a new sin 
committed by the damned worthy of further punishment. A similar objection is suggested 
by Carson, who asks: "are we to imagine that the lost in hell love God with heart and soul 
and mind and strength, and their neighbours as themselves? If not, they are breaking the 
first and second commandments. Are they full of spontaneous worship and praise?"519 Put 
more succinctly, Carson is arguing that since the damned are not living perfectly in hell 
they are therefore guilty of continued sin. However, I would suggest that these are not new 
acts of sins committed by the damned, but simply the state they are in. Thus, as I will 
argue at length below when discussing the damned being reconciled, it is conceivable that 
in hell the damned are capable of pleasing God, and even loving him, as fully as they are 
then able without doing so in the same way as the blessed. Further, there is a difference 
here between the position of Carson who is highlighting sin as falling short of perfection, 
and the tradition I have highlighted where the damned continue to desire to rebel. It is this 
element of desire to sin which Blocher is primarily rejecting, and it may be that one can 
agree with Carson about the damned's failure to be perfect, while agreeing with the 
broader thesis that the damned don't continue to desire to sin. 
An unsatisfactory attempt to avoid this objection is made by Constable who argues there is 
no sin in hell because there is no law in hell. 
It may be fairly questioned whether, according to any principles of divine or 
human law, the lost in hell are capable of sinning. We deny that they are. "Sin is 
the transgression of the law," St. John tells us; and Paul lays down this great 
principle of equity, "Where no law is, there is no ttansgression."520 We deny that 
those who are denied all the benefits of law, and subjected to its greatest and final 
penalty, are ever considered as under the law, or capable of incurring any fresh 
519 Carson, Gagging, p. 534. 
520 1 John 3:4; Romans 4:15. 
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guilt for its infraction ... In a word, as the saved will be raised above the possibility 
of sinning; so the lost will be sunk below it. 521 
However, I think that a lawless hell increases the problems of the justice of hell, and the 
dualism of hell, since the damned can defy God with impunity. William Reid, in the 
nineteenth century debate, devotes a whole chapter ( of 8 pages), entitled "Endless 
Punishment and Endless Sinning", to critique the notion of an end to sin, which he 
examines in the form articulated by Constable. He comments on this argument and asks a 
series of questions, rightly expecting a negative answer. 
But are [ the damned] really "out of and beyond all law?" When devils disowned 
their allegiance, did they escape from their responsibility? Souls in hell, are under 
the same obligation to love God, that are souls in heaven; and the one are still as 
certainly as are the other, the subjects of moral government. Will any pretend that 
God cannot maintain a moral government in hell ?522 
Fifth, Reid uses the parallel between the damned and demons to argue that there is sin in 
hell: "The doings of demoniacs recorded in the Gospels, the doings of the arch-spirit of 
evil, show that sin extends its deceitfulness and malignity even to hell itself. "523 This 
argument from the sin of demons in hell is his main criticism, which he repeats several 
times. My response to Reid's argument is that it overlooks the fact that the present 
punishment of the demons is only provisional, and they will face a further punishment 
after the Last Judgement. Therefore, even if the demons do provide an analogy to the state 
of humans in hell, the analogy should be with the demons in their final state. In that final 
state I think that Blocher's argument about Divine patience, below, would apply equally to 
the demons as to humans: that the permission of sin in this life does not mean that it will 
be extended into eternity. Reid explicitly denies this, but I think that his case is 
unconvincing, being more of a statement than an argument: 
Now, we are aware of no ground on which to conclude that it will be different in 
the future. Death is not a moral, but a physical change ... Are we, then, to expect a 
reverse of our nature - an entire change in His method of dealing with us, when we 
have passed into the spiritual world? It would be as reasonable to expect a 
revolution in the Divine moral administration. 524 
However, there will be such a significant change at the Last Judgment. I conclude that the 
arguments for continuing sin in hell are not compelling. 
521 Constable, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 
522 Reid, op. cit., p. I 03. 
523 Reid, op. cit., pp. 104, 105, 109. 
524 Ibid., p. 107. 
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3.5.1.3 Arguments for the Modified Position 
Having discussed argwnents for the continuation of sin in hell, Blocher offers several 
counter arguments in justification of his own position that there is no sin in hell, although 
they are somewhat interspersed with other points over several pages. (Some of these 
points, such as the damned being lucid, I will examine further under subsequent headings, 
although Blocher rightly believes that they also contribute to his case for an end to sin in 
hell.) First, in Scripture, "the punishment [of hell] refers only to 'things done through the 
body' (2 Cor. 5:10) ... It is the harvest of the seeds of this life."525 Given the distinctions 
which I have made, it is clear that this argwnent doesn't necessarily stand against all the 
positions holding to the continuity of sin. It certainly counters continuous sin as a primary 
argument, and as a secondary argwnent where sin is culpable, but not necessarily the 
Aquinan position that sin in hell is not culpable. However, since no traditionalist in the 
current debate makes such a distinction, Blocher's point does stand against classic 
Traditionalism in its present form. 
Second, Blocher argues from the Biblical imagery of 'fire' and the 'worm of remorse'. He 
interprets these images metaphorically of the state of the damned in scripture and 
concludes that 
This means agreement with God in his reprobation of their behaviour ... The main 
Biblical expressions, then, may refer to the reaction of the moral creature, no 
longer able to sin, when he or she becomes at last lucid ... full knowledge in self-
abhorrence, condemnation, remorse. 526 
Blocher doesn't explain why the damned would not be able to sin when they are lucid, but 
preswnably his argument would be that they would see clearly the awfulness and 
consequences of sin so. as not to be rationally able to choose to sin. 527 It could be 
responded that sin is never chosen rationally, and thus lucidity may not prevent further sin, 
but this is to overlook the purpose of the Last Judgement to force sinners to see sin for 
what it truly is. However, I will argue that the damned are not actually free to sin, even if 
they desired. I will examine this point further below under The Damned are Lucid . 
525 Blocher, op. cit., p. 302. 
526 Ibid, p. 307. 
527 This is a disputed point, but Tony Gray supports the notion that a persol). cannot freely and rationally 
choose hell, once its nature is clear, where hell is understood to be a place of continuing sin. See Tony 
Gray, "Post-Mortem Evangelism: A Response to R.R. Cook," in Tyndale Bulletin 4611 (1995). 
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Third, Blocher argues from what he calls "the weightiest datum of all. The theory of sin 
forever flourishing ignores the message of Christ's perfect victory over sin and all evil." (I 
will examine this below under The Damned are Reconciled.) 
Fourth, Blocher argues from the idea of divine patience, which he presents as 
"confirmation" of this position. 
Would it be normal for God to allow for sin to go on for ever since he allows it 
now? That logic appears to by-pass entirely the Biblical theme of divine patience. 
Is not the point that God tolerates at present what he will no longer when his 
patience comes to an end?528 
Further, "what is abnormal, incredible, is not that God should suppress sin - rather, that he 
should not do so immediately! ... When the time of patience falls due, sin can be no 
more. "529 Thus Blocher concludes that "the main axes of the eschatological vision 
unfolded in Scripture, encourage us boldly to profess this assurance. "530 Thus Blocher 
believes that the position can be affirmed with a high degree of confidence. Birks makes a 
very similar argument to Blocher's, based on the notion of God's forbearance: 
[I]t is not strange, but natural and certain, that sinners should have far less freedom 
for active wickedness under the revealed and fiery anger of God, than in the times 
of forbearance and long-suffering. The strange notion is, that under the holy eye 
and righteous hand of their Judge, they can still rebel even more freely and fiercely 
than before.531 
Fifth, Blocher raises the very issue of dualism which has prompted this discussion. 
Blocher states: "The difficulty [ of explaining evil] doubles when continuance in sin 
becomes cardinal in the fate of the lost. 11532 
Sixth, Blocher challenges the coherence of the traditional view: "There is a fatal tension in 
the thesis under scrutiny: for it affirms both the extreme of vicious rebellion and the 
sinner's approval of [God's] judgement as just. "533 I will develop this point, that the 
d~ed need to acknowledge judgement as just, further in the following section on 
528 Blocher, op. cit., p. 299. 
529 Ibid., p. 305. 
530 Ibid., p. 304. 
531 Birks, Victory, p. 249. 
532 Blocher, op. cit., p. 30 I. 
533 Ibid., p. 302. 
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lucidity. Blocher is rightly asswning that if the damned continue to sin they do not approve 
of the justice of their judgement. 
Seventh, Blocher's notion of fixity, which I examined in the previous chapter, may also 
bear on this issue, although he does not make a link. As I have shown, Blocher analyses 
the biblical idea of death and concludes with a contrast: "[Life] is ability to act and to 
project, life is sharing in exchanges; total death is isolation, paralysis, non-renewal, that is 
fixity, absolute fixity. "534 It may be that this state of fixity includes the inability to sin, 
because sin itself requires a continuing moral life, in which sin can be committed. This 
notion certainly rules out the idea of the decline of the damned in hell into greater 
sinfulness and severer punishment. 
I would also note an additional argument used in the nineteenth century debate. Thus, 
eighth, Birks argues that an end to sin is required for the punishment of hell to be 
complete. He writes, 
this punishment will be complete, not incomplete; so as not merely to confine from 
without, but to subdue and crush the rebellious will under the mighty power of 
God, revealed in judgement; so that there will be, and can be, no eternal reign of 
Satan, and no power of active mutual torment on the part of men and angels, under 
this condemnation. 535 
Again, this also relates to the issue of lucidity, which I examine below, since for a 
punishment to be just I will argue that it is necessary for it to be recognised as just by the 
one punished, and in that sense must be internalised by the damned. 
I now tum to some of the implications of accepting Bl ocher's thesis. First, the great 
strength of this view is that it helps to overcome the charge against Traditionalism of 
dualism. Blocher develops his thesis primarily as a response to this problem of dualism 
which, like many annihilationists, he believes is implicit within the usual formulations of . 
the traditionalist position. Birks, who, as I have noted, holds a view similar to Blocher's, 
writes that his view stands in "contrast to the medieval superstition, which assigns to Satan 
a rival empire to God's own dominion for evermore. "536 I~ is this problem of there seeming 
to be a rival empire for eternity which is central to the charge of P .E. Hughes and others, 
534 Ibid' p. 308. 
535 Birks, Victory, p. 229. 
536 Ibid., p. 211. 
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and which this position avoids, although I will need to examine the other elements of 
Bl ocher's position to gain a fuller picture of what this final state would be like. Second, 
Blocher's thesis removes an argument against Annihilationism, and for Traditionalism. 
Carson, as I have noted above, argues that continuing sin greatly weakens the argument for 
Annihilationism, 537 while Stott suggests it is a possible justification for Traditionalism. 538 
Although several of these points require further discussion later in this chapter, I would 
conclude in the light of that fuller discussion, that Blocher's argument at this point is 
strong and therefore persuasive. 
3.5.2 The Damned Are Lucid 
I now tum to a second element ofBlocher's thesis: that the damned will be 'lucid', by 
which Blocher means that they are fully aware of the justice of their punishment. While 
Blocher doesn' t draw this as a separate conclusion, it does serve as a premise for the 
notion of 'reconciliation' which I will examine in the next section. The link is that if the 
damned realise the nature of their sin against God and the justice of his judgement and 
punishment of them, it is a short step to argue that they praise God for his justice, which 
is a central feature of reconciliation as Blocher understands it. Blocher writes: " ... all 
creatures will share in God's abhorrence; the lost will be ashamed, theirs will be the 
ultimate 'confusion of face', as they shall be unable to escape the truth of their past 
actions. "539 As I noted above, summarising a discussion about the biblical language of 
"fire" and the "worm of remorse," Blocher comments, 
The main Biblical expressions, then, may refer to the reaction of the moral 
creature, no longer able to sin, when he or she becomes at last lucid. Then, 
impenitent sinners appreciate the value of their lives and see them as they are, 
under God's reprobation. "540 Again: " ... sinners ultimately glorify God ... And they 
know it, since they now see the truth of their lives; they see their evil works -
which they now abhor - as included in God's plan, by his permissive will, and used 
for his purposes ... their thought is fixed in the knowledge that, through their very 
deprivation, they glorify God and agree with him. 541 
Bloc4er thus argues that the damned will not remain deluded or successful in their 
rebellion. 
537 Carson, How Long, p. 103. 
538 Stott, op. cit., p. 319. 
539 Blocher, op. cit., p. 307. 
540 Ibid., p. 307. 
541 Ibid., p. 310. 
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In the tradition lucidity is also widely held. Shedd notes: 
The sinner's own conscience will "bear witness" and approve of the condemning 
sentence, "in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ" 
(Rom. 2:16) ... Accordingly, all the evangelical creeds say with the Westminster 
Larger Catechism (89) that "the wicked, upon clear evidence and full conviction of 
their own consciences, shall have the just sentence of condemnation pronounced 
against them. 542 
Jonathan Edwards argues that those in hell will have a keener sense of the glories of 
God than those on earth. 
Multitudes that are now in hell, will have ideas of the external glory that pertains 
to things heavenly, far beyond whatever any have in this world. They will see all 
that external glory and beauty, in which Christ will appear at the day of 
judgement, when the sun will be turned into darkness before him; which, 
doubtless, will be ten thousand times greater than ever was impressed on the 
imagination of either saints or sinners in the present state, or ever was conceived 
by any mortal man. 543 
More recently, Peter Toon has written: 
This loss of heaven will be most tormenting because their understandings will be 
cleared to know their loss, their consciences will make them fully aware of their 
guilt, and their affections will be no longer be stupefied. The memory of their past 
lives and how they offended God will ever be before them and they will fully 
recognise the enormity of their sin. 544 
The chief argument in favour of this position is, I believe, that it establishes the justice of 
the punishment of the damned. If retributive punishment is to be just then the one 
punished must be aware and convinced that their actions are deserving of the punishment 
they are given. Thus Blamires argues: " ... if punishment is effective it makes the punished 
one aware of why he is being punished, and what it is he is being paid for. "545 This 
argument seems to be the primary reason why the tradition also holds to the lucidity of the 
damned. Thus, for example, Jonathan Edwards makes a similar point when he writes, 
It is agreeable both to Scripture and reason to suppose, that the wicked will be 
punished in such a manner, that they shall be sensible of the punishment they are 
under; ... They should know themselves that justice takes place upon them; that 
God vindicates that majesty which they despised; that God is not so despicable a 
being as they thought him to be. 546 
542 Shedd, op. cit., p. 140. 
543 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 46. 
544 Toon, op. cit., p. 169. 
545 Blamires, op. cit., p. 32. 
546 Edwards, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 84. 
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The legal principle on which this is based is stated by Aquinas: "in every judicial hearing, 
the witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the matter on which 
judgement has to be pronounced."547 Aquinas believes that this principle is so important 
that he goes to great lengths to establish that the damned are able to be so acquainted with 
their sin. Thus in response to the objection that "It seems that after the resurrection 
everyone will not be able to know all the sins he has committed, "548 Aquinas proposes a 
temporary supernatural increase of the powers of the damned. He begins his reply with a 
reference to Augustine. "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xx) that a kind of 
Divine energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to mind. "549 
Later, when discussing whether all merits and demerits will be seen in an instant, Aquinas 
writes: "But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents itself, since their intellect is 
not raised so that they can see God and all else in Him." Aquinas accepts that the lucidity 
of the damned is less than that of the righteous, but in order to establish the notion that the 
damned are adequately lucid about their sin, he argues that while the damned do not see in 
an instant, as the righteous do, they do see very rapidly with supernatural assistance: 
"[T]hey will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine 
power coming to their aid. "550 
However, it is arguable that in order to understand sin it is not simply a case of bare 
cognition but also of some degree of moral commitment. Thus, in order to understand 
sin, which is ultimately an offence against God, conscience must play a role. This is 
precisely what Dale argues. Dale is clear that only a moral being can conceive of 
punishment. " [ A sinner] certainly cannot be made to feel that he is being punished 
except through his conscience. It is through his conscience that he belongs to the moral 
world and can conceive such an idea as that of punishment; ... "551 Dale also links this 
idea to the doctrine of hell when he states that, "something tells us that we ought to 
suffer for what we have done. When joined with the inklings of God's displeasure, this 
547 Aquinas, op. cit., Q. 87, Art. 1. However there are limitations to .this knowledge, since Aquinas argues 
that the damned cannot see God, understood as the Beatific Vision, because to do so would necessarily 
bringjoy. [Ibid, Q. 90, Art. 3.] 
548 Ibid., Q. 87, Art. 1, Obj. 1. 
549 Ibid, Q. 87, Art. 1, Obj. 1. 
sso Ibid, Q. 87, Art. 3. 
m R.W. Dale, The Atonement (7th ed., London: Congregational Union of England and Wales, 1895), p. 
215. 
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sense of things is the start ofhell."552 Dale also explains the problem for conscience that 
sin brings: 
Sin is invariably followed by a deterioration of our moral and spiritual nature ... 
By wrongdoing we become less able to discriminate between good and evil, and 
those forces of our nature which refuse to listen to the voice of duty are 
strengthened in their revolt; the sensibility of conscience is diminished, and the 
authority of conscience is impaired. 553 
Therefore if the damned are to be able to understand sin truly they must cease sinning. 
However, Blocher notes that traditionalists such as Shedd also hold that the damned 
continue to sin in hell, as indeed do each of the writers quoted above. Blocher objects, 
There is a fatal tension in the thesis under scrutiny: for it affirms both the extreme 
of vicious rebellion and the sinner's approval of his judgement as just. How can 
Shedd both write: 'It is pure wickedness, without regret or sorrow'?554 and 'The 
sinner's own conscience will "bear witness" and approve of the condemning 
sentence,' as the Westminster Larger Catechism specifies, 'upon evidence and full 
conviction of their consciences'?555 Conscience is the man conscious! Conscience 
would be suppressed by total sin! It is not possible to associate them, as Shedd 
suggests, as 'brimstone and fire'. 556557 
To note just one other example, which raises the related issue of sanity, Packer writes of 
"The words used by theologians, on the basis of Scripture, to describe hell - ... 
introversion to the point of idiocy ... "558 I think that Blocher' s criticism of tradition at this 
point is valid, as far as it goes. However Blocher slightly simplifies the tradition at this 
point, and therefore to more securely establish this argument I will add an extra step to it. 
Blocher has failed to note that the tradition tends to introduce a chronological distinction 
between the two states of lucidity and continuing sin: the damned are forced to be lucid at 
the Last Judgement, but are then thrown into hell where they continue in sin in 'pure 
wickedness, without regret or sorrow'. Therefore Blocher needs to argue in two steps to 
establish his criticism, the second being the additional one. First, the damned cannot both 
sin and recognise the justice of their judgement. This is recognised by the tradition when it 
argues for special conditions to prevail at the Last Judgement to enable the damned to 
apprehend, and presumably accept, the full extent of their sin and the justice of their 
552 Ibid., p. 30. 
553 Ibid., p. 330. 
554 Shedd, op. cit., p. 155. 
555 Ibid., p. 140. 
556 Ibid., p. 151. 
557 Blocher, op. cit. , pp. 302-3. . 
558 J.I.-Packer, Knowing Christianity (Guildford: Eagle, 1995), p.186. The words are taken from Packer, 
Problem, op. cit., p.14. 
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judgement. Second, it is necessary for the damned to continue to apprehend and accept the 
justice of their judgement, and therefore they can not change their state after the Last 
Judgement and begin to sin again. The requirement for this continued acceptance of the 
justice of their punishment could be argued in various ways. First, one could argue simply 
that the required conditions for a just punishment remain equally valid through the length 
of the punishment. Two illustrations exemplify this. If someone is punished by 
imprisonment, and accepts the justice of their sentence, but then under the strain of the 
punishment goes mad and begins to imagine that they are actually in a pleasurable state, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the punishment was no longer effective qua 
punishment. 559 Second, someone might be imprisoned for manslaughter after someone 
died due to their negligence. However, if during their punishment they came to believe 
that in fact the death had not been their fault, they would begin to view the punishment 
very differently, no longer as just but unjust. Again, one could conclude that the 
punishment was no longer effective as retributive punishment because the prisoner no 
longer accepted the justice of their punishment. Thus, in both cases, the effectiveness of 
the retributive punishment changes if the initial conditions of the one punished are not 
maintained. A second argument for the continued acceptance of the justice of their 
punishment is that the rejection of the justice of God's judgement is to impugn his 
goodness, and is therefore sin. However, if the damned do not continue to sin, then they 
cannot so sin! A third argument is that the change from lucidity to sin in the tradition 
assumes that the damned are able to change after the Last Judgement. Any such change is 
ruled out if one accepts the arguments for the fixity of the damned. 
However, even if Blocher' s response to Shedd's argument for some sort of lucidity and 
total sin is held to be successful, this may not mean that he has established that justice is 
irreconcilable with any sin at all. Shedd holds that the damned become increasingly more 
sinful in hell 'Ulltil they end up in a state of "pure wickedness." It could thus be argued that 
even if "Conscience would be suppressed by total sin" and ''pure wickedness" it need not 
559 Here I disagree with Chan who counters a similar argument based upon the preference of the damned: 
"Pinnock and Stott may well argue that if people choose to go to hell, they could not properly be said to 
be punished. Can a prisoner be said to be punished ifhe enjoys being in prison? But this confuses the 
psychological state which accompanies punishment with the objectivity of the penalty itself. To be shut 
out of the totally real is an objective punishment, even when the shutting Ol!t is freely chosen. Reality will 
judge that person as existing in a pathetic state even ifhe may not think so." [Chan, art. cit., p. 30.] I think 
that Chan has failed to take account of the need for lucidity for a punishment to be fully retributive. 
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be so by partial sin. I think that Blocher has chosen an extreme position in Shedd, although 
one shared by others such as Charles Hodge. 560 I would argue that not only does the 
principle hold for this extreme position, but that it also applies for less extreme situations. 
Thus, the more the damned sin the less they would be able to comprehend the justice of 
their penalty, and the more partial would be their ackn~wledgement of the justice of the 
punishment. Jonathan Edwards mentions three factors established by the lucidity of the 
damned about their punishment, in the quote above. Each of these three factors would 
seem to be diminished if the damned continue to sin and thus remain in rebellion against 
God: they would not consider their punishment totally just; they would not fully 
acknowledge the majesty of God; and they would think God partially despicable. Further, 
as I will argue in the next section, it would limit the sense in which the damned could be 
reconciled with God. Therefore, I would maintain that the most just situation is one in 
which the damned do not sin. 
In turning to assess potential problems with this 'no sin' thesis, I begin with the main 
reason that this position is rejected in the tradition: because remorse is held to amount to 
repentance, and repentance would result in salvation. An example of this criticism, that the 
damned in being lucid about their sin and the justice of its punishment have thereby 
fulfilled the conditions of penitence which should lead to release, is from Michael 
Paternoster, for whom this is his chief criticism ofT.R. Birks. Paternoster concludes, 
"Birks has, illogically, turned hell into purgatory and yet maintained its eternity. "561 It is 
also Ellis' one criticism: "But as an Augustinian-Calvinist, Blocher should recognize that if 
their remorse is a 'godly sorrow' it is the product of the Holy Spirit in His work of 
redemption; if only a remorse that they were caught and judged, that remorse continues to 
be sin."562 Blocher responds with two steps that I think are distinct, distinguishing firstly 
remorse in this life and in the life to come, and secondly remorse and repentance. 
But fihal remorse differs from remorse as it is experienced in life: final remorse 
will be remorse-in-agreement with God. In life ... only repentance agrees with God; 
remorse remains a twisted and truncated apprehension of the truth of one's deeds. 
Will not, then, final truthful remorse amount to repentance? ... the deepest 
difference between remorse and repentance is this: repentance has afuture, it 
enters the open future; remorse relates only to the past. 563 
560 See Hodge, op. cit., pp. 877f. 
561 Paternoster, op. cit., p. 103. 
562 Ellis in Brower and Elliot, op. cit., p.216, n.79. 
563 Blocher, op. cit., p. 307. [Italics original] 
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Of course a simple response is to deny that the damned have any freedom of choice in hell, 
and this is the option that Blocher also takes by arguing for moral 'fixity' in hell. Leckie 
attributes a similar position to Augustine, and notes a similar response. Augustine faces 
the additional difficulty in that he believes that the damned have some "essential 
goodness" in virtue of their mere continued existence: 
If, again, we inquire how Augustine could be sure that the lost, while remaining 
essentially good would yet never repent, the reply is that this conclusion followed 
from his belief that moral life, in the case of the unregenerate, did not go on 
beyond the grave. They were destined by the decree of God to enter a condition of 
spiritual paralysis, and to have no consciousness beyond that of consuming pain, 
physical and mental. And beings who existed in such a state were, of course, 
incapable of repentance. 564 
Another difficulty is to determine the degree of moral awareness the damned are capable 
of. If the righteous are the ones who are most clearly aware of the horror of sin, it raises 
the question of whether the damned have a true perception. Moberly writes, "The evidence 
of the saints suggests that realisation of the horror of sin is proportional to holiness ... it is 
the holy one who suffers. "565 Thus the unrighteous are less aware of the horror of sin. This 
raises the question of whether the punishment of the damned can be fully retributive, 
because they cannot have a full appreciation of the seriousness of their sin. At least two 
lines of response are possible. First, the damned can comprehend the justice of their 
punishment in an adequate though not necessarily total way. An analogy might be that a 
child may not understand fully why it is wrong to tell lies, but it may still know that it 
deserves a smack if it does so. Second, the damned could be supernaturally endowed, 
which is the line Aquinas took, as I noted above. Edwards also writes about such 
supernatural endowment, which could be adapted for this argument: "Besides, their 
capacity will probably b~ enlarged, their understandings will be quicker and stronger in a 
future state; and God can give them as great a sense and as strong an impression of 
eternity, as he pleases, to increase their grief and torment. "566 I would argue that even God 
cannot give a finite creature a complete "impression of eternity," although it may be that 
Edwards means that the damned can have an adequate impression, understood as the 
fullest impression a finite creature is capable of. However, the purpose of these quotes is to 
establish that there is in the tradition an existing argument for the supernatural lucidity of 
564 Leckie, op. cit., p. 124. 
565 Moberly, op. cit., p. 347. 
566 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 88, col. 2. 
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the damned, and Blocher's thesis could use this. For the defence of Blocher's position it is 
simply required to make this supernatural endowment permanent rather than temporary. 
There are several strengths to Blocher' s position. Blocher himself mentions one advantage 
to do with degrees of punishment: 
The model accommodates easily and economically other elements of the doctrine 
of everlasting punishment: not only the reference to the deeds done through the 
body (with the harvest metaphor), but also the diversity in degrees (few stripes, 
many stripes). There can be no proportion more exact to guilt than that of seeing 
oneself in the light of truth. 567 
However, the greatest strength of this notion of the lucidity of the damned is that it offers a 
more satisfactory response to the problem of dualism than the continuing sin form of 
Traditionalism. C.S. Lewis offers an excellent discussion of this issue when he considers 
an evil man who considers himself righteous. Lewis writes of 
. . . a truly ethical demand that, soon or late, the right should be asserted, the flag 
planted in this horribly rebellious soul, even if no fuller and better conquest is to 
follow. In a sense, it is better for the creature itself, even if it never becomes good, 
that it should know itself a failure, a mistake. Even mercy can hardly wish to such 
a man his eternal, contented continuance in such ghastly illusion. Thomas Aquinas 
said of suffering, as Aristotle had said of shame, that it was a thing not good in 
itself, but a thing which might have a certain goodness in particular circumstances. 
That is to say, if evil is present, pain at recognition of the evil, being a kind of 
knowledge, is relatively good; for the alternative is that the soul should be ignorant 
of the evil, or ignorant that the evil is contrary to its nature, "either of which", says 
the philosopher, "is manifestly bad". And I think, though we tremble, we agree.568 
Blamires makes a similar point to Lewis when he argues that love does not want people 
to be deceived into thinking they are good when they are not. 569 I think that this 
argument that evil recognised is a good is correct. Therefore if the damned will not 
recognise their evil if they continue to sin, they cannot achieve this relative good, and thus 
the classic traditionalist position is dualistic where Blocher' s modified position is not. 
However, an annihilationist could agree with the value of lucidity and incorporate it into 
their position, and still claim that their position is a better resolution of the problem of 
dualism. Indeed I have argued that annihilationists are probably required to reject any 
notion of continuing sin for which further punishment is deserved. I will argue below 
567 Blocher, op. cit., p. 310. 
568 Lewis, Problem, p. 110, quoting Aquinas, op. cit., I, Iiae, Q. 39, Art. I. [Italics Original]. However this 
his vision does not seem to be as clearly maintained in The Great Divorce [London: Geoffrey Bies, 1945], 
where there does seem to be the continuation of 'ghastly illusions'. 
569 Blaniires, "Eternal Weight," art. cit., p. 6,9. 
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under the head 'The Reconciliation of the Damned' that Bl ocher's full position is a better 
resolution of the problem of dualism than Annihilationism. 
I have also argued above that if sin continues in hell then there is no recognition of the full 
justice of their judgement by the damned, and this itself makes their judgement not fully 
retributive and therefore unjust. The lucidity of the damned therefore ensures the justice of 
their judgment. Further, lucidity also serves to emphasise the poena damni, the pain of loss 
and exclusion, since the damned are now more fully aware of what it is they have lost and 
are excluded from. From this it follows that there is no 'black pleasure' 570 for them in hell. 
Also this notion also serves to correct what Harmon rightly judges to be a weakness in the 
tradition: "The one image which is so terribly neglected in the debate between 
conditionalists and traditionalists, and which has been inadequately considered in church 
history, is that of personal exclusion."571 This discussion also serves to provide an answer 
to an objection I will encounter more fully in the next section: that such lucidity would 
reduce the awfulness of hell. One possible aspect of this objection is that, as Aquinas 
argued and I noted above, to see God is to be blessed, and lucidity involves a clearer vision 
of God. In response I want to argue that in fact lucidity results in hell being both more and 
less awful depending on the criteria used. Such a hell will be more awful because the 
damned will have no escape from the poena damni. Edwards, for example, argues that 
such lucidity about God's holiness and their sinfulness would increase the awfulness of 
hell. Edwards writes, 
Natural conscience is not extinguished in the damned in hell; but on the contrary, 
remains there in its greatest strength, and is brought to its most perfect exercise; 
most fully to do its proper office as God's viceregent in the soul, to condemn 
those rebels against the King of heaven and earth, and manifest God's just wrath 
and vengeance, _and by that means to torment them, and be as a never-dying 
~orm within them. Wretched men find means in this world to blind the eyes and 
stop the mouth of this viceregent of a sin-revenging God; but they shall not be 
able to do it always. In another world, the eyes and mouth of conscience will be 
fully opened. God will hereafter make wicked men to see and know these things 
from which now they industriously hide their eyes, ... 572 
570 Lewis, Problem, p. 114. 
571 Harmon, Case, pp. 216-217. I disagree with some of Harmon's application of this point. He goes on to 
argue that ''A second aspect of hell to which personal exclusion points is that hell is God's judgment in 
completely giving over the sinner to himself (the 'depart')." [Ibid., pp. 220-221.] However, this seems 
to lose the personal element just gained, and that the damned are not able to forget God, but are 
constantly aware that it is God they are excluded from. 
572 Edwards, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 44. Edwards quotes Isaiah 24: 10, 11 in support. 
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This seems to me to be right, that lucidity makes hell more awful for the damned in that 
they will see clearly the awfulness of their sin. However, it will also be less awful in that 
they themselves will know the good which Lewis described above, of having truth planted 
at last in their souls, as they at last see themselves and God more clearly. In this sense it 
might even be a preferable state to the hell of classic Traditionalism for the damned. 
Certainly the end to sin and lucidity serve to diminish the seeming pointlessness and 
thus brutality of classic Traditionalism, with its vision of the rebellious damned raging 
against God, and thus offers a mitigation of the severity of hell, while making it more 
truly terrible. I will extend this argument after the next section when I incorporate the 
notion of the reconciliation of the damned. 
In the previous section I noted that if the damned do not continue to sin, then this removes 
one of the common additional arguments used by many traditionalists for their position. 
Here I would note that if the damned are lucid then this may remove another common 
additional argument used by traditionalists: that the damned desire to be in hell. 573 The 
importance of this argument is noted by Blocher who writes, "Among the modem, the 
most popular argument, the very soul of most apologies for the possibility of hell, refers to 
human freedom. "574 One typical recent example is from Moore, who is a traditionalist: 
"[Hell] is a place where God says to men, "Thy will be done." It seems that there is much 
biblical warrant for Milton's comment that the impenitent would rather "reign in hell than 
serve in heaven. ""575 An older example is Shedd: 
[T]hat endless punishment is reasonable, is proved by the preference of the wicked 
themselves. The unsubmissive, rebellious, defiant, and impenitent spirit prefers 
hell to heaven. Milton correctly represents Satan as saying: "All good to me 
becomes bane, and in heaven much worse would be my state;" and, also, as 
declaring that "i~ is better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven. 576 
Such arguments from free-will seem to be excluded by the lucidity of the damned that 
cannot evade the awfulness of hell. 
573 The hell that is desired on this argument is the classic traditionalist hell of continuing sin. I will argue 
in the next section that the damned may indeed desire the reconciliationist hell, but not in order to sin and 
to avoid God, but in order to be reconciled to him to the degree that they are reconciled to the justice of 
their punishment. 
574 Blocher, op. cit., p. 295. 
s15 M . 49 oore, op. cit., p. . 
576 Shedd, op. cit., pp. 153-4. 
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In conclusion, in this section I have argued that for retributive punishment to be just, it 
must be recognised by the one being punished as just. For this condition to be fully met it 
is necessary for sin and rebellion to have ceased in hell. If sin continues in hell then it 
would seem that the justice of God's judgement is not fully recognised by those in hell, 
ince they continue in a state of rebellion. Therefore sin must cease for the justice of the 
punishment to be recognised by the damned, which in turn is necessary for the punishment 
to be fully retributive. 
3.5.3 The Damned Are Reconciled 
The third and final element of Blocher's position, as I have expounded it in this chapter, is 
that the damned are reconciled to God in the limited sense that having acknowledged their 
sin and the justice of God's judgement, they are to that extent reconciled to him and may 
even praise him for his justice, while remaining in torment. This is the most speculative of 
the elements, and it could be rejected while retaining the previous two. However, it is also 
the most distinctive of the three elements. Blocher writes of it being "a kind of 
'reconciliation"', 577 and therefore I have drawn on this element to name the whole position 
'Reconciliationism' in order to aid clarity in my discussion. However, although most 
proponents in the nineteenth century debate held that it was a distinct fourth view of the 
state of the damned in hell, I believe that it is best understood as a modified form of 
Traditionalism. I will argue that this notion of reconciliation builds on the previous section 
on lucidity: if the damned acknowledge the justice of their judgement, they also 
acknowledge the justice of the judge, which implies praise for at least this aspect of God's 
character. I am therefore distinguishing reconciliation from lucidity as being a more 
positive quality, emphasising the active praise of the damned for God. Bonda asks, "How 
can the message that all people praise God be explained in such a way that those who are 
forever lost will share in it? ... Blocher provides a carefully constructed answer. "578 
I will begin by briefly expounding Blocher' s position at this point. I will then survey the 
tradition to determine the degree to which it has held a different position, and then the 
degree to which it has held a similar position. I will then assess the arguments for and 
577 Blocher, op. cit., p. 310. 
578 Bonda, op. cit., p.227. 
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against the reconciliation of the damned. As well as being the most distinctive element of 
the position, reconciliation is also the element which goes furthest to mitigate the 
Annihilationist charge of dualism against the classic traditionalist position. If the cessation 
of sin means an end to active rebellion against and hatred of God, then reconciliation 
means some kind of affirmation by the damned of the justice of God. Such a modified 
Traditionalism may, I have suggested, serve to diminish the attractiveness of 
Annihilationism to evangelicals, in so far as they hold it in reaction to the perceived 
problems of classic Traditionalism. Indeed I will suggest that it offers a better resolution of 
damnation dualism. 
Blocher follows the line of many universalists and some Annihilationists who have argued 
that the classical traditionalist position has failed to adequately account for the 
'universalistic' texts in scripture. Blocher actually calls this "the weightiest datum of all," in 
his case against sin in hell, because "The theory of sin forever flourishing ignores the 
message of Christ's perfect victory over sin and all evil." Without fully agreeing with the 
universalists, Blocher comments on texts such as Phil. 2: 1 Of and makes the point that 
'every knee shall bow and every tongue confess' includes the damned, and yet "cannot 
mean mere outward, hypocritical and forced agreement; what sense could there be in any 
outward show in the light of that Day, when all the secrets shall be exposed 
(Rom.2: 16). "579 Turning then to Col.1 :20, about God reconciling all things through Christ, 
he comments that "'Reconciliation' does not imply salvation, ... it means the restoration of 
order, of all within God's order, 'pacification,' as all are brought back into the divinely-
ruled harmony. Nothing could be further removed from divine defeat and sin going on 
after judgement. "58° Further: "If sinners ultimately glorify God, they do reach in a 
paradoxical way the telos of all creatures as such ... their thought is fixed in the knowledge 
that, through their very deprivation, they glorify God and agree with him. 11581 
However, this is a relatively rare position in the tradition. It is more common to argue that 
the damned continue to hate God. A number of quotes could be repeated from the earlier 
579 Blocher, op. cit., p. 303. 
580 Ibid., p. 303. Bonda comments on Blocher's use of these passages, and draws a different conclusion: 
"reconciliation is the restoration of peace with God through forgiveness of sins - never exclusion from 
fe·llowship with God." [Bonda, op. cit., p. 228.] 
581 Ibid, p. 310. 
sections where writers argue that the damned continue to sin and refuse to accept their 
judgement, since the concepts are closely linked. Shedd again is a clear witness: 
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when in the next life [retribution] is denied, and jeered at; and when in the next 
life, it is complained of, and resisted, and the arm of hate and defiance is raised 
against the tribunal; penalty hardens and exasperates. This is impenitence. Such is 
the temper of Satan; and such is the temper of all who finally become his 
associates. This explains why there is no repentance in hell, and no meek 
submission to the Supreme Judge. 582 
Strong writes of ''the misery of the soul which eternally hates God ... "583 Blanchard writes 
that the damned are "even while compelled to acknowledge his glory and goodness, angry 
at God for condemning them to this fate."584 Again, Gerstner describes the unending 
attitude of the damned as "Resentment, hatred, cursing, and no repentance ever ... "585 
As with the previous elements of Blocher' s thesis, this is not without some precedent in 
the mainstream tradition. Orr in a footnote links this to the notion of lucidity: 
Theologians have often spoken of the last judgement as compelling the 
acknowledgement of God's righteousness in the minds even of the condemned. 
In this may lie the germ of the ultimate submission to the divine order which the 
above passages [ when God is spoken of as "all in all"] seem to anticipate. 586 
Where Orr argues for 'the acknowledgement of God's righteousness' at the Last 
Judgment, Blocher is extending this position into the eternity of hell. This position 
though is rare in the evangelical debate I have been tracing. However, Helm comes close 
to Blocher's position when he also builds on the notions of an end to sin and of lucidity. 
He comments on Philippians 2: 11: 
We are informed that before Christ the Judge every knee shall bow and every 
tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father (Phil. 
2: 11). And this language implies that the impenitent will recognise the essential 
justice of their plight. For they too recognise Christ's Lordship, and confess him, 
not with love and adoration as a Saviour, but as their Lord. So hell is a place of 
pain, but not of defiance or resistance. It is not a demonic colony which has 
gained unilateral independence from God. Because there is full recognition of 
God's justice, God's character is vindicated, and hence glorified, even by those 
who in this life have defied him and suffer for it. 587 
'
582 Shedd, op. cit., p. 151. Shedd gives two lengthy quotes in footnpte 4 7, p. 197, in support of his 
argument here. 
583 Strong, op. cit., p. 1056. 
584 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 156. 
585 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 75. 
586 James Orr, Sin as a Problem of To-Day (Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1910), p. 318. 
587 Helm, op. cit., pp. 116-117. [Italics mine]. 
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Guillebaud, quoted by Fudge, suggests a similar position, that the damned are reconciled 
but not saved, but goes on to say that it is only a temporary position, to be followed by 
subsequent extinction: 
Guillebaud raises another interesting question. Philippians 2:9, 10 says that every 
tongue will confess Jesus' sovereignty, whether in heaven, in earth, or under the 
earth. But, Guillebaud points out, when Paul says God will "sum up all things" in 
Christ, he includes things in heaven, in earth - but makes no mention of 
subterranean beings (Eph. 1 :9, 10). Does this mean, Guillebaud asks, that "the 
infernal creatures will confess Christ but not be included in His saving 
consummation?588 
However, the main development of, and debate about, this position comes in the period 
1850-1910 (although I will refer to it as the nineteenth century debate). This debate has 
been referred to only very occasionally in the twentieth century, and I have recorded 
references to it in my Appendix. It is not referred to by evangelicals involved in the debate 
over annihilation. 589 Indeed even Blocher himself seems ignorant of the precursors of his 
position. Yet is this third element of reconciliation which was taken in the nineteenth 
century to be the most distinctive element of the position. Michael Paternoster rightly 
summarises Birks' position: 
his originality showed itself in the speculation that the damned, in spite of their 
personal loss and shame, would come to accept the justice of their sentence and to 
worship their judge. He believed that saved and unsaved alike would, each in their 
way, contribute to the total victory of Christ... Birks, feeling that the total victory 
of divine goodness is incomplete while an opposition party exists anywhere in the 
universe, is constrained to say that the damned are not in rebellion, but accept 
God's sentence and by accepting turn it to his praise. 590 
Again, it is the most distinctive element of the nineteenth century forebears of Blocher' s 
position, and they wrote more extensively on it than on the other elements. There is also a 
diversity of positions that they adopt. For example, unlike Blocher, a number of the 
nineteenth century fore.bears argue that God retains a merciful attitude towards the damned 
and that the state of the damned was dynamic and could change in hell. For these reasons I 
will take longer to analyse and assess this element than the others. 
For the first part of my analysis I will seek to give an exposition of the position as 
articulated by Thomas Rawson Birks, who was the leading advocate of Reconciliationism. 
588 Fudge, op. cit., p. 355, quoting Guillebaud, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
589 The ACUTE report does refer to the leading protagonist ofreconciliation, T.R. Birks, but it doesn't 
note any relevance for the recent debate. [Op. cit., p. 4, pp. 64-65.] 
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His prominence is indicated in several ways. Not only was he held to be an able 
theologian, but he is the writer most.often quoted and referred to by theological allies and 
critics alike. As to Birks' theological ability, I have already noted Rowell's positive 
appraisal. Dr. Candlish concurs, noting that Birks is from the Evangelical wing of the 
Church of England, and that "he is one of the ablest and best of that school." As well as 
expounding Birks' position, I will also expound the positions of other proponents of 
Reconciliationism, particularly where they differ or serve to clarify an issue. I will present 
the main arguments used in favour of Reconciliationism, followed by the chief criticisms 
of it, noting that there are a variety of positions. I will then contrast the position of 
Blocher, as developed in this thesis, with the predominant position in the nineteenth 
century debate: I will conclude that, where there are differences, Blocher's position is 
usually preferable, and that Reconciliationism is a valuable alternative understanding of 
the fate of the damned which offers distinct advantages over classic Traditionalism and 
Annihilationism. 
3.5.3.1 An Exposition of Reconciliationism 
I begin by describing the various forms of Reconciliationism. Birks' "major statement of 
his position"591 is The Victory of Divine Goodness. 592 In this book Birks twice offers a 
numbered summary of his position within a few pages of each other. I will quote the 
second since it contains an additional sub-division, along with a briefer summary he gives 
in his response to Dr. Candlish's criticisms. 
The main doctrines on the judgement to come asserted or implied in my work are 
these. Firstly, that the moral contrast between the righteous and the wicked, in this 
life, leads to an eternal and solemn contrast of doom, of reward or of punishment, 
in the life to come. Secondly, that everlasting punishment does not mean 
extinction or cessation of all being, but an abiding for ever under the penal and 
condemning sentence of the righteous and holy Judge.593 Thirdly, that this 
punishment will be complete, not incomplete; so as not merely to confine from 
without, but to subdue and crush the rebellious will under the mighty power of 
God, revealed in judgement; so that there will be, and can be, no eternal reign of 
Satan, and no power of active mutual torment on the part of men and angels, under 
this condemnation. [The earlier list concludes: "This is the contrast to the 
590 Paternoster, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 
591 Rowell, op. cit., p. 124. 
592 Birks, op. cit. 
593 Ibid., p. 211. In the earlier list the implication is spelt out further: "This is the contrast of the doctrine of 
Annihilation or Absolute Destruction of being itself." 
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mediaeval superstition, which assigns to Satan a rival empire to God's own 
dominion for evermore."594] Fourthly, that the perfections of God, who is at once 
just and gracious, lead to the conclusion that since righteousness, as well as grace, 
is displayed for ever towards the saved, so grace, mercy, and compassion, in some 
mysterious form, will be displayed, as well as righteous justice, towards even the 
worst and guiltiest of the creatures of God. Fifthly, that the general nature of such 
mercy may, and probably will, consist in a contemplation, passively and under 
Divine compulsion, of the infinite goodness of the Lord, a contemplation rendered 
possible to lost souls only by the strict execution of the solemn threatenings of 
God.595 
Birks also summarises his position in his response to Candlish, as follows. 
First, they who die in their sins will be punished, and punished for ever, by the 
sentence of the Righteous Judge. Neither will they cease to exist, not have their 
sentence reversed, so as to mingle with the saved and glorified ... Next, this 
punishment will not be so incomplete, as that Satan will still reign over the lost 
and torment them, or that they will actively blaspheme and torment each other, 
but will imply their entire subjection under the mighty hand of God. They will be 
made the footstool of Christ. Thirdly, because this judgement is so complete, it 
will involve the capacity for a passive contemplation of God's perfect goodness, 
so far as He may be pleased to unfold it; such as tends in its own nature to 
adoration, wonder, and praise ... Its extent and degree I leave as a solemn 
mystery, which eternity alone may reveal. 596 
I now tum to examine Birks' position in more detail, along with the positions of other 
proponents of what I have termed Reconciliationism, and I begin with the issue of how 
this doctrine of hell is best categorised. Despite Birks' formal distinction between the 
blessedness of the damned and the righteous, the most common criticism from 
traditionalists is that this is a distinction without substance, and that that the doctrine of 
reconciliation is actually a doctrine of Universalism, or 'Restorationism' or 'Restitutionism' 
as it is also called in the debate. If this charge could be substantiated it would be a very 
strong argument against Reconciliationism for evangelicals, because Universalism is 
usually regarded as an unacceptable doctrine for evangelicals. The ACUTE report states, 
"we understand universalism to be. divergent from authentic evangelical faith, ... "597 A 
typical charge that Reconciliationism is actually a form of Universalism is made by 
William Reid, who in the Appendix to his book lists Birks under the heading "Writers who 
594 Ibid., p. 211. 
,
595 Ibid., pp. 229-230. , 
596 T.R. Birks, The Atonement and the Judgment: A Reply to Dr. Candlish 's Inaugural Lecture; with a 
Brie/Statement of Facts in Connection with the Evangelical Alliance (Rivingtons: London, 1870), pp. 23-
24. 
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advocate the doctrine of universal restoration." He then appends a quote by another critic 
who says: "[Birks] emphatically reiterates his belief in the doctrine of eternal punishment. 
Yet his qualifications and premises come so near to Universalism as to create a danger, 
and demand some notice."598 Another example is from Dr. Candlish who concludes his 
discussion of Birks' position that "his doctrine at bottom is really that of universal 
restoration. "599 A more recent verdict is from the ACUTE report which describes his 
position as a 'modified restitutionism'. 600 An important challenge for reconciliationists is 
therefore to demonstrate that there is an understanding of reconciliation that is not 
restoration. I will argue that such an understanding is possible. However, there are a range 
of positions that were held by reconciliationists, and I will argue that the distinction is 
clearer and more secure on Blocher' s position than Birks', and more secure on Birks' than 
on that of some other advocates such as Langton Clarke's. Two of the key differences 
between writers are the possibility for change in the state of the damned, and the attitude 
of God toward the damned. I will examine Birks' position first, then compare it with 
Langton Clarke's who comments extensively on this issue and who is the writer who most 
blurs the distinction. I will draw a comparison between both writers and Blocher at the 
end. 
Birks does make some statements that might suggest Universalism. In speaking of the 
contemplation of God which the damned are capable of, he carefully notes the difference 
to that of the saints, but also goes some way towards Universalism: 
... its attainment may be possible only in part to souls under sentence of judgement; 
its effect, though its own tendency is to unutterable blessedness, may account only 
to some merciful relief of what would else be unmingled, as well as hopeless, 
misery; and their adoration, being the result of compulsion, not of free choice, 
would never deserve to be called holy adoration.601 
In an earlier work, Letter V, On Future Punishment he describes the state of the damned as 
"in its own nature, unutterably blessed. 11602 In his later Reply to Recent Strictures he points 
out, in response to criticism on this point, that he was careful to say that they were not 
597 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 32. Also, in their 'Conclusions and Recommendations': "We also reject the 
teaching of Universalism, which holds that all will be saved regardless of their commitment to Christ 
' (Rom. 2:12-16; Luke 1:15; 18:15-17; Rom. 10:9-13; Matt. 7:13)." [Ibid., p.131]. 
598 Reid, op. cit., p.314, quoting Randie's Essay, p. 269. 
599 Candlish, op. cit., p. 14. 
600 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 64. 
601 Birks, Victory, p. 244. 
602 Ibid, p. 48. 
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necessarily as blessed as the righteous, but that it was as blessed as they could be "in their 
own nature.11603 However, Birks uses the language of salvation with respect to the 
damned. 
They will be saved from bodily corruption, ... They will be saved from the curse 
of hopeless vanity, from the first death, in which the creature is self-ruined, and 
God himself is not glorified, but for ever blasphemed. They will be saved from 
the abyss, ... Will they not also be saved from that utter, hopeless misery, where 
no ray of light or comfort breaks in on the solitude of everlasting despair? Will 
they not be saved, in a strange, mysterious sense, when the depth of their 
unchangeable shame and sorrow finds beneath it a still lower depth of Divine 
compassion, and the creature, in its most forlorn state, is shut in by the vision of 
surpassing and infinite love?604 
However, Birks explicitly denies that his position is universalist, understood as the 
salvation of all people, as the first points in both of his numbered summaries show. 
Further, in a lengthy quote, he outlines the various routes to such Universalism which he 
rejects, and the distinct position he advocates. In his Seventh Letter, his questioner 
expresses the hope "that ultimately all created beings will be pardoned ... " Birks 
responds: 
Now, if you mean by pardon, what I fear some persons mean by it, the cessation 
of vindictive malice on the part of God towards particular sinners, then such 
pardon is never given to any, because such malice has no existence, save in the 
chimeras of a conscience defiled and perverted by sin. Or, if it means an act of 
grace, which shall admit the unholy, in their unholiness, to the vision of God, 
such pardon is an essential and inherent impossibility. Again, if we mean by it a 
miraculous act, after this life, whereby an exercise of Divine sovereignty effects 
the change in a moment in lost souls, which the Gospel and the Spirit have failed 
to effect here, without any further "sacrifice for sins" (Heb. X), it is doubtful 
whether such a work is possible in its own nature, and the statements of 
Scripture give us the strongest reasons to disbelieve its future occurrence ... On 
the other hand, if it be meant that the infliction of just punishment is not the 
whole of God's purpose towards the unsaved; but that, while His holiness is for 
ever manifested in the fulfilment of His warnings, and in their own irreparable 
loss and shame, there will, even in the depth of that ruin, be such a display of the 
unchangeable love of the Holy Creator to all the creatures of his hand, such 
depths of compassion to the self-ruined, as, without reversing their doom, may · 
send a thrill of wondrous consolation through the abyss of what would else be 
unmingled woe and despair, - I do believe, for many reasons, that such a display 
of God's all-perfect love is truly kept in store for the ages to com(?. While clear, 
its truth may be deduced by humble and reverent hearts from patient study of the 
603 T.R. Birks, Reply to Recent Strictures, [Added to the 5th ed. of The Victory of Divine Goodness, op. 
cit.], p. 244. 
604 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
Scripture, and from calm meditation on the sure victory of good over evil, and 
the mingling of mercy with judgement in the perfection of the Most High. 605 
Compared to a classic traditionalist position, this is certainly a step or two towards 
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Universalism: Birks allows for the love of God towards the damned and in response 
they will experience "a thrill of wondrous consolation." Further, as I will argue below, 
this is also closer to Universalism than the position of Blocher in which there is neither 
divine love for the damned, nor any necessary mitigation of the awfulness of the state of 
the damned because of that love. However Birks is also explicit that this is still mingled 
with God's "judgement" and their sense of "woe and despair," and this clearly 
distinguishes his position from Universalism. 
Candlish, in his criticism above, also recognises this formal distinction between the two 
positions. However Candlish's primary reason for rejecting Birks' distinction between 
reconciliation and restoration is that such a passive ~ontemplation by the damned 
requires the regeneration of the damned. This is similar to the issue of lucidity. Candlish 
writes, 
But, as I cannot help thinking, they all imply this serious consequence, at least, 
that the finally lost may, nay, must have an apprehension and appreciation of the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, such as he [Birks], as well as I, would 
strenuously maintain cannot be got now, except through the regenerating and 
enlightening operations of the Holy Ghost ... Surely there is in all this a sad and 
serious under-estimate of man's inability to "see God," in our Lord's sense of 
h hr 606 t at p ase, ... 
Birks' answer would be, I think, that this partial vision of God by the damned does not 
require regeneration but is the result of punishment forcing them to contemplate God. I 
will examine this at greater length below, after examining a related distinction. 
Related to this issue of the difference between reconciliation and restoration is the issue of 
the experience of the damned. Birks argues from two distinctions: that ••every created 
being may be viewed in two different aspects, internal and external;11607 and an 
unqerstanding "that all happiness is of two kinds, personal and federal, one resulting 
directly from blessings strictly our own, and the other from sympathy with the joys of 
others, or from the contemplation of external and objective truth. "608 These distinctions are 
605 Ibid, pp. 62-3. 
606 Candlish, op. cit., p. 8. 
607 Birks, Victory, p. 42. 
608 Ibid, p. 43. 
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then combined to argue that while the damned suffer subjectively and personally, there is 
also an objective and federal element in which they can share in the blessing of heaven by 
its passive contemplation. However Birks admits that this "further objective or federal 
element... is nowhere in the Bible, in set terms, explicitly revealed. 11609 Candlish isolates 
this understanding of the psychology of the damned as Birks' starting point. Candlish 
claims that Birks has combined the former, personal, aspect, which underlies 
Traditionalism, with the latter, federal, aspect which underlies the 'new' view, by which 
he means Universalism.610 Therefore, as Candlish summarises Birks' argument, 
Along with "the utmost personal humiliation, shame and anguish," there may be 
"the passive contemplation of a ransomed universe, and all the innumerable 
varieties of blessedness enjoyed by unfallen sprits and the ransomed people of 
God; such a contemplation as would be fitted, in its own nature, to raise the soul 
into a trance of holy adoration in the presence of infinite and unsearchable 
goodness. "611 
Birks illustrates the psychology of the damned with an analogy drawn from the life of 
General Wolfe. Candlish examines this example at length, first summarising it. 
Wolfe, expiring in the arms of victory, may lose his sense of his own dying pain 
in his patriotic joy of sympathy with his king and country, and this may be said 
to show a double character: the one personal and individual, the other relative or 
federal. In the one, he feels his wounds as touching himself. In the other, he loses 
and merges himself personally - his personal self - in his covenant relation to a 
higher circle, or in his rapt admiration of some absorbing object or event. But is 
it conceivable that a man could live long in this nicely-poised balance, in his 
double character, between anguish or delight? Or that he could live in it to all 
eternity? And, especially as regards the analogical use made of this instance, is it 
conceivable that the condemned sinner, personally kept in penal shame and 
torment through everlasting ages by the righteous Judge, should yet be able, in 
his federal character, apart from his own personal interest in it, or its bearing on 
himself personally, to behold with complacency, as a sort of abstract object of 
admiration, the glorious love of Him under whose inexorable penal sentence he 
is all the while.lying? - or to behold with sympathy the members of the family to 
which he federally belongs, who actually enjoy it, as he never can hope to do? I 
much doubt if that is true to human nature in any state. It seems to be to demand 
superhuman virtue, a sort of supernatural disinterestedness.612 
CaJ?-dlish thus responds that this presents a picture of the state of the damned which is at 
least psychologically unrealistic, and probably psychologically impossible. In response to 
this charge that his view of the damned is untrue to human nature because "It seems to 
609 Ibid., p. 45. 
610 Candlish, op. cit., p. 3. 
611 Ibid., p.3, quoting Birks, Victory, p. 45. 
612 Candlish, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
demand superhuman virtue, and supernatural disinterestedness,"613 Birks argues that 
Candlish has failed to take into account the impact of God's judgement. Birks writes: 
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But the most essential feature in the statements I have made is that such 
contemplation has become possible to the unsaved by punishment, and Divine 
compulsion alone. The soul has forfeited for ever the highest dignity of willing 
and free co-operation with the will of God; but this is no reason why the natural 
capacity for admiring what is unspeakably glorious should also have passed 
away for ever.614 
Birks is even clearer about the element of compulsion in his earlier Reply. 
They will be compelled, under the mighty hand of God, to see and own the 
justice of their sentence; while their own folly and guilt in despising the 
warnings of a God of love will fill them with a sense of everlasting shame. But 
this utter extinction, by judgement, and by judgement alone, of their pride and 
blasphemy, and this compulsory submission under the mighty hand of the Holy 
Judge, will open the way for such a contemplation of Creative Power, All-seeing 
Wisdom, and Redeeming Goodness - all surpassingly glorious - as shall 
constitute, not bliss, indeed, or joy, but an awful and stupendous 
consolation ... 615 
He also writes of "Their adoration, being the result of compulsion, not of free 
choice, ... "616 However, again it is important to note that Birks is careful to argue that 
the response of the damned is not merely maintained by external force, since that would 
mean that their response was hypocritical, but is also a result of a consequent 
transformed perspective, that is lucidity. Further, I don't think that Birks' position does 
suffer from being psychologically unrealistic, as Candlish charges. I think that the 
analogy of a prisoner who, having come to realise the enormity of his crime, accepts the 
justice of his punishment, and is praiseworthy of the judge, is quite realistic. Candlish I 
think fails to take adequate account of the effect of the lucidity given at the Last 
Judgement. 
Some writers in the ni_neteenth century debate do however have a much less secure 
distinction between reconciliation and restoration. I will examine the position of 
Langton Clarke because he writes at some length on the question; his position is 
different to Birks at a number of points; and he goes furthest in seeing mitigations in the 
state of the damned. Clarke distinguishes between two main types, or levels, of the 
reconciliation doctrine. Level one is the acquiescence to punishment by the damned; 
613 Quoted in Birks, Atonement, p. 28. 
614 Ibid., p. 28. 
615 Birks, Victory, p. 270. 
616 Ibid., p. 244. 
167 
level two is the restoration to sonship, but still a lesser state than that of the righteous. I 
will quote Clarke's discussion at length. 
[I]f the saving element really does continue, then we may venture to add to the 
conception of reconciliation as distinguished from full restoration to all that 
might have been, another feature, namely, that the reconciled are not only in a 
state in which acquiescence in their punishment results in peace and content, but 
are also restored to a condition of sonship which is not only a joy to the 
reconciled, but also to the angels of God in heaven, and to the Heavenly Father 
Himself ... Yet even this state is not full restoration to all that might have 
been.617 
Clarke then uses the Prodigal Son to illustrate this higher level of restoration which falls 
short of all that could have been. 
The parable of the prodigal son enables us to see clearly that while reconciliation 
is something higher than a peaceful acquiescence in punishment, it is yet lower 
than restoration to all that might have been. [The father could have said to the 
returning son] " ... , I will make such arrangements as will ensure your comfort 
and peace away from home." The Prodigal, if he were really penitent and meant 
what he said, could not but feel the wisdom and justice of this decision; and 
though debarred from the delight of restoration to his home, he would still 
"accept his condition as just, and be at peace." But the father in the parable does 
much more than this. In the overflowing of his joy he not only receives the 
prodigal home again, but receives him not as a hired servant, but as a son, and 
shows more special marks of rejoicing over him than he had ever shown in the 
case of the elder son who went astray. By so much, as it seems to me, is the 
reconciliation of the truly penitent in the world to come a more blessed state than 
that of a peaceful and contented acquiescence in punishment.618 
However, this raises the question of what the difference is between the highest rung of 
hell and the lowest rung of heaven. Clarke concludes by emphasising the difference 
between these two levels: 
But the rest of the parable makes it equally clear that the resultant state of 
reconciliation and acceptance, joyful and blessed beyond all hope of the prodigal 
though it was, was yet something decidedly lower than full restoration to his 
former condition ... [it] does not for one moment mean that any part of what 
belongs to the ·elder (and all belongs to him) is to be taken from him and given to 
the younger, ... By so much does the reconciliation and acceptance, however 
blessed it may be, which awaits those who only in the future life are brought by 
God s judgements to true repentance, fall short of full restoration to all that 
might have been, had they lived here the life of faith and love, and departed 
hence in the Lord.619 
617 Clarke, op. cit., pp. 345-6. 
618 Ibid., p. 346. 
619 Ibid., pp. 346-7. 
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However, this use of the parable raises difficulties, and opens Clarke to the charge of 
not having adequately distinguished reconciliation from restoration, since the prodigal 
son is usually taken to refer to those who respond positively to God in this life. 
Clarke uses few non-Scriptural analogies, but does offer the following to show that 
permanent loss can be combined with blessing: " ... by idleness in school days succeeded 
by hard work, which, though it meets with its reward, can never altogether make up for 
the idleness at school."620 Although Clarke doesn't develop this type of analogy, 
Illingworth does, and seems to hold a very similar position. Therefore, I quote 
Illingworth's discussion of a spendthrift to illuminate Clarke's position. 
[W]e can conceive of a punishment that shall be everlasting, without doing 
violence to our sense of Divine justice. For we have an analogy for it within the 
limits of this life. Take the case of a man who was a culpable spendthrift, in his 
youth, and so reduced himself to penury for the remainder of his life. His poverty 
is his punishment, and as long as he resents it he is in misery; but no sooner does 
he recognise its justice, than he can bear it with cheerful acquiescence, as God's 
will. Yet the punishment remains; he has all the incapacities of poverty, and can 
never now do the good that he might have done with his wealth ... Men are being 
perpetually punished by the life-long consequences of their sins; but if they 
accept the punishment, it ceases to be pain; for they become in Dante's language 
'content within the fire.' Now one can conceive a similar process in the future 
life; that men may there wake to recognise that, by their earthly conduct, they 
have brought themselves for ever to a lower state then might have been, and are 
to that extent everlastingly punished, while yet they accept their condition as 
divinely just, and are at peace.621 
However Clarke makes the penal element of reconciliation clearer than Illingworth 
when he writes: 
Eternal Judgement is the process by which that vast portion of mankind which 
has not in this life, owing to ignorance or wilful sin, accepted the reconciliation 
worked for mankind, while yet sinners, by the death of Christ, is reconciled to 
God ... ReCO\lCiliation which has not been achieved in this life, though it is 
salvation, is salvation of a lower kind, salvation with loss, as by fire - the fire 
kindled by the punitive element in the Eternal Judgeship, the fire of punishments 
corrective in their tendency, and ( as we may be permitted to hope, though we 
may not dare to go the length of positively asserting this) eventually corrective in 
their result. 622 
Clarke's final sentence shows that he holds a dynamic conception of hell in which 
further change is possible, and that the type of reconciliation exemplified by the 
620 Ibid., p. 90. 
621 J.R. Illingworth, Reason and Revelation: An Essay in Christian Apology (2nd ed. Macmillan and Co.: 
London, 1906),p.231. 
622 Clarke, op. cit., pp. 114-5. [Italics original]. 
Prodigal Son is a hope but not a certainty. Clarke then clarifies his position when he 
asks, expecting a negative answer: "Does Scripture teach that there is such a thing as 
final impenitence, i.e., an impenitence which can never change through endless ages 
notwithstanding all the resources and influences of Divine Wisdom and Love?"623 
Further, Clarke writes, 
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The doctrine of endless sin and misery seems really to destroy and annihilate the 
freedom of the human will in the future life at the same time that it seems 
strongly to assert it; ... It seems a strange kind of freedom of will which has 
boundless powers of resistance, but is impotent to tum back to God. 624 
Clarke also holds that God does not cease to desire the rescue of the wicked from hell. 
"We cannot conceive of a God of Unchangeable Love ever ceasing to desire the rescue 
of the wicked from their unspeakably awful misery. "625 The combination of divine love 
for the damned, the free-will of the damned, and the beneficial effects of punishment, all 
enable him to hope for the reconciliation of all people. Thus he speaks of "a continuous 
stream of reconciled and purified sinners pouring night and day through the ever open 
gates into the Holy City, ... "626 where this refers to 'salvation with loss' in the period 
after the Last Judgement. 
Most other writers in the debate seem to follow Clarke at this point, in their willingness 
to countenance some kind of continued free-will in hell. Thus, Garratt also has a 
dynamic understanding of hell, although he too excludes full restoration. "On this lower 
level we may imagine all degrees of punishment and all kinds of change without in any 
degree interfering with the permanent loss. "627 Again, "Punishment so long as resisted 
(for God will force no one's hand) inevitably galls. But punishment submitted to may 
without being removed bring its own relative blessing."628 One difficulty with this free-
will approach is that the universal suppression of sin is no longer a necessary 
consequence of the universal rule of Christ. If the damned could remain in their 
rebellion, then it can't be necessary that they don't! On the other hand, if it were argued 
that all will in fact submit, but after a period of time, then not only is it hard to see why 
they should all do so if they retain free-will, but it removes the complete victory over sin 
623 Ibid., p. 95. [Italics original] 
624 Ibid., p. 106. 
625 Clarke, op. cit., p. 106. 
626 Ibid., p. 111. 
627 Samuel Garratt, Veins of Silver or, Truths Hidden Beneath the Surface (2nd ed. London: Charles J. 
Thynne, 1904), p. 158. 
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from the Last Judgement to some later undetermined period. This then reintroduces 
what I earlier called the New Intermediate State, after the Last Judgement, while the 
righteous await the final victory of Christ. Here then is an important distinction between 
Blocher and the nineteenth century proponents: whereas Clarke, for example, holds a 
free-will or dynamic understanding of hell, Blocher holds to a fixed hell in which the 
state of the damned does not change after the Last Judgment. 
Clarke does refer to the possible implications of his position as a form of Universalism. 
' The theory does not itself prove it [Universalism], but I fully admit that, if true, it 
justifies a great increase of hope that Universalism (modified by the view of possible 
reconciliation for all rather than full restoration) may be a true doctrine."629 However, 
Clarke also sets out the difference between his view and Universalism very clearly, 
describing his position as reconciliation, rather than restoration: 
The difference then between Restoration and Reconciliation is plain. Restoration 
means, given two men, both of whom have had full knowledge of Christ in this 
life, and one of whom has lived the life of faith working by love, the other has 
drawn back unto perdition, that the latter shall eventually in some future age be 
restored to all that he might have been had he lived like the former. 
Reconciliation means that the latter may indeed inherit a blessing, but not the 
blessing which he forfeited by his backsliding, or by neglecting so great 
salvation .... Reconciliation means that he may indeed be saved, but not restored; 
saved but with loss, not with the exceeding weight of glory which is the reward 
of the true believer; redeemed, but with judgement, subjected to the punitive 
element in the Eternal Judgeship which the other altogether escapes. 630 
Finally, Clarke can also write as if his position lies somewhere between Traditionalism 
and Universalism: 
The antithesis to salvation is, according to the view taken in this book, not the 
elimination of the saving element from the Eternal Judgeship of Christ, but the 
abiding of the punitive. This appears to be the middle truth between two 
extremes of error, which teach, the one, the abolition of the saving element, the 
other, the abolition of the punitive.631 
Again, he speaks of "the main contention of this treatise - namely, that the saving 
element continues throughout the eternal Judgeship of Christ. .. "632 
628 Samuel Garratt, World Without End(William Hunt and Co.: London, 1886), p. 262. 
629 Ibid., p. 111. 
630 Ibid., p. 87. [Italics original] 
631 Ibid., p. 86. [Italics original] 
632 Ibid., p. 345. 
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In conclusion, Clarke does hold that his view is a distinct fourth view, differing from both 
Traditionalism and Universalism, and therefore it might be as accurate to call him a 
modified universalist as a modified traditionalist. However all the authors surveyed reject 
the claim that their doctrine is fully universalist. There are also several important 
differences between the positions of Clarke and the Nineteenth Century writers and the 
position of Blocher. First, the older position has a higher level of reconciliation: the 
vision of the state of the damned is closer to that of the righteous than Bl ocher's. 
Second, the older position has what I will call a weak doctrine of reconciliation, since it 
is not a necessary final state, but hoped for, unlike Blocher for whom reconciliation is 
certain. 
One final, surprising, element in Clarke's position I will note is that he also holds that 
extinction would follow if the damned remained impenitent. Most reconciliationist 
writers are firm in their rejection of Annihilationism, and Clarke is unique in leaving 
open the possibility of extinction: "And I fully admit that IF there is such a state 
possible for any human being as a state of endless and hopeless impenitence, then such a 
state would involve Annihilation ... for preservation is with a view to restoration or 
Reconciliation ... "633 However, it is hard to see how Clarke can justify this, both given 
his critical comments about Annihilationism, and also given the continuing possibility 
for change with the continuing free-will of the damned, love of God and the potentially 
reformatory effects of punishment. 
Before continuing with my examination of Birks' position, I will more briefly note some 
features of Garratt, another proponent of Reconciliationism in the nineteenth century. In 
particular he gives a more extensive variety of analogies for the state of the damned than 
any other writer, some of which I will note before proceeding. Garratt says that hell "is a 
destiny of e erlasting shame, but not everlasting sin. "634 Shame is a key term to describe 
the state of the damned for Garratt. 
Shame is not always an unmitigated evil, nor is humiliation. At all events, shame 
is better than shamelessness, and humiliation than pride. When there is shame on 
account of sin and humiliation is accepted, who shall dare to say that it is not a 
moral progress? And who shall say what may not be the resulting blessing?635 
633 Ibid., p. 108. 
634 Garratt, World, p. 227. 
635 Ibid., p. 233. 
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Garratt characterises the damned as in "humble, willing submission. "636 This 
submission to punishment doesn't remove or reduce it, but does transform the damned's 
experience of it. He gives an extensive illustration of his position, based on the narrative 
in Dr. Browning's Convict Ship and England's Exiles.631 Browning, who was a 
physician on a convict ship, notes that due to conversion, 
the change [ amongst the convicts] was such in their moral character that they 
submitted without repining to the penal discipline of the ship, and gave every 
promise of being diligent servants and obedient subjects in that penal colony, in 
which many of them were condemned to spend the remainder of their lives. 
When they landed, though few of them could ever cease to be exiles, such was 
the influence on their minds, so much happier did they feel for the restraints of 
the convict ship, that the bitter hatred of the law and justice and of its ministers 
had passed away; and to apply in a lower sense the words of the Psalm [145:9], 
they owned mercy in that rigid execution of human law which had rendered to 
each of them according to his work. 
We might carry the illustration further. The sentence of transportation for 
life was in one respect an image of everlasting punishment, that so long as the 
man lived it lasted. Rebellion against it, the attempt to escape, continued 
misconduct, any resistance to the sentence led to still worse banishment; but 
submission to it and good conduct brought with it first relaxation, then elevation. 
The sentence could not be reversed. But many a convict would have owned that 
in his case, beneath inexorable judgement, mercy lay concealed. 638 
In the narrative transformation of the attitude of the convicts occurred through a special 
work of grace through the preaching of the gospel by Dr. Browning. Garratt does not 
address the question of whether he believes that there are special works of grace in hell 
to bring about the transformation of the damned. However, even if the notion is rejected, 
as Blocher would, it seems to me though that this is still a useful analogy for 
understanding the fate of the damned. 
Garratt uses another analogy for the way that the attitude to punishment can change its 
quality. "And when God inflicts punishment, though, like the sentence of labour on man 
and subjection on women, it may change its colour and become a source of joy or a 
present hell, according as it is submitted to or rebelled against; ... "639 
Again, Garratt writes, 
In fact, the very punishment which God has inflicted, and does continue to inflict 
on man, of being the bread-winner for his wife and children, is, under the present 
636 Ibid., p. 227. 
637 Garratt, Veins, p. 166. 
638 Ibid., pp. 167-8. 
639 Garratt, World, pp. 196-7. Garratt then gives a series of biblical examples. 
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circumstances of life, felt and owned by all right-thinking men to be no calamity; 
but, though a punishment in form, mercy in reality ... It is only felt as punishment 
when he resists it or leaves it undone. 640 
This seems to suggest a very high degree of blessing and pleasure, for the damned if 
they fully accept their punishment, and Garratt goes on to speak of, "the result of that 
first punishment remains, and will remain, the everlasting token of God's anger against 
sin; yet through His love and wisdom changed, when submitted to, into a source of 
unnumbered blessings. "641 
Again, Garratt's statements raise the obvious question of what prevents this position 
collapsing into Universalism. Put another way, how does Garratt believe the experience 
of the damned is different from that of the righteous? It might seem that the highest state 
of the damned is little different from the lowest state of the blessed. Garratt addresses 
this issue. He begins by arguing that "there are degrees or orders of infinity."642 He then 
gives an analogy: 
An infinite surface is infinitely greater than an infinite line, and an infinite solid 
than an infinite surface. A line produced into infinity does not become or tend to 
become a surface; nor a surface, infinitely extended, a solid. There is an infinite 
difference between an infinite line and an infinite surface, between an infinite 
surface and an infinite solid. And in an infinitely higher sense, there is an infinite 
difference between the creature and the Creator; and an everlasting increase in 
holiness, knowledge, grace of any kind, would have no more tendency to 
diminish the gulf between the Creator and the creation, between God and man, 
than a line infinitely produced would have to become a solid. 643 
Garratt then draws the conclusion to respond to the question above: 
And for a similar reason, if the state of everlasting punishment is one which 
admits of no comparison with that of everlasting blessedness, if they are not 
separated by gradation but by nature, it is quite possible that in everlasting 
punishment itself there may be not only difference, as between many stripes and 
few, but an unlimited improvement and infinite alleviation, without the slightest 
approach, or tendency to approach, to a reversal of the sentence, or to admission 
into heaven of the blest. 644 
A difficulty with this argument is that there is no ontological difference between the 
damned and righteous in the way that there is between the Creator and creatures. 
However, later, Garratt re-emphasises his belief about the state of the damned: "It seems 
to be the permanent sinking to a lower level in the seal~ of creation, which carries with 
640 Garratt, Veins, p. 160. 
641 Ibid., p. 162. 
642 Ibid., p. 125. 
643 Ibid., p. 126. 
it as its inevitable result, because of the greatness of the forfeited glory, shame and 
everlasting contempt. "645 
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Before turning to examine criticisms of this position, I will note the issue of the destiny of 
Satan. As I have noted above, there is often a reluctance for annihilationists to address the 
question of the extinction of Satan, although it is probably required by their arguments. 
Similarly Reconciliationism probably requires that Satan should also cease to sin, "bow 
the knee," and reach his "telos." One writer who notes this conclusion is Garratt: 
Even Satan, instead of being conqueror and ruling over a kingdom of darkness in 
which God's creatures are his captives, as some imagine, or, as others think, 
compelling God to undo His work and put His own creatures out of existence, 
may, himself conquered, became a footstool for Christ's feet. 646 
This doesn't seem to raise any theological problems beyond those raised below. 
In the light of those writers I have expounded in this section, one could divide the 
positions into strong and weak reconciliation: in the strong version all the damned are of 
necessity reconciled; in the weak version all the damned may be reconciled but there is 
no certainty because of continuing free-will. The weak view means that there could be a 
temporary classic traditional hell for some, which could be permanent if the punishment 
never achieves its corrective purpose. Clarke offers these two alternatives, although it 
remains unclear if he thinks anyone will remain permanently unreconciled. 
It should be thoroughly understood that I do not go the length of asserting that 
the continuance of the saving element in the Judgement of Christ must of 
necessity produce reconciliation ... The "lost" may accept their punishment in the 
spirit of Esau's later life, or in the spirit of Saul's: if in the former spirit, they 
will find reconciliation though not restoration; if in the latter spirit, they will 
remain unreconciled; the wrath of God abiding on them till their sin-caused 
misery makes them, as it made the perishing prodigal, come to themselves.647 
In conclusion, Reconciliationism is best understood as a modification of Traditionalism. 
However this classification is clearest for Blocher, followed by Birks, but rather less so for 
Garratt, while it is debatable that Clarke is better thought of as a modified universalist. 
Against some commentators, like Reid above, Salmond rightly gives Birks' The Victory of 
Divine Goodness as a reference for a position that is not a form of Universalism: "Some, 
644 Ibid., p. 126. 
645 Ibid., p. 158. 
646 Garratt, World, p. 227. 
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who regard the triumph of the Divine love as necessary, but to whom the ingathering of all 
erring souls seems too great a hope, take refuge in the idea that the final position of the 
condemned will be one of acquiescence in their condition. "648 Further, the move to have 
Birks excluded from the Evangelical Alliance was led by a solicitor, R. Baxter, who 
admitted Birks' claim to teach a form of Traditionalism, only questioning his 
interpretation of Scripture. 649 
From the discussion so far, it might be expected that Reconciliationism is also a 
mitigation of the severity of the hell of classic Traditionalism. This is certainly the 
understanding of the position in the nineteenth century. So, for example, it can be 
established as Birks' position in at least three ways: by direct statement; by his doctrine 
of reserve; and by his distinction of the two deaths. I will examine each in turn, before 
concluding that this is not the only possibility, and Blocher would seem to take an 
alternative view. So, I turn to the evidence from Birks and others that reconciliation is a 
mitigation of classic Traditionalism. First, Birks states clearly that he believes 
Reconciliationism is a mitigation. Writing of the contemplation of God by the damned, 
he notes, "its effect, though its own tendency is to unutterable blessedness, may amount 
only to some merciful relief of what would else be unmingled, as well as hopeless, 
misery ... "650 Birks also argues that many people disbelieve in the hell of classic 
Traditionalism because of its harshness.651 
Second, there is the evidence from Birks' doctrine of reserve. The doctrine of reserve, 
with respect to the doctrine of hell, argues that any mitigation of hell should be 
communicated cautiously because it lessens the deterrent effect against sin in this life. 
Thi~ has been a widely advocated reason for the suppression of discussion of the 
doctrine of hell. 652 Birks holds to a form of the doctrine of reserve and argues that this 
new doctrine should only be made known gradually, as people's consciences become 
647 Clarke, op. cit., p. 89. · 
~
8 S.D.F. Salmond, The Christian Doctrine of Immortality (4th ed. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1901), p. 
665. 
649 For a brief historical account, see J.B.A. Kessler Jnr., A Study of the Evangelical Alliance in Great 
Britain (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1968), pp. 67-69. 
650 Birks, Victory, p. 244. 
651 Ibid., p. 63. 
652 See Walker, op. cit., pp. 3-8. 
176 
troubled by classic Traditionalism. 653 Garratt also speaks of the need for reserve. Using 
the analogy of transportation for life, and the fact that this could result in a prosperous 
career for the convict, he notes, 
But judges did not disclose the fact to convicts ... The blessed truth as to the 
loving and holy purpose of everlasting punishment is a pearl to be carefully 
handled, a secret not to be too rashly divulged, but told to God's children, or to 
those who are thinking of God wrongly and need to be taught that He is indeed 
love. It may sometimes, when God's character is called in question on account of 
false impressions widely spread on this subject, as is the case now, be necessary 
to speak more openly and plainly. But it is easy to see why in Scripture the 
purpose of everlasting punishment is revealed more dimly than the fact itself. 
Yet it is revealed. 654 
A third piece of evidence for the contention that Birks holds that Reconciliationism is a 
mitigation of the traditionalist hell is found in his discussion of the two deaths. Birks' 
argument is based on what Candlish calls: "The very key-stone of his whole edifice - his 
doctrine about the nature of the second death."655 Birks compares the two deaths: 
The one, the second death, is the 'lake of fire', solemn indeed and most awful, 
yet bounded in its range, shut in by firm land on every side. The other, the first 
death, is 'the deep', the abyss, 'the bottomless pit', evil reigning, rioting, 
growing, deepening without limit and without end, in its final descent, farther 
and farther from light and happiness and heaven. By the sentence of the law, 
fulfilled without atonement or redemption, mankind, thus fallen, would be shut 
out from God's presence, and sink, and sink, and sink for ever, in this abyss of 
hopeless and endless ruin. 656 
In other words, Birks argues, uniquely so far as I know, that there is a group of texts 
which suggest a classic traditionalist hell, but they all apply to the first death. Thus, 
Birks only holds a distinctive view about hell when the term is applied to the state of the 
damned in the second death, after the benefits of Christ's passion have been applied to 
the damned. Therefore, as is so often the case in this debate, the situation is more 
complex than at first appears: Birks in fact holds that there is a classic traditionalist hell, 
but that it then changes into a modified traditionalist hell as a result of the atonement. It 
could therefore be said that Birks is a partial classic traditionalist! He holds that the 
traditionalist hell is the punishment for sin, including the features of infinite decline into 
sinfulness, and perhaps madness. And this hell is the punishment of the first death. If 
this position is held, however, then it would have to deal with my arguments against the 
653 Birks, Victory, p.63, and Candlish, op. cit., p. 9. 
654 Garratt, World, pp. 228-229. 
655 Candlish, op. cit., p. 11. 
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traditionalist hell that claim that it fails to be properly penal! I will discuss the relvance 
of the atonement in Birks' writing further in chapter four. 
That Reconciliationism is a mitigation of the severity of Traditionalism is also the 
conclusion of a number of traditionalist commentators. Reid concludes his discussion of 
Birks: 
To those who are always ready to welcome any relaxation of Divine threatening, 
this novel doctrine, however devoid of Scriptural support, will offer a subterfuge. 
All its author's protests against any repeal or termination of the final sentence will 
probably not suffice to prevent their finding encouragement to sin in the prospect 
of a much lighter penalty than is held out by the plainest terms of Holy Writ: 
especially as the new doctrine comes from a clergyman of high intellectual repute, 
and one of the most earnest vindicators of evangelical Christianity.657 
However, this is not the uniform position. Garratt can argue that divine mercy shown to 
the damned in reconciliation does not diminish the sense of dread of punishment, but 
actually increases it. 
And as it is well known that mercy so shown does not in the least diminish, but 
rather increases the dread with which earthly punishment is regarded, so I 
believe that if it was understood that in eternal punishment God will not leave 
men alone, or allow them to corrupt one another, but by His stem yet loving 
discipline restrain sin and lead to submission, wicked men would fear it more, 
658 
A consequence of Garratt' s position is that he argues that the hell of Traditionalism is 
not adequately penal, which is similar to my conclusion concerning the lack of lucidity 
in classic Traditionalism, even if the justification differs. 
"[F]or the sinner to be left to his own ways without judgement and without 
punishment, that would have been irremediable ruin, involving a continual 
descent in the scale of moral character; whereas when God condemns and 
punishes, and then Christ Himself is Judge, His holy punishment is calculated to 
benefit and not to injure, to elevate morally and not to degrade him who suffers 
it. ,,659 
Garratt can also write that his view is a mitigation, even " an unlimited improvement 
and infinite alleviation. "660 His argument here is, I think, similar to Bl ocher's for whom 
the punishment is both more severe, and yet there is also a mitigation, since both are the 
product of lucidity. The damned are unable to evade the seriousness of their sin, and this 
is to increase the severity of their punishment compared to the classic traditionalist view 
656 Birks, Victory, p. 157; quoted by Candlish, op. cit., p. 4. 
657 Reid, op. cit., p. 314. 
658 Garratt, Veins, pp. 168-9. 
659 Garratt, World, p. 235. 
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that has the damned continuing to rebel against God and his judgements, and thus to 
evade the truth about themselves. However, the same vision of God which highlights 
their own sin also highlights the justice of the punishment, for which God is 
praiseworthy, and the contemplation of these perfections is in some sense a mitigation. 
Before turning to examine more closely some of the arguments for Reconciliationism, I 
will briefly summarise the main differences between reconciliationists, which largely 
reflect the differences between the nineteenth century proponents and Blocher' s position 
which I have sought to develop. There are four major issues. First, there are differences 
over the necessity of the submission of the damned. For writers like Clarke and Garratt 
for whom the damned retain free-will, there is no certainty about the submission of the 
damned. However, for Blocher, and to a lesser degree Birks as well, submission is a 
} 
necessity from the requirements of justice, which is further demonstrated by the second 
difference. 
Second, there are differences over the timing of, and means to, the submission of the 
damned. For Birks submission is the result of punishment: 
... the punishment will not be so incomplete as to leave the wicked in the active 
commission of eternal blasphemy, defiant rebellion, and mutual torment, but will 
bring them, as the footstool of Christ, into a state of passive subjection and utter 
and complete humiliation under the mighty hand of God. 661 
This implies that there is a temporal process at work at which the damned begin in 
rebellion, but are gradually subdued. However, on Blocher' s position, this subjection takes 
place completely at the Last Judgement, and is necessary for the punishment to be just. 
Therefore there is no process or progress in hell, emphasised by Blocher' s notion of the 
fixity of the damned. 
Third, there are differences over the presence of mercy in hell. For the nineteenth 
century writers God continues to love and be merciful towards the damned. However, it 
can also be argued that hell does not exhibit the love and mercy of God, but only his 
wrath. This latter position is, I think, closer to Blocher's view, for whom the 
modification of hell from Traditionalism is due to the requirements of justice and the 
660 Garratt, Veins, p. 126, quoted at length above. 
661 Birks, Victory, p. 211. 
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cessation of sin with its excessive d~alism, rather than the love and mercy of God. Put 
another way, when Birks summarises the two main reasons why he holds his view, he 
gives them as the victory of God and the character of God. 662 In this thesis I have argued 
that the victory of God does indeed demand a modification of Traditionalism, such that 
the ·damned submit to their punishment. However, one can still hold to 
Reconciliationism while rejecting Birks arguments from the character of God, and in 
particular that the love and mercy of God extend to the damned in hell. This difference 
also relates to that of the scope of the atonement. Birks argues from a universal scope of 
the atonement to justify his position of mercy in hell. However, it is also possible to reject 
such a position and hold that no blessings gained on the cross are extended to the damned 
in hell while remaining a reconciliationist. 
Fourth, there are differences over the mitigation of the severity of hell. For most of the 
nineteenth century writers reconciliation is a definite mitigation, to the extent that at 
points it is hard to determine what distinguishes the experience of the damned from the 
righteous. Alternatively, these modifications to Traditionalism can be understood to lead 
not to a lessening of torment, but, if anything, to its increase. Thus for Blocher there is 
no room for Lewis' 'black pleasure'663 in hell, since the damned are not able to 'enjoy' 
their freedom, but are faced with the full consequences and awfulness of their sin and its 
penal consequences. However, I would accept that there are additional blessings that are 
experienced by the damned at the same time, and that these could also be understood as 
some sort of mitigation. Blocher certainly speculates that this may be a better fate for the 
damned than extinction when he asks, suggesting a negative reply, "Would annihilation 
be a better fate, objectively, and even subjectively, for the lost themselves?"664 He 
concludes, "If we may cautiously trust the larger hope that the existence of the lost shall 
not amount to a total waste, neither for the universe, nor for God, nor for themselves, it 
may shed some encouraging light on the problem of evil."665 
However, the fundamental agreement between all the proponents of Reconciliationism 
is that the damned either do, or may, cease to sin, and are lucid, and are in some sense 
662 Ibid., p. 63. 
663 Lewis, Problem, p. 114. 
664 Blocher, op. cit., p. 311. [Italics original] 
665 Ibid., p. 311. 
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reconciled to God. Before moving on, I will add one more analogy and mention two 
more writers who are suggestive of Reconciliationism and also add a significant point of 
development. The analogy, similar to that of the exiled prisoners above, is of a prisoner 
who accepts the justice of his punishment and who is not therefore released, and may even 
insist that he 'serves his time'. An example of this is given by O'Donovan in his booklet on 
capital punishment. He writes about the case of Gary Gilmore who preferred to be 
executed than use the appeal procedures. "He found the idea of execution dignifying. He 
was fighting to be allowed to 'die like a man'. He wished his death to be, as many have 
wished it, an act of purpose, a joy and a triumph. It was, in its way, a religious attitude. "666 
I think that this is both a more complete punishment, and less 'dualistic' than an analogy 
where the prisoner refuses to accept his sentence, as classic Traditionalism holds. 
The first additional writer who is suggestive of Reconciliationism who I want to 
mention is Robert Anderson, one time Inspector of Scotland Yard in the Victorian era. 
Anderson is of interest because he is usually acknowledged as a traditionalist; and yet he 
actually develops the notion of reconciliation to suggest the damned will serve God. The 
references to Anderson in the current debate are rare, yet Vernon Grounds notes that 
His discussion of eschatology, Human Destiny: After Death - What?, Spurgeon 
praised as the most satisfactory treatment of that problem he had ever read. After 
examining the theories of universalism, conditionalism, and annihilationism and 
showing their untenability from a scriptural perspective, Anderson states some 
of the prevalent misconceptions about hell. He then proceeds to undercut the 
case against eternal punishment. .. 667 
He is therefore usually categorised as a mainstream traditionalist. However, Anderson 
lists a number of difficulties with what he believes is the traditional understanding of 
hell. I will quote those relevant to this discussion: 
What are those difficulties? That God should tolerate the existence of evil for 
eternity ... That banished from love and light and peace to their awful prison 
home, Satan shall reign over [ the damned] for evermore, and his foul demons 
shal revel in their anguish ... [the best in hell] shall be herded with the vilest and 
the worst of men, and trampled on by devils; in time to grow like them, until at 
last all trace and memory of purity and good shall perish, and hell itself shall 
~66 O'Donovan, op. cit., p. 21. 
667 Vernon C. Grounds, The Final State of the Wicked, JETS24/3 (September 1981), p. 218. R. Anderson, 
Human Destiny: After Death - What? (London: Pickering and Inglis, 1913). Carson also notes this 
recommendation by Spurgeon, and adds his own comments that Anderson is "more satisfactory" than C.S. 
Lewis in his speculations about the nature of hell, while noting of his book that "I remain uncertain of 
some of its arguments ... " Carson, Gagging, p. 532. 
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lose its power to make the damned more hateful, more corrupt, so hideous and 
awful shall be the depths of their depravity and guilt. 668 
Anderson then goes on to propose a number of modifications to this understanding of 
Traditionalism, which come very close to those I have proposed in this chapter: 
The "everlasting fire" is not to be the Devil's kingdom, it will be his prison, not 
his palace. Amidst so much that is doubtful, this at least is sure ... Every creature 
in the universe shall be in absolute subjection to Almighty God. The under-
world is not to be a scene of satanic carnival. The word-pictures which describe 
the shrieks and curses of the lost on earth, as demons mock their anguish or heap 
fuel on their torture fires, are relieved from the charge of folly only by the graver 
charge of profanity. There is no spot in all the Queen's dominions in which the 
reign of order is so supreme as in prison. So shall it be in Hell. To speak of this 
as producing an alleviation of the sinner's doom betrays the lingering influence 
of error here condemned. Obedience will be the normal condition there. To 
speculate how it will be brought about is idle. It may be that the recognition of 
the perfect justice and goodness of God will lead the lost to accept their doom. 
Possibly, too ... Divine love shall shine out so clearly even amjd the fires of 
judgment, even the prison-house shall join in the refrain, and praise shall issue 
forth from hell. 669 
Anderson thus seems to come very close to Blocher' s understanding of an end to sin, if 
obedience is the state of the damned. He also acknowledges the more speculative 
possibility of the reconciliation of the damned to hell, and even their praise of God. 
However, one difference is that Anderson speculates that this praise would be for God's 
love, whereas I have only suggested it would be for God's justice exhibited in their 
judgement. Further, Anderson goes beyond my list of modifications when he speculates 
that the damned may be able to minister in hell. 
There are no idlers in a well-disciplined gaol: in God's great prison-house is 
idleness to reign supreme? ... Are we to suppose that all the energies of the lost 
are to be consumed in tasks of aimless punishment? ... May we not suppose that 
in the infinite wisdom of God there are purposes to the accomplishment of which 
event they will be made to minister? ... Why assume that the lost will be 
battened down in some huge dungeon with no occupation save to bewail 
forevermore tlieir doom ?670 
One difficulty with this addition is that it is difficult to reconcile with the notion of 
fixity. However, this addition can be rejected without rejecting the other modifications. 
Grounds offers a succinct and I believe valid conclusion for those parts of Anderson's 
position I have quoted, the final point excepted: "Confessedly these revelational 
principles with their undeniable admixture of logical extrapolation fail to remove all 
668 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 134-5. 
669 Ibid.~ pp. 141-143. 
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difficulties, but at any rate they make hell a doctrine that does not offend the heart and 
crucify the mind. "671 
The second writer who is suggestive of Reconciliationism is R.W. Dale who argues that 
the damned will demand punishment, rather than rebelling against it: 
conscience will vehemently maintain that the Law is supreme; and in the case 
supposed will protest that while on the one hand the creature had dishonoured 
the Law by sin, the Creator has completed the dishonour by refusing to 
acknowledge the ill-desert of sin. 672 
Therefore, if the Creator and creature are not to be dishonoured, both will acknowledge 
the ill-desert of sin. Further 
Punishment gives to the sufferer occasion for manifesting humility, patience, and 
a spirit of penitent submission to the pain which he has deserved by his offences; 
and if he does not manifest these virtues he incurs fresh guilt. But the duty of 
manifesting them arises from the fact that by some external force or authority he 
is being made to suffer the just consequences of his past offences. 673 
3.5.3.2 Arguments for Reconciliationism 
So far I have largely focused on descriptions of the state of the damned. I now tum to 
examine directly the chief arguments used by Birks, and others, for their view. A central 
argument for Birks is that all of God's attributes, including his love and grace, will be 
directed toward the damned as well as the righteous. This is indicated in the following 
summary of his own position. 
The main idea, in my view of the future, is that eternal punishment, however 
sure and however solemn, does not exclude every form and kind of goodness or 
mercy from being shown to those who are punished, but that the King of Heaven 
retains still the right and power to mingle such actings of Divine mercy and 
compassion with the fulfilment of his threatenings, in such measure as seems 
good in His sight. The secondary idea is that of one especial way in which such 
mercy may be shown. 674 
670 Ibid., pp. 173-4. 
671 Grounds, art. cit., p. 219. However it is unclear whether Grounds has realised the true distinctiveness 
and value of Anderson's modifications, since in the next sentence he writes, "Help in clearing away 
rhetorical fog from this area of theology is also provided by Friedrich von Hugel." [Ibid., p. 219]. 
However, in Grounds own summary of von Hugel it is clear that von Hugel holds to the continuation of 
sin and the damned's lack of lucidity as to the nature of their sin and the justice of their judgement. He 
speaks for example of "ever-increasing spiritual blindness." [See Ibid., p. 220, quoting F. von Hugel, 
·"What Do We Mean By Heaven? And What Do We Mean By Hell?" in Essays and Addresses on the 
Philosophy of Religion (London: J.M. Dent, 1924), pp. 216-221.] 
672 Dale, op. cit., p. 385. 
673 Ibid., p. 386. 
674 Birks, Atonement, pp. 39-40, point 8. 
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Again, he writes 
that the perfections of God, who is at once just and gracious, lead to the conclusion 
that since righteousness, as well as grace, is displayed for ever towards the saved, 
so grace, mercy, and compassion, in some mysterious form, will be displayed, as 
well as righteous justice, towards even the worst and guiltiest of the creatures of 
God.675 
This point is emphasised in Rowell's comments in summary on Birks 
Birks saw more clearly than most that the conflict between universalism and a 
rigorous understanding of eternal punishment was paralleled by the problem of 
the relation of God's justice and mercy. His attempted solution may have been 
paradoxical, but he did at least recognise that the problem existed, and at the 
same time pointed the way to an emphasis on a corporate as well as an 
individual salvation. 676 
I will address this issue of whether it is a paradoxical position below. Garratt also holds 
that this is a strength of this view compared to Traditionalism. 
Better still is it, because it honours God by reconciling His attributes, to be able 
to discover in the deep mine of the Word of God the possibilify of the union of 
love with justice in the Eternal Punishment of sin, as in the Atonement itself we 
see the union of justice with love. 677 
Further, Birks argues that his position is wedded to what he calls a moderate Calvinism, 
and would be much weaker if combined with a stricter Calvinism. Thus, when 
discussing the attitude of the righteous as they contemplate the damned, he comments: 
If, indeed, you retain all the other elements of supralapsarian Calvinism, and 
merely replace unending blasphemies by adl'!liring contemplation of the Divine 
glory, then I fully allow that the difficulty, relieved on one side, is aggravated on 
the other; and not just sensibility alone, but the higher sense of justice, might 
hinder the acquiescence of the holy and righteous in the judgement of the Most 
High .. _678 
Presumably the difficulty that is aggravated for Birks is the idea that God might not love 
all and seek to save all. However, if one does accept the stricter Calvinist position that 
God is just in not ele~ting to save, and in not loving all after death either, then Birks' 
objection collapses. 
Birks also discusses the atonement at length holding, as might be expected from his 
comments on Calvinism, a doctrine of a universal atonement. From this he argues, 
unusually for an evangelical, that one of the effects of the atonement was to gain mercy for 
675 Birks, Victory, p. 230. 
676 Rowell, op. cit., p. 129. 
677 Garratt, Veins, p. xvi. 
678 Birks, Atonement, p. 36 [Also Victory, p. 179] 
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the damned as well as the righteous, but to a different end. Since I will examine this at 
length in the next chapter, I will be content simply to note the point here. As with the 
previous point, if one can hold to Reconciliationism without having to hold that God is 
gracious to the damned, similarly one can hold to Reconciliationism without holding to a 
universal atonement and the efficacy of the cross for the damned. 
Birks also makes use of an argument from the notion of God's forbearance. He begins by 
talking about Satan, and then extends his comments to the damned. 
There is the widest contrast between [Satan's] present time of permitted and active 
reign, and the season of punishment, ... For the rest, it is not strange, but natural and 
certain, that sinners should have far less freedom for active wickedness under the 
revealed and fiery anger of God, than in the times of forbearance and long-
suffering. The strange notion is, that under the holy eye and righteous hand of their 
Judge, they can still rebel even more freely and fiercely than before. 679 
This is the same point that I noted Blocher making at the beginning of this section. 
However, the issue that prompted this investigation of Reconciliationism was the 
annihilationist charge of dualism against classic Traditionalism, and the subsidiary 
problem of the so-called Abominable Fancy. And I now turn to examining the 
comments by reconciliationists on these two issues. I begin with the Abominable Fancy. 
Birks argues forcibly that the righteous will look on the state of the damned in hell 
without diminishing their blessing. Candlish objects at this point that 
[Birks] does not seem to see how completely his arguments can be turned 
against himself. For what, according to hiin, do the saved, as they are gathered 
round the lake, behold? Lost men, suffering eternal shame and misery, yet 
capable of such a sympathetic and admiring contemplation of the glory of God in 
redemption, as somehow and somewhat mitigates the sense of their own 
unintermitting and unending pain. Is not that a spectacle which might shock the 
saved even ID(?re than the other? Might it not raise questions as to the equity of 
keeping intelligent creatures, capable of so knowing and understanding God, 
under penal constraint and penal suffering for ever? Is it not, in that view, their 
mery sensibility that is apt to take offence, but their higher sense of justice. 680 
However, I think that Candlish's objection at this point is unfounded, since it assumes 
that his own position is correct, and the implication is that the second death is not a just 
punishment. A unique feature of Birks' position is tha~ the equanimity of the righteous 
only applies to their attitude to the damned at the second death. Indeed Birks' claims that 
679 Birks, Victory, p. 249. 
68° Candlish, op. cit., p. 11. 
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the righteous would recoil from the torments of the first death.681 Again, this seems to 
undermine Birks' own arguments since if the blessed recoil it would suggest that the 
punishments of the first death are unjust. This is the same point I have made against 
annihilationists above. Birks also goes further than simply arguing that the righteous 
won't have their bliss diminished by the torments of the damned. He goes on to argue 
that the view of the damned is beneficial to the righteous, in that it is needed to prevent 
the righteous from falling again. 
When the redemption has been so complete, in myriads on myriads of ransomed 
souls, that no trace of sin, corruption, or mortality remain, how easily might 
pride creep in once more, and a second and more fatal apostasy ensue, if the 
lessons of the past, fading ever into the further distance, were not renewed and 
deepened by the present sight of those in whom is still to be learned the 
creature's lesson of self-emptiness and utter shame ... in this way alone a rescued 
universe may be upheld for ever in the enjoyment of a blessedness based on 
perfect humility, and therefore capable of enlarging itself without end. It may be 
thus through the work of judgement alone, that the bulwarks will be reared of 
that heavenly city, whose walls are Salvation, and her gates Praise.682 
If it is true that the righteous require the vision of the damned for the permanence of 
their own felicity, then this is a strong argument for the Abominable Fancy. It also 
provides an argument against Annihilationism, and Rowell notes the similarity with 
Aquinas at this point. 
Aquinas argued against annihilationism because he believed the glory of the 
blessed to be enhanced by their knowledge of the torments of the damned; Birks 
suggests that the continued knowledge of the lost by the blessed makes 
redemption a perpetually revealed, present reality, whereas, if the wicked were 
annihilated, redemption would only be the recollection of an ever-fading past as 
far as the blessed were concerned. 683 
However, unlike Aquinas, Birks' argument assumes an ability of the righteous to sin 
which is usually rejected in the tradition. Thus Clarke represents the traditional position 
when he rejects the necessity for the righteous to view the damned, and writes of "the 
righteous, who, ex hypothesi, will no longer need so terrible a warning and deterrent. "684 
However, Clarke argues that the blessed can see the damned and he concludes from this 
that their punishment cannot be that of classic Traditionalism because it would diminish 
their bliss. "How can they possibly be happy if that misery has no reformatory or saving, 
681 Birks, Victory, p. 179. 
682 Ibid., p. 184. This view is shared, for example, by Garratt, Veins , p. 178. 
683 Rowell, op. cit., p. 126. Cf Aquinas, op. cit., Suppl. Q. 98, Art: 5,8,9, on the attitude of the lost to God 
and to the blessed; Victory, 1870, p. 205. 
684 Clarke, op. cit., p. 100. 
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element in it, but is endless and hopeless?"685 In this Clarke is similar to Birks, in 
arguing that the torments of the first death would diminish the bliss of the righteous, and 
in proposing the alternative of a hell into which God extends his mercy. This is the same 
as the objection of annihilationists in the recent debate, and my response is the same: if 
the punishment is just, it won't diminish the bliss of the righteous, and if it does, then it 
can' t be just. Garratt is also clear that the damned are viewed by the righteous, and he 
concludes that there must be some benefit gained by the righteous from this: "does it not 
prove that there is to be seen there what the holy may look upon with pleasure? Is it not 
explained by what we have already learned from Scripture, - that in eternal punishment 
God's love is able to make men seek His name?"686 Certainly any argument for a benefit 
for the righteous in the continuation of hell serves as an argument against 
Annihilationism since the extinction of the damned would be to deprive the righteous of 
that benefit. However, on Blocher's position the divine attribute present in hell is his 
justice, and not his mercy, and any benefit to the righteous comes from a perception of 
this virtue. 
I now turn directly to the discussion of dualism and, having noted the relevant 
discussions in the literature, I will argue for three conclusions. First, I will argue that 
Reconciliationism does avoid classic Traditionalism's problem of dualism, and that this 
in itself may encourage annihilationists to consider it. Second, I will argue that it is a 
better response to the problem of damnation dualism than Annihilationism, and that this 
is a further reason for annihilationists to consider it. Finally, I will argue that 
Reconciliationism is not an incoherent position on this issue as some critics have 
claimed. 
Several reconciliationists discuss the issue of dualism directly. Birks refers to the victory 
over evil, and refers to this victory in the title of his major book on the subject of hell. 
"The purpose of His judgement cannot be to stereotype and eternize [sic] active 
rebellion against God, but to abolish it for evermore. "687 He does however acknowledge 
that this is not an entire 'solution' to the problem of evil. To his imaginary interlocutor 
685 Ibid., p. 102. 
686 Garratt, Veins, p. 178. 
687 Birks, Victory, p. 179. 
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he writes, "I cannot hope to give your perplexity full and entire relief. "688 James Orr 
frames his very brief comments that tentatively propose a form of Reconciliationism as 
an answer to this problem. Orr writes 
The veil, in Scripture, falls on what seems to be a duality, yet not to the 
exclusion of hints, even more, of a future final unification - a gathering up of all 
things in Christ as Head - when God is once more "all in all. "689 Such language 
would seem to imply at least a cessation of active opposition to the will of God -
an acknowledgement universally of His authority and rule, - a reconcilement, in 
some form, on the part even of those outside the blessedness of the Kingdom 
with the order of the universe.690 
Clarke also sees Reconciliationism as a solution to the problem of the dualism of classic 
Traditionalism. He begins by highlighting the problem: 
[I]t is so generally admitted that the counsel of the Lord is the redemption of 
man from the power of evil, that a view of the future destinies of man which 
practically makes Satan triumph, and his counsel prevail over that of the 
Almighty, or at any rate, establishes an endless dualism of good and evil, seems 
practically impossible. 691 
Clarke also quotes Westcott to this effect. 
Or does it [ eternal life] leave room for existence finally alien from God and 
unsubdued by His Love, for evil, as evil, enduring as God is? To suggest this last 
alternative seems to admit the possibility of a dualism in a form wholly 
inconceivable. The present existence of evil carries with it difficulties to which 
nature offers no solution; but to suppose that evil once introduced into the world 
is for ever, appears to be at variance with the essential conception of God as 
revealed to us.692 
Clarke sees Reconciliationism is a more adequate solution to the problem of dualism, 
and frames this notion as a partial answer to a question set by Westcott. 
[T]he Saviour-Judge theory, though it by no means professes to explain 
everything, does really seem to go some way towards the solution of the question 
he mentions as being yet unsolved, viz.: How the ideal of a final Divine unity is 
to be reached in harmony with the justice of God and the obligations of man's 
responsibility. 693 
Although Clarke and t4e other nineteenth century reconciliationists differ from Blocher in 
holding to the extension of God's love and mercy into hell, I think that their claim about 
their position being a better resolution of the problem of dualism can also be made for 
Blocher's more restrictive position. 
688 Ibid., p. 42. 
689 Acts 3:21; 1 Cor.15:24-28; Eph.1:10; Phil.2:9-11. 
690 Orr, op. cit., pp. 317-8. 
691 Clarke, op. cit., p. 103. 
692 Westcott, Historic Faith, p. 149, 5th ed., quoted by Clarke, op. cit., p. 103. 
693 Clarke, op. cit., p. 112. Clarke is commenting on Westcott, op. cit., pp. !49-153, which he calls a 
"remarkable passage". 
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However, with the extinction of the damned, Annihilationism also avoids the problem 
of permanent sin dualism, even if it has the problems of a temporary dualism. I now 
want to examine whether Reconciliationism is a better resolution than Annihilationism 
of the problem of damnation dualism (the problem of some being permanently damned, 
whether in torment or extinguished). Clarke argues that it is a less dualistic solution than 
Annihilationism. 
To expel the evil which Tertullian named the great interloper, must ever remain 
the aim and the effort of the eternal righteousness, or evil will become a sort of 
naturalised or legitimated citizen of eternity. But how is it to be expelled? There 
is the way of Annihilation - ... And if this were the method of cure, who would 
be the victor - God or sin? Would not the victory remain with the evil which 
compelled God to uncreate His own creation ?694 
Thus Clarke certainly hopes, and probably expects, his view to be accepted by 
Annihilationists: 
[It] would probably be welcomed by Annihilationists as relieving their theory 
from the enormous difficulty of holding that the resurrection of the wicked is 
only with a view to their undergoing the full punishment they deserve, and, when 
that is over, suffering extinction of being. 695 
Helm offers a brief account of a traditional Calvinist understanding of a purpose of hell, 
which Annihilationism would not be able to maintain so easily with the extinction of the 
damned, and which goes some way to providing a purpose for hell, and thus relieving 
damnation dualism. Helm begins by mentioning the problem which I have called 
damnation dualism: 
[F]rom the point of view of the original creation, and looked at in isolation, hell 
may be an anomaly. For the Creator intended to create an all-good universe, and 
did so, and hell is the final culmination of the sinful departure of creatures from the 
original order of things. 
But hel1 is not an anomaly from the point of view of God's purpose or 
decree. For it was God's nature to punish sin in hell. It is required by God's 
holiness, and by the enormity of sin as rebellion against God. So that although 
according to Scripture hell is a place of indescribable woe, nevertheless in hell, no 
less than in heaven, the justice of God reigns. Heaven is founded upon the justice 
of God in accepting Christ's righteousness on behalf of sinners; hell is founded on 
the justice of God in punishing sinners ... Older Christian writers developed this 
thought in a way which is unfamiliar to most Christians today, but in a way which 
is nonetheless scriptural. They claimed that, far from being an anomaly, or the 
triumph of evil, hell demonstrates the justice of God in a public, unmistakable 
694 Clarke, op. cit., p. 109. 
695 Ibid., p. 107. 
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way. His justice against sin is manifest in the punishing of the sinner, just as his 
grace is demonstrated in providing his Son as a substitute for those who are as 
undeserving of the saving goodness of God as are any of those who are in hell. 696 
The ACUTE report notes this as the main traditionalist response, and quotes Bray as an 
example of it: 
If conditionalists recoil from eternal conscious punishment on the grounds that it 
seems ultimately wanton and pointless, traditionalists reply that it does have a 
positive aim - namely, to glorify God as a righteous Judge. Bray again articulates 
this view concisely: 'If the non-elect have no hope of salvation and God does not 
want them to suffer unduly, why were they ever created in the first place? Their 
existence must serve some purpose, and once that is admitted the view that their 
eternal punishment glorifies the justice of God seems perfectly logical. '697 
Blocher puts forward this argument as an improvement on Annihilationism but with 
greater hesitancy: "If we may cautiously trust the larger hope that the existence of the lost 
shall not amount to a total waste, neither for the universe, nor for God, nor for themselves, 
it may shed some encouraging light on the problem of evil. "698 His argument is thus that 
his position is not only more faithful to Scripture but an improved response to the problem 
of evil than Annihilationism, without claiming to be a solution of it. Blocher makes the 
same point in quoting Salmond who comments on the Greek mind's preference for 
unending torment over extinction, and commenting: "Would annihilation be a better fate, 
objectively, and even subjectively, for the lost themselves? ... This pagan preference, ... may 
not have been so far misguided. "699 However, he continues that hell "remains a 
tragedy.11700 In an earlier essay he offers a slightly more confident sounding summary of 
his position, and the implication that follows: 
[W]e can correct ... inadequate ideas of eternal punishment. Scripture, for instance, 
never suggests the idea that it is a divine defeat, or that sin continues, that evil 
perpetuates itself in Gehenna. On the contrary, evil, vanquished and crushed by 
judgment shall no longer exist! ... all human beings, without any exception, in the 
blaze of that Day, shall see at last in truth. They will render to God the homage he 
requires: a sinc~re Amen assenting to judgment. The ungodly shall condemn their 
own ungodliness, in agreement with God; they will wish for nothing else than for 
punishment as they will see that punishment alone can right them with God; the 
consuming desire of their conscience shall be to satisfy the divine justice. It will be 
good for them to glorify God in and through their judgment; they will thus fulfil, in 
696 Helm, op. cit., pp. 114-115. 
697 ACUTE, op. cit., pp. 105-106, quoting Bray, art. cit., p. 23. Anbther rationale for the continuation of 
hell is that mooted by Birks, Blanchard and Spanner, noted above, p. 118, where hell serves to prevent the 
righteous from sinning. However, the ACUTE report rightly emphasises the speculative nature of this 
proposal. ACUTE, op. cit., p.108. 
698 Blocher, op. cit., p.311. 
699 Ibid., p. 311. The Salmond quote from Plutarch is in The Christian Doctrine, p. 610. 
700 Ibid., p.312. Blocher refuses to be pushed to "a non-Biblical/elix culpa" position. [Ibid., p. 312.] 
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spite of a lost life, the essential calling of all creatures - to glorify the Lord - and 
they will know it. It might happen that this doctrine be more merciful, in the end, 
to them, than theories which have been framed to elude the clarity of biblical 
teaching.701 
If this argument about the purpose of hell is accepted, and I agree that it is 'perfectly 
logical', and if the extinction of the damned would lessen the clarity of the demonstration 
as the memory of the damned faded after their extinction, then this would provide a further 
reason for holding that Reconciliationism is a better response to damnation dualism than 
Annihilationism. Certainly Reconciliationism does not suffer from the dualism of waste 
which Annihilationism does, and if it is persuasive it would provide a strong reason for 
annihilationists preferring this modified form of Traditionalism over Annihilationism. 
An argument could still be mounted that any unending form of hell creates a dualism in 
the nature of God: before creation there was no wrath exercised by God, but if hell is 
unending then there has been an eternal change in God since he eternally has to display his 
wrath. However, the extinction or transformation of the objects of his wrath is only a 
partial response since the state of' having been wrathful' and the memory of past wrath 
would remain. Clarke also notes that another reason that extinction is not an adequate 
answer to the problem of dualism is that God will remember the damned. 
"The annihilated creature would be indeed gone for ever - good and evil, shame 
and misery, penalty and pain would for him be all ended with his being: but it 
would not be so with God - out of His memory the name of the man could never 
perish, ... "702 
Further, there is still Bray's incisive question to be faced: "why were [the non-elect] ever 
created in the first place?" 703 On the assumption that it had a purpose, then the 
glorification of his justice is a logical reason, and one that may also require the 
permanence of his wrath. 
A final issue is whether Reconciliationism is a coherent position at this point, or whether 
the different judgements as to what sort of doctrine it is reflects inherent confusion, or 
even contradiction. Birks was prepared to talk about his view having elements of paradox: 
"May we not rather believe that their condition will be a mysterious paradox, ... "704 This is 
701 Blocher, "The Scope of Redemption and Modem Theology," in The Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical 
Theology, p.103. 
702 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
703 Bray, art. cit., p. 23. 
704 Birks, Victory, p. 195. 
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also Rowell's tentative verdict on Birks' position: "His attempted solution may have been 
paradoxical, ... "705 However Birks uses the term 'paradox' confusingly. In the following 
quote he defines paradox as a type of contradiction and then argues that his position is not 
in fact paradoxical. Thus, Birks summarises Candlish's second objection, "Your next 
objection is that my view involves a moral paradox, the possibility of two opposite and 
contradictory experiences co-existing in the same man, and for ever."706 Birks responds 
that this is a contrast, but not a contradiction. He points out that God has the contrast of 
both justice and mercy, and that humanity can too. It is therefore uncertain what exactly 
Birks is admitting when he admits to 'a mysterious paradox'. I think it likely that he 
does not mean an absolute paradox to which there is no resolution, but a seeming 
paradox from our current perspective in this life. Blocher' s understanding is therefore 
probably different from Birks' in that he probably is claiming an absolute paradox. John 
Wenham describes Blocher's paper as "devout and difficult" and concludes a very brief 
summary of its position with this comment: "This is all very paradoxical and seems to 
me to owe more to the doctors of the church than to holy Scripture."707 Blocher himself 
states that hell "remains tragedy,11708 and that he believes there is "no rational solution of 
the riddle." 709 By this he means not just that there is no rational solution that can be found 
in this life, but there is no rational solution at all. Certainly in his work on the problem of 
evil he seems to conclude that there is no solution.710 However I would argue 
differently, that the position should be rejected if it really is ultimately paradoxical, but 
that in fact it isn't, and can therefore be accepted. 
I tum now to the strengths of Bl ocher's position. As I noted above, for Blocher the greatest 
strength of this position is that it avoids the problem of sin dualism with which 
annihilationists charge the traditionalist position: there is no eternity of sinning, but rather 
the damned are reconciled. I have argued that the annihilationists' objection to the dualism 
of the classic traditionalist position is valid in so far as it points to the problem of 
continuing sin in hell. However I have argued that Annihilationism, while avoiding the 
problem of there being a place of permanent rebellion against the rule of God, does not 
705 Rowell, op. cit., p. 129. 
706 Birks, Atonement, p. 27. 
707 Wenham, Facing, p. 258. 
708 Blocher, op. cit., p. 312. 
709 Ibid., p. 286. 
710 Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross (Leicester: IVP, 1994; French edition 1990). 
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entirely avoid the problem of dualism itself, since there remains what I have termed 
damnation dualism. The challenge therefore remains: "Orthodox tradition, we feel, has not 
paid enough attention to the grand proclamation of fullness in the New Testament, 
recapitulation and universal reconciliation ... "711 Blocher's position does, I believe, take 
better account of this theological theme of universal reconciliation than either classic 
Traditionalism or Annihilationism, and thereby gives a less dualistic account of hell than 
either of these positions. In its denial of continuing sin and in the notion of lucidity of the 
damned, it offers a better account than Traditionalism, and in the notion of reconciliation it 
offers a better account than Annihilationism since the reconciliation of the damned seems 
to be a good which their extinction would lose. 
I have also argued that these aspects of Bl ocher's thesis also offer a different account of the 
I 
severity of hell, and thus has implications for the other major annihilationist criticism of 
classical Traditionalism: its injustice. If the damned do not continue to sin and rebel 
against their sentence but rather praise God, then this is a relative good and would 
presumably bring pleasure to the damned. However, lucidity would also serve to sharpen 
the poena damni, and indeed I have argued that the continuation of sin in classic 
Traditionalism actually serves to undermine much of this aspect of the torment of the 
damned. Therefore this might also be a more severe punishment. However, I think that for 
most annihilationists this conception would be considered a mitigation of Traditionalism, 
because their underlying objection is to the pointlessness and therefore brutality of the 
traditional hell. Even though the pains of a reconciliationist hell are sharper, they are also 
more moral, since more just, and with a point, in that they serve to emphasise the justice of 
God. 
I have also speculated that Annihilationism may be in part a reactive doctrine, defined as 
much by its r~jection of Traditionalism. I would therefore hope that by offering a 
modified Traditionalism annihilationists might be encouraged to consider their position 
less favourably. Garratt makes clear the strategy of this thesis in proposing 
Reconciliationism as a means of responding to criticisms from annihilationists of the 
classic traditional view. Garratt states that his own view is basically Traditionalism 
stripped of human additions. "The Eternal Punishment of unforgiven sinners is a 
711 Blocher, Everlasting Punishment, p. 289. 
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Scriptural doctrine, and it is best to defend it from the plausible objections which human 
additions to the teaching of God's Word have raised against it, by clearing them 
away."712 I believe that these modifications serve to clear away several such human 
additions. 
712 Garratt, Veins, p. xiv. 
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Chapter 4: Hell and the Atonement 
In this chapter I turn to examine links between the doctrine of hell and the doctrine of the 
atonement. These links are rarely discussed in the current debate, and where they are the 
discussion is usually brief, but on the basis of them some traditionalists and some 
annihilationists conclude they provide arguments in support of their position and against 
the other. The paucity of discussion is highlighted by Edward Fudge: "The literature 
concerning final punishment contains a number of surprises, and one of the greatest is the 
scant attention given to the death of Jesus Christ."713 The value of and need for further 
study of these links is stated by the ACUTE report: "... questions of hell are never far 
from questions of soteriology - that is, the doctrine of salvation and theories of atonement. 
Although detailed exploration of this link lie beyond our remit here, we believe it to be an 
important and fertile area for further research."714 The importance of this neglected area is 
stated by Guillebaud: "It is impossible to begin to understand eternal punishment, if it is 
considered in isolation from ... the Doctrine of the Atonement."715 Kendall Harmon's 
judgement in the final paragraph of his essay on Fudge is that, "Like so many other 
doctrines, hell is finally best understood in the light of the cross."716 
In the discussion of the links between the two doctrines in the literature, the arguments are 
sometimes similar to those about the justice of hell, since a similar logic is usually applied 
to the justice of the punishment of Christ on the cross and the punishment of the damned 
in hell. However, I will discuss these links here, rather than in Chapter 2, because whereas 
the issues of justice and dualism are common explicit concerns of the debate, this issue is 
less common and is an area I want to develop since I believe that it offers strong, and 
possibly decisive, arguments for the debate. A further reason for discussing this issue here 
is that, having now fully expounded the modified Traditionalism which I have termed 
Reconciliationism, I can also examine the links between it and the doctrine of the 
atonement. 
713 Fudge, op. cit., p. 215. (Cf. the whole of chapter 12: 'Golgotha and Gehenna.') The same quote stands at 
the head of the same chapter of the 1994 edition ofFudge's book, 2nd ed, op. cit., p.135. 
714 ACUTE, op. cit., p. 104. 
715 Guillebaud, op. cit., p. 44. 
716 Harmon, op. cit., p. 222. 
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I will divide this chapter into three main sections. In the first section I will expound the 
argwnents related to the doctrine of the atonement as they are used in the debate about 
hell. I will begin by briefly reviewing the logic of the link between the two doctrines, 
noting that this link is upheld by a number of writers on both sides of the debate. I will 
then assess the arguments used by both sides on the basis of this link. The arguments run 
in two directions: from the understanding of hell for one's doctrine of the atonement, and 
from the understanding of the atonement for one's doctrine of hell. My chief conclusions 
will be that, on the basis of the link widely held on both sides in the debate, the 
annihilationist position leads to unorthodox doctrines of the incarnation and the 
resurrection. In particular, I will argue, first, that Annihilationism entails a separation of 
the natures of Christ at death, and an annihilation of the human nature of Christ, which is 
counter to the Chalcedonian doctrine of the incarnation. Second, Annihilationism entails 
that the 'resurrection' of Christ was not a true resurrection but rather some sort of re-
creation, involving a new incarnation. The first of these conclusions is, I believe, the more 
compelling, but either conclusion would probably be considered unorthodox, and thus 
unacceptable, by an evangelical annihilationist, and if proven would be a strong reason for 
the rejection of their doctrine of hell. One strategy for annihilationists to avoid these 
conclusions is to reject the link between hell and the cross which underlies the arguments. 
In the second section of this chapter I will argue that the rejection of this link would raise 
further problems for annihilationists. In particular I will argue that the denial of such a link 
may require the rejection of a doctrine of penal substi~tionary atonement, which 
evangelicals have traditionally held. In order to establish this point, I will survey the nature 
of the link between the doctrine of the atonement and hell in three writers who have been 
highly influential for many evangelicals: Calvin, John Owen and Jonathan Edwards, along 
with briefer comments .on Luther and, from the recent debate, Packer. I will argue that the 
link is strongest in Owen and Edwards, which may be a result of their developed advocacy 
of a doctrine of limited atonement, but that each writer believes that there is such a link as 
to raise these problems for annihilationists. I will therefore conclude that annihilationists 
are required to reject the doctrine of penal substitution if they are to avoid the link between 
the atonement and hell, with its unorthodox consequences. In the third section of this 
chapter I will examine the implications of Reconciliationism for the doctrine of the 
atonement. My aim here is twofold. My first aim is to establish a link between the cross 
and Reconciliationism. My argument against Annihilationism in this chapter, based on the 
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link established by penal substitution, would be weakened if I could not establish a link for 
my alternative doctrine of hell, since it would offer no doctrinal advantage at his .point. My 
second aim is to suggest that Reconciliationism might offer a closer equivalence between 
the experience of Christ on the cross and the damned in hell than classic Traditionalism, 
and that this is a further argument in favour of this alternative doctrine of hell. Therefore, 
in this third section I will begin by expounding reconciliationist writing on this link, which 
is relatively extensive in comparison to the recent debate, particularly in the writing of 
Birks. I will argue that,although equivalence cannot be maintained on the nineteenth 
century form of Reconciliationism, it can be by the form I have developed based on 
Blocher' s writing. 
There is no common or settled terminology in the literature for discussing the link between 
hell and the atonement. I will use the word 'link' to refer to any such elements of the two 
doctrines which are used to connect them and so establish an argument from one to the 
other. As I will argue, much the most the important link is the doctrine of substitutionary 
atonement. I will use the adjectives 'strong' and 'weak' to qualify those links, where a 
'stronger link' is one where the arguments from one doctrine to another are more firmly 
established. I will use the term 'equivalence' to refer to that degree of strength of link such 
that Annihilationists are required to draw the unorthodox conclusions I will argue for. 
4.1 The Arguments in the Literature 
4.2 The Basis of the Link Between the Doctrines of Hell and of the Atonement 
I begin by examining_ the link between the doctrines of hell and the atonement as 
established in the recent literature. The logic of the link is summarised by Morey (his 
second and third points being particularly relevant to thiscussion): 
. . . the vicarious atonement of Christ is crucial to our understanding of divine 
punishment. First, the fact of the atonement reveals the necessity of divine 
punishment for sin. Second, Christ took the punishment for sin which His people 
would have suffered. Third, the nature of Christ's vicarious punishment will be a 
good indication of the nature of divine punishment of rebel sinners.717 
717 RA. Morey, Death and the Afterlife (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1984), pp. 101-102. 
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The middle term in the link between the atonement and hell is thus a doctrine of vicarious 
atonement, which is synonymous here with penal substitution. The relevance of this 
doctrine of penal substitution is thus that it is usually held to establish a strong link 
between hell and the atonement. This doctrine of penal substitution is held by the 
majority of evangelicals. Packer writes of 
a belief which, by and large, is a distinguishing mark of the world-wide 
evangelical fraternity: namely, the belief that Christ's death on the cross had the 
character of penal substitution, and that it was in virtue of this fact that it brought 
salvation to mankind.718 
Therefore the link that is established by penal substitution is held in common by most 
traditionalists and annihilationists. On the traditionalist side the most extensive discussion 
of the link between hell and the atonement in the recent debate are four pages in 
Peterson. 719 He concludes, "The cross sheds light on the fate of the wicked, because on the 
cross the sinless Son of God suffered that fate. He bore the retributive punishment of hell 
in being separated from the Father's love (subtraction) and in enduring God's wrath 
(addition).11720 Peterson's distinction between the two elements of retributive punishment 
draws on an earlier discussion which serves to highlight how tight he believes the link is 
between the experience of hell and the cross, since the distinctive elements of Christ's 
punishment correspond to those suffered by the damned. This quote also shows that the 
argwnent can be run back from the nature of hell to the nature of the cross. 
The traditional understanding of the retributive punishment of hell involves two , 
elements: separation from God (poena damni, the punishment of the damned) and 
the positive infliction of torments in body and soul (poena sensus, the punishment 
of sense). The former is subtraction of desired blessing, the latter addition of 
undesired punishment. . . At the cross Jesus suffered the retributive punishment of 
hell for sinners. He endured both the subtraction of the Father's love and the 
addition of God's wrath.721 
It is on the basis of this link that writers on both sides of the recent debate speak of Christ 
suffering hell. Examples on the traditionalist side, as well as Peterson above, includes 
Blanchard who states that "Jesus suffered everything the Bible means when it describes 
hell as a pit, a prison, darkness and a lake of fire, and he felt in his own body and soul all 
718 Packer, "What Did The Cross Achieve? The Logic Of Penal Substitution." Tyndale Bulletin 25 (1974), p. 
3. [Italics original.] 
719 Peterson, op. cit., pp. 213-216. 
720 Ibid., p. 216. 
721 Ibid., p. 213. 
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of hell's shame, contempt, punishment, banishment, separation, deprivation, torment and 
agony."722 Dixon writes: 
We realise that the atoning work of Christ by which He turned away the wrath of 
God is to be understood in more than a quantitative fashion. But is there no 
quantitative dimension to His becoming sin for us? It seems to be consistent with 
the New Testament teaching to say that Christ bore our hell on the cross.723 
It is therefore a surprise to read in the ACUTE report that "Traditionalists have tended 
to. . . [state] that the death of Christ was a one-off conscious punishment which cannot be 
used as an analogy for eternal conscious punishment after final judgment."724 This is not 
simply inaccurate with respect to the recent debate since this claimed equivalence is well 
established in the tradition as will be demonstrated with my study of some leading 
theologians of the past. 
On the annihilationist side, Atkinson has a brief section entitled The Suffering and Death 
of Christ which he begins with the observation: "It has often been forgotten that we have 
in history at the centre of our faith an open example and illustration of the punishment of 
sin."725 Fudge writes at greater length and he quotes Berkhof appreciatively, "that Christ 
our substitute suffered the punishment due to us, and in the our place met all the 
requirements of the law,"726 and Boettner who wrote that Jesus "voluntarily took our place 
and suffered the penalty which was due to us and so made atonement for our sin." 727 
Earlier in the same section Fudge introduced this view as that held by "Orthodox 
theologians. "728 Fudge argues that the implication which springs from the doctrine of 
penal substitution is that "To use the familiar language, Jesus has suffered hell for His 
people - the very hell they would have suffered had He not taken their place." 729 It is this 
logic that leads Fudge to ask one of the two questions that will constitute the core of this 
section: "If Jesus' death "reveals" God's last judgement, if his death was "for sin" and 
"instead of sinner,"[sic] if it entailed the penalty and curse and condemnation of sin 
pronounced throughout the Bible, what does the cross teach us about final 
722 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 277. 
723 o· · 185 IXon, op. cit., p. . 
724 ACUTE, op. cit., p. l 04. 
725 Atkinson, op. cit., p. 103. 
726 Louis Berkhof, Vicarious Atonement Through Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1936), p. 111, quoted by 
Fudge, op. cit., p. 227. 
727 Loraine Boettner, The Person ofChrist(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1943), p. 92, quoted by Ibid, p. 227. 
728 Fudge, op. cit., p. 227. 
129 Ibid., p. 227. Fudge goes on to argue that the reason that Gehenna is not used in the New Testament 
Epistles is for precisely this reason: a more accurate 'picture' of hell is provided by the cross. Ibid., p. 263. 
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punishment?"730 The other question is the reverse of this: what does one's doctrine of final 
punishment teach us about the cross? 
4.2.1 The Annihilationist Arguments 
As Fudge's reference to "scant attention" suggests, there has been relatively little 
discussion on the basis of this linkage. Fudge's own discussion is a rare exception, 
devoting a whole chapter to the question, entitled Golgotha and Gehenna (Jesus' Death 
and the Punishment of the Lost), and I will look at it in some detail.731 I would distinguish 
two types of argument made by Fudge and other annihilationists on the basis of this 
equivalence between the cross and hell. First, there are the negative arguments that the 
cross undermines Traditionalism. Second, there are the positive arguments that the cross 
favours Annihilationism. 
4.2.1.1 The 'Negative' Argument: the Atonement Undermines Traditionalism 
In turning to the negative argument that the cross undermines a traditionalist doctrine of 
hell, I will first expound the usual traditionalist argument for the link between the cross 
and hell, to which annihilationists are responding and rejecting. This traditionalist 
argument from the atonement shares the same assumption as that used by annihilationists 
about the link between the doctrines, but draws a different conclusion on the basis of it. I 
will call this traditionalist argument the 'classic' argument since it has a long pedigree and 
is widely used, and builds on the logic of the 'classic' argument for an unending hell. The 
argument can be run in two directions. First, from the atonement to hell, it can be briefly 
summarised: since it ~as a divine person who died on the cross, the penalty for sin must 
have been infinite. If the penalty for sin is infinite then for a finite person the punishment 
of hell must be eternal. Fudge sets out the lines of this argument and explains the reason 
why annihilationists have often, wrongly as he argues, been understood as denying the 
divinity of Christ. 
Traditionalists had argued for Christ's divinity on the ground that only such a One 
could offer the infinite sacrifice needed to satisfy justice in the case of sin against 
the infinite God. Arians and Socinians reasoned in the opposite direction. Denying 
730 Ibid., p. 228. 
731 Ibid., Chapter 12, pp. 215-234. 
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Christ's deity, they consistently dismissed the need for an infinite atonement, then 
the threat of infinite punishment - which traditionalists said required everlasting 
conscious torment for finite men. 732 
It is this link that explains the often noted association of unorthodox Christologies and 
annihilationist beliefs about hell ( although the annihilationist beliefs are usually those of 
extinction at physical death, which is not the form of Annihilationism I am studying in this 
thesis). Walker develops this point, and I quote him at length because he then rehearses the 
underlying logic: 
Both with the Socinians and the English Arians a doctrine of the Trinity in which 
Christ is not very God of very God is accompanied by doubts about, or the denial 
of, the eternity of hell. There is a logical connection between these two heresies, as 
William Dodwell, in refuting the English Arian, Whiston, pointed out. In the 
orthodox doctrine of the Redemption, the expiation by the crucifixion is 
considered infinite because it was a God who suffered and died; infinite expiation 
was necessary to atone for the infinite offence of man's sin; the infinite offence of 
man's sin is shown by its deserving eternal punishment. If, as ih the Arian doctrine, 
Christ was not fully God, then His expiation, if there was an expiation (which the 
Socinians denied), was not infinite, and there is no necessary reason to suppose 
that the offence of man's sin is infinite and deserves eternal punishment. This is nc t 
of course proof that hell is not eternal, but it does remove one of the most serious 
obstacles to such a proof. 733 
Shedd claims an even stronger, logical, link between the two doctrines: 
The doctrine of Christ's vicarious atonement, logically, stands or falls with that of 
endless punishment. Historically, it has stood or fallen with it. The incarnation of 
Almighty God, in order to make the remission of sin possible, is one of the 
strongest arguments for the eternity and infinity of penal suffering. 734 
Second, this 'classic' argument can be run the other way from the doctrine of hell to that of 
the atonement. Here the argument, briefly stated, is that Christ was able to bear the infinite 
punishment of hell in a finite period of time because of his divine nature. A typical 
statement of this argument is from Grudem: 
If we had to pay the penalty for our own sins, we would have to suffer eternally in 
separation from God. However, Jesus did not suffer eternally ... Jesus was able to 
bear all the wrath of God against our sin and to bear it to the end. No mere man 
could ever have done this, but by virtue of the union of divine and human natures 
in himself, Jesus was able to bear all the wrath of God against sin and bear it to the 
end.735 
This is the most common version of the argument, and uses what I will call a 'divine 
multiplier', whereby the sufferings of Christ in his human nature are held to be of infinite 
732 Ibid, p. 396, and he footnotes Rowell, op. cit., p. 30. 
733 Walker, op. cit., p. 26. 
734 Shedd, op. cit., p. 153. 
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value because of the union with the divine nature. Berkhof puts it more succinctly: "In a 
short period of time He bore the infinite wrath against sin to the very end and came out 
victoriously. This was possible for Him only because of his exalted nature."736 Letham 
offers a variant of this, where the union with the divine nature means that Christ's 
experience is actually more intense, although this is a rarer position: 
The death due to us from our transgression of God's law is an eternal death that 
involves everlasting exclusion from the presence of God, yet Christ suffered on the 
cross for only three hours, and the sufferings of his earthly life lasted for only thirty 
three years. Is there not a huge disparity between the two? How can he be said to 
have endured our penalty in our place if his sufferings are so disproportionate to 
what ours were to be? ... The reality is surely that Christ's sufferings were infinitely 
more intense. The prime factor is that he is the Son of God. 737 
Shedd offers a brief summary of both variants of this argument, in a longer discussion of 
the issues: "The suffering of an absolutely infinite person in a finite duration is, therefore, 
a greater suffering in degree and dignity, than is the suffering of a multitude of finite 
persons in an endless but not strictly infinite time [because only parte post]." 738 
In response to this 'classic' argument, there have been two main annihilationist arguments. 
First, some argue that the traditionalist logic is faulty. Fudge quotes Edward White to 
state, rather than argue, that the classic traditionalist answer to this question is inadequate. 
If it be asserted that it was the presence of the Godhead within [Christ] which 
dispensed with the infliction of endless pains, through the substitution of an 
Infinite Majesty for the infinitely extended misery of a finite being, we reply, that 
this is an 'afterthought of theology' which finds no place in the authoritative 
record.739 
In fact Fudge is critical of the whole terminology of finite and infinite that has formed such 
an important part of the classic traditionalist argument. In his chapter on the Atonement, 
Fudge states and then counters a part of this classic argument. 
Some protest that Christ's death was not a true pattern of the judgement awaiting 
sinners in hell, since Jesus was an infinite person and could absorb infinite 
punishment in a single moment. Finite sinners ['finite' with reference to their 
natures, not their sin], this argument goes, will require conscious punishment in 
infinite duration for justice to have its way. The whole logic of "finite" and 
735 Grudem, op. ci,:, pp. 577-8. 
736 Berkhof, op. cit., p. 339. 
· 
737 Robert Letham, The Work of Christ (Leicester: IVP, 1993), p. 133. 
738 Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (Nashville: Nelson, 1980 (1889]), vol. 2, p. 461. 
739 White, op. cit., p. 241, quoted by Fudge, op. cit., p. 233. 
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"infinite" punishment and victims is totally without biblical basis, springing 
instead from medieval speculation grounded in feudalistic canons of justice. 740 
Second, some annihilationists respond by pointing out that the cross wasn't a traditionalist 
hell. John Wenham notes that "Many stress that on the cross Jesus suffered the pains we 
deserve. But, though he suffered physical torture, the utter dereliction of separation from 
the Father, and death, he did not suffer endless pain."741 Atkinson concludes from the 
nature of Christ's death that Traditionalism is in error: "If He bore the punishment of our 
sins, that punishment cannot under any circumstances be eternal conscious suffering or 
misery, for He never suffered this and it is impossible that he could have."742 Rather, " ... 
the facts of the suffering and death of Christ Jesus prove conclusively that the punishment 
of sin is death in its natural sense of deprivation of life." 743 
Before turning to this positive argument for Annihilationism, I want to argue that, for my 
criticisms of Annihilationism on the basis of this link to stand, it is not necessary for me to 
defend Traditionalism's 'classic' arguments. This is for three reasons: first, the task I hav 
set myself in this thesis is to off er a doctrinal assessment of Annihilationism. I have 
offered a modified Traditionalism to strengthen the argument against Annihilationism at 
certain points, given what I have suggested is its reactive quality to certain errors in the 
classic traditionalist position. However, successfully defending Traditionalism, even in a 
modified form, is not required for a successful criticism. However I think that there are 
reasons for holding that annihilationists face particular difficulties at this point which 
traditionalists may avoid. 
Thus, second, there is a qualitative difference between the annihilationist and traditionalist 
arguments on the basis of equivalence. If the annihilationist holds that Christ suffered hell 
then this has to include extinction, since it is part of the punishment of the damned. 
However extinction cannot be a punishment of degrees: it isn't possible to be partially 
extinguished. Therefore since Christ has to be extinguished this necessarily leads to the 
chief arguments I make against Annihilationism. However torment is amenable of degrees 
740 Ibid, p. 232. The first part of the classic traditionalist position: to which Fudge seems to allude when he 
refers to 'medieval speculation' and 'feudalistic canons of justice', is that the gravity of sin is determined by the 
dignity of the person sinned against. Since God possesses infinite dignity, any sin against him is therefore 
worthy of infinite punishment. I discussed this in chapter two. 
741 Wenham, Case, p. 185. 
742 Atkinson, op. cit., p. 103. 
743 Ibid, p. 103. 
203 
in intensity and duration. Therefore it may at least be possible that Christ could have 
experienced a unique intensity of torment which is equivalent to the unending torment of a 
traditionalist hell. (I am not sure that a traditionalist even needs to argue this if they hold 
that Christ's divine nature means that any suffering in his human nature is potentially of 
infinite value as a penal substitute. Certainly this would break the equivalence of 
important details of the punishments, but it would not necessarily require the denial of 
penal substitution. As I will note below writers like Owen and Edwards are happy to 
talk about differences between the accidents of the punishments of Christ and the 
damned, including duration, while affirming substantial equivalence. A further option is 
that it may be possible to have as full an experience of eternity as the damned in a finite 
period of time. This can be approached in two ways, each relying on a different 
psychological insight. First, there is a suggestion by Edwards, which I will note below, 
that it may be possible to experience an eternal punishment through the exercise of 
sympathetic imagination. Second, rather than Christ experiencing an infinite 
punishment, it may be that the damned subjectively experience a finite punishment 
which objectively continues unendingly. Building on this speculation in the last chapter, 
it is then easier to maintain equivalence if it only needs to be argued that Christ had to 
experience a finite punishment.) 
Third, I will argue below that, while it is possible to conceive of the divine second person 
of the Trinity experiencing at least the type of punishment of a traditionalist hell, if not its 
duration, it is impossible to conceive of him experiencing the type of punishment of an 
annihilationist hell. Christ could experience torment in his human nature, and the 
separation of his human body and soul, but it is impossible to 'experience' the extinction of 
his human nature in the way the damned would since of necessity the divine nature 
remains alive and conscious. Of course, it remains a problem for the traditionalist to 
explain how Christ could experience a traditionalist hell of unending duration, but it seems 
to me that difficult though this may be it is not necessarily impossible. I will therefore not 
attempt a defence of the 'classic' arguments as part of this assessment of Annihilationism, 
although I believe that such a defence may be possible. 
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4.2.1.2 The 'Positive' Argument: the Atonement Supports Annihilationism 
The positive case for Annihilationism is just the positive side of the second argument 
above, and argues that the cross was an annihilationist hell. Although Fudge doesn't 
directly say that Christ's human nature was extinguished, his references to the death of 
Christ clearly imply this, given his understanding of death. Thus he writes 
[Christ] suffered torment of body and soul. More than that, He drained the cup of 
God's wrath, passively enduring the simultaneous draining of His own life into 
total death."744 Again, "The Bible exhausts the vocabulary of dying in speaking of 
what happened to Jesus. He "died for our sins" (1 Cor 15:3). He "laid down His 
"life" [psyche]" (John 10: 15). He was destroyed (Matt 27:20, KJV) or killed (Acts 
3:15). Jesus compared his own death to the dissolution of a kernel of wheat... 
(John 12:23-26). Jesus ''poured out His life [psyche} unto death" and in so doing 
was "numbered with the transgressors" (Isa. 53:12).745 
That extinction is the meaning Fudge gives to these statements seems to be assumed in the 
following quote where he in turn assumes that many of his readers will find this 
conclusion difficult to accept. He argues that: 
We naturally recoil from such a thought, that the Son of God could truly have 
perished - even for a moment. Yet is this not the same difficulty we face in 
accepting Jesus' true kenosis and humiliation in becoming a man? (Phil. 2:5-10). In 
the first century the Docetics tried to avoid the implications of saying that the 
incarnate God truly died, but the apostolic witnesses refused to yield an inch ( 1 
John 5:6-10).746 
Given the significance of this conclusion, I will try and spell out exactly what it is that 
Fudge is trying to say. First, by "perish" he certainly means extinction. Not only does 
Fudge head this section "Jesus' Death Involved Total Destruction", but in an earlier 
paragraph he equates Jesus' death with a return to non-being: 
In the beginning God gave man being instead of non-being, and He had warned 
then that sin would bring death in the place of life (Gen. 2: 17). From the very first 
the wages of sin was death, and Jesus underwent the very same sentence 
pronounced iri the primal Garden. 
Second, by "Son of God" he does not mean the divine second person of the Trinity in 
disincarnate form. In a quotation immediately before Fudge's conclusion above is the 
sentence: "as God He could not die."747 Thus the Son of God would seem to be the 
incarnate, two-natured, God-man. Since on the cross the human nature of the Son of God 
perished, Fudge says that the Son of God perished. Thus Fudge argues from the cross, 
744 Ibid., p. 296. 
745 Ibid., p. 230. [Italics original.] 
746 Ibid, p. 231. 
747 Fudge, op. cit., p. 231, quoting White, op. cit., pp.243-244. 
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where the human nature of Christ was extinguished, to the nature of hell as ending in 
extinction. Further, Fudge quotes approvingly two scholars whom he believes share this 
conclusion. He quotes two statements by James Dunn. "Man could not be helped other 
than through his [Christ's] annihilation," and "This process of destruction is speeded up in 
the case of Jesus, the representative man, the hilasterion, and destroys him."748 However, 
in context the focus is on the annihilation of the body of Jesus, and I think that Fudge is 
going considerably further than this. Fudge also quotes Oscar Cullmann favourably, who 
wrote that: 
[Jesus] can conquer death only by actually dying, by betaking Himself to the 
sphere of death, the destroyer of life, to the sphere of nothingness ... Whoever 
wants to conquer death must die; he must really cease to live - not simply live on 
as an immortal soul; but die in body and soul, lose life itself ... furthermore, if life 
is to issue out of so genuine a death as this, a new divine act of creation is 
necessary. And this act of creation calls back to life not just a part of man, but the 
whole man - all that God had created and death had annihilated. 749 
Not only does this confirm that Fudge believes that Christ's body and human soul were 
annihilated, but also that this requires a subsequent re-creation. I will return to this late · 
point in my discussion of the resurrection below. Fudge himself raises, and seeks to 
answer, an objection to this and in doing so serves to underline his conclusion above that 
Christ's human nature, but only his human nature, was extinguished: 
Some may object that the original curse entailed death forever, dissolution with no 
hope of resurrection, and that this did not befall Jesus. Conditionalist author, 
Edward White, admitted that this would be a problem - if Jesus had been only 
human - but he saw in Jesus' divinity the impossibility of such permanent 
destruction. 750 
Fudge then quotes White to explain how permanent destruction was avoided: 
If Jesus had been the Son of David only... He must have suffered everlasting 
destruction ... But the Saviour was Divine ... And therefore, when the curse had 
taken effect upon the manhood, it was still open to the Divine Inhabitant, 
absorbing the Spirit into his own essence, to restore the 'destroyed Temple' from its 
ruins; and, taking possession of it, in virtue of His Divinity (not, legally, as a man), 
'to raise it up on the third day.'751 
748 Fudge., op. cit., p. 229, quoting J.D.G. Dunn, "Paul's Understanding of the Death of Jesus," in 
Reconciliation and Hope: New Testament Essays on Atonement and Eschatology, presented to L.L. Morris 
on his 60th birthday. Ed. Robert Banks. (Exeter: Paternoster, 1974),,P· 130. The first of these quotes is itself a 
quotation. The footnote in Dunn reads, "K. Barth, cited by G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace: The 
Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, 1956), p. 135." The second quotation is actually from p. 139 in 
Dunn. 
749 Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (London: Epworth, 1958), pp. 
25-26; quoted by Fudge, op. cit., p. 230. 
?SO Ibid., p. 230. 
?SI Ibid, p. 231. Quoting White, op. cit., pp. 243-244. 
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Therefore Fudge holds that Jesus experienced hell on the cross, and this hell was the 
annihilationists' hell of torment and ultimate extinction. 
Froom also draws the same conclusion, that Christ's human nature was annihilated. Froom 
opens a section headed "Christ Truly "Died" According to Prediction, Fulfilment, 
Attestation," with this statement: 
It is essential to establish the fact that Christ died on Calvary - truly died. And no 
inner or real self, or being, as a separate, continuing entity, lived on during the 
period between His giving up of the "ghost," or "expiring," and His resurrection 
on the' third day."752 
This point is expressed so forcefully, it seems to imply that even Christ's divine nature 
ceased to exist for a period. Froom doesn't elucidate this point, but I assume that this is not 
intended. The basic point is reiterated, with the middle term of a penal substitutionary 
atonement also spelt out, in a later quote: 
If Christ did not Himself truly, actually die, as called for in the terms of atoning 
substitution - but only his body, while His spirit lived on as a continuing discarnate 
entity. . . - then the declared transaction of the cross is a travesty; and the veracity 
of God and of Christ is impugned. 753 
Atkinson writes along similar lines: "the facts of the suffering and death of Christ Jesus 
prove conclusively that the punishment of sin is death in its natural sense of the 
deprivation of life."754 In fact Atkinson's position is more complex than this, since he also 
holds, as do all Annihilationists, that just as Christ suffered a period of torment before 
death, so the damned suffer torment before extinction too. Thus Atkinson can write 
Now at the time of his passion the Lord Jesus underwent a period of increasingly 
excruciating agony culminating in death. The suffering lasted some hours. There is 
no reason why we should not take this as the model and example of the final 
punishment of sin. 755 
This position is premised on Atkinson's anthropological monism, and the belief therefore 
that when Christ died bodily there was no immaterial part which continued to exist. 
Discussing 1 Corinthians 15 he writes, "We may also notice that the whole of the apostle's 
teaching in this chapter is based upon the resurrection of Christ and not a word said about, 
752 Froom, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 377. [Italics original] 
753 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 381-2. [Italics original] 
754 Atkinson, op. cit., p. 103. 
755 Ibid., p. 103. 
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much less based upon, the survival of Christ between death and resurrection."756 Peterson 
rightly concludes that Atkinson holds that Christ's human nature was extinguished: 
Atkinson ... holds that nothing of Jesus' humanity survived death until his 
resurrection. His human nature experienced death, that is, the deprivation of life. In 
other words, Jesus' humanity suffered extinction in death. I will give him the 
benefit of the doubt and conclude that he held that Jesus' deity did not suffer 
extinction. 757 
While I agree with the thrust of this paragraph, there are two small clarifications I would 
make. First, I'm not sure that Atkinson would argue there was 'nothing' of Jesus' 
humanity left, if this means that even his body was extinguished, even if this might be the 
logical implication of his position. Second, as I argued in Chapter 2, I'm not sure to what 
degree someone can 'experience' death, since it is itself the cessation of experience. 
However, the main point stands, that Atkinson is another annihilationist who argues that 
the equivalence with the atonement leads to the conclusion that Christ's human nature was 
extinguished. An indication of just how tightly some annihilationists see the link between 
the experience of Christ and that of the damned is seen in Atkinson's comment on t e 
length of the torment of the damned, part of which I have quoted above. From the example 
of Christ he draws a conclusion about the length of suffering in hell. 
The suffering [ of the Lord Jesus] lasted some hours. There is no reason why we 
should not take this as the model and example of the final punishment of sin. We 
are not likely to go far wrong if we conclude that His suffering was the most 
extreme that will be inflicted on the most deviant and responsible sinner ... 758 
There is another aspect of this question which I will not examine here, since it is closely 
linked to the question of the immortality of the soul, which I have decided to exclude from 
my discussion. To briefly outline the issue: many Annihilationists, particularly in the 
nineteenth century, argued that the annihilationist position made the atonement a greater 
work because it gained the gift of immortal life and not merely changed the quality of an 
already owned immortality. Such an argument is developed, for example, by Constable: 
According to the Augustinian theory, Christ came to alter the condition of life 
from being miserable to being happy: according to our theory, Christ came to 
bestow life itself. This latter is the greater work. .. And the view which attributes to 
756 Ibid., pp. 62-3. [Italics original] 
757 Peterson, R.A., "Basil Atkinson: A Key Figure for Twentieth-Century Evangelical Annihilationism" in 
Churchman, p. 204. 
158 Ibid, p. I 03. There are a variety of opinions as to how long the period of torment might last, and some 
annihilationists argue that it is considerably longer than Atkinson suggests. [See ACUTE, op. cit., p.19.] One 
perverse consequence of an argument that extinction is a 'natural' consequence of the torment, is that the more 
intense the torment, the shorter time it would last. 
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the atonement the gift of eternal life magnifies that atonement more, infinitely 
more, than the view which only attributes to the atonement the alteration of the 
condition and circumstances of life. 759 
Dixon is probably unique in modem evangelical writing in making this kind of point from 
the atonement, but he argues from it for Traditionalism: "Christ did not die for our 
potential non-existence, but for our eternal bearing of the wrath of God in a place 
separated from Him." 760 I think that Dixon's argument fails because annihilationists are 
arguing that the potential non-existence is the consequence of the wrath of God and an 
infinite punishment, and thus the two are not relevantly distinct. 
In conclusion there is a well established link between the atonement and hell, which has 
been picked up by a number of Annihilationists and it is used both to argue for 
Annihilationism and against Traditionalism. 
4.2.2 An Assessment of the Annihilationist Arguments 
The whole notion of Christ on the cross suffering the punishment to be experienced in hell 
by the damned may well be rejected by those not wed to an atonement doctrine of penal 
substitution. However, this is a doctrine shared by almost all evangelical writers on both 
sides in the recent literature, and the task I have set myself is not to adjudicate upon the 
validity of this shared premise, but to assess the coherence of the arguments based upon it. 
However, in the second section of this chapter I will begin with assessment and then I will 
examine in more detail exactly what doctrine of the atonement these arguments require if 
they are to be securely grounded. 
Recent traditionalist discussions of this link and its implications for the doctrine of hell are 
even rarer and briefer than those of annihilationists: four pages in Peterson;761 a mere two 
pages in Morey; 762 four brief pages in Gerstner; 763 as well as some shorter comments by a 
few other writers. However, I hope to demonstrate that it is a fruitful line of study. As 
759 Constable, op. cit., pp. 235-6. 
760 Dixon, op. cit., pp. 184-5. Constable's position favours the view that extinction is more severe a 
punishment than torment. Dixon's argument is more in line with the twentieth century debate in assuming that 
torment is more severe. 
761 Peterson, op. cit., pp. 213-216. 
762 Morey, op. cit., pp. 101-103. 
763 Gerstner, op. cit., pp. 159-162. 
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above, I will examine the implications of the link in both directions: both of the atonement 
for the doctrine of hell, and of the doctrine of hell for the atonement. I want to argue that 
an annihilationist doctrine of hell results in an unorthodox doctrine of the incarnation and 
the resurrection. 
4.2.2.1 The Implications of the Atonement for the Doctrine of Hell 
I begin with the doctrine of the atonement and its implications for the doctrine of hell. 
Here I turn first to the question of what happened at the death of Christ. I begin with the 
arguments of several traditionalists that since Christ was not extinguished on the cross it 
follows that the damned will not be extinguished in hell. Donald Macleod states, 
But there is a deeper, more fundamental question. The wages of sin is death. 
Suppose we translate that, the wages of sin is annihilation. How can we relate this 
to the atonement? Christ became a curse for us. Does that mean that he was 
annihilated? Christ tasted death. Does that mean that he tasted annihilation? To ask 
is to answer. For Jesus, the curse was conscious torment: something through which 
he existed, and throughout which he was fully conscious. 764 
In response an annihilationist might point out that Macleod has overlooked the fact that for 
annihilationists the wages of sin are extinction (which Macleod calls 'annihilation') 
preceded by torment. An annihilationist might respond that Jesus suffered pain and then 
suffered extinction which is like the two-part hell of Annihilationism. However this still 
leaves the question of whether Christ was extinguished, and whether that is an acceptable 
doctrine. However his general point still stands. Blanchard argues that "[I]f 'the second 
death' is the ultimate punishment for sin, making it mean annihilation collapses before the 
fact that when Jesus bore the full penalty for sin in his death on the cross he was not 
annihilated."765 Morey's writes: "There is no way to escape the fact that Christ did not 
experience total annihilation in body and soul on the cross." 766 
However, none of the traditionalist writers quoted above offers justification for their 
statements that Christ's human nature was not extinguished, presumably believing it to be 
self-evident. There are however several other reasons I will propose to justify rejection of 
the annihilationist understanding of the atonement as involving extinction. There are two 
related sets of problems which follow from the position that Christ's human nature was 
764 Macleod, art. cit., p. 13. 
765 Blanchard, op. cit., p. 228. 
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extinguished: this understanding of the atonement results in unorthodox doctrines of the 
incarnation and of the resurrection. I will examine these problems in the following two 
sections, along with some related issues. 
So, first, the implications for the incarnation. The argument here is that the notion of the 
extinction of the human nature of Christ is untenable within a Chalcedonian Christology. 
If an annihilationist argues that Christ's human nature was extinguished at death, it 
therefore follows that the incarnation ceased at that point. This, it can be argued, 
contradicts Chalcedonian Christology. John Cooper summarises the teaching of the 
Council of Chalcedon of 451 at this point, and then points out the implication of holding 
that Christ's human nature was annihilated on the cross. 
Since the Council of Chalcedon the church has officially recognised what is taught 
in the New Testament and held by the early church; that because of the incarnation 
Jesus Christ is both truly God and truly human; that he is one person with two 
natures, one divine and one human; and that these natures are neither mixed 
together nor are they separable. 767 
Now if the extinction - re-creation account of Jesus ' resurrection is true, 
then the teaching of Chalcedon is false. The two natures of Christ are separable 
and were in fact separated between Good Friday and Easter Sunday. The human 
being Jesus completely ceased to exist. .. So the divine-human person Jesus Christ 
did not exist for the interim. Only the nonincarnate Word, the wholly divine Son, 
the Second Person of the Trinity, existed during that time. What occurred on 
Easter is essentially the same as the miracle of Christmas. Once again the Word 
became flesh, this time resurrection flesh. We do not have an incarnation and 
something essentially different - a resurrection - in the life of Christ, but two 
incarnations. If the extinction - re-creationists are consistent, they seem closer to 
the heresies which Chalcedon rejected than to orthodox Christology itself. For 
either the human nature of the Son is incidental even after his incarnation and was 
non-existent for three Jewish days; or else we have two persons in Jesus Christ, a 
divine person who continued to exist and a human person who did not. Neither 
option would have escaped condemnation at Chalcedon. . . Since human nature is 
such that persons can exist temporarily without their bodies, Jesus Christ could 
have existed between Friday and Sunday without his body and yet have been one 
person with both a divine and a human nature. 768 
The final sentence of this quotation highlights what Cooper understands as the orthodox 
understanding of the death of Christ: that his human body and his human soul were 
766 Morey, op. cit., p. 102. 
767 Cf. Louis Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1937; reprint, Baker, 
1975), p.107. 
768 John Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting. Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism 
Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 144-5. 
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separated, and that this does not constitute a cessation of the incarnation. An example of 
this orthodox understanding is found, for instance, in Berkhof: 
In a short period of time He bore the infinite wrath against sin to the very end and 
came out victoriously. This was possible for Him only because of His exalted 
nature. At this point we should guard against misunderstanding, however. Eternal 
death in the case of Christ did not consist in an abrogation of the union of the 
Logos with the human nature ... The Logos remained united with the human nature 
even when the body was in the grave; ... 769 
Cooper later adds a further comment which offers slightly more detail about the nature of 
the separation of the natures that must be held took place: "For if Jesus was extinct 
between Good Friday and Easter, then some doctrinally illicit separation took place, either 
of the divine and human natures, or perhaps even of two hypostasized persons, one divine 
and one human." 770 Peterson, in the context of a discussion of the position of Fudge, 
draws the same conclusion as Cooper: "Indeed, to hold that Jesus' humanity was 
annihilated on the cross, brings one into conflict with Chalcedonian Christology."771 
Therefore, if Annihilationists want to maintain both their doctrine of hell and their 
argument for a link between hell and the cross, then their options are limited with respect 
to their Christology. I will note two options, to reinterpret or to reject Chalcedon's 
teaching at this point, and argue that neither are likely to be accepted by Annihilationists, 
and thus they must either change their doctrine of hell, their doctrine of the atonement, or 
their understanding of a link between the two. 
The first option, to reinterpret, is to argue that Chalcedon doesn't actually require the 
permanent unity of the natures after the incarnation. One suggestion is that what I have 
called 'Chalcedonian Christo logy' is actually the product of later Councils than Chalcedon. 
Swinburne writes that "Some lesser creeds and church pronouncements have stated that 
the union of God the Son with human nature (soul and body) was, after the conception of 
Christ, permanent; that Christ took away with him at the end of his earthly life his human 
nature and body."772 It is certainly true that the first council to explicitly state the 
permanence of the union was not Chalcedon, but the 11th Council of Toledo (675 A.D.), 
in The Symbol of Faith, which stated that " ... the one person of Christ has so united in 
769 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1941), p. 339. 
770 Ibid., p. 215. 
771 Peterson, R.A., "The Hermeneutics of Annihilationism: The Theological Method of Edward Fudge," 
Presbyterion 21.1 (1995), p. 27. 
772 Swinburne, op. cit., p. 236. 
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himself that the divinity can never be separated from the humanity ... " However,. this was 
understood to be in agreement with Chalcedon, and this permanent union of the natures 
was understood by the tradition in the Western church to be the implication of the 
Chalcedonian doctrine of the incarnation. 
The second option, to reject, would be to deny the doctrine of permanent union. 
Swinburne opens the way to this option when states that "I cannot see the permanent union 
as a central Christian doctrine." 773 By this he seems to indicate not just that it is less 
important than some other doctrines but that it can be dropped without affecting other, 
more central, doctrines such as the incarnation. However, this is a step which would 
require extensive justification, and would seem to be too radical for many evangelicals. 
If neither of these options are acceptable to evangelicals, then this leaves Annihilationists 
two alternatives: they can either change their doctrine of hell, or offer a different account 
of the kind of link there is between the doctrines of hell and the atonement. Peterson 
concludes his discussion with a call to Annihilationists to take the first of these options, 
since he believes that the second is not possible for them: 
I conclude: instead of Fudge's appeal to systematic theology strengthening his case 
for conditionalism, it weakens it considerably. Indeed, to hold that Jesus' humanity 
was annihilated on the cross brings one into conflict with Chalcedonian 
Christology. Such a prospect ought to cause conditionalists to re-examine their 
views, for the Bible teaches that Christ did suffer the pains of hell, but not as they 
are conceived by Annihilationists.774 
I believe that Peterson's assessment is correct at this point, and his conclusion for 
annihilationists is well founded. However, I will examine the second alternative of a 
weakened link further below, but before then I will offer further arguments for questioning 
the annihilationist position on the basis of its doctrinal implications. 
There are also implications of Annihilationism for the doctrine of the resurrection if it is 
argued that the human nature of Christ was annihilated. I will argue that some of these 
implications are unorthodox, and therefore very likely to be unacceptable to 
Annihilationists. At this point I need to highlight a distinction to the discussion, mentioned 
by Morey above: the orthodox position is that Christ had both a human body and a human 
773 Ibid, p. 236. 
774 Peterson, Hermeneutics, p. 27. 
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soul, as essential to his human nature. Therefore, if the annihilationist argues from the 
equivalence of the cross to hell that Christ's human nature must have been extinguished, 
then the annihilationist has to argue that both Chri~t's human body and soul would have to 
be extinguished. This is certainly the conclusion that Morey believes such a position must 
draw: "If the Annihilationists were right, then Christ should have disintegrated on the 
cross and would have ceased to exist in body and soul."775 
First after extinction recreation is required rather than resurrection. Resurrection is 
impossible since there is nothing left to resurrect. Fudge's own comments on the creation 
and curse above point to this: God created out of non-being; the result of sin is death, 
understood as return to non-being; therefore if Christ died then a new creation is required. 
The language of resurrection refers to something that already exists. Gerstner states this 
objection succinctly, " ... God can't raise what is not there to raise."776 Cooper, in a quote 
above, spoke of 'the extinction - re-creation account of Jesus' resurrection'. Therefore if 
Christ was extinguished, he cannot have been resurrected. Since the New Testament 
witnesses to the resurrection of Christ's body, confirmed by the empty tomb, he cannot 
have been extinguished. 
Second, this new creation would also be a new incarnation, since Christ would now be 
taking to himself newly created flesh. Cooper makes this point above as well. Peterson 
also makes this point, although confusingly he talks about 'resurrected flesh' rather than 
're-created flesh' following extinction: 
Furthermore if Jesus were annihilated on Calvary, and his natures separated 
because his humanity ceased to exist, then his resurrection constituted another 
incarnation. This incarnation would differ from the first in that this time the Word 
would take to himself resurrected flesh. Notwithstanding, it would be a second 
incarnation. 777 
Third, if Jesus suffers extinction then one might expect the body of Jesus to cease to exist 
at the moment of his death, and not simply cease to be animated. From this it would 
follow that there would have been nothing left on the cross after death, and obviously no 
body to be buried. Morey notes that this is the conclusion the Jehovah's Witnesses draw. 
775 Morey, op. cit., p. 102. 
776 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 92. 
777 Peterson, Hermeneutics, p. 27. 
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With identical logic to Annihilationists, he states that the Jehovah's Witnesses argue that, 
" In order for Christ's punishment to parallel the total destruction of body and soul which 
will happen to sinners, they feel that Christ must be totally destroyed in body and soul." 778 
From this premise it follows that, "The Jehovah's Witnesses state that Christ's body 
probably dissolved into gases and ceased to exist... Thus [the Jehovah's Witnesses] go on 
to deny the bodily resurrection of Jesus ~hrist. They state that Jesus was raised as a spirit 
creature." 779 Thus, Morey concludes, "If [ Annihilationists] are consistent, they will have to 
end up denying the bodily resurrection of Christ as do the Jehovah's Witnesses."780 An 
annihilationist could respond that although Christ's body was extinguished, it doesn't mean 
that it had to cease to exist immediately, but that it could simply have rotted gradually in 
the tomb, had it not been resurrected ( or, as I have argued, re-created). However since the 
extinction is penal it would seem to me marginally more likely that it would be immediate. 
While I don't think that this is a particularly strong argument, Annihilationists do face the 
problem of explaining the way in which the body was extinguished and why it did not 
immediately cease to exist. 
Fourth, there is a further difficulty with respect to the soul: even if something extinguished 
can be said to be resurrected, there is no doctrine in the New Testament of the resurrection 
of the soul of Christ. Gerstner makes this point in a comment on John 2: 19. 
If the soul had perished with the death of the Body, as [P.E.] Hughes assumes, it 
would have perished permanently because the soul, according to the 
Annihilationists, has no independent existence apart from the body ... Our text 
refers to the resurrection of Christ's body, not His soul, which according to 
Hughes, must be gone forever since no re-creation of the soul is mentioned in the 
text. 781 
I think that this argument holds even if the soul could potentially have independent 
existence from the body, because in the case of Christ Annihilationists are committed to 
the notion that his body and soul were extinguished. However, mortalists have always 
argued that the soul as well as the body of all people would be resurrected. Therefore, 
while annihilationists need to account for the re-creation of Christ's soul, there is at least 
one, albeit minority, position which might be acceptable to evangelicals. Fudge notes a 
778 Morey, op. cit., p. 102. 
779 Ibid., p. 102. 
780 Ibid., p. I 02. 
781 Gerstner, op. cit., p. 44. Gerstner is inaccurate to state that all annihilationists reject the possibility of 
the independent existence of the soul. As I demonstrated in chapter one, while this may be the majority 
position it is not the uniform one. 
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similar argument in Calvin: "Even John Calvin objected in his Psychopannychia that it 
was unthinkable that Jesus' "soul" truly died or even slept."782 Calvin argues that the 
divine person of Jesus could not die in the sense that his opponents used the term. Rather 
" ... death was a separation of soul and body. But the soul never lost its life."783 However I 
have excluded from this thesis discussion the issue of the Immortality of the Soul. 
Fifth, there is the problem of explaining the continuity of identity of the human nature of 
Christ through death if it is extinguished. Cooper raises this issue with reference to 
'monists'. Not all annihilationists are monists, but the point still stands for their 
understanding of Christ's death, because they equate the death of Christ not with the first 
death but the second death, at which both body and soul are extinguished even more 
completely than a monist holds occurs at the first death. Cooper writes, "all monists ... 
have the problem of personal identity. . . a distinct entity is created [ after death]. . . So 
[they] must explain how this new personal being is numerically identical with the earthly 
personal being." 784 Anderson makes this point when he writes, "So we say if the Man 
Christ Jesus did not rise from the dead a wholly new being was called to life at the 
resurrection."785 An obvious, and strong, response is that the continuity of the person is 
guaranteed by God. However, since most of the discussion of this issue in the recent 
debate has turned on the doctrine of 'soul sleep', and the related issue of the mortality of 
the soul, discussion would take me into the issue of the immortality of the soul, which I 
have decided to exclude. 
Thus far I have argued on the basis of the implications if Christ's human nature was 
extinguished. I now want to suggest that there may be a problem with the notion of Christ 
suffering extinction . The problem arises because Christ the divine person remains 
conscious, and it is difficult to see how he could suffer the cessation of consciousness that 
extinction involves. Certainly there would be the human nature's dreaded anticipation of 
extinction, but the moment of extinction could not be experienced by the divine person as 
a human person would precisely because consciousness would remain. The traditionalist, 
by contrast, can argue that Christ could experience both torment and death understood as 
782 Fudge, op. cit., p. 231. 
783 Calvin, Psychopannychia, vol. 3, p. 437. Quoted by Fudge, op. cit., p. 455. 
784 Cooper, op. cit., p. 145. 
785 Anderson, op. cit., p. 95, footnote. [Italics original.] 
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the separation of the body and the soul. On the understanding of penal substitution that 
underlies this debate, it would therefore be difficult to see how Christ could be a substitute 
in the sense required. 
In conclusion, on the premise of the link between the atonement and hell that is held in 
this debate, I have shown that there are significant difficulties for the annihilationist 
position. I believe that these difficulties are great enough to conclude that Annihilationism 
is an unacceptable position for an Evangelical. This doctrine of hell, I have argued, raises 
problems related to the doctrines of the incarnation with a separation of the natures of 
Christ greater than that usually accepted in the tradition on the basis of a Chalcedonian 
Christology; and the resurrection, since recreation rather than resurrection is required after 
extinction; and, more tentatively, the substitutionary nature of Christ's death, because of its 
disanalogy to the experience of the annihilationist hell. 
4.2.2.2 The Implications of Hell for the Doctrine of the Atonement 
I now turn to make a brief point in following the argument in the opposite direction, from 
the annihilationist doctrine of hell to its implications for the atonement. As I have already 
noted, annihilationists hold that there are two elements to the punishment of hell: a period 
of torment and then extinction. On the premise of the link between the atonement and hell 
assumed in the debate, it would seem likely that an annihilationist has to hold that the twin 
elements of the punishment to be inflicted in hell, torment and extinction, correspond to 
two elements in Christ's passion. The most likely division in Christ's passion is that 
between a period of torment on the cross, and his death, probably continuing until the 
resurrection. Thus C~st's sufferings on the cross correspond to the period of torment; his 
death to the extinction of the second death. No annihilationist spells out the link in this 
form, but it seems the most likely position. It remains a task for annihilationists to justify 
some such division in the atonement corresponding to their division in the punishment of 
the damned. 
In conclusion, I have argued that Annihilationism faces major difficulties if it wants to 
maintain and argue from a strict substitutionary parallel between the atonement and hell. 
These difficulties arise particularly when the implications of the doctrine of the atonement 
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are examined for the doctrine of hell. I have argued that these implications include 
reinterpretations of central Christian doctrines including the resurrection, the incarnation, 
and substitutionary atonement itself. Thus, if the equivalence is maintained and the type of 
reasoning I have noted in the debate is held to be legitimate, then I would conclude that 
Annihilationism faces doctrinal consequences which would warrant the rejection of 
Annihilationism by evangelicals. 
A strategy for annihilationists to avoid this conclusion would be to give a different account 
of the link between hell and the cross. I therefore now turn to examine the nature of the 
link between hell and the cross in the tradition to see what support there might be for this 
strategy. 
4.3 The Nature of the Link between Hell and the Atonement 
An alternative strategy for annihilationists to avoid the unorthodox conclusions I have 
noted above would be to give a different account of the link between hell and the cross 
so as to argue that the suffering of Christ on the cross is not equivalent to that of the 
damned in hell. This is not a strategy any annihilationist actually adopts, and it would 
obviously also undermine those annihilationist arguments for Annihilationism and 
against Traditionalism based on that link. However, it is a logically possible strategy to 
avoid the undesirable doctrinal consequences I have outlined. 
In this section I will argue that equivalence is usually held to follow from the doctrine of 
penal substitution, and therefore if annihilationists reject equivalence they are probably 
committed to rejectii;ig the mainstream evangelical doctrine of the atonement too. I will 
conclude that since the rejection of penal substitution is unacceptable to most 
evangelicals, annihilationists cannot avoid the unorthodox doctrinal implications of 
equivalence. I will begin with a brief taxonomy of the history of tradition of the doctrine 
of the atonement, based on the categories of James Denney. This taxonomy will serve to 
set the discussion in context, but specifically to establish what doctrine of the atonement 
establishes the strongest link with the doctrine of hell. I will also establish that this 
doctrine of penal substitution is held by most evangelicals. I will then examine leading 
theologians in the tradition who hold this doctrine to see what conclusions they draw 
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about equivalence with the experience of the damned. This equivalence in the tradition 
has not been studied beyond the debate over hell where the discussion is very brief. 
Therefore I will quote several authors at length. From a study of Calvin, Edwards and 
Owen and, more briefly, Luther and Packer, I will conclude that the doctrine of penal 
substitution is held to establish that degree of equivalence which leads annihilationists 
to hold unorthodox doctrines of the incarnation and resurrection. I will also note that the 
link is stronger where a doctrine of limited atonement is held, but that equivalence is 
still established without holding to this specific form of penal substitution. 
Annihilationists are therefore unable to avoid equivalence without either rejecting the 
doctrine of penal substitution, or rejecting the conclusions of leading theologians in the 
evangelical tradition. I will argue that both of these conclusions would be considered 
undesirable by most evangelicals. 
4.3.1 The Link Between Hell and the Atonement in the Tradition 
In this survey of the doctrinal tradition for understanding the atonement, my aim is to 
focus on those arguments that bear on the question of what Christ suffered on the cross, 
and whether he could be said to have suffered hell. I will begin by noting that the most 
significant distinction in the tradition for my purposes is that of what kind of satisfaction 
Christ made. I will conclude that the strongest equivalence between cross and hell is 
established when it is held that Christ made satisfaction by being punished. Later, when 
examining the writings of Owen and Edwards, I will note the additional distinction of 
those for whom Christ died, and suggest that limited atonement gives the strongest link. 
Having defined the different usages of satisfaction, I will off er a summary of several 
leading theologians . in the Protestant tradition of which most evangelicals are 
theological heirs. 
In his survey of The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, Denney contrasts two broad 
streams of understanding of the atonement based on their understanding of how 
satisfaction is made for sin. The first stream holds that 'Satisfaction is punishment'. On 
this, Denney comments, "Satisfaction, in the strictly legal sense of the term, is identical 
with punishment. The man who has broken a law makes satisfaction by enduring the 
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penalty which is attached by the law to his offence."786 Denney goes on to point out the 
implications for the link with hell: "Some [theologians] rendered it rigorously in the 
legal sense, and then to make satisfaction was the same thing as to pay the penalty, 
which in this case was eternal death." 787 The second stream he calls 'Satisfaction or 
punishment', in which satisfaction is an alternative to punishment. Denney explains the 
second stream as follows: 
Others, in accordance with the facts involved in the sinner's satisfaction for his 
own sin, could only regard the satisfaction of Christ as improperly or quasi 
penal. .. There had to be pain or sacrifice in it as in all satisfactions made by men, 
but it was not precisely penal pain. It was pain by which the penal pain due to sin 
was avoided. It was pain which in a way was a substitute for punishment: ... 788 
This understanding of the term was introduced into theology by Tertullian. McDonald 
notes this position, and draws the conclusion for the link between cross and hell. 
Other [theologians] took satisfaction in the sense Tertullian had applied it to the 
Christian's repentance, and so regarded Christ's death not as an equivalent, but 
as something accepted in lieu of the full quota of punishment. Christ did not, nor 
could not, suffer the total punishment for human sin; but he did suffer its pain. 
The pain was "accepted" as "satisfaction"; it was the substitute for 
punishment. 789 
These two broad streams can also be seen as characterising historical periods. Packer 
suggests that the Reformation marks a watershed in the understanding of satisfaction: 
What the Reformers did was to redefine satisfactio (satisfaction), the main 
mediaeval category for thought about the cross. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo?, 
which largely determined the mediaeval development, saw Christ's satisfactio for 
our sins as the offering of compensation for damages done, but the reformers 
saw it as the undergoing of vicarious punishment (poena) to meet the claims on 
us of God's holy Law and wrath (i.e. his punitive justice). 790 
Denney notes that most Protestant theology came to stand in this broad stream where 
punishment is satisfaction. 
In Protestant theology the equivocal character of the idea of satisfaction ... tends 
to disappear. The satisfaction of which the theologians think is not the Anselmic 
one, which has no relation to punishment, nor that of the penitential system, 
which was only quasi-penal, but that of Roman law, which is identical with 
punishment. What comes more and more steadily into view is the idea that 
Christ made satisfaction for our sins, by bearing the penalty of them in our 
786 James Denney, The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), pp. 
46-7. 
787 Ibid., p. 48. 
788 Ibid., p. 48. 
789 H.D. McDonald, The Atonement of the Death of Christ: In Faith, Revelation, and History (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), p. 155. 
790 Packer, Cross, p. 4. 
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stead ... Melanchthon is as explicit as words can be: 'Deus justitiae suae 
puniendo satisfecit; justitia servatur in recipienda poena. ' 791 
Again, Denney recognises this as the mainstream Protestant position when he writes, 
"The orthodox doctrine made Christ's satisfaction penal; Christ made satisfaction by 
bearing the punishment of sin."792 Packer's summary is that penal substitution was held 
by all the magisterial reformers. "The two main historical point~ relating to the idea [ of 
penal substitution] are, first, that Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melanchthon and their 
reforming contemporaries were the pioneers in stating it..." 793 It is this stream which 
characterises evangelicalism. The importance of penal substitution is highlighted by 
Packer in a lecture in 1973, when, as I have noted already, he speaks of 
a belief which, by and large, is a distinguishing mark of the world-wide 
evangelical fraternity: namely, the belief that Christ's death on the cross had the 
character of penal substitution, and that it was in virtue of this fact that it brought 
salvation to mankind.794 
However the distinction between the two streams is not watertight. Denney argues that 
on the 'satisfaction or punishment' position, satisfaction can still be very similar to t 1e 
punishment. 
In law, satisfaction was penal; it was rendered to the law by paying its penalty. In 
the discipline of the Church it was not strictly speaking penal; it was a means of 
averting the penalty. But it was painful, it was due to sin, and in that sense it was 
quasi-penal. 795 
The broad distinction between the streams remains useful, though. And before turning to 
a more detailed study of the 'satisfaction is punishment' stream, I would note two 
provisional conclusions. First, Annihilationists face their major challenge from the 
stream which most strongly establishes equivalence, that is the 'satisfaction is 
punishment' stream. Second, since this stream is characteristic of the Reformers, 
Protestant orthodoxy in general, and evangelicalism in particular, annihilationists may 
find themselves having to reject the mainstream evangelical heritage on the atonement. 
In turning to examine more closely the 'satisfaction is punishment' stream, my aim will 
be to examine the conclusions that representative writers draw about the link between 
791 Denney, op. cit., p. 94. 
792 Ibid., p. 110. 
793 Packer, Cross, p. 3. 
794 Ibid., p. 3, [Italics original.] The second point is that Socinus' arguments have been central in the 
discussion ever since. 
795 Denney, op. cit., pp. 76-77. 
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the cross and hell. I will focus on writers who are particularly influential for evangelical 
theology, since annihilationists would be rightly hesitant to reject their conclusions if 
they want to remain acceptable to the evangelical constituency. Having spoken of a 
broad stream in which 'satisfaction is punishment' Denney distinguishes two lines that 
flowed from the assumption, which he entitles the 'legal/material' and the 'spiritual'. It 
is in the first of these two sub-categories that the theological tradition is found which 
most clearly claims that Christ suffered hell on the cross; however the second may 
provide some additional suggestive links to the modified Traditionalism I have 
proposed. I turn now to specific theologians noted as standing in these lines, beginning 
with the legal/material line. Denney writes: 
Many theologians in applying it [satisfaction] to Christ took it in the strict legal 
sense. He made satisfaction for sin by enduring the penalty which was due for it 
to man. But this penalty was eternal death, or the pains of hell. Could any one 
say that Christ has endured this? 796 
Denney answers "Yes" and goes on to note that Luther, Calvin and Owen draw just this 
conclusion. I now tum to an examination of the views of Calvin and Owen, along with 
those of Edwards and, more briefly, Packer. I begin, though, with some references to 
Luther's views in the secondary literature. 
That Luther held a doctrine of penal substitution is argued by Packer, who in turn quotes 
favourably Pannenberg's statement that "Luther was probably the first since Paul and his 
school to have seen with full clarity that Jesus" death in its genuine sense is to be 
understood as vicarious penal suffering." 797 Luther writes clearly of a very strong link 
between the sufferings of Christ and the damned: "'In His innocent, tender heart He was 
obliged to taste for us eternal death and damnation, and, in short, to suffer everything 
that a condemned sinner has merited and must suffer for ever.' And again: 'Sinsit 
poenam infernal em."' 798 Dale summarises Luther's commentary on Galatians 3: 13: 
the substance of this passage is this - Christ so assumed the penal responsibilities 
of mankind, that all who believe in him are delivered from the penalties of sin. 
The law has inflicted on Him the sufferings which but for His mercy would have 
been inflicted on us. 799 
196 Ibid., p. 49. 
797 W. Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, tr. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe, SCM, London, 
1968, p. 279, quoted by Packer, Cross, p. 32, n. 33. 
798 Denney, op. cit., p. 49, footnote 1. In this footnote Denney notes that there are many other similar 
references in Luther: "See the abundant collection of passages in K<5stlin; Luthers Theologie, ii. 41 lf." 
799 Dale, op. cit., pp. 289-290. 
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Packer adds a further quote from Luther to similar effect: 
'Christ himself suffered the dread and horror of a distressed conscience that 
tasted eternal wrath;' 'it was not a game, or a joke, or play-acting when he said 
"Thou hast forsaken me"; for then he felt himself really forsaken in all things 
even as a sinner is forsaken" (Werke, 5.602,605)8°0 
Finally Peterson quotes Luther to highlight that Christ's experience of hell's torment 
was not just physical: "Christ, therefore, suffered the pains of hell for us, in physical 
death and 'also in the anxiety and terror of a frightened conscience, which feels God's 
eternal wrath as though it would be forsaken and rejected by God for eternity."'801 
Like Luther, Calvin was an advocate of a doctrine of penal substitution in which 
punishment is the means by which satisfaction is made. I offer three quotations: 
Christ... took upon himself and suffered the punishment that, from God's 
righteous judgement, threatened all sinners... that by this expiation he made 
satisfaction and sacrifice duly to God the Father ... "802 Again, "in every respect 
[he] took our place to pay the price of our redemption."803 Further, "For unless 
Christ had made satisfaction for our sins, it would not have been said that he 
appeased God by taking upon himself the penalty to which we were subject.804 
Denney judges that, compared to Luther, Calvin "is almost equally emphatic" on the 
equivalence of the punishment of Christ and that of the damned. 805 
This link is clearest in his exposition of the doctrine of the Descent into Hell. 
Christ was put in the place of evildoers as surety and pledge - submitting himself 
even as accused - to bear and suffer all the punishments that they ought to have 
sustained. All - with this one exception: "He could not be held by the pangs of 
death" [Acts 2:24] No wonder, then, if he is said to have descended into hell, for 
he suffered the death that God in his wrath had inflicted upon the wicked! ... The 
point is that the Creed sets forth what Christ suffered in the sight of men, and 
then appositely speaks of that invisible and incomprehensible judgement which 
he underwent in the sight of God in order that we might know not only that 
Christ's body was given as the price of our redemption, but that he paid a greater 
and more excellent price in suffering in his soul the terrible torments of a 
condemned and forsaken man. 806 
Calvin even suggests that Christ's experience on the cross included some sense of the 
unending nature of hell: "he must also grapple hand to hand with ... the dread of 
800 Packer, Cross, p. 41. 
801 Peterson, op. cit., p. 112, quoting Luther in Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 205. 
802 Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. McNeill, J.T., trans. Battles, Ford Lewis, The 
Library of Christian Classics, vol. 21 (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1960), p. 504. 
803 Ibid., p. 511. 
804 Ibid., p. 532. 
805 Denney, op. cit., p. 49. 
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everlasting death."807 Therefore for Calvin the doctrine of Christ's descent into hell is a 
statement about Christ's experience of hell. This equivalence is also spelt out when 
discussing the credal statement 'Dead and Buried'. "Here again is to be seen how he in 
every respect took our place to pay the price of our redemption. "808 Calvin also 
discusses which aspects of Christ's human nature suffered on the cross, concluding that 
he suffered in both body and soul. Calvin argues, "If Christ had died only a bodily death, 
it would have been ineffectual."809 Again, "And surely, unless his soul shared in the 
punishment, he would have been the Redeemer of bodies alone."810 
There are features, though, of Calvin's presentation which may initially seem to weaken 
this equivalence between the cross and hell. One such feature is that Christ's work of 
salvation involves more than his death on the cross. The issue here is that if Christ's 
work of salvation involves more than his death on the cross, then the equivalence is not 
between the cross and hell, but his whole life and hell, which becomes a more complex 
comparison to analyse. In a section headed (in the Battles edition) "Christ has redeemed 
us through his obedience, which he practised throughout his life."811 Calvin writes 
Now someone asks, How has Christ abolished sin, banished the separation 
between us and God, and acquired righteousness to render God favourable and 
kindly towards us? To this we can in general reply that he has achieved this by 
the whole course of his obedience.812 
He summarises, "In short, from the time when he took on the form of a servant, he 
began to pay the price of liberation in order to redeem us."813 This obedience was even 
necessary in death, because only a voluntary sacrifice was useful for righteousness. 814 
806 Calvin, op. cit., pp. 515-6. 
807 Ibid., p. 515. This understanding of the Descent into Hell came to be enshrined in The Heidelberg 
Catechism which at Question 44 asks, 'Why is there added: "He descended into hell"?' The answer is, 
"That in my severest tribulations I may be assured that Christ my Lord has redeemed me from hellish 
anxieties and torment by the unspeakable anguish, pains, and terrors which he suffered in his soul both on 
the cross and before." The Heidelberg Catechism, translated by A.O. Miller and M.E. Osterhaven 
(Philadelphia: United Church, 1962). Peterson quotes a different, and unacknowledged, translation of this 
question which makes the point of Christ's experience of hell even more clearly. "But only Christ out 
Substitute endured the full weight of "the anguish and torment of hell" here on earth (Heidelberg 
Catechism, Q. & A. 44)." Peterson, op. cit., p. 183. 
808 Calvin, op. cit., p. 511. 
809 Ibid, p. 515. 
810 Ibid., p. 518. 
811 Ibid., p. 507. 
812 Ibid., p. 507. 
813 Ibid., p. 507. 
814 Ibid., p. 508. 
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However, the importance of this obedience in salvation should not be over-estimated, 
since the great emphasis is upon Christ's death on the cross. 
Yet to define the way of salvation more exactly, Scripture ascribes this as 
peculiar and proper to Christ's death .... For this reason the so-called "Apostles' 
Creed" passes at once in the best order from the birth of Christ to his death and 
resurrection, wherein the whole of perfect salvation consists.815 
Another feature of Calvin's position that might seem to weaken equivalence is the 
universal extent of Christ's death, being sufficient satisfaction for the sins of all people. 
The issue here is that if Christ's death was sufficient satisfaction for the sins of more 
than one person, it might seem that he must have experienced a quantitatively far greater 
amount of suffering than any individual in hell. In fact, on a commercial analogy, Christ 
must have paid for everyone in both heaven and hell. However the response in the 
tradition was that Christ's death was of such value not because he experienced some 
multiple of the torments of hell, but because the dignity of his Divine nature gave the 
sufferings of his human nature far greater value. There was what I will call a 'divine 
multiplier'. This response could have been used by Calvin as well. A further response in 
the tradition, which also maintains equivalence, is that Christ had a federal headship and 
died as a representative, and therefore only suffered the equivalent of one individual in 
hell. Calvin certainly argues for Christ's death being representative. Despite difficulties, 
the Protestant tradition has usually followed Calvin here, maintaining that Christ had 
both a representative and a substitutionary relationship with the righteous. 
In conclusion, it is clear that Calvin was an advocate of penal substitution, and from this 
he held that there was an equivalence whereby Christ could be said to have experienced 
hell on the cross. This is particularly apparent in his exposition of the credal phrase "He 
descended into hell.'' 
I now tum to argue that the equivalence between the atonement and hell is even stronger 
if one holds a more specific understanding of the penal nature of the atonement in the 
doctrine of limited atonement. McDonald suggests this conclusion when he comments 
that theologians can speak of Christ "bearing in a literal and actual form from the divine 
punishment of man's sin ... its strongest statement, as by Jonathan Edwards and John 
815 Ibid., pp. 507-8. 
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Owen, who restrict the atonement to the elect."816 The logic here is that if Christ died to 
save some and not others, there may well be a clearly defined quantity of substitutionary 
suffering that Christ experienced, and therefore that the equivalence is more likely to be 
exact. McDonald mentions Edwards and Owen, and I will focus on them not only 
because they offer perhaps the strongest and lengthiest advocacy of limited atonement, 
but also because they are major theologians, who have been influential in the 
evangelical tradition. In turning to these two advocates of limited atonement, it would 
be wrong to draw a sharp distinction between them and Calvin at this point. There is 
some debate about Calvin's views, but it is arguable that Calvin was a 'Calvinist' at this 
point,817 and certainly Owen saw himself as standing in the tradition of Calvin. 
However, these two writers do articulate limited atonement with greater definition. 
In turning to John Owen first, I will examine his major discussion of the atonement: The 
Death of Death in the Death of Christ: A Treatise in which the whole controversy about 
Universal Redemption is fully discussed. 818 John Owen is quite explicit that Christ on 
the cross experienced the punishment due to sinners in hell. For example, 
Christ so took and bare our sins, and had them so laid upon him, as that he 
underwent the punishment due to them, and that in our stead ... The consequence 
of the proposition is apparent... Secondly, That all the evils of punishment 
whatsoever are comprised in these is unquestionably evident."819 Again, "Christ 
underwent not only that wrath (taking it passively) which the elect were under, 
but that also which they should have undergone had not he borne it for 
them: ... 820 
Owen actually uses the phrase 'pains of hell': "it seems strange to me that Christ should 
undergo the pains of hell in their stead who lay in the pains of hell before he underwent 
those pains, and shall continue in them to eternity ... "821 
Owen also reiterates benney' s careful distinction about the meaning of satisfaction, and 
again clearly establishes equivalence. Having noted that the term 'satisfaction' is not 
816 H.D. McDonald, The Atonement of the Death of Christ: In Faith, Revelation, and History (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), p. 223. 
817 See Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1982). 
818 John Owen, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ: A Treatise in which the whole controversy 
about Universal Redemption is fully discussed (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1959.) 
819 Ibid., p. 168. 
820 Ibid., p. 173. 
821 Ibid., p. 61. 
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used in Scripture, he offers a brief definition: "being a compensation made to God by 
Christ for our debts. "822 He also offers a fuller definition: 
Satisfaction is a term borrowed from the law, applied properly to things, thence 
translated and accommodated unto persons; and it is a full compensation of the 
creditor from the debtor ... Personal debts are injuries and faults; which when a 
man hath committed he is liable to punishment... unless satisfaction be made. 823 
Owen then makes an important distinction which serves to emphasise the equivalence of 
the experience of Christ on the cross and the damned in hell. 
Now there may be a twofold satisfaction: - First, By a solution, or paying the 
very thing that is in obligation, either by the party himself that is bound, or by 
some other in his stead: as, if I owe a man twenty pounds, and my friend goeth 
and payeth it, my creditor is fully satisfied. Secondly, By a solution, or paying of 
so much, although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which 
by the creditor's acceptance, stands in the lieu of it; upon which, also, freedom 
from the obligation followeth, not necessarily, but by virtue of an act of 
favour. 824 
Owen continues, a few pages later 
Now, whereas I said that there is a twofold satisfaction, whereby the debtor is 
freed from the obligation that is upon him, - the one being the solutio ejusdem, 
payment of the same thing that was in obligation; the other, solutio tantidem, of 
that which is not the same, nor equivalent unto it, but only in the gracious 
acceptation of the creditor, - it is worth our inquiry which of these it was that our 
Saviour did perform. 825 
In rejecting Grotius' arguments against the former, Owen concludes: 
the death of Christ made satisfaction in the very thing that was required in the 
obligation... All our debt was in the curse of the law, which he wholly 
underwent. Neither do we read of any relaxation of the punishment in the 
Scripture, but only a commutation of the person ... 826 
In giving a reason why God demands a solutio ejusdem, Owen merely states that "in the 
business of satisfaction ... God, as a creditor, doth exactly require that payment of the 
debt by way of punishment. "827 In other words the satisfaction required is the 
punishment due. This is also maintained when he writes, "[T]o make satisfaction to God 
for our sins, it is required only that he undergo the punishment due to them; for that is 
the satisfaction required where sin is the debt."828 This equivalence is emphasised by 
Owen's use of commercial analogies for the punishment of sin as the payment of a debt, 
although he notes that in doing so this changes the strict meaning of punishment. Thus 
822 Ibid., p. 154. 
823 Ibid., p. 153. 
824 Ibid., p. 153. 
825 Ibid., p. 155. 
826 Ibid., p. 157. 
827 Ibid., p. 160. 
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Owen notes that "It is true of punishment, as punishment, there is no creditor properly; 
for, "Delicta puniri publice interest." But this punishment being considered also as a 
price, as it is, 1 Cor. vi. 20, it must be paid to the hands of some creditor, as this was 
into he hands of God; .. "829 More briefly, "by the payment of the debt of sin understand, 
by analogy, the undergoing of the punishment due to it."830 More succinctly still "where 
sin is the debt, [the payment] is punishment..."831 Therefore Owen contends t~at the 
satisfaction Christ made was not payment in kind but the thing itself. This link is 
clarified by the frequent use of commercial analogies of debt payment for both 
punishment and satisfaction: since they both pay off the same debt they are presumably 
the same value coinage. 
However, as with Calvin, despite such clear statements of an equivalence between the 
cross and hell, there are a number of points in Owen's book which might raise doubts 
about the degree of this equivalence. Most have already been rehearsed in the above 
section on Calvin, although I will address them again here since Owen often gives more 
detail in his arguments. I begin by noting that Owen goes beyond Calvin particularly in 
the care with which he seeks to distinguish the ways in which Christ's experience on the 
cross was like that of the damned, but also the points in which it differed. 
The punishment due to our sin and the chastisement of our peace was upon him; 
which that it was the pains of hell, in their nature and being, in their weight and 
pressure, though not in tendency and continuance (it being impossible that he 
should be detained by death), who can deny and not be injurious to the justice of 
God, which will inevitably inflict those pains to eternity upon sinners?832 
Similarly, Owen then offers this conclusion about the "nature of the satisfaction": 
It was a full, valuable compensation, made to the justice of God, for all the sins 
of all those for whom he made satisfaction, by undergoing that same punishment 
which, by reason of the obligation that was upon them, they themselves were 
bound to und~rgo. When I say the same, I mean essentially the same in weight 
and pressure, though not in all accidents of duration and the like; for it was 
impossible that he should be detained by death. 833 
Owen's comments raise the issue as to how many of the accidents of the two 
experiences can differ, especially duration, without the substance of the equivalence 
being weakened to the point at which it becomes more misleading than enlightening to 
828 Ibid., p. 154. 
829 Ibid., p. 158. 
830 Ibid., p. 156. 
831 Ibid., p. 158. 
832 Ibid., p. 61. 
228 
say that Christ experienced hell on the cross. Owen recognises the issue, and argues that 
accidents such as duration can differ and the equivalence maintained. Further, there is 
some debate about how Owen is to be understood at this point. Packer argues, 
To construe Owen's statement of equivalence between what threatened us and 
what Christ endured in 'quantitative' terms, as if some calculus of penal pain was 
being applied, would be a misunderstanding, though admittedly one which 
Owen's constant reliance on the model of payment invites, and against which he 
did not guard. 834 
Denney however quotes the last excerpt of Owen quoted above which he reads as 
arguing for such a quantitative equivalence. 835 Denney therefore states that Owen holds 
a view different, and indeed objectionable, to his own. However, Packer argues that 
Denney's conclusion isn't warranted, by offering an alternative reading of Owen and 
concluding that Owen actually had the same view as Denney, in which there was 
equivalence, but not a quantitative equivalence. Thus Packer quotes Denney, "'that in 
that dark hour He had to realise to the full the divine reaction against the sin in the 
race. "'836 and then states, "But Denney's statement expresses what Owen means."837 My 
own adjudication would be, first, that Packer is probably right in seeing Denney as 
closer to Owen than Denney realised, and second, that Denney is probably right in 
seeing that Owen does argue for a quantitative equivalence, and that it can't be as easily 
avoided as Packer thinks. However, it is clear that Owen held that there was a very 
strong equivalence. 
Another issue that might seem to undermine equivalence is that if Christ's death was of 
infinite value then it might be that his suffering was not equivalent to any other 
individual's, but far greater. Owen argues that Christ's death was of infinite value, being 
sufficient for all mankind. 
The value, wprth, and dignity of the ransom which Christ gave himself to be, 
and of the price which he paid, was infinite and immeasurable; fit for the 
accomplishment of any end and the procuring of any good, for all and every one 
for .whom it was intended, had they been millions of men more than ever were 
created. 838 
833 Ibid., pp. 157-8. 
834 Packer, Cross, pp. 40-41, n. 43. 
835 D . 49 enney, op. cit., p. . 
836 Ibid., p. 40, no reference in Denney given. 
837 Ibid., p. 41, n. 43. 
838 Owen, op. cit., p. 119. 
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Owen proceeds to affirm "that old distinction of the schoolmen, embraced and used by 
divers Protestant divines, ... namely, "That Christ died for all in respect of the sufficiency 
of the ransom paid, but not in respect of the efficacy of its application;" ... "839 Owen then 
explains how this sacrifice could be of such value in the next quotation. 
This sufficiency of his sacrifice hath a twofold rise: - First, The dignity of the 
person that did offer and was offered. Secondly, The greatness of the pain he 
endured, by which he was able to bear, and did undergo, the whole curse of the 
law and wrath of God due to sin. 840 
Owen does not discuss these two reasons any further. However, they raise at least three 
related questions: First, how are these two factors of dignity and pain related in their 
value? Second, could the dignity of the person mean that even if Christ had suffered 
little or no pain besides death, his sacrifice would still have been sufficient for all? 
Third, when Owen says that Christ underwent the whole curse of the law and wrath of 
God, does this mean that he suffered more than anyone else will in hell? In other words, 
was the suffering of the cross greater than the suffering of hell? The most likely 
interpretation is, I think, that Christ underwent the maximum intensity of suffering that 
any individual could experience in hell, rather than some multiple of the suffering of an 
individual, and that the sufficiency of the sacrifice comes from what Owen calls 'the 
dignity of the person', and in particular the union of the human nature with the Divine, 
which I have termed the 'divine multiplier'. 
Further, Owen explains why the death of Christ, though a sufficient satisfaction for all, 
was not efficient to save all. The problem is focused by Owen's own contention that 
double payment of satisfaction can not be demanded by God. "That a second payment of 
a debt once paid, or a requiring of it, is not answerable to the justice which God 
demonstrated in setting forth Christ to be a propitiation of our sins, Rom. iii. 25."841 
Owen's response is that the distinction resides in the will of God. Having spoken of the 
sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice for the sins of all people, Owen continues, 
That is its own true internal perfection and sufficiency. That it should be applied 
unto any, made a price for them, and become beneficial to them, according to the 
worth that is in it, is external to it, doth not arise from it, but merely depends 
upon the intention and will of God. It was in itself of infinite value and 
sufficiency to have been made a price to have bought and purchased all and 
every man in the world. That it did formally become a price for any is solely to 
839 Ibid., p. 184. 
840 Ibid., p. 184. 
841 Ibid., p. 161. 
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be ascribed to the purpose of God, intending their purchase and redemption by it. 
The intention of the offerer and acceptor that it should be for such, some, or any, 
is that which gives the formality of a price unto it; that is external. But the value 
and fitness of it be made a price ariseth from its own internal sufficiency. 842 
Owen therefore finds a resolution solely in the will of God, which is hidden to us. 
However this introduces an arbitrary element into the debate. It would seem that the 
reason Christ suffered as he did is not ultimately because of a necessary equivalence to 
the sufferings of the damned, but because the level was set by the will of God. This then 
breaks a necessary equivalence, even if Owen argues that in fact there is equivalence. 
Owen resolves some other issues with a similar recourse to the will of God, which also 
serve to break a necessary equivalence, although in fact he maintains that God has 
chosen to maintain equivalence. Thus Owen argues that satisfaction is not necessary for 
God to have mercy on sinners. In responding to Arminius, he writes, 
The foundation of this whole assertion seems to me to be false and erroneous, -
namely, that God could not have mercy on mankind unless satisfaction were 
made by his Son. "843 Again, "That neither Scripture nor right reason will enforce 
nor prove an utter and absolute want of power in God to save sinners by his own 
absolute will, without satisfaction to his justice, supposing his purpose that so it 
should be; indeed it could not be otherwise. 844 
However in a footnote, the editor notes that Owen later changed his mind on this 
question. 
In the statements above, it is implied that salvation might have been 
accomplished without the absolute necessity of such a satisfaction to the claims 
of justice as the death of Christ afforded. Dr Owen, it will be found in [De 
Divina Justitia] , latterly changed his views at this point, and held the necessity 
for the satisfaction of divine justice by an atonement, in order to [sic] salvation, 
to be absolute.- ED.845 
As in the conclusion to the previous point, this arbitrary quality to Christ's satisfaction 
serves to break a necessary equivalence between the cross and hell, but equivalence can 
still be maintained. God could have chosen to set the level of satisfaction he required at 
exactly the level equivalent to the punishment of hell. Indeed, Owen's quotes above on 
the exact equivalence of Christ's satisfaction suggest exactly this. 
842 Ibid., p. 184, [Italics original.] 
843 Ibid., p. 93. 
844 Ibid., p. 116. 
845 Ibid., pp. 93-4. The editor is Edward Hickman. Carl R. Trueman offers a detailed study of this change 
in "John Owen's Dissertation on Divine Justice: An Exercise in Christocen.tric Scholasticism," Calvin 
Theological Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 87-103. 
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A similar problem seems to arise when Owen argues that it's not necessary for God to 
punish. 
God may, by virtue of his supreme dominion, omit punishment without any 
wrong or prejudice to his justice. It is as great a thing to impute sin where it is 
not, and to inflict punishment upon that imputation, as not to impute sin, where 
it is, and to remove or not to inflict punishment upon that non-imputation. Now 
the first of these God did towards Christ; and, therefore, he may do the latter.846 
However, earlier Owen argues that while God relaxes the law, he only does so in 
allowing the debt to be paid by a surety. "The only Lawgiver, who alone had power so 
far to relax his own law as to have the name of a surety put into the obligation, which 
before was not there, and then to require the whole debt of that surety; ... "847 Therefore 
there seems to be no necessary breaking of the equivalence between cross and hell at 
this point. 
Owen's detail and clarity on the view that Christ experienced on the cross what sinners 
would in hell is such that he seeks to categorise the similarities and differences between 
the two experiences, drawing a distinction between the accidents and the substance of 
the suffering of the cross. However, the very clarity of the discussion tends to raise more 
sharply the question of whether this equivalence is persuasive. 
I tum next to Jonathan Edwards848, who has some of the most detailed discussion on the 
degree of equivalence in the literature, rivalled only by Owen. Further, like Owen, he is 
one of the premier theologians of particular redemption, which I am suggesting leads to 
a stronger case for equivalence. However, Edwards is also seen by some as a precursor 
of the other line in Denney's 'punishment is satisfaction' stream: the spiritual/moral line, 
which was to reach clearer fruition in the vicarious repentance doctrine of Mcleod 
Campbell, who quot~s Edwards as a source. It is this second line which I will suggest 
has some illuminating parallels with the modified Traditionalism I have proposed. 
I will divide my study of Edwards into four parts, with the first and second in this 
section and the third and fourth in the following section where I examine links between 
846 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
847 Ibid., p. 158. 
848 Mark Noll offers a striking comment on Edwards when he writes in the Foreword to Tidball's book on 
evangelicalism: "In defining how evangelicals should believe and act, Tidball follows the best authorities: 
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the atonement and Reconciliationism. First, and most importantly, I will address directly 
the issue of equivalence. Second, I will examine the question of the effect that Christ's 
divine nature is believed to have on the value of Christ's satisfaction (what I have 
termed the 'Divine Multiplier'.) Third, in the following section, I will examine the links 
to McLeod Campbell's doctrine of vicarious atonement, although there is some overlap 
with material in the first section. Finally, I will note some miscellaneous links to 
Blocher' s modified Traditionalism. 
So, first, I will examine Edwards' comments which bear directly on the issue of 
equivalence. In this extended quotation below, Edwards is primarily concerned to argue 
that the fate of the damned is worse than that of Christ on the cross, both in terms of the 
nature of the suffering and its duration. However he also states that there was an 
equivalence to the suffering, in terms of its objective nature as the wrath of God, 
differing rather in the nature of the subjects. 
Let such senseless sinners consider, that that misery, of which they are in danger 
from the wrath of God, is infinitely more terrible than that, the fear of which 
occasioned in Christ his agony and bloody sweat. It is more terrible, both as it 
differs both in its nature and degree, and also as it differs in its duration. 
1. It is more terrible in its nature and degree. Christ suffered that which, as it 
upheld the honour of the divine law, was fully equivalent to the misery of the 
damned; and in some respect it was the same suffering; for it was the wrath of 
the same God; yet in other respects it vastly differed. The difference does not 
arise from the difference in the wrath poured out on one and the other, for it is 
the same wrath, but from the difference of the subject, which may be best 
illustrated from Christ's own comparison. Luke xxiii. 31. "For if they do these 
things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" Here he calls himself the 
green tree and wicked men the dry, intimating that the misery that will come on 
wicked men will be far more dreadful than those sufferings which came on him, 
and the differences arise from the different nature of the subject. The green tree 
and the dry are both cast into the fire; but the flames seize and kindle on the dry 
tree much more fiercely than on the green. The sufferings that Christ endured 
differ from the misery of the wicked in hell in nature and degree in the following 
respects. 
1. Christ felt not the gnawings of a guilty, condemning conscience. 
2. He felt no torment from reigning of inward corruptions and lusts as the 
damned do. The wicked in hell are their own tormentors, their lusts are their 
tormentors, and being without restraint, (for there is no restraining grace in hell,) 
their lusts will rage like raging flames in their hearts. They shall be tormented 
with the unrestrained violence of a spirit of envy and malice against God, and 
Scripture first, then the noble worthies of the tradition like Edwards ... " [TJdball, Evangelicals, op. cit., p. 
xii.] 
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against the angels and saints in heaven, and against one another. Now Christ 
suffered nothing of this. 
3. Christ had not to consider that God hated him. The wicked in hell have 
this to make their misery perfect, they know that God perfectly hates them 
without the least pity or regard to them, which will fill their souls with 
inexpressible misery. But it was not so with Christ. God withdrew his 
comfortable presence from Christ, and hid his face from him, and so poured out 
his wrath upon him, as made him feel its terrible effects in his soul; but yet he 
knew at the same time that God did not hate him, but infinitely loved him. He 
cried out of God forsaking him, but yet at the same time calls him "My God, my 
God!" knowing that he was his God still, though he has forsaken him. But the 
wicked in hell will know that he is not their God, but their judge and 
irreconcilable enemy. 
4. Christ did not suffer despair, as the wicked do in hell. He knew that 
there would be an end to his sufferings in a few hours; and that after that he 
should enter into eternal glory. But it will be far otherwise with you that are 
impenitent; if you die in your present condition, you will be in prefect despair. 
On these accounts, the misery of the wicked in hell will be immensely more 
dreadful in nature and degree, than those sufferings with the fears of which 
Christ's soul was so much overwhelmed. 
2. It will infinitely differ in duration. Christ's sufferings lasted but a few hours, 
and there was an eternal end to them, and eternal glory succeeded. But you that 
are secure, senseless sinner, are every day exposed to sufferings, immensely 
more dreadful in nature and degree, and that are to be without any end, but must 
be endured without any rest day or night for ever and ever! If you had a full 
sense of the greatness of that misery to which you are exposed, and how dreadful 
your present condition is on that account, it would this moment put you into as 
dreadful agony as that Christ underwent; yea, if your nature could endure it, one 
more dreadful. We should now see you fall down in a bloody sweat, wallowing 
in your gore, and crying out in terrible amazement.849 
This might seem to settle the issue for Edwards: there is a lack of equivalence at crucial 
points since the damned suffer more severely than Christ, although they both suffer the 
same wrath of God. In particular, Edwards is explicit that they had different experiences 
of the length of torment, with Christ not suffering the unending torments of a 
traditionalist hell. However, elsewhere Edwards writes in a way which seems to give 
evidence for a stronger link. The chief source of relevant discussion is Edwards' 
Concerning the Necessity and Reasonableness of the Christian Doctrine of Satisfaction 
for Sin. (Remarks on Important Theological Controversies, Chapter V). 850 I begin with 
a brief, but general, statement of equivalence. "Th~t Christ indeed suffered the full 
punishment of the sin that was imputed to him, or offered that to God that was fully and 
849 Edwards, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 871 ff. 
850 Ibid., pp. 565 ff. 
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completely equivalent to what we owed to divine justice for our sins, is evident by 
Psalm lxix.5 ... "851 A longer, and more detailed, passage, introduces at least three further 
important ideas. First, Edwards makes the interesting observation that temporal death 
"is a great image of eternal death," thus suggesting that although there is an infinite 
difference in their degree, there is still some kind of link. Second, Edwards now lists 
some of the ways in which the suffering of Christ was greater than that of the damned. 
Again, this may serve to weaken equivalence just as much as the points above about 
Christ's suffering being less, but there may be some higher synthesis. Third, and most 
significant, Edwards argues that the idea of hell is the equivalent of the thing itself. This 
opens up the possibility that if Christ could have the idea of an unending torment, he 
could be said in some sense to have experienced it. 
Christ suffered the wrath of God for men's sins in such a way as he was capable 
of, being an infinitely holy person, who knew that God was not angry with him 
personally, knew that God did not hate him, but infinitely loved him. The wicked 
in hell suffer the wrath of God, as they will have the sense, and knowledge, and 
sight of God's infinite displeasure towards them and hatred of them. But this 
was impossible in Jesus Christ. Christ therefore could bear the wrath of God in 
no other but these two ways. 
I. In having a great and clear sight of the infinite wrath of God against the sin of 
men, and the punishment they had deserved ... The sight of evil of sin tended to 
this, and so did the enduring of temporal death, that is a great image of eternal 
death, especially under such circumstances, with such extreme pain, God's 
hiding his face, his dying a death that by God's appointment was an accursed 
death, having a sight of the malice and triumph of devils, and being forsaken of 
his friends, &c .... Thus, Christ bare our sins; God laid on him the iniquities of us 
all, and he bare the burden of them; and so, his bearing the burden of our sins 
may be considered as something diverse from his suffering God's wrath. For his 
suffering wrath consisted more in the sense he had of the other thing, viz. The 
dreadfulness of the punishment of sin, or the dreadfulness of the punishment 
inflicted for it. Thus, Christ was tormented not only in the fire of God's wrath, 
but in the fire of our sins; ... 
Thus ~hrist suffered that which the damned in hell do not suffer. For 
they do not see the hateful nature of sin. They have no idea of sin in itself, that is 
infinitely disagreeable to their nature, as the idea of sin was to Christ's holy 
nature; though conscience in them be awakened to behold the dreadful guilt and 
desert of sin. And as the clear view of sin in its hatefulness necessarily brought 
great suffering on the holy soul of Christ; so also did the view of its punishment. 
For both the evil of sin and the evil of punishment are infinite evils, and both 
infinitely disagreeable to Christ's nature; the , former to his holy nature, or his 
nature as God, the latter to his human nature, or his nature as man. Such is 
human nature, that a great, and clear, and full idea of suffering, without some 
other pleasant and sweet idea to balance it, brings suffering; as appears from the 
851 Ibid., p. 576. 
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nature of all spiritual ideas. They are repetitions (in a degree at least) of the 
things themselves of which they are ideas. Therefore, if Christ had a perfectly 
clear and full idea of what the damned suffer in hell the suffering he would have 
had in the mere presence of that idea, would have been perfectly equal to the 
thing itself, if there had been no idea in Christ in any degree to balance it; such 
as, some knowledge of the love of God, of a future reward, future salvation of 
his elect, &c. But pleasant ideas in this clearness being in a great measure 
withholden by reason of God's hiding his face; hence, the awful ideas of eternal 
death which his elect people deserved, and of the dismal wrath of God, of 
consequence filled the soul of Christ with an inexpressible gloom. 852 
In this last paragraph Edwards begins with a statement undermining equivalence. It is 
noteworthy that the reasons he gives for the lack of equivalence are eased on a 
reconciliationist view of hell since sin is recognised as a punishment and punishment is 
acknowledged as a good. However Edwards himself then strongly reaffirms equivalence 
towards the end. This latter argument is particularly significant, because Edwards argues 
that to have the idea of hell, is equivalent to the experience of hell itself. Although 
Edwards has been arguing earlier that Christ did not have the same idea as the damned 
because he knew of the love of God, in this paragraph, Edwards argues that God largely 
withdrew such pleasant ideas, presumably leaving Christ in a similar position as the 
damned. Thus, in the final sentence, Edwards seems to argue that Christ experienced the 
idea of eternal death (understood as unending torment), and thus presumably he could 
be said to have suffered it. This the~efore serves as a strong case for equivalence. 
Edwards goes on to spell out this key psychological principle, that he is basing his 
argument on, at greater length in the following statement: 
A strong exercise of love exercises a lively idea of the object beloved. And a 
strong exercise of pity excites a lively idea of the misery under which he pities 
them. Christ's love then brought his elect infinitely near to him in that great act 
and suffering wherein he especially stood for them, and was substitute in their 
stead: and his love and pity fixed the idea of them in his mind, as if he had really 
been they; and fixed their calamity in his mind, as though it really was his. A 
very strong and lively love and pity towards the miserable, tends to make their 
case. ours; as in other respects, so in this in particular, as it doth in our idea place 
us in their stead, under their misery, with a most lively, feeling sense of that 
misery, as it were feeling it for them, actually suffering it in their stead by strong 
sympathy. 853 
852 Ibid., p. 574. 
853 Ibid., p. 575. 
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Thus Edwards seems to argue that Christ's suffering comes in large part through 
sympathetic entering into the experience of the damned. It is this principle that McLeod 
Campbell saw as a precursor of his own theory of vicarious repentance, of which I will 
say more below. However, Edwards then indicates that although this is the greater 
reason for his suffering, it is not the only one, and then proceeqs to give as the second 
reason one which sounds much more like the traditional understanding of substitution in 
which Christ suffers the thing itself, and not simply the idea of it: 
The suffering of his soul in great part consisted in the great and dreadful sense 
and idea that he then had given him of the dreadful, horrid odiousness of sin; 
which was done by the Spirit of God ... 
II. Another way in which it was possible that Christ should endure the wrath of 
God was, to endure the effects of that wrath ... 854 
Then Edwards argues that Christ's experience of the loss of his Father's love is as great 
as the damned experience of God's hatred. 
God dealt with him as if he had been exceedingly angry with him, and as though 
he had been the object of his dreadful wrath. This made all the sufferings of 
Christ the more terrible to him [Christ], because they were from the hand of his 
Father, whom he infinitely loved, and whose infinite love he had had eternal 
experience of. Besides, it was an effect of God's wrath that he forsook Christ. 
This caused Christ to cry out. .. "My God my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" 
This was infinitely terrible to Christ. Christ's knowledge of the glory of the 
Father, and his love to the Father, and the sense and experience he had had of the 
worth of the Father's love to him, made the withholding of the pleasant ideas 
and manifestations of his Father's love as terrible to him, as the sense and 
knowledge of his hatred is to the damned, that have no knowledge of God's 
excellency, no love to him, nor any experience of the infinite sweetness of his 
love.855 
Edwards also speculates that God permits the devil his role in tormenting Christ 
specifically to create an equivalency with the experience of the damned: "He was let 
loose to torment the soul of Christ with gloomy and dismal ideas. He probably did his 
uttermost to contribute to raise his ideas to the torments of hell. "856 
Edwards seems to hold to the traditional position that the hypostatic union serves to 
multiply the value of Christ's suffering in his human nature. Edwards uses a metaphor 
to make this point, which is reminiscent of one used by Anselm. Strictly speaking it 
doesn't demand that Christ was divine, but simply a hµman of great dignity, in order to 
make satisfaction for many, but in context the assumption is that Christ's dignity is 
854 Ibid., p. 575. 
855 Ibid., p. 575. 
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greater because of his divine nature. "If the patron be, in the eyes of him whose favour is 
sought, of very great dignity, it is agreeable to reason and nature that this should have 
influence to procure greater favour to the client than if he were ofless dignity." Edwards 
also suggests other types of multiplier: not just the dignity of the one suffering, but the 
dignity of the one insulted and the meanness of the one insulting: 
As an indignity is always rated by the presumption, and as the presumption bears 
an exact proportion to the meanness of the person insulting, and to the greatness 
of the party insulted; so, in like manner, all acts of condescension are estimated 
by the humility, and that again by the dignity, of the condescending person, and 
by the lowness and demerit of the party condescended to.857 
A further multiplier is the infinite regard given by Christ to God the Father. "The value 
of Christ's sacrifice was infinite, both as a propitiation, and as an act of obedience; 
because he showed an infinite regard to the majesty, holiness, &c. of God, in being at 
infinite expense from regard to those divine attributes."858 Again, this doesn't 
necessitate a divine person, and if it doesn't then it would serve as a further piece of 
evidence of similarity to McLeod Campbell and the notion of vicarious atonement. 
Edwards also holds that Christ's satisfaction was efficacious for many because of his 
representative federal headship. 
The satisfaction of Christ, by suffering the punishment of sin, is properly to be 
distinguished, as being in its own nature different from the merit of Christ. For 
merit is only some excellency or worth. But when we consider Christ's 
sufferings merely as the satisfaction for the guilt of another, the excellency of 
Christ's act of suffering does not all come into consideration; but only these two 
things, viz. Their equality or equivalence to the punishment that the sinner 
deserved; and 2ndly, The union between him and them, or the propriety of his 
being accepted in suffering, as the representative of the sinner.859 
Edwards' point is that the ability of the person to make satisfaction does not depend 
upon their worthiness; it simply requires the criteria to be fulfilled. Edwards then 
concludes with this intriguing debate: 
If the law be fulfilled, there is no need of any excellency or merit to satisfy it; 
becaµse it is satisfied by taking place and having its course. Indeed, how far the 
dignity or worthiness of Christ's person comes into consideration, in 
determining the propriety of his being accepted as a representative of sinners, so 
856 Ibid., p. 575. 
857 Ibid., p. 573. 
858 Ibid., p. 577. 
859 Ibid., p. 577. 
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that his suffering, when equivalent, can be accepted as theirs, may be a matter of 
. d d b b . . · 1 ~ · h 860 question an e ate; ut 1t 1s a matter entire y 1ore1gn to t e present purpose. 
In conclusion, Edwards, in what is probably the most detailed discussion of equivalence 
in the whole tradition, spends a lot of time focusing on the points of dissimilarity 
between the cross and hell, while still furnishing much material to indicate that he held 
to equivalence. Thus, again, there are two positions proposed by Edwards which suggest 
that Christ suffered simply in his human nature, and thus either would serve to establish 
a strong equivalence. The two positions are first, where Christ simply suffers in his 
human nature and the divine nature multiplies its value; second, where Christ's federal 
headship extends its value. However, I will argue below that this equivalence would be 
strengthened if one held that the damned, rather than being full of hatred for God, were 
also able to appreciate the loss of the love of God and to acknowledge his other 
qualities. 
I will also briefly note one contemporary evangelical author in this legal/material 
stream, J.I. Packer. As I have noted above, McGrath claims that Packer is possibly the 
most important evangelical theologian in the twentieth century. While I find this a 
surprising claim, it certainly shows that Packer is an important evangelical theologian. 
In his paper What Did The Cross Achieve? Packer defends the doctrine of penal 
substitution, arguing that limited atonement follows from this. He makes a number of 
clear statements of equivalence: 
Should we not then think of Christ's substitution for us on the cross as a definite, 
one-to-one relationship between him and each individual sinner? This seems 
scriptural, ... Christ specifically took and discharged my penal obligation as a 
sinner, ... "861 Again, "Jesus Christ. .. took our place under judgement and received 
in his own personal experience all the dimensions of the death that was our 
sentence, whatever these were, so laying the foundation for our pardon and 
immunity."862 Again, " ... what Christ bore on the cross was the Godforsakenness 
of penal judgement. 863 
However Packer is also sensitive to what he believes are weaknesses in the formulations 
of Owen and Edwards, and favours those of the Magisterial reformers: "much of the 
860 Ibid., p. 577. 
861 Packer, Cross, p. 36. 
862 Ibid., p. 30. 
863 Ibid., p. 34. 
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formative and influential discussing of penal substitution was done in the seventeenth 
century, at a time when Protestant exegesis of Scripture was coloured by an uncriticized 
and indeed unrecognized natural theology of law ... "864 It is also Packer who, as I noted 
above, offers what I think is an unnatural interpretation of Owen, arguing that he held 
that equivalence was not to be measured in quantitative terms. However such is the 
unqualified equivalence in Packer's own statements that it is the tendency of his own 
position too towards such quantitative measurement.865 However, Packer is still a clear 
and important witness for two propositions. First, he argues that penal substitution and 
limited atonement are the mainstream positions in the evangelical theological heritage, 
and indeed that the latter is the necessary consequence of the former. Second, Packer 
argues that equivalence follows from this doctrine of the atonement. 
In conclusion, Denney's taxonomy has been helpful in highlighting tliat the clearest and 
strongest statements of equivalence lie down Stream 1 (punishment is satisfaction) and 
down Line 1 (the legal/material). A further refinement I have introduced is that 
equivalence is clearest in theologians who hold to a limited atonement. 
If Annihilationists are not to abandon their doctrine of hell because of the reasons adduced 
in the first section above, they are committed to at least one of three courses of action, 
each of which raises further problems for evangelicals. First, annihilationists could argue 
that the doctrine of penal substitution is to be significantly changed or rejected. Clearly 
annihilationists have already rejected the traditional evangelical doctrine of hell, but to 
change or reject so central and widely held a doctrine for evangelicals as penal substitution 
would at least raise doubts for evangelicals assessing the doctrinal implications of 
Annihilationism, and µiight lead to its rejection. Second, annihilationists could argue that 
the theologians I have studied are wrong in their belief in a link between hell and the 
atonement. However in rejecting this link, Annihilationists are rejecting the conclusion of 
important theologians in the evangelical tradition. Harmon makes a similar point about 
the doctrine of hell itself, and in doing so highlights the importance of three of the 
theologians I have studied. 
864 Ibid., p. 26. 
865 Ibid., pp. 40-41, n. 43. 
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The great majority of the finest theologians in the church for the last twenty 
centuries have held to the traditional view ... This in itself is not definitive - the 
Scriptures are always the final court of appeal. But it does mean that if we are 
going to disagree with Augustine and Aquinas and Luther and Calvin and 
Edwards (to name only a few among so many) we need to have extremely strong 
grounds for doing so and the burden of proof is on those who wish to change the 
traditional doctrine. 866 
Further, it is difficult to see on what grounds annihilationists could reject the belief that 
equivalence is established by penal substitution. I will comment on this further after noting 
a third strategy. A third course of action is a combination of the two arguments above. 
Annihilationists could argue that equivalence is most strongly established on the basis of a 
doctrine of limited atonement, and that only this needs to be rejected rather than the 
broader doctrine of penal substitution. If this conclusion could be justified, it would indeed 
lessen this objection to Annihilationism based on equivalence, since limited atonement is 
not held by all evangelicals to be the necessary consequence of penal substitution, and 
therefore its rejection would not be as problematic. However problems remain. First, as 
Packer claims, limited atonement has a claim to be the inheritor of the mainstream 
reformation position to which evangelicals have a strong loyalty, and has been held by 
some of the greatest and most representative theologians in the evangelical tradition. 
Therefore the necessary rejection of limited atonement still raises doubts about 
Annihilationism and weakens its claim for many evangelicals. Second, and more 
significantly, equivalence is still usually believed to be established even where there is no 
definite espousal of limited atonement, or even where it is rejected as a consequence of 
penal substitution. Luther is an example of a theologian who argues for equivalence but 
doesn't espouse limited atonement. It is striking though that every evangelical in the recent 
literature who comments on the link assumes that equivalence is established, and only 
disagrees with others over the implications, although it is unlikely that they all hold to a 
doctrine of limited atonement. So even annihilationists who comment on the link assume 
that equivalence is established. Third, in development of this point that equivalence is 
established on the basis of penal substitution even if limited atonement is rejected, I would 
argue that the key distinctive element of Annihilationism, extinction, is not amenable to a 
weak link. In other words, Christ either suffered extin~tion or he did not. If he did not 
suffer extinction then it is very hard to see how he could be a penal substitute, since he did 
not suffer an essential and distinct part of the punishment due to sinners. Indeed it is the 
866 Harmon, Case, p. 200. 
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distinct part of the punishment of an annihilationist hell. The only option for 
annihilationists who don't want to abandon a doctrine of penal substitution is to argue that 
extinction is not penal, and therefore Christ did not have to suffer it. However, not only 
have I argued that extinction is penal, but also every annihilationist who comments on the 
issue argues that Christ did suffer extinction as well as torment. Therefore, although 
equivalence is more firmly established by limited atonement, it is nonetheless adequately 
established for this argument by the more general doctrine of penal substitution. 
Therefore I conclude that annihilationists cannot avoid unorthodox conclusions about 
the incarnation and resurrection unless they reject a doctrine of penal substitution. 
However, to reject the standard evangelical doctrine of the atonement would be 
considered a highly problematic consequence by annihilationists, and so I would expect 
that were these conclusions accepted as necessary they would change their doctrine of 
hell. 
4.4 Implications of Reconciliationism 
In this third section I will examine the link between the atonement and the modified 
Traditionalism which I have proposed in the previous chapters, and which I have termed 
Reconciliationism. In outline I want to argue that there is still equivalence between a 
reconciliationist hell and the cross with the consequence that annihilationists are forced 
to make the choice I have stated above. I also want to suggest that there may actually be 
a stronger equivalence between Reconciliationism and the atonement than between a 
classic traditionalist hell and even a doctrine of limited atonement, and thus if 
Reconciliationism is . accepted, the challenge to Annihilationism is even more firmly 
established. 
I will begin my discussion of the equivalence established by Reconciliationism by 
examining the discussion in the literature. Blocher does not address the issue at all and 
in the nineteenth century debate only Birks deals With it at any length, albeit more 
broadly, while Clarke is the only writer who addresses the issue of equivalence directly, 
albeit briefly. I will conclude that Birks and Clarke are unable to establish equivalence, 
although Clarke assumes that there is. I will then argue that my own development of 
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Blocher' s position has significant differences on this issue from that of Birks and Clarke 
which may lead to a closer equivalence not only than its nineteenth century forerunners, 
but also than classic Traditionalism. I will also suggest that there are some striking 
parallels between the experience of Christ as suggested by Reconciliationism and as 
described by writers such as McLeod Campbell who hold to a doctrine of the atonement 
sometimes termed 'vicarious repentance'. 
Turning first to Birks, he is not only the chief nineteenth century proponent of 
Reconciliationism, but he also writes more extensively on the atonement in the context 
of discussions of hell than any other Reconciliationist. Birks writes so extensively on the 
atonement because it is one of the arguments for Reconciliationism he rests the greatest 
weight on. He begins his Letter On Eternal Judgement with these words: "The doctrine 
of the Atonement is closely linked with the teaching of Scripture concerning the solemn 
truth of judgement to come."867 Birks argues that his doctrine of hell follows from a 
doctrine of a universal atonement. 
I plainly assume, as alike revealed, that Christ died for all, and that many souls 
do perish in sin. The question must arise: Has Christ in their case died wholly in 
vain? Is the sole object and result of His death to redouble and increase their 
perfect misery? The doctrine of particular redemption removes the difficulty, by 
affirming that Christ died only for the elect Church, and did not bear the sin of 
the whole world, but of believers alone. I have rejected this view, ... 868 
Birks answers his rhetorical questions in the negative and argues that the atonement did 
indeed gain benefit for the damned. In particular the death of Christ enabled the damned 
to avoid the hell of classic Traditionalism and only to suffer the modified hell of 
Reconciliationism. Birks notes that it is commonly agreed by traditionalists that the 
atonement gained something for the damned as well as the righteous, that is 
resurrection. He then goes further and argues that the atonement gained more than 
merely resurrection for the damned. Discussing the dilemma of Christ dying for all, but 
not all being saved, Candlish summarises Birks' position: 
The solution is to be found, it seems, in the distinction between the two deaths. It 
is assumed, that while, as a consequence of the atonement, the saved enjoy all 
spiritual and eternal good, the lost as well as they have the good of a present 
respite of forbearance and grace, a resurrection to judgement, and beyond that, 
the second death. The connection of the first of these with the atonement is 
867 Birks, Victory, p. 167. 
868 Ibid., p. 252. The doctrine of 'particular redemption' is the same as that of 'limited atonement'. 
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admitted by all. That of the second is denied by many of us. But the point is 
about the third: - the second death. 869 
So, Christ's death saved the damned from the first death, which Birks understood to be 
that of classic Traditionalism, and left them to suffer only the second death which he 
understood to be his reconciliationist hell. Candlish argues Birks holds that sin as debt is 
dealt with by the atonement, but sin as disease is only dealt with when there is 
repentance and faith. Again, more briefly, Candlish argues that Birks must hold that 
Christ died for sins, but not for sin, and concludes that the damned "are condemned in 
the judgment, not as breakers of the law, but as rejecters of the gospel."870 
Before turning to examine the issue of equivalence on Birks' position, I will first 
examine his doctrine of the atonement, over which there is a certain amount of 
disagreement. Birks clearly held both to a doctrine of penal substitution and a doctrine 
of universal, as opposed to limited, atonement in which Christ died for all. Birks 
describes his own position as "moderately Calvinistic, or, to speak more correctly, 
temperately Augustinian, in my views on theology"871 and repudiates the idea that he 
was an Arminian. However Candlish suggests that he was an Arminian, and Rowell 
judges that "there would seem to have been some justice in Candlish's suggestion that 
[Birks] was an Arminian despite Birks' repudiation of the idea. "872 The difference of 
opinion occurs, I suspect, because Birks holds a different understanding of the impact of 
the atonement on what he calls the first death (the classic traditionalist hell) and the 
second death (his reconciliationist hell). Thus the atonement actually gained some 
blessings for all people, saving them from the first death, but only the possibility of 
salvation from the second death. A further quote serves to clarify Birks' position. 
I do hold, indeed, that the sin of each, as a debt of guilt from the breach of 
perfect law, was cancelled on the cross ... But I do not hold that the present guilt 
of any one, in the rejection of grace and disbelief of God's promise, is cancelled 
until he repents and believes. 873 
Candlish also quotes an example used by Birks to illustrate his position: a friend may 
pay the debt of someone to have them released from prison, but that doesn't mean that 
he has also issued an invitation for them to join his family. 874 Therefore, as I argued in 
869 Birks, quoted by Candlish, op. cit., p. 6. 
87° Candlish, op. cit., p. 6. 
871 Birks, Atonement, p. 11. 
872 Rowell, op. cit., p. 124. 
873 Birks, Atonement, p. 21. 
874 Birks, Victory, p. 165, quoted by Candlish, op. cit., p. 5. 
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the previous chapter, it would also be inaccurate to call Birks a Universalist, although 
this was a charge that was sometimes made against him, since the atonement doesn't 
gain all the benefits of the righteous for the damned. 
I now tum to the question of what sort of equivalence Birks holds. Birks doesn't address 
the issue directly, but I want to argue that his position undermines any equivalence. As I 
have noted, Birks holds that the effect of the atonement is to save the damned from the 
torments of the first death, which are broadly the same as the classic traditionalist hell, 
and to translate them to the reconciled state of the second death, which is a mitigation of 
Traditionalism and yet less blessed than heaven. Therefore, on a penal substitutionary 
model, Christ must have suffered the torments of the first death in order to save the 
damned from them. Thus Christ suffered what the damned do not suffer, but rather what 
they would have suffered had he not died for them. This is identical to the logic all 
evangelicals would accept with respect to the lack of equivalence of the atonement and 
the righteous: Christ suffered what the blessed do not suffer. Thus Birks is unable to 
establish equivalence on these premises. 
If this conclusion is true for all reconciliationists, that they are unable to establish 
equivalence, then the charge I have made against Annihilationists in relation to the 
atonement is greatly weakened if one adopts this modified Traditionalism. However, I 
do not think th<1;t reconciliationists are required to draw this conclusion. Indeed, as I 
have suggested, I believe that Reconciliationism may actually establish a closer 
equivalence than classic Traditionalism. I will examine this issue of equivalence from 
three aspects. First I will note Birks' own alternative, and argue that this highlights the 
basic change that needs to be made to establish equivalence. Second, I will examine the 
only explicit statement about equivalence in the nineteenth century debate. Although 
Langton Clarke claims that there is equivalence, he doesn't provide any extended 
discussion, and his view of hell has some important differences from that of Blocher' s. 
So, third, I will argue that my own position based on Blocher offers some suggestive 
points of equivalence which may be even stronger tharl those of classic Traditionalism. 
So, first, I note that Birks himself recognises that his conclusion would change if he held 
what he calls 'a doctrine of particular redemption'. On this limited atonement position 
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Christ did not die for the damned, and therefore equivalence is re-established. What is 
uncertain is whether Birks thinks that he could abandon his doctrine of universal 
atonement, as he understands it, and still hold to his reconciliationist conclusions. 
Certainly Birks sees his doctrine of the atonement as a very important argument for his 
position, but it is not the only one, and I think that Birks would still hold his position 
with a different doctrine of the atonement. Indeed Reconciliationism is quite compatible 
with a doctrine of penal substitution and even limited atonement. Thus equivalence can 
be established if Christ's experience can be shown to be compatible with that of a 
reconciliationist hell, which I hope to suggest below. The main difference between 
Blocher's position and Birks' at this point is that the damned are not the beneficiaries of 
any additional mitigations as a result of the atonement as compared to the classic 
traditionalist position. The reason for the state of the damned on Blocher's 
understanding of a Reconciliation_ist hell is to do with justice rather than grace through 
the atoning work of Christ. Therefore this developed view of Reconciliationism sits 
easily with a doctrine of the atonement in which Christ's death gains no additional 
benefits for the damned, including limited atonement. Therefore, having suggested that 
limited atonement is understood in the tradition to lead to a stronger equivalence, I 
would argue that Reconciliationism can also establish such an equivalence with the 
conclusion that Annihilationism is still to be rejected. 
Second, another reconciliationist in the nineteenth century debate who takes a different 
view from Birks is Langton Clarke. Indeed, his is the only other argument based on a 
link with the atonement in the reconciliationist literature. His brief discussion 
foreshadows one of the annihilationist objections against Traditionalism from the 
atonement which I have noted above, which is that Christ could not have suffered a 
classic traditionalist hell on the cross. Clarke's response is to accept the same logic as 
that of recent annihilationists, but to argue for Reconciliationism rather than 
Annihilationism. Thus, 
20. If, as is the belief of the Catholic Church, our Lord took our punishments 
upon Himself, and suffered for us ("the just for the unjust") all that we should 
have had to suffer if unredeemed, how can He be said to have suffered our due 
and destined punishment, if that punishment consisted in hopeless and endless 
torment? Can it be for one moment contended for as conceivable, that His 
sufferings, intense as they were during His short life on earth, so infinitely 
exceeded all the torments of the damned, that they were equal to innumerable 
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millions of years in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone? If not, then He 
has not undergone our punishments; He has not taken upon Himself all the 
stripes that would have fallen on us. 875 
I would note a number of things from this paragraph. First, like Birks, Clarke holds a 
doctrine of penal substitution. Second, again like Birks, Clarke holds that the hell of 
Reconciliationism is a significant mitigation of the traditionalist view. This is the 
implication of his statement that Christ could not have suffered 'hopeless and endless 
torments' and therefore, by equivalence, neither do the damned. Third, unlike Birks, 
Clarke's argument rests on the assumption that there is an equivalence between the 
cross and hell. He states that this equivalence is 'the belief of the Catholic church'. This 
is a major difference between Clarke and Birks. Fourth, Clarke doesn't argue here that 
this mitigation of hell is itself an effect of the atonement. It is therefore likely that 
Clarke differs from Birks. Clarke is therefore an example of a writer who holds that 
reconciliation and equivalence can be maintained. However, Clarke suffers from two 
particular limitations with regards to my aim of establishing equivalence for 
Reconciliationism. First, in his brief discussion Clarke doesn't clarify his argument nor 
suggest in what ways Christ's experience on the cross is like that of the damned. 
Second, as I have touched on in the previous chapter, Clarke's understanding of the state 
of the damned in hell is significantly different from my own development of Blocher, in 
particular in his understanding of the continuation of choice for the damned and the 
possibility of translation to heaven. Therefore I will now seek to develop the argument 
for equivalence on the basis of Reconciliationism as I have defined it and to argue not 
only that equivalence can be established, but to suggest it may actually be stronger than 
classic Traditionalism. 
Blocher' s thesis, as I liave expounded and developed it, suggests that the damned in hell 
are not in a state of continuing rebellion against God. Rather their state can be described 
as having four features distinct from the classic traditionalist position, all but the first 
being closely related. First, the damned are fixed. Second, they don't continue to sin. 
Third, they are lucid, understanding and accepting the justice of their punishment. 
Fourth, since they accept the judgement of God, they are to that degree at least 
reconciled to God. Blocher does not explore the issue of equivalence, but I will 
875 Clarke, op. cit., p. 105. 
247 
comment on each of these four features, and suggest how they might relate to 
experience of Christ on the cross. 
First, fixity is the feature from which equivalence can least easily be established. 
However I have also argued that it is not an essential feature of Reconciliationism, and 
could be removed without rejecting the whole doctrine. Evidence for equivalence might 
be the silence and inactivity of Christ, along with the darkness, during his last three 
hours on the cross, which suggests an experience closer to that of fixed contemplation of 
the awfulness of sin and divine wrath than the raging and rebellion of the damned in a 
classic traditionalist hell. Further, as I suggested in chapter two, a reconciliationist hell 
can be understood as a finite punishment, since this would offer a response to the 
annihilationist objection that Christ could not suffer endless torment. However, it seems 
difficult to speculate on what Christ experienced on the cross with enough precision to 
adjudicate between these options, and while I have argued that Christ could not have 
experienced extinction, it is unclear whether a divine person could have experienced an 
infinite punishment, as Edwards argues above, or a state of fixity, understood either as 
temporal or a-temporal. I therefore conclude that Blocher's thesis offers no decisive 
conclusion on this related issue. 
The other three features of Blocher's position are all, I have argued, closely linked, and 
indeed overlap. Certainly Christ did not sin, and so there would seem to be closer 
equivalence with the damned in a reconciliationist hell than a classic traditionalist hell. 
However, perhaps the closer equivalence is found with the notions of lucidity and 
reconciliation. First, it is highly likely that Christ is fully lucid and realises the nature of 
the sin that has resulted in this punishment. While I have argued · that if lucidity is a 
moral attribute then there are limits to how much the damned can know of God and 
therefore the true nature and extent of their sin, nonetheless this is still much closer to 
the hell of Reconciliationism. It also likely that Christ is reconciled to his punishment in 
that he accepts its justice, and to have recognised the goodness or praiseworthiness of 
God, for to do otherwise would have been to sin: Again, this is much closer to 
~econciliationism than Traditionalism. 
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Perhaps the most striking parallels to the experience of the damned in a reconciliationist 
hell come from theologians who hold to a doctrine of the atonement sometimes termed 
'vicarious repentance'. Thus Denney quotes McLeod Campbell as to what Christ 
suffered: 
He [Christ] who so responds to the divine wrath against sin ... is necessarily 
receiving the full apprehension and realisation of that wrath, as well as of that 
sin against which it comes forth into His soul and spirit, into the bosom of the 
divine humanity, ... "876 Further, "by that perfect response in Amen to the mind of 
God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to 
divine justice which is its due, and could alone satisfy it. 877 
However, even if one doesn't hold to a doctrine of vicarious repentance, a proponent of 
penal substitution could still agree with these remarks. Indeed Packer argues that 
Denney does hold to the substance of the penal substitution position, despite disowning 
the name, and is thus a witness for precisely this argument. Packer writes, "It seems to 
me that these affirmations point straight to a way of formulating the penal substitution 
model which is ... inclusive of all that the concept means to those who embrace it. "878 In 
fact Denney actually uses 'penal' language at one point, albeit with careful qualification. 
[W]hile the agony and the Passion were not penal in the sense of coming upon 
Jesus through a bad conscience, or making Him the personal object of divine 
wrath, they were penal in the sense that in the dark hour He had to realise to the 
full the divine reaction against sin in the race in which He was incorporated, and 
that without doing so to the uttermost He could not have been the Redeemer of 
that race from sin, or the Reconciler of sinful men to God ... we see the events of 
Jesus' last hours ... as an experience in which He knew what it was to be appalled, 
in an agony, stricken and desolate ... 879 
Further, Packer believes that Denney is right to see the moral and personal nature of 
punishment, rather than merely the external and quantitative. And in this perception 
there would seem to be a stronger equivalence. 
In conclusion, I believe that I have shown that if annihilationists retain their doctrine of 
hell, and their understanding of equivalence between hell and the cross established by 
penal substitution, then they are required to draw unorthodox conclusions about the 
nature of the incarnation, in particular its cessation at Christ's death, and the 
876 Denney, op. cit., pp. 258-9 quoting John McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement, and its 
relation to remission of sins and eternal life (4th ed., London: Macmillan, 1873), pp. 117-9. 
877 Denney, op. cit., p. 259, quoting McLeod Campbell, op. cit., p. 119. 
878 Packer, Cross, p. 29. 
879 Denney, op. cit., p. 273. [Italics mine.] 
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resurrection. These conclusions are such that most evangelicals would believe them 
unacceptable. An alternative resolution of this problem would be to deny that there is 
such an equivalence between the experience of Christ and the damned based on penal 
substitution. However, I have argued that some of the theologians most influential for 
evangelicals in the tradition have held that precisely such an equivalence follows from 
penal substitution. Alternatively, annihilationists could reject penal substitution, but this 
would also be held by most to be an unacceptable option. Thus I believe that evangelical 
annihilationists face a trilemma. They must give up important elements of one of the 
following three doctrines: their doctrine of the incarnation/resurrection; their doctrine of 
penal substitution; or their doctrine of hell. However, since the first two doctrinal areas 
are not only better established in the tradition, but arguably more important, this 
trilemma serves as a strong incentive to re-examine Annihilationism. If there are other 
grounds for questioning Annihilationism, as I have suggested there are in this thesis, I 
would argue that this third doctrine would be the one to reject. Whether or not this is the 
course evangelical annihilationists take will depend ultimately on their being convinced 
from Scripture. But I believe that this thesis has served to show not only that their 
position is not as convincing as they have argued, but also that there is a more 
persuasive alternative doctrine. 
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Conclusion 
Evangelicalism is one of the few sections of the church which has retained a belief in 
the traditional doctrine of hell. Over the last twenty five years this doctrine has 
increasingly been criticised, largely from the perspective of Annihilationism which has 
rapidly become the leading alternative. However, there has been relatively little 
assessment of Annihilationism at the doctrinal level, both in terms of what the position 
itself entails, and also in terms of the criticisms it makes of Traditionalism. I have 
argued in chapters two and three that the chief doctrinal arguments in the literature, 
revolving around issues of justice and dualism, are not as successful as annihilationists 
claim, and that they have frequently overlooked the doctrinal implications of their own 
position, often because their position has not been clearly formulated. My most decisive 
criticisms of Annihilationism, though, come in chapter four where, on the basis of an 
equivalence of the cross and hell, I have argued that Annihilationism leads to 
unorthodox conclusions, and therefore should be rejected by evangelicals. 
However annihilationist arguments have served to highlight real weaknesses in the 
classic traditionalist position. This is most clearly the case with its dualism, due to the 
continued sin of the damned. Some of the resources for response lay within the very 
theological tradition which is being criticised, but they are elements that have not been 
brought into their proper place. Thus there is a recognition in the tradition that the 
damned are lucid, but this has been limited to the Last Judgment. The failure to maintain 
this in the hell of classic Traditionalism means that it is not a fully just, and therefore 
moral, punishment. However, building on the work of Blocher, I believe that this 
conception should be .understood as a permanent feature of the state of the damned in 
hell, along with the related notions of an end to sin and reconciliation. Therefore the 
damned come to fully recognise the justice, and horror, of their state. From this it 
follows that many common notions of and apologies for hell are to be rejected, 
including that the damned continue to hate God, or reject their judgment, or gain 'dark 
pleasures' or comfort from their continued rebellion, or that they prefer hell to heaven. 
Perhaps most significantly in the wider debate about hell, this leads to a rejection of any 
'free-will defence' of hell, where hell is justified because the damned choose to go 
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there. 880 I have argued that in one sense the damned do choose hell, but they do so 
because they recognise that it is their just punishment and as such is a good to be 
welcomed, rather than because they choose to live apart from God. I don't argue that 
Reconciliationism entirely resolves the problem of what I have called salvation dualism, 
but I do think that it offers a better resolution than both classic Traditionalism and also 
than Annihilationism since the damned have a greater good to fulfil than mere 
extinction in their glorification of the justice of God. 
The other main annihilationist argument in the literature is that the classic traditionalist 
hell is unjustly severe. Although I believe that a number of the annihilationist arguments 
are weak or confused, I am less confident of being able to offer steps to help resolve this 
issue as clearly as I believe I have offered steps towards the resolution of the problem of 
dualism. I have argued that although annihilationists believe hell to be an infinite 
punishment, it is actually best understood as a finite punishment with permanent 
consequences. Thus, if there is any justification to the argument for an infinite 
punishment, and I tend to think that there is, then Annihilationism should be rejected as 
unjustly lenient. However, it seems to me that Traditionalism may be unduly severe, and 
that some middle way should be sought. Therefore I have offered the notion of fixity as 
an alternative to be considered, and expounded it in such a way as it can be considered 
either as an infinite punishment that mitigates classic Traditionalism, or, less likely, as a 
finite punishment and thus even more of a mitigation. I am more confident that lucidity 
and reconciliation serve to change the severity of the punishment, and overall to 
mitigate it. In one sense I think that this makes the punishment more severe, since the 
damned can no longer evade the true nature of their sin, nor the true nature of their 
punishment, particularly the poena damni. Reconciliationism gets truth back into hell 
and serves to emphasise the personal nature of the punishment, making the punishment 
more truly moral and, insofar as it leads on to reconciliation, it may also establish a 
purpose for the punishment beyond simple retribution. I think that these features may 
well serve to reduce annihilationist objections, and, if I am right that Annihilationism is 
largely a reactive doctrine, to encourage annihilationists to reconsider a form of 
Traditionalism. Garratt states that his own form of Reconciliationism is basically 
880 One example from many is The Mystery of Salvation by The Doctrine Commission of the Church of 
England (London: Church House Publishing, 1995), especially p. 199. 
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Traditionalism stripped of human additions. "The Eternal Punishment of unforgiven 
sinners is a Scriptural doctrine, and it is best to defend it from the plausible objections 
which human additions to the teaching of God's Word have raised against it, by clearing 
them away."881 I believe that in arguing with Annihilationism I have come to just such a 
renewed understanding of the traditional doctrine. 
881 Garratt, Veins, op. cit., p. xvi. 
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Appendix: Reconciliationism - A Brief Historical Survey 
In this appendix I intend to give a brief historical survey of the modified form of 
Traditionalism which I have termed Reconciliationism. First, after a brief personal 
comment about how I came to discover this position, I will begin with a survey of the 
chief advocates of this position in the period 1850-1910, which is when the doctrine 
came to prominence and accounts for almost all the relevant writers. Second, I will note 
theologians who were regarded as forerunners of this position. Third, I will note critical 
response. Finally, I will note references to Reconciliationism since 1910. There is also a 
fair amount of material in the main thesis, which I will try not to duplicate. 
Reconciliationism as I have defined it in this thesis is that doctrine of the fate of the 
damned which teaches that they remain unendingly conscious in hell, but that they cease 
to sin and are in some sense reconciled to God without thereby experiencing the 
blessings of the saints in heaven. I have argued that it is best thought of as a modified 
form of Traditionalism, although the most common charge against it is that actually it 
collapses into a form of Universalism, and its advocates usually saw it as a distinct 
fourth doctrine of hell, as I will note below. 
1 A Personal Comment 
Before giving a more formal historical survey I would like to offer a brief personal 
comment about how I came to be aware of these writers. In my study of the recent 
evangelical debate about hell, I read an essay by Henri Blocher which offered some 
ways of modifying the traditional position so as to suggest to me ways of responding to 
the debate between traditionalists and annihilationists. I subsequently came to describe 
this position as Reconciliationism. However, Blocher didn't mention any previous 
advocates of this position, although he noted elements of the position in older writers 
such as Augustine. He therefore seemed to be unaware of any historical debate about his 
position. That there was an historic debate about a doctrine of hell, similar to that of 
Blocher' s, was opened up for me in various ways. First, in personal conversation in 
1992, Dr. Kendal Harmon mentioned that he noticed some similarities between the 
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position of Blocher and that of Langton Clarke. However, at the time I failed to make 
much of this comment, or to follow it up. Second, in his book on the doctrine of hell in 
the Victorian age, Geoffrey Rowell records and discuses the doctrine of hell held by 
T.R. Birks, one of the leading reconciliationist theologians. However, although Rowell 
records Birks' position, he neither gives Birks' position a name, nor sees Birks as part of 
a group of writers in that period advocating a distinct position. The only parallels to 
contemporary Victorian positions that Rowell notes are as follows: 
There is a strong echo here of Maurice's concept of the Kingdom of Christ, and, 
as E.H. Plumptre recognised, there are many affinities between the theology of 
Maurice and Birks. Plumptre went so far as to comment that The Victory of 
Divine Goodness 'in not a few passages ... presents so close a verbal identity 
with the language of Mr. Maurice's Theological Essays, that in a writer of 
inferior calibre it would suggest the thought of a literary plagiarism'. 882 He also 
pointed out the resemblance of Birks' teaching to that of some parts of E.H. 
Bickersteth's poem, Yesterday, Today and for Ever, published the year before 
The Victory of Divine Goodness. 883884 
However, I think that Birks held a distinctive position, and these claimed parallels are 
only partial. Third, Michael Paternoster offered some brief discussion of Birks, but 
again without noting any group of theologians holding a similar position. Fourth, the 
clearest and fullest bibliographical reference I have found comes at the end of H. 
Griffith Thomas work The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirty-Nine 
Articles. He gives, as the fourth of four views on hell, 
Another view which endeavours to harmonise the idea of everlasting punishment 
with the non-eternity of sin ... 11 He gives as bibliography II The Eternal Saviour-
Judge, by R.L. Clarke; Reason and Revelation ( chap. xii), by Illingworth; Sin, a 
Problem Today (the last pages), by J. Orr; World Without End, and Veins of Silver, 
by Garratt; and The Victory of Love, by T.R. Birks.885 
Although Thomas doesn't discuss these works, the value of the reference is not just that it 
is more comprehensive in terms of the number of theologians listed, but also because he 
lists it as a distinct doctrinal position alongside Traditionalism, Annihilationism and 
Universalism. Other references to this position and its advocates have been occasional and 
brief. 
882 E.H. Plumptre, The Spirits in Prison, 1884, p. 229. 
883 e.g. p. 232, where Satan and the lost souls acknowledge the righteousness of their punishment. 
884 Rowell, op. cit., p. 127. 
885 W.H. Griffith Thomas, The Principles of Christian Theology (5 th ed., London: Church Book Room Press, 
1956), p. 526. These bibliographical references were removed from subsequent editions. The correct initial 
for Langton Clarke is 'J' (for James) and not 'R' as Thomas records it. He may have confused him with 
Robert Lowes Clarke, another theologian of the time who had written on eschatological topics. 
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2 An Historical Survey 
2.1 Written Works, 1850-1910 
There are certain parallels between the context of the debate about hell amongst 
evangelicals at the end of the Twentieth Century, and that at the end of the Nineteenth 
Century. In both periods there was strong disagreement between traditionalists and . 
annihilationists. Garratt wrote in 1904, looking back to 1872, 
When I was writing this chapter there was rising a storm of controversy on the 
subject which divided men into various camps with none of which I found 
myself in agreement. Those varying opinions are still strongly held. I agreed with 
none of them then, and I agree with none of them now. 886 
Another statement, also with parallels today, and written in 1904, comes from the pen of 
Langton Clarke. 
My own belief is that the clergy generally, even those who would formally give 
their adhesion to what is known as the orthodox doctrine [i.e. Traditionalism], 
avoid the subject as far as possible, because they feel so uncertain what the true 
nature of Eternal Judgement is, and are at least doubtful whether the ordinary 
presentation of the doctrine is the true one. 887 
The leading advocate of Reconciliationism was Thomas Rawson Birks. This is indicated 
in several ways. Not only was he held to be an able scholar (I have noted assessments in 
the main thesis), but he is the writer most often quoted and referred to by theological 
friend and critic alike. Samuel Garratt, a clergyman and Honorary Canon of Norwich, 
writes of the influence of Birks, while also indicating the lack of advocates of 
Reconciliationism. In the Preface to the 1904 edition of Veins of Silver Garratt states "I 
am painfully conscious of being in this matter unable to refer to any modem writers."888 
On the next page though he qualifies this statement: 
... even in our own day there has been one well-known Theologian, the late 
Professor Birks, to whom I alluded in the Preface to my First Edition, whose 
cordial agreement I then hoped for, and afterwards knew that I really possessed. 
There were no doubt others, but there was an astonishing reticence. 889 
In that 'Preface to the First Edition', Garratt notes the influence of Birks on his own 
views. "Some of the views here expressed I have long held. Of others the seed has been 
886 G r,, . .. arratt, Y ems, p. v11. 
887 Clarke, op. cit., p. 4. 
888 G y . .. arratt, ems, p. vu. 
889 lb'd ... l ., p. Vlll. 
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derived from Professor Birks. "890 He speaks of "the use I have made of his suggestive 
hints;"891 and concludes, 
nor do I wish myself to express agreement with every phrase or argument in The 
Victory of Divine Goodness, which, nevertheless, as a whole, is a book for 
which, especially in relation to the subject of Eternal Punishment, the Church 
has, in my opinion, much reason to be grateful to him and thankful to God. 892 
Garratt again notes the significance of Birks in his later book World Without End, in 
which he lists a series of recent writers on the subject of divine judgement, and notes 
last of all, "Birks (with the last of whom alone I am myself in substantial 
agreement); ... "893 It is unclear from these comments just how great a debt Garratt owes 
to Birks for his views, and how much these views developed independently. It may also 
be that part of Birks' influence was that he was also the first author to be published on 
this doctrine. However, this feature of the independent discovery of this doctrine which 
Garratt records is shared with others, including Birks himself. 
Birks suggests that his view came by independent study without any major prior 
influences. He dates his discovery and acceptance of this fourth view to 183 7. In his 
work, Replies to Recent Strictures, published in 1870 along with the second edition of 
The Victory of Divine Goodness, Birks offers the following chronological account of the 
development of his own thought. 
The chief thoughts on Future Judgement, first published in this work, were 
unfolded to me abut thirty-three years ago [1837], in the course of earnest and 
continual study of the Word of God. Expression in writing was first given to 
them, ten years ago, in my letter [1860], 894 ... The state of the Church, viewed in 
the light of Prophecy, concurring with other reasons, made me feel it a duty, 
three years ago, to print them in their original form ... 895 
In the Preface to The Victory of Divine Goodness, he makes similar chronological 
statements896 He also adds that "It is one [subject] on which my own thoughts were 
sorely, deeply, and continuously exercised more than 30 years ago."897 A similarly 
independent route to a form of Reconciliationism seems to have been taken by a later 
advocate, Langton Clarke, who was Professor of Divinity at Durham University when 
890 'b'd ... .1., l ., p. Xlll. 
891 lb"d ... l ., p. Xlll. 
892 Ibid., p. xiii. [Italics original] 
893 Garratt, World, p. xi. 
894 Birks, Victory. 
895 Birks, Victory, pp. 254-255. 
896 'b'd . .1., l ., pp. V-Vl. 
897 'b'd .1., l ., p. X. 
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he wrote his major work on the subject, The Eternal Saviour Judge. 898 This significance 
of Birks is also highlighted not just by references in other proponents, but also by the 
fact that the only works of refutation I have found were all directed against Birks. These 
critics included Bevan, Baxter and, most prominently, Dr. Candlish. There are two other 
advocates of this position that Thomas mentions: James Orr, an influential conservative 
theologian who taught at the United Free Church College in Glasgow from 1900 to 
1913; and Dr J .R. Illingworth who is perhaps best known for his two chapters in Lux 
Mundi. 
Reconciliationism was understood by all its nineteenth century advocates more as an 
alternative to Traditionalism than a modification of it. Clarke uses the terminology of 
"A fourth view." The title of his third chapter is "A Fourth View Possible." Of this view 
Clarke writes, "nevertheless a fourth view seems possible, which has ' slowly grown up 
in my mind on the basis of the Eternal Saviour-Judgeship of Christ, and this view may 
be called by the name of reconciliation. "899 Later Clarke notes that this terminology is 
used by Edersheim in his Appendix to his Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah on the 
question of everlasting punishment. Edersheim writes 
It is at least conceivable that there may be a quartum quid (i.e. a fourth) [ view of 
hell] - that there may be a purification or transformation (sit venia verbis) of all 
who are capable of such ... and in connection with this, we note that there is 
quite a series of Scripture statements, which teach alike the final reign of God, 
and the final putting of all things under Christ, and all this in connection with the 
blessed fact that Christ has 'tasted death for every man,' that the world through 
Him might be saved, and that He was to 'draw all men unto Himself.' 900 
Clarke also so describes Illingworth' s position, which he addresses in an Appendix. 
DR. ILLINGWORTH ("Reason and Revelation," p.228ff.), although he says 
that, broadly speaking, Christian opinion is exhaustively represented by the three 
views ... yet, in speaking of the doctrine of everlasting punishment, makes some 
remarks on its possible compatibility with reconciliation to God, which amount 
to a fourth view, and one which contains several important features of a doctrine 
of reconciliation.901 
898 Cl k . ar e, op. cit .. 
899 Ibid., p. 85. [Italics original] 
900 A. Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, Appendix IX., vol. ii., p. 795, quoted by 
Clarke, op. cit., pp. 91-92. 
901 Ibid., p. 345. [Italics mine]. 
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2.2 Forerunners of Reconciliationism, pre-1850 
No advocate ofReconciliationism argues that it was ever common in any past period of 
the Church. Indeed none even mention a previous theologian as a clear advocate. The most 
that is claimed is that some aspect of a past theologians thought would support 
Reconciliationism. The rarity of this position in the history of doctrine is suggested, for 
example, by Garratt who emphasises the novelty of this view. Referring particularly to 
the notion that punishment does not harden the damned, he writes, 
The consequences I have pointed out have never actually flowed from the 
traditional doctrine handed down to us in unsystematic utterances from an early 
period in the West, though not in the East where a healthier tone on this subject 
.1 d 902 prevai e , ... 
A similar point is made more forthrightly by one of Birks' critics, a Mr. Grant, who judged 
that Birks' book contained "views unlike any he had elsewhere met with, ... 11903 However 
Clarke seems to suggest that the doctrine of reconciliation may be closer to the view of 
the early church, when he quotes Gladstone who concludes that "none of the above three 
principal forms of eschatological opinion, which at the present day actively compete for 
the assent of believers in Christianity, altogether correspond with the sense of the early 
Christian church. "904 Garratt can also be more positive about patristic support. 
I am painfully conscious of being in this matter unable to refer to any modem 
writers [ although in the same Preface he notes agreement with Birks]; but in the 
days of the best of the Christian Fathers, before Apostasy had ripened, and while 
Christian men still built their faith on Scripture, there were men like Gregory of 
Nazianzum and Gregory of Nyssa with whom on this point I am in accord; ... 905 
In World Without End, he notes the same precedent for the purifying purpose of the 
judgement of hell in Gregory of Nyssa. "Denials there are also of any purifying purpose, 
in which they differ from Gregory of Nyssa, and are, as I think, at variance with 
Scripture."906 A little later, Garratt claimed Gregory of Nyssa argued for an end to 
rebellion. 
Christ will not lay down His mediatorial kingdom till this work has been 
accomplished, and there remains not one rebel throughout the universe of God. 
902 Garratt, World, p. 252. 
903 Mr. Grant, Religious Tendencies of the Times, vol. 2, p. 205. 
904 Clarke, op. cit., p.85, note 1, quoting Gladstone's Studies on Butler, p. 208. The three principle forms 
referred to are what I have termed Traditionalism, Annihilationisrn and Universalism. 
905 Garratt, Veins, p. viii. 
906 Garratt, World, p. 206. 
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This is no new interpretation of the text. It is dwelt upon by Gregory of 
N 907 yssa, ... 
Clarke's view of Gregory is rather different though when he writes of"the great Gregory 
of Nyssa, who taught Universalism in an extreme form, ... "908 In a footnote, Garratt says 
that Augustine also held that there might be mercy shown in hell. "in [Enchiridion] cap. 
Cxii. St. Augustine seems to me to lean to a much truer view than that of the 
Schoolmen, and admits that it is possible that in everlasting punishment God may show 
mercy.909 
Birks goes even further back and claims to find a foundation in Plato: 
It is a deep thought of Plato in his Dialogues, that just as a sick man resorts to 
the physician, so wicked men, if they were wise, and knew what was really good, 
would offer themselves up, of their own accord, to undergo the punishment 
which is the only fit medicine for their inward disease. This truth will apply even 
to the last act of solemn judgement. Compared with the awful wages of sin, left 
without redemption, of death without resurrection, of corruption working ever 
without restraint, and evil triumphing for ever, and tormenting itself for ever, in 
its own abyss of darkness, even the second death with all its terrors may be, not 
only in the sight of a holy God, but even in the consciousness of the lost 
themselves, an infinite gain.910 
Blocher offers a fuller range of theological precursors for his slightly different position, 
which I have noted in the main thesis. 
Before turning to writing which continued this position post-1910 I will also note the 
answers to two questions given by the writers in the period on which I am focusing. First, 
why it was that Traditionalism developed rather than Reconciliationism as the mainstream 
doctrine? Second, why is it that the doctrine of reconciliation had now come to the fore, or 
even been discovered for the first time? In answer to the first question Illingworth 
observed: 
Holding that everlasting punishment was implied in the New Testament, men 
have gone on io infer that this would involve everlasting impenitence - the 
perpetuity of sinful will, with all the speculative difficulty that such a notion 
creates. 911 
Birks argues from a doctrine of reserve, by which I mean the idea that any doctrine of hell 
which mitigates the severity of the classic traditionalist one is liable to weaken the 
incentives to moral behaviour in society, and so should ?nly be revealed as necessary. 
907 Ibid., p. 226. 
908 Clarke, op. cit., p. 97. 
909 Garratt, World, p. 205, n. 1. 
910 Birks, Victory, pp. 170-171. 
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However, he doesn't use it to argue that Reconciliationism has long been held but not 
revealed, but simply that it shouldn't be widely disseminated in his own day.912 In answer 
to the second question as to why only now Reconciliationism has come to the fore, Birks 
argues against the background of a prophetic schema which understands that new doctrinal 
truth from the Scriptures will be revealed as the end of the world approaches.913 
2.3 Reconciliationism Since 1910 
I have found no works clearly advocating a position which could be termed 
Reconciliationism since 1910, with the one exception of Henri Blocher, who doesn't refer 
to the Nineteenth Century proponents at all, and thus may be unaware of these earlier 
advocates. I have noted other traditionalist writers in the main thesis, such as Helm, who 
have suggested elements of the position but do not distinguish themselves from classic 
Traditionalism. Thus my conclusion remains that this is an unusual position in the history 
of doctrine. The only three references to this position I have found in writing post-1910 are 
those I have already mentioned: Griffith Thomas, who is the only writer in this period to 
present it as a clear and distinct alternative to the existing eschatological positions; 
Michael Paternoster; Geoffrey Rowell; Don Carson; Jan Bonda; and Earle Ellis. 
2.4 Critical Engagement, 1850-1910 
There are three main written critical responses on Birks. (There are no commentaries I 
have found on any other advocates, which again serves to highlight the importance of 
Birks.) Birks notes each of these traditionalist critics. "The first mover in this attack 
[Mr. Grant] ... The second exposition of orthodoxy by my chief assailant (God's 
Purpose in Judgement) [Mr Baxter] ... [and] Dr. Candlish, ... "911 In his Reply to Recent 
Strictures, Birks responds to the first two of these works, and gives more details about 
them. 
I now pass on to review the objections which, during the present year, have been 
brought against [Birks' views] These are found in the second volume of Mr. 
Grant's "Religious Tendencies of the Times," and a smaller work of Mr. Baxter, 
91 1 Illingworth, op. cit., p. 232. 
912 See Birks, Victory, pp. 45-47; pp. 173-174; Garratt, World, pp. 227-229. 
913 See Birks, Victory, pp. 174-175. 
914 Ibid., pp. 62-65. 
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called, "God's Purpose in Judgement." Both of these may have gained a wider 
influence, at least among Evangelical Churchman, from the highly flattering 
notices they have received from their reviewer in the Record, who has made 
himself a public partner in all the severest charges against myself and the 
statements of the previous work . .. The second volume of Mr. Grant's "Religious 
Tendencies of the Times" contains fifty pages in which I am concerned, ... 915 
Rowell briefly fills in a little of the historical background, and comments that "The 
attack (to have Birks expelled from the Evangelical Alliance] was led by a solicitor, R. 
Baxter, ... " 916 Rowell also mentions The Religious Tendencies of our Time by James 
Grant who was editor of the Morning Advertiser, following his receipt of an account of 
Birks' views from R.C.L. Bevan, Treasurer to the Evangelical Alliance.917 However the 
most able critic is Dr. Candlish who delivered his comments in his introductory lecture 
at the opening of the Session of the Free Church of Scotland, at New College, 
Edinburgh, in 1869, subsequently published as a pamphlet the following year. Birks 
responded to Dr. Candlish in a lengthy pamphlet of his own, published the same year, 
entitled, The Atonement and the Judgement: A Reply to Dr. Candlish 's Inaugural 
Lecture; with a Brief Statement of Facts in Connection with the Evangelical Alliance. 
3 Conclusion 
I conclude by drawing together some observations. First, the only advocates of 
Reconciliationism come in the period 1850-1910, with the sole exception of Blocher. 
However Blocher does not note any of these earlier theologians in his writings on hell. 
Second, although these theologians show some knowledge of each other, there never 
developed a clear group advocating this position. A sign of this is that I have found only 
one reference since 1910 to Reconciliationism as a distinct doctrinal alternative to 
Traditionalism, Anni~ilationism and Universalism, in Griffith Thomas' bibliography. 
Third, there are a significant number of variations between writers, which I have noted in 
the main thesis, and thus no standard presentation of the doctrine. This may in part be due 
to the fact that chief advocates state or imply that they came by their views through largely 
independent study, while noting some debts to other writers, particularly Birks, who is the 
earliest and most influential advocate. 
915 Ibid., p. 213. 
916 Rowell, op. cit., p. 127. 
917 Ibid., pp. 127-8. 
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These conclusions suggest some further thoughts. First, despite the advocacy of several 
notable theologians, the doctrine of reconciliation did not gain any widespread acceptance. 
Garratt concludes his Preface to his First Edition of Veins of Sliver, written in 1872, and 
retained in the third edition of 1904, with these optimistic words "[W]hile I do not 
expect that all will at once receive as truth what is here taught, I have the full conviction 
that not many years will elapse before Christian men will wonder that it could ever have 
been doubted."918 However, Garratt's expectation did not prove to be correct. It might 
therefore be argued that the theory was tested, and found wanting. However, it may be 
that there never developed much momentum to hone and develop the position, and thus it 
may be that there is still a useful job of advocacy to be done based on a careful exposition 
and clarification of the position, with its several variants. Such a clarified and, hopefully, 
strengthened presentation, may generate more interest amongst theologians, and Garratt' s 
conviction may yet have a partial fulfilment. Second, the recent debate about hell has 
almost entirely overlooked this position as an alternative. It may therefore be of value to 
continue Blocher' s work and to place it in the context of the terminology and issues of the 
recent debate. 
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